Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report
(TOSIR) No. 335
12 June 2008

Contents

HYPERLINK \l "Item1" Article 1 “Win the War? Yes, We Can!” By Matthew Continetti for the Editors, Weekly Standard, 9 June 2008. Don’t look now, but evidence of progress in the war on terror is just about everywhere. What once seemed a war between jihadists and the West is now a war between jihadists and Muslims who reject terrorism. The left’s analysis of jihadism has been proved incorrect at every turn. Among others, the left argues that a “war on terrorism” is futile, that defeat is inevitable, because terrorism is a “tactic,” not an enemy. Nonsense. President Bush has demonstrated through perseverance and (more often than not) sound policy that the war on terror can be won. And right now we’re winning it.

HYPERLINK \l "Item2" Article 2 “Al-Qaeda Chief Dies in Missile Air Strike: The Death of a Senior Militant in a Controversial Hit Has Led to Claims of the Terror Group’s Defeat,” by Jason Burke, Observer (United Kingdom), 1 June 2008. The death two weeks ago of Abu Suleiman al-Jazairi, a highly experienced Algerian militant, has been confirmed in the last few days. Al-Jazairi died along with at least 15 others when the house in which he was staying in Pakistan was hit by a missile fired from a Predator, an American pilotless drone. The death of al-Jazairi was cited by CIA chief Michael Hayden last week as one of the reasons for the “strategic defeat” of Al-Qaeda. However, the CIA chief’s upbeat assessment contrasts with collective thinking in the intelligence community in America and elsewhere. Still, senior figures within American intelligence have also been struck by the failure of Al-Qaeda to mobilize broad support in the Islamic world, and have begun to think more optimistically about the future.

HYPERLINK \l "Item3"Article 3 “The Newest Trends in Terror,” by Peter Brookes, New York Post, 3 June 2008. CIA Director Michael Hayden recently said Al-Qaeda movements in Iraq and Saudi Arabia were essentially defeated and pushed back on their heels elsewhere, including in Pakistan. Some doubt that take on Pakistan, yet the other anti-terror gains seem undeniable. The blood and sweat of brave Americans—plus international cooperation—have brought great strides in tackling terrorism. But this is no time to rest on our laurels. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates continue to adapt their means and methods to our security measures—meaning we must evolve to the twists and turns in their terror tactics.

HYPERLINK \l "Item4"Article 4 “How to Measure Al-Qaeda’s Defeat,” by Walid Phares, Counterterrorism Blog,
4 June 2008. On 30 May 2008, CIA Director Michael Hayden was quoted as portraying the Al-Qaeda movement as “essentially defeated in Iraq and Saudi Arabia and on the defensive throughout much of the rest of the world, including in its presumed haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.” These powerful declarations prompted a series of reactions and debates both in political and counterterrorism circles, causing loud media discussions. The main but simple question of interest to the public, and subsequently to voters in the United States and other democracies, is this: Is Al-Qaeda being defeated? Several parameters are proposed in an effort to better answer this complex question. Either way the public is told that we have won this round against Al-Qaeda but it should be informed of what it would take to reach final victory in this global conflict.

HYPERLINK \l "Item5"Article 5 “Rumors of Al-Qaeda’s Death May Be Highly Exaggerated,” by Michael Scheuer, Terrorism Focus, Vol. 6, No. 21, 3 June 2008. Two articles recently published by U.S. terrorism experts asserted that Osama bin Laden’s group is increasingly isolated in the Islamic world and alienated from Muslims because of criticisms and theological challenges authored by repentant Islamic scholars. The contention that there is a fierce debate occurring between and among Al-Qaeda leaders and theoreticians and other Islamists is true enough, but hardly new. What is unusual in the current round of argument is that: [a] It is more public than usual; and [b] many heretofore credible Western analysts are indulging in wishful thinking and giving great credence to the words of Al-Qaeda critics, even though the two sources they most often and most fully cite are of rather doubtful credibility. In fact, the theological challenges presented change nothing in regard to the fundamental motivation of Al-Qaeda and its allies—the impact of U.S. and Western policies in the Muslim world; the presence of U.S. and Western military forces in the Arab region; and U.S. and Western support for tyrannical Arab regimes. As long as this status quo lasts, Al-Qaeda and its allies will continue fighting and their efforts will continue to win broad and probably increasing public support, or at least acquiescence.

HYPERLINK \l "Item6"Article 6 “Terrorism—A Radical New Strategy: Kill Fewer Muslims,” Economist (United Kingdom), 5 June 2008. There is no denying that Al-Qaeda has damaged its own cause by killing so many Muslims. And yet the impact of this on global terrorism may, alas, be small. Al-Qaeda has compensated for its strategic setback in Iraq by creating a sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan. As for its ideological problems, these may well be outweighed by the continuing current of anti-Americanism in the Islamic world. Besides, the organization has a simple remedy. It just needs to kill more Westerners and fewer Muslims. For this it does not have to attract millions of people to its cause: a small number of disaffected souls in the right places is all it takes.

The Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR) has been published weekly since January 2002 by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com). TOSIR issues are intended for non-profit research and educational use only. Quoted material is subject to the copyright protections associated with the original sources.

