Beijing Embraces Classical Fascism
By Michael A. Ledeen
Posted: Tuesday, May 6, 2008

ARTICLES
Far Eastern Economic Review (May 2008)
Publication Date: May 1, 2008


Freedom Scholar
Michael A. Ledeen

In 2002, I speculated that China may be something we have never seen before: a mature fascist state. Recent events there, especially the mass rage in response to Western criticism, seem to confirm that theory. More significantly, over the intervening six years China's leaders have consolidated their hold on the organs of control--political, economic and cultural. Instead of gradually embracing pluralism as many expected, China's corporatist elite has become even more entrenched.

Even though they still call themselves communists, and the Communist Party rules the country, classical fascism should be the starting point for our efforts to understand the People's Republic. Imagine Italy 50 years after the fascist revolution. Mussolini would be dead and buried, the corporate state would be largely intact, the party would be firmly in control, and Italy would be governed by professional politicians, part of a corrupt elite, rather than the true believers who had marched on Rome. It would no longer be a system based on charisma, but would instead rest almost entirely on political repression, the leaders would be businesslike and cynical, not idealistic, and they would constantly invoke formulaic appeals to the grandeur of the "great Italian people," "endlessly summoned to emulate the greatness of its ancestors."

Substitute in the "great Chinese people" and it all sounds familiar. We are certainly not dealing with a Communist regime, either politically or economically, nor do Chinese leaders, even those who followed the radical reformer Deng Xiaoping, seem to be at all interested in treading the dangerous and uneven path from Stalinism to democracy. They know that Mikhail Gorbachev fell when he tried to control the economy while giving political freedom. They are attempting the opposite, keeping a firm grip on political power while permitting relatively free areas of economic enterprise. Their political methods are quite like those used by the European fascists 80 years ago.

The Chinese now enthusiastically, even compulsively, embrace the glories of China's long history.

Unlike traditional communist dictators--Mao, for example--who extirpated traditional culture and replaced it with a sterile Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese now enthusiastically, even compulsively, embrace the glories of China's long history. Their passionate reassertion of the greatness of past dynasties has both entranced and baffled Western observers, because it does not fit the model of an "evolving communist system."

Yet the fascist leaders of the 1920s and 1930s used exactly the same device. Mussolini rebuilt Rome to provide a dramatic visual reminder of ancient glories, and he used ancient history to justify the conquest of Libya and Ethiopia. Hitler's favorite architect built neoclassical buildings throughout the Third Reich, and his favorite operatic composer organized festivals to celebrate the country's mythic past.

Like their European predecessors, the Chinese claim a major role in the world because of their history and culture, not just on the basis of their current power, or scientific or cultural accomplishments. China even toys with some of the more bizarre notions of the earlier fascisms, such as the program to make the country self-sufficient in wheat production--the same quest for autarky that obsessed both Hitler and Mussolini.

To be sure, the world is much changed since the first half of the last century. It's much harder (and sometimes impossible) to go it alone. Passions for total independence from the outside world are tempered by the realities of today's global economy, and China's appetite for oil and other raw materials is properly legendary. But the Chinese, like the European fascists, are intensely xenophobic, and obviously worry that their people may turn against them if they learn too much about the rest of the world. They consequently work very hard to dominate the flow of information. Just ask Google, forced to cooperate with the censors in order to work in China.

Some scholars of contemporary China see the Beijing regime as very nervous, and perhaps even unstable, and they are encouraged in this belief when they see recent events such as the eruption of popular sentiment against the Tibetan monks' modest protests. That view is further reinforced by similar outcries against most any criticism of Chinese performance, from human rights to air pollution, and from preparations for the Olympic Games to the failure of Chinese quality control in food production and children's toys. The recent treatment of French retailer Carrefour at the hands of Chinese nationalists is a case in point. It has been publicly excoriated and shunned because France's President Nicolas Sarkozy dared to consider the possibility of boycotting the Olympics.

In all these cases, it is tempting to conclude that the regime is worried about its own survival, and, in order to rally nationalist passions, feels compelled to portray the country as a global victim. Perhaps they are right. The strongest evidence to support the theory of insecurity at the highest levels of Chinese society is the practice of the "princelings" (wealthy children of the ruling elites) to buy homes in places such as the United States, Canada and Australia. These are not luxury homes of the sort favored by wealthy businessman and officials from the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. Rather they are typically "normal" homes of the sort a potential émigré might want to have in reserve in case things went bad back home.

Moreover, there are reasons to believe that eruptions of nationalist passion do indeed worry the regime, and Chinese leaders have certainly tamped down such episodes in the past. In recent days, the regime has even reached out to the Dalai Lama himself in an apparent effort to calm the situation, after previously enouncing the "Dalai clique" as a dangerous form of separatism and even treason.

The violent denunciations of Westerners who criticize Chinese repression may not be a sign of internal anxiety or weakness. They may instead be a sign of strength, a demonstration of the regime's popularity.

On the other hand, the cult of victimhood was always part of fascist culture. Just like Germany and Italy in the interwar period, China feels betrayed and humiliated, and seeks to avenge her many historic wounds. This is not necessarily a true sign of anxiety; it's an integral part of the sort of hypernationalism that has always been at the heart of all fascist movements and regimes. We cannot look into the souls of the Chinese tyrants, but I doubt that China is an intensely unstable system, riven by the democratic impulses of capitalism on the one hand, and the repressive practices of the regime on the other. This is a mature fascism, not a frenzied mass movement, and the current regime is not composed of revolutionary fanatics. Today's Chinese leaders are the heirs of two very different revolutions, Mao's and Deng's. The first was a failed communist experiment; the second is a fascist transformation whose future is up for grabs.

If the fascist model is correct, we should not be at all surprised by the recent rhetoric or mass demonstrations. Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy were every bit as sensitive to any sign of foreign criticism as the Chinese today, both because victimhood is always part of the definition of such states, and because it's an essential technique of mass control. The violent denunciations of Westerners who criticize Chinese repression may not be a sign of internal anxiety or weakness. They may instead be a sign of strength, a demonstration of the regime's popularity. Remember that European fascism did not fall as the result of internal crisis--it took a bloody world war to bring it down. Fascism was so alarmingly popular neither Italians not Germans produced more than token resistance until the war began to be lost. It may well be that the mass condemnation of Western calls for greater political tolerance is in fact a sign of political success.

Since classical fascism had such a brief life span, it is hard to know whether or not a stable, durable fascist state is possible. Economically, the corporate state, of which the current Chinese system is a textbook example, may prove more flexible and adaptable than the rigid central planning that doomed communism in the Soviet Empire and elsewhere (although the travails of Japan, which also tried to combine capitalist enterprise with government guidance, show the kinds of problems China will likely face). Our brief experience with fascism makes it difficult to evaluate the possibilities of political evolution, and the People's Republic is full of secrets. But prudent strategists would do well to assume that the regime will be around for a while longer--perhaps a lot longer.

If it is a popular, fascist regime, should the world prepare for some difficult and dangerous confrontations with the People's Republic? Twentieth-century fascist states were very aggressive; Nazi Germany and fascist Italy were both expansionist nations. Is it not likely that China will similarly seek to enlarge its domain?

I believe the answer is "yes, but