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Articles

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1. “Win the War? Yes, We Can!” By Matthew Continetti for the Editors, Weekly Standard, 9 June 2008 (http://www.weeklystandard.com). [KBTWSummary, KBTQOverview] We quote:

Don’t look now, but evidence of progress in the war on terror is just about everywhere. Last week CIA director Michael Hayden noted some U.S. accomplishments for the Washington Post: “Near strategic defeat of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Near strategic defeat for Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Significant setbacks for Al-Qaeda globally.” USA Today: Attacks in Iraq are “down 70 percent since President Bush ordered a U.S. troop increase, or ‘surge,’ early last year.”

The New Yorker’s Lawrence Wright devoted a long essay to Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, onetime mentor to Ayman al-Zawahiri, who now criticizes his former protégé and Osama bin Laden and suggests they be put on trial. In the New Republic, Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank told the story of Sheikh Salman al-Awdah, author of an open letter attacking bin Laden and violent jihad that has caused shockwaves across the Muslim world.

The sheikhs of Anbar province in Iraq lead a national, trans-sectarian movement preparing for provincial elections by the end of the year. Polling shows a widespread decline in support among Muslims for suicide bombing and for bin Laden. Fareed Zakaria observed that the number of Islamist attacks worldwide has declined precipitously since 2004.

[War on terror now between jihadists and Muslims who reject terrorism]

How did this happen? It is partly due to Muslim outrage at Al-Qaeda’s killing of its coreligionists. It is partly due to Muslim rejection of Al-Qaeda’s malign interpretation of Islam. For these reasons, Bergen and Cruickshank wrote that “encoded in the DNA of apocalyptic jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda are the seeds of their own long-term destruction.”

True. But such seeds must be sown, watered, and tended. Read the authors mentioned above, and you would think that Al-Qaeda’s troubles sprung up overnight. They did not. Its troubles cannot be separated from U.S. counterterrorism policy. From President Bush’s policy.

After 9/11, the president mobilized all forms of American power against bin Laden and his global jihadist movement. The constant pressure—cutting off the movement’s funding, bringing down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, hunting down jihadist affiliates in the Philippines and the Horn of Africa, and spying on the terrorists’ global communications—put the enemy on the defensive for the first time.

Then the president denied the jihadists an ally by removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Bin Laden declared Iraq the “central front” of his war against the West, and the Sunni insurgency helped Al-Qaeda in Iraq gain a foothold there. Bush changed strategy last year, sending reinforcements to Iraq and ordering General David Petraeus to secure the country’s population. The results have been dramatic. By the time the first reinforcements arrived in Iraq, the Anbaris were already turning against Al-Qaeda. The Americans helped to almost completely eliminate the group in Anbar. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is on the run. It has been denied its strategic goal of establishing an Islamic State of Iraq. Its black flag flies no more there.

What once seemed a war between jihadists and the West is now a war between jihadists and Muslims who reject terrorism. Bin Laden is close to losing this fight on his central front. Al-Qaeda is no longer the attractive “strong horse” of bin Laden’s December 2001 metaphor. It is that fact, more than any other, that accounts for his movement’s current disarray.

[President Bush has demonstrated through perseverance, sound policy war can be won]

But a global war has many fronts. Progress in one battle is often accompanied by setbacks in another. Al-Qaeda may be on the brink of defeat, but its leadership maintains a safe haven along Pakistan’s northwest frontier. In Afghanistan, coalition forces continue to fight Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other agents of state failure.

Meanwhile, the Iranian theocracy moves steadily forward in its quest for nuclear weapons. Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Gaza, and Lebanon commit murder in the pursuit of illiberal ends. A disturbing number of European Muslims are sympathetic to the jihadists and are a potential source of fresh recruits. And a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq would erase all of the progress that has been made in the last year and a half. A precipitous withdrawal would provide aid and comfort to Al-Qaeda.

The left’s analysis of jihadism has been proved incorrect at every turn.

It argued military power would be ineffective against the terrorists. Wrong.

It argued that intervention in Iraq would energize bin Laden’s movement. That movement is in shambles.

The left argued Iraq was a lost cause. It isn’t.

The left argues that a “war on terrorism” is futile, that defeat is inevitable, because terrorism is a “tactic,” not an enemy. Nonsense.

President Bush has demonstrated through perseverance and (more often than not) sound policy that the war on terror can be won. And right now we’re winning it.

TOSIR Note: CIA Director Michael V. Hayden’s comments about Al-Qaeda mentioned above, and in other articles in this TOSIR No. 335, appeared in the article entitled “U.S. Cites Big Gains against Al-Qaeda: Group Is Facing Setbacks Globally, CIA Chief Says,” by Joby Warrick, Washington Post, 30 May 2008. Our excerpts of that article led off the previous issue of the TOSIR, No. 334, 5 June 2008.

The foregoing is Article No. 1 (TR335A01) in the Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR), No. 335, 12 June 2008, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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2. “Al-Qaeda Chief Dies in Missile Air Strike: The Death of a Senior Militant in a Controversial Hit Has Led to Claims of the Terror Group’s Defeat,” by Jason Burke, Observer (United Kingdom), 1 June 2008 (http://www.observer.co.uk). [KBTWSummary, KBTQOverview, KBTQLeadership] We quote:

An Al-Qaeda trainer and explosives specialist involved in a range of European terrorist networks has been killed in Pakistan, the latest senior militant to die in a spate of controversial American missile strikes.

The death two weeks ago of Abu Suleiman al-Jazairi, a highly experienced Algerian militant, has been confirmed only in the last few days, intelligence sources in Pakistan and Western Europe told the Observer. Al-Jazairi, thought to have been 45, died along with at least 15 others when the house in which he was staying in Pakistan’s Bajaur tribal district was hit by a missile fired from a Predator, an American pilotless drone.

[CIA chief’s upbeat assessment contrasts with collective thinking in intelligence community]

Details are only now emerging about the strike on Damadola, a village near the Afghan-Pakistan border hit twice in the past. The house targeted and destroyed by the drone is believed to belong to a former Afghan Taliban defense minister, Maulvi Obaidullah, members of whose family, including women and children, are thought to have died. The surrounding area is in the hands of militants linked to the Pakistan Taliban militant group who have been blamed for the killing of Benazir Bhutto last year.

The death of al-Jazairi, thought to have been director of external operations for Al-Qaeda and thus responsible for running the terrorist group’s European and British networks, was cited by CIA chief Michael Hayden last week as one of the reasons for the “strategic defeat” of Al-Qaeda. Another top militant, Abu Laith al-Libi, was killed in February.

“The ability to kill and capture key members of Al-Qaeda continues, and keeps them off balance—even in their best safe haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border,” Hayden said. Hayden added that Al-Qaeda had been defeated in Saudi Arabia, was losing the battle for hearts and minds in the Islamic world, and was now unable to exploit the Iraq war to draw in new recruits.

However, the CIA chief’s upbeat assessment contrasts with collective thinking in the intelligence community in America and elsewhere. Senior counterterrorist officials in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia in recent weeks revealed profound concern about the potential use of weapons of mass destruction by militants and the continued attraction of the Al-Qaeda ideology for second or third generation immigrants and converts in the West.

[Disputes, defections within Al-Qaeda leading some analysts to more optimistic conclusions]

Britain, with its close links to Pakistan, is in a particularly vulnerable position. “It is certain that mainstream hard-core Al-Qaeda have suffered considerable setbacks—in Iraq certainly and elsewhere—but I think generally there is a lot more caution,” said Nigel Inkster, recently retired deputy head of MI-6. “It would only take a couple of attacks for the positive perception to radically change.”

Bruce Hoffman, terrorism expert at Georgetown University, said Hayden’s comments needed to be seen in the context of American domestic politics. “In an election year with a two-term administration that is very sensitive to its historical record this is not unexpected,” he told the Observer. “Al-Qaeda may not have had a successful attack in three years but it is too early to declare victory.”

Hoffman said that the danger this year was in fact high. “People do not join a terrorist group to sit on their hands and if [Al-Qaeda] are going to retain their relevance it is now or never.” Yet senior figures within American intelligence have also been struck by the failure of Al-Qaeda to mobilize broad support in the Islamic world, and have begun to think more optimistically about the future.

Security services have closely followed disputes and defections in recent months. Vicious feuding has led some analysts to conclude that the Islamic militant movement is turning in on itself with Al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri increasingly isolated. Postings by al-Zawahiri in a question and answer session on the Internet a month ago had a defensive tone, seeking to justify civilian casualties in militant attacks. The strategy is seen as a failure by many militants outside Al-Qaeda and by some within the group.

The foregoing is Article No. 2 (TR335A02) in the Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR), No. 335, 12 June 2008, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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3. “The Newest Trends in Terror,” by Peter Brookes, New York Post, 3 June 2008 [KBTWSummary, KBTQOverview] Peter Brookes, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, is a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. We quote from this item from http://www.nypost.com:

. . . [CIA Director] Michael Hayden last week told the Washington Post that Al-Qaeda movements in Iraq and Saudi Arabia were essentially defeated and pushed back on their heels elsewhere, including Pakistan. Some doubt that take on Pakistan, especially with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri still on the loose. Yet the other anti-terror gains seem undeniable. But the bad guys could bounce back. Consider some trends that worry U.S. planners.

[Experts believe Internet radicalization is replacing in-person radicalization]

. . . Al-Qaeda’s Internet propaganda machine is working overtime to spread its extremist message, looking for recruits and funding, and pushing terrorist acts to overcome its setbacks on the ground in places like Iraq. Terror groups prize the Web, releasing a torrent of products—from print manifestos to online terror encyclopedias to videos—for digestion by their supporters around the world.

Al-Qaeda’s online mouthpiece is a media production entity called As-Sahab (“the clouds”). Using that and other outlets to push the party line of violence and hate, the terror groups seek to win support from sympathetic audiences and to project an image of power and prestige. Indeed, Zawahiri wrote: “We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media . . . a race for the hearts and minds of our people.”

This isn’t amateurish stuff. These outlets are feverishly improving their quality—and achieving ever more impressive message conformity, a key to propaganda warfare. They’re targeting younger audiences and women—and translating their extremist screeds into other languages, especially English. Production levels are at all-time highs, say analysts.

Experts believe Internet radicalization is replacing in-person radicalization in terror camps, tea houses, or mosques. The Web lets Al-Qaeda & Co. build ties with the sympathetic, radicalize those on the margins—and offer training and expertise to the converted. All without a trip to a terror camp—a “virtual safe haven.”

[Homegrown, self-radicalized “lone wolf” terrorists particularly worrying for FBI]

. . . Al-Qaeda has long sought to recruit operatives already in-place in the West—foot soldiers who don’t need passports or transportation to slaughter innocents here. Europe has a real problem. [CIA Director] Hayden told Congress this year of an “influx of Western recruits” into Pakistan since 2006, which suggests rising radicalizing across the Pond. Homegrown terrorists pulled off deadly attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). Other plots have been hatched, or carried out, in recent years in Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Denmark.

The British feel particularly under the gun; their authorities are tracking dozens of active plots and more than 2,000 people in the United Kingdom. The 2006 London-based conspiracy to bring down ten or so airliners over the Atlantic could’ve produced more victims than 9/11. But it’s not just Europe. We’ve also had terror attempts here, too—by “self-radicalized” people who were inspired by, but had no physical contact with Al-Qaeda at all. Such homegrown, self-radicalized “lone wolf” terrorists are a particular worry for the FBI.

[Despite strides in battling terrorism, Al-Qaeda continues to adapt means and methods]

There’s also the growing intersection of terrorism and international crime. Al-Qaeda and others, such as the Taliban, are increasingly turning to crime to fund their operations. For instance, Afghanistan’s poppy crop provides perhaps half of the Taliban’s income, according to U.S. and United Nations analysts; Al-Qaeda is likely getting a cut, too.

Terror groups are also making money through smuggling and trafficking persons, the State Department reports. Those same networks are moving foreign fighters, particularly into Iraq—but could get terrorists into America as well.

The blood and sweat of brave Americans—plus international cooperation—have brought great strides in tackling terrorism. Al-Qaeda’s been its own worst enemy, alienating fellow Muslims with its brutal violence. But this is no time to rest on our laurels. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates continue to adapt their means and methods to our security measures—meaning we must evolve to the twists and turns in their terror tactics.

The foregoing is Article No. 3 (TR335A03) in the Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR), No. 335, 12 June 2008, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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4. “How to Measure Al-Qaeda’s Defeat,” by Walid Phares, Counterterrorism Blog,
4 June 2008 (http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/06/how_to_measure_al_qaedas_defea.php). [KBTWSummary, KBTQOverview] Dr. Walid Phares is the director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and is the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad. We quote:

In an article published in the Washington Post on Friday, 30 May, CIA Director Michael V. Hayden is quoted as portraying the Al-Qaeda movement as “essentially defeated in Iraq and Saudi Arabia and on the defensive throughout much of the rest of the world, including in its presumed haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.”

The article said Hayden asserts that: “Osama bin Laden is losing the battle for hearts and minds in the Islamic world and has largely forfeited his ability to exploit the Iraq war to recruit adherents.” More importantly, the article quotes the intelligence chief declaring a “near strategic defeat of Al-Qaeda in Iraq; near strategic defeat for Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia; significant setbacks for Al-Qaeda globally—and here I’m going to use the word ‘ideologically’—as a lot of the Islamic world pushes back on their form of Islam.”

These powerful declarations prompted a series of reactions and debates both in political and counterterrorism circles, causing loud media discussions. The main but simple question of interest to the public, and subsequently to voters in the United States and other democracies, is this:

Is Al-Qaeda being defeated?

However more complex questions arise from the CIA director’s statements, which if answered accurately would leave the main assertion still unclear. Following are few of these strategic questions:

If Al-Qaeda is being defeated, who is defeating it? Is it the United States and the West, the Arab and Muslim moderates, or other jihadists?
If Osama bin Laden is being challenged by his own members, ex-members, or non-Al-Qaeda jihadists, how can that be determined as a defeat and to whom?
Would a coup inside Al-Qaeda be of interest to Washington if the new team is as jihadist but not as “bin Ladenist”?
Or is it the U.S.-centered interests that are at play? Meaning the inability of Al-Qaeda under bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri to strike at America or target American troops and presence overseas, including in Iraq?
Is it bin Laden’s discredit, Al-Qaeda’s weakening, or jihadism’s defeat that is the broadest strategic goal to attain?
Even farther in questioning, is it Al-Qaeda’s Takfiri method or it the global jihadist ideology that is receding?

The matter is not that simple, as one can conclude. So how can we measure an Al-Qaeda defeat in the middle of a war still raging around the world? I propose the following parameters.

Is Al-Qaeda being defeated strategically worldwide as stated by the CIA director?

First the confrontation is still ongoing. Hence we need to situate the conflict first. Are we comparable with World War II before Normandy or after? In this War on Terror terms, what are our intentions? Is the U.S.-led campaign designed to go after the membership of Al-Qaeda, go after its ideology, or to support democracy movements to finish the job? Everything depends on the answers.

Geopolitically and at this stage, Al-Qaeda has been contained in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in Somalia. But Al-Qaeda has potential, through allies, to thrust through Pakistan and the entire sub-Sahara plateau. It was contained in Saudi Arabia but its cells (and offshoots) are omnipresent in Western Europe, Latin America, Indonesia, the Balkans, Russia, and India, let alone North America.

Objectively one would admit that the organization is being pushed back in some spots but is still gaining ground in other locations. Although geopolitical results are crucial, a final blow against Al-Qaeda has to be mainly ideological.

How can we measure Al-Qaeda’s defeat in Iraq, if that is true?

There are three ways to measure defeat or victory: operational, control, and recruitment. First, is Al-Qaeda waging the same number of operations? Second, does it control enclaves? Third, is it recruiting high numbers?

By these parameters Al-Qaeda was certainly “contained” in Iraq, particularly in the Sunni Triangle. This was a combined result of the U.S. surge operations and of a rise by local tribes, backed by American military and funding. But this scoring against Al-Qaeda would diminish and probably collapse if the United States quit Iraq abruptly, or without leaving a strong ally behind. So, technically it is a conditioned containment of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

How about Saudi Arabia?

The Saudis have contained many of Al-Qaeda’s active cells in the Kingdom. But authorities haven’t shrunk the ideological pool from which Al-Qaeda recruits, i.e., the hard-core Wahhabi circles. The regime has been using its own clerics to isolate the more radical indoctrination chains. It has been successful in creating a new status quo, but just that.

If Iraq crumbles, i.e., if an abrupt withdrawal takes place in the absence of a strong and democratic Iraqi government, Al-Qaeda will surge in the Triangle and thus will begin to impact Saudi Arabia. Therefore the current containment in the Kingdom is hinging on the success of the U.S.-led efforts in Iraq, not on inherent ideological efforts in Saudi Arabia.

How about Pakistan-Afghanistan?

In Afghanistan, both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda weren’t able to create exclusive zones of control despite their frequent terror attacks for the last seven years. But there again, the support to operations inside Afghanistan is coming mainly from the jihadi enclaves inside Pakistan which [links] the victory over Al-Qaeda by the Kabul government to the defeat of the combat jihadi forces within the borders of Pakistan by Islamabad’s authorities.

Do we expect President Pervez Musharraf and his cabinet to wage a massive campaign soon into Waziristan and beyond? [This is unlikely] for the moment believe most experts. Hence, the containment of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is hinging on Pakistan’s politics. While it is true that the bin Laden initial leadership network has been depleted, the movement continues to survive, fed by an unchallenged ideology, so far.

The war of ideas: Is Al-Qaeda losing it?

Geopolitically, Al-Qaeda is contained on the main battlefields in Iraq, Afghanistan, and somewhat in Somalia. It is suppressed in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. But it is roaming freely in many other spots. It is not winning in face of the Western world’s premier military machine, but it is still breathing, and more importantly it is making babies. All what it would take to see it leaping back in all battlefields and more is a powerful change of direction in Washington, D.C.

As simple as that: if the United States decides to end the War on Terror. Or as its bureaucracy has been inclined to do lately, ending the War of Ideas against jihadism, the hydra will rise again and change the course of the conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Arabia, and the African Sahara.

All depends on how Americans and other democracies are going to wage their campaign against Al-Qaeda’s ideology. If they choose to ignore it and embark on a fantasy trip to nowhere, as the “Lexicon” business shows, Al-Qaeda—or its successors—will win eventually. But if the next administration would focus on a real ideological defeat of bin Laden’s movement, then, the advances made on the battlefields will hold firmly and expand.

Lately, some in the counterterrorism community are postulating that bin Laden is being criticized by his own supporters, or more precisely by ideologues and jihadists who backed him in the past, then turned against him lately. These analysts offer striking writings by Salafist cadres against the leadership of bin Laden and his associates as evidence of an Al-Qaeda going into decline.

Would these facts mean that the once unchallenged bin Laden is now losing altitude? Technically yes, Osama is being criticized by jihadists. But does that mean that we in liberal democracies are winning that war of ideas? Less likely.

A thorough review of the substance of what the jihadi critics are complaining about . . . is not exactly what the Free World would be looking forward to. But in short, Al-Qaeda is now contained in the very battlefield it chose to fend off the infidels in: Iraq. But this is just one moment in space and time, during which we will have to fight hard to keep the situation as is. Our favorable situation is a product of the U.S. military surge and of a massive investment in dollars. It is up to this Congress, and probably to the next President to maintain that moment, weaken it, or expand it.

Al-Qaeda and the Iranian regime know exactly the essence of this strategic equation. I am not sure, though, that a majority of Americans are aware of the gravity of the situation. In other words, the public is told that we have won this round against Al-Qaeda but it should be informed of what it would take to reach final victory in this global conflict.

The foregoing is Article No. 4 (TR335A04) in the Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR), No. 335, 12 June 2008, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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5. “Rumors of Al-Qaeda’s Death May Be Highly Exaggerated,” by Michael Scheuer, Terrorism Focus, Vol. 6, No. 21, 3 June 2008 (http://www.jamestown.org). [KBTWSummary, KBTQOverview, KBTQStrategy] Dr. Michael Scheuer, a senior fellow with the Jamestown Foundation, served in the CIA for 22 years before resigning in 2004. He served as the chief of the Osama bin Laden unit at the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center from 1996 to 1999. He is the author most recently of Marching toward Hell: America and Islam after Iraq. We quote:

Whether said about the aging process or the implacable approach of writing deadlines, the old saw about “time flying” is certainly true. But seldom has it been truer than in the three weeks since this author last wrote for Terrorism Focus. At dawn on 29 May the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate that said Al-Qaeda was a major and gradually increasing threat to the United States was still valid; by late that afternoon, [Michael Chertoff,] the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), had announced that Lebanese Hezbollah was now the “A-Team of terrorism” and that it made “Al-Qaeda look like a minor league team” (Fox News, 29 May).

Then, on 30 May, the CIA director [Michael Hayden] said that Al-Qaeda was strategically defeated in several important venues; that it was “facing setbacks globally,” and that, overall, the United States was doing “pretty well” against its Islamist nemesis (BBC, 30 May). The next morning, [DHS Secretary Chertoff] one-upped the CIA director by issuing a “don’t-worry-be-happy statement” that greatly downplayed the chances of Al-Qaeda acquiring and using a nuclear device (Associated Press, 31 May).

[Three U.S. terrorism experts assert Al-Qaeda increasingly isolated in Islamic world]

To make things even cheerier, all of these glad tidings rode in on the back of other claims that Al-Qaeda’s demise was, if not imminent, at least on the horizon. Three U.S. terrorism experts published two articles [recently] which asserted that Osama bin Laden’s group is increasingly isolated in the Islamic world and alienated from Muslims because of criticisms and theological challenges—some of book-length—authored by repentant Islamic scholars.

At least one former “Al-Qaeda mastermind”—Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, AKA Dr. Fadl—penned a thoroughly damning anti-Al-Qaeda tract, but happened to be locked away in an Egyptian prison at the time of publication and so was unavailable to talk to Western journalists.

Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank [in “The Unraveling: Al-Qaeda’s Revolt against bin Laden,” New Republic, 11 June 2008] ask why former Al-Qaeda allies have turned against Al-Qaeda’s leaders:

“To a large extent it is because Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have increasingly adopted the doctrine of Takfir, by which they claim the right to decide who is a “true” Muslim. Al-Qaeda’s critics know what results from this Takfiri view: “First, the radicals deem some Muslims apostates; after that, the radicals start killing them. This fatal progression happened in both Algeria and Egypt in the 1990s. Its is now taking place even more dramatically in Iraq, where Al-Qaeda’s suicide bombers have killed more than 10,000 Iraqis, most of them targeted simply for being Shia. Recently, Al-Qaeda in Iraq has turned its fire on Sunnis who oppose its dictates, a fact not lost on the Islamic world’s Sunni majority.”

[Al-Qaeda leadership intact, sanctuaries unthreatened, social conditions largely unchanged]

Lawrence Wright in the New Yorker [article of 26 May 2008, “The Rebellion Within: An Al-Qaeda Mastermind Questions Terrorism”] adds:

“This August [2008], Al-Qaeda will mark its twentieth anniversary. That is a long life for a terrorist group. Most terror organizations disappear with the death of their charismatic leader, and it would be hard to imagine Al-Qaeda remaining a coherent entity without bin Laden. The Red Army Faction went out of business when the Berlin Wall came down and it lost its sanctuary in East Germany. The Irish Republican Army, unusually, endured for nearly a century until economic conditions in Ireland significantly improved, and the leaders were pressured by their own members to reach a political accommodation. When one looks for hopeful parallels for the end of Al-Qaeda, it is discouraging to realize that its leadership is intact, its sanctuaries are unthreatened, and the social conditions that gave rise to the movement are largely unchanged.”

“On the other hand, Al-Qaeda has nothing to show for its efforts except blood and grief. The organization was constructed from rotten intellectual bits and pieces—false readings of religion and history—cleverly and deviously fitted together to give the appearance of reason. Even if [Dr.] Fadl’s rhetoric [recanting earlier support for Al-Qaeda] strikes some readers as questionable, Al-Qaeda’s sophistry is rudely displayed for everyone to see. Although it likely will continue as a terrorist group, who could still take it seriously as a philosophy?”

[Fierce debate between Al-Qaeda leaders, theoreticians, other Islamists nothing new]

Amazing. In the 21 days since this author last wrote, bin Laden and Al-Qaeda have been transformed from Salafists and Wahhabis to nihilistic, kill-’em-all Takfiris; have been demoted from veteran and talented insurgents to the level of the whack-jobs who manned the Red Army Faction; and have been defeated in a manner the world has not seen since “Mission accomplished in Iraq” was declared in 2003.

How to explain this stunning turnaround? Well, the astounding claims made by senior U.S. government officials that Al-Qaeda is reeling from American blows seem easy enough to explain. After the U.S. government was roundly damned for not destroying Al-Qaeda before attacking Iraq, the spate of late-May pronouncements by top U.S. officials—if one is permitted to be cynical—may be intended to assure Americans that Al-Qaeda is beaten if in the next few months it becomes necessary for U.S. forces to attack Iran.

The contention that there is a fierce debate occurring between and among Al-Qaeda leaders and theoreticians and other Islamists is true enough, but hardly new. Passionate, learned, and personally stinging inter-group and even intra-Al-Qaeda debate is standard operating procedure among Islamists.

[Repentant jihadists’ words carry less weight due to circumstances surrounding them]

What is unusual in the current round of argument is that: (a) It is more public than usual and (b) many heretofore credible Western analysts are indulging in wishful thinking and giving great credence to the words of Al-Qaeda critics, even though the two sources they most often and most fully cite are of rather doubtful credibility.

One is a Saudi, Shaykh Salman al-Awdah, who wrote a public letter [“Letter to Osama bin Laden,” Islamtoday.net, 17 September 2007] condemning bin Laden for taking the lives of many Muslims in Al-Qaeda’s attacks. The other is an Egyptian, the above mentioned and legendary jihadi theorist Dr. Fadl, who, from an Egyptian prison, is publishing—through the Egyptian security service’s good offices—180-degree retractions of pro-jihad works he once claimed were sanctioned by God.

Al-Awdah was once a firebrand Islamist who preached jihad, mentored bin Laden, and spent five years in prison for opposing the U.S. military presence on the Arabian Peninsula and suggesting the al-Saud family is un-Islamic. Today, Shaykh al-Awdah is a member in good standing of the official Saudi religious establishment. He has his own Website (Islamtoday.net), hosts a television program, and he is allowed to travel overseas to condemn violence conducted in the name of religion.

Dr. Fadl, while still in jail, has access to a fax machine and is getting special treatment. “His son says he has a private room with a bath and a small kitchen,” complete with a refrigerator, newspaper delivery, and a television set (New Yorker, 26 May).

Interestingly, Dr. Fadl lived freely in Yemen from 1994 until 2001, but it was only after he found himself in prison in Egypt, at some point after 9/11, that he was seized by genuine remorse for his older jihadi writings and felt motivated by God to recant his earlier radical beliefs (New Yorker, 26 May).

There is no doubt that the statements and arguments of Shaykh al-Awdah and Dr. Fadl are splashed around all media venues and carry some weight with Islamists; they have and will provoke debate, both polite and bitter in nature.

But their words would carry much more weight among Islamists and average Muslims—and would pose a much greater threat to the future of Al-Qaeda and the Islamist movement—if it was not so starkly clear that both men are fully under the not-always-gentle thumb of the Saudi and Egyptian regimes, and that each has personally benefited from his willingness to recant former positions by publishing anti-Islamist statements and treatises both regimes want published and widely distributed.

The statements by al-Awdah and Dr. Fadl certainly will not help Al-Qaeda; indeed, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya-al-Libi have both publicly said that they could deepen the defeatism which is so deeply engrained among Arabs, and which Al-Qaeda has been trying to overcome since it was founded in 1988. [Reference “The Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri, Part 1,” As-Sahab Media, 2 April 2008; and Abu-Yahya al-Libi, “I am not a deceiver nor will I allow someone to deceive me,” As-Sahab Media, 10 March 2008].

[Theological challenges do not change fundamental motivation of Al-Qaeda and its allies]

Still, the statements are unlikely to rapidly kill off support for bin Laden and his group in an Islamic world where most Muslims recognize that nine times out of ten, such drastic recantations from previously held positions are prompted by monetary payoffs, threats to family and friends, or severe physical abuse.

More importantly, the theological challenges launched by al-Awdah, Dr. Fadl, and others change nothing in regard to the fundamental motivation of Al-Qaeda and its allies—the impact of U.S. and Western policies in the Muslim world; the presence of U.S. and Western military forces in the Arab region; and U.S. and Western support for tyrannical Arab regimes.

As long as this status quo lasts, Al-Qaeda and its allies will continue fighting and their efforts will continue to win broad and probably increasing public support, or at least acquiescence.

In the face of this reality, individuals like Shaykh al-Awdah and Dr. Fadl offer Muslims nothing but defeatism, a willingness to see the rule of Arab police states prolonged indefinitely, and supine acceptance of what is viewed by much of the Muslim world as a mortally anti-Islamic “Crusader-Zionist” hegemony.

The always vituperative British journalist and author Robert Fisk described this reality neatly in the 1 June issue of the Independent [“So Al-Qaeda’s Defeated, Eh? Go Tell It to the Marines”]. Although putting too much emphasis—as he often does—on the Western-oppression-of-Muslims theme, Fisk otherwise presents a valid and commonsense view of why Al-Qaeda is not on the ropes and will not be anytime soon. “So Al-Qaeda is ‘almost defeated,’ is it?”—Fisk began:

“Major gains against Al-Qaeda. Essentially defeated. ‘On balance, we are doing pretty well,’ the CIA’s boss, Michael Hayden, tells the Washington Post. ‘Near strategic defeat for Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Near strategic defeat for Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Significant setbacks for Al-Qaeda globally—and here I’m going to use the word ideologically—as a lot of the Islamic world pushes back on their form of Islam.’”

“Well, you could have fooled me. . . . Yes, we’ve bought ourselves some time in Iraq by paying half of the insurgents to fight for us and to murder their Al-Qaeda cousins. Yes, we are continuing to prop up Saudi Arabia’s head-chopping and torture-practicing regime—no problem there, I suppose, after our enthusiasm for ‘waterboarding’—but this does not mean Al-Qaeda is defeated.”

“Because Al-Qaeda is a way of thinking, not an army. It feeds on pain and fear and cruelty—our cruelty and our oppression—and as long as we continue to dominate the Muslim world with our Apache helicopters and our tanks and our Humvees and our ‘friendly’ dictators, so will Al-Qaeda continue. . . .”

The foregoing is Article No. 5 (TR335A05) in the Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR), No. 335, 12 June 2008, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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6. “Terrorism—A Radical New Strategy: Kill Fewer Muslims,” Economist (United Kingdom), 5 June 2008 (http://www.economist.com). [KBTWSummary, KBTQOverview] We quote:

Al-Qaeda is under fire from inside radical Islam; sadly, the blood may merely flow elsewhere.

[CIA director’s main point was Al-Qaeda has suffered setbacks in realm of ideology]

A bomb exploded outside the Danish embassy in Pakistan’s capital on 2 June, killing at least half-a-dozen people. The same day another bomb struck a police headquarters in the Iraqi city of Mosul. Just an ordinary start to an ordinary month in this twenty-first century, you might think. Except that these attacks followed, and some will say belie, a claim the previous week from Michael Hayden, the director of the CIA, that, on balance, America was doing “pretty well” against terrorism.

Needless to say, indignant politicians and pundits pounced on Mr. Hayden’s remarks, which he made in an interview with the Washington Post. The chairman of the Senate intelligence committee complained to Mr. Hayden that his interview was inconsistent with the CIA’s reports to Congress. Had not last year’s National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Al-Qaeda had “regenerated” its ability to attack America?

It had. In fairness, however, the CIA director did not say that Al-Qaeda had been put out of business. His main point was that it had suffered setbacks in the realm of ideology. “Fundamentally, no one really liked Al-Qaeda’s vision of the future,” Mr. Hayden said. The CIA’s claims are no longer universally believed. But Mr. Hayden’s comments coincide with the publication in a brace of heavyweight American magazines of two lengthy articles by independent researchers, also focusing on what looks like a growing schism within jihadism.

[Al-Sharif’s religious scholarship commands following big enough to rattle al-Zawahiri]

In the New Yorker [“The Rebellion Within: An Al-Qaeda Mastermind Questions Terrorism,” released on 26 May], Lawrence Wright, author of an authoritative book on Al-Qaeda, concentrates on the recantation of Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, alias “Dr. Fadl,” a former associate of Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s deputy. From prison in Egypt, this off-message jihadist has for a period now been taking hurtful ideological pot-shots at Al-Qaeda.

Much of this debate among jihadists turns on whether and when Muslim rulers can be deemed apostates and so become legitimate targets. But Mr. al-Sharif’s quarrel with Al-Qaeda goes further. Nothing in Islam, he avers, says that ends can justify means. Nor is killing Christians or Jews allowed unless they are actively attacking Muslims. Furthermore, it is dishonorable of Muslims living in non-Muslim lands to betray their hosts. By these lights, says Mr. al-Sharif, the perpetrators of 9/11 were “double-crossers,” having entered America with American visas and so with an implied contract of protection.

Mr. al-Sharif’s motives are not above reproach. Writing from prison, he may have come under pressure to repudiate his former allies. Part of his animus against Al-Qaeda appears to derive from a literary tiff: Mr. al-Zawahiri’s unauthorized emendation of a gripping tome of Mr. al-Sharif’s called “The Compendium of the Pursuit of Divine Knowledge.” But Mr. al-Sharif’s religious scholarship is respected and he commands a following big enough to rattle the relatively uncredentialed Mr. al-Zawahiri. That, says Mr. Wright, may be why Al-Qaeda’s number two felt the need in December to answer a shower of pointed questions on the Internet asking why Al-Qaeda killed innocent Muslims while claiming to defend Islam.

[Debate on jihad unlikely to change minds of those standing ready to carry out attacks]

Mr. Wright concludes that radical Islam is facing rebellion from within. The same verdict is reached in the New Republic [article, “The Unraveling: Al-Qaeda’s Revolt against bin Laden,” 11 June 2008,] by Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, also respected analysts, who chart a swelling tide of former jihadists now critical of Al-Qaeda’s promiscuous violence. Such critics, they say, have joined mainstream Muslim leaders in “a powerful coalition countering Al-Qaeda’s ideology.”

There is no denying that Al-Qaeda has damaged its own cause by killing so many Muslims. That is why even Sunni Arabs in Iraq have for now joined the American side. A report from Simon Fraser University in Canada notes an extraordinary drop in support for terrorist groups in the Muslim world.

And yet the impact of this on global terrorism may, alas, be small. Al-Qaeda has compensated for its strategic setback in Iraq by creating a sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan. As for its ideological problems, these may well be outweighed by the continuing current of anti-Americanism in the Islamic world.

Besides, the organization has a simple remedy. It just needs to kill more Westerners and fewer Muslims. For this it does not have to attract millions of people to its cause: a small number of disaffected souls in the right places is all it takes.

Does it have them? In Britain the domestic intelligence services reckon that up to several thousand people stand ready to carry out violent acts on Islam’s behalf—people who are unlikely to change their minds because of a recondite debate on the proprieties of jihad conducted from an Egyptian prison.

Better still, from Al-Qaeda’s cynical point of view, would be to mount a big attack on Israel, against which it has so far done little but has lately directed a spate of blood-curdling threats. Sadly, even dissenting jihadists might welcome a bit of that.

The foregoing is Article No. 6 (TR335A06) in the Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR), No. 335, 12 June 2008, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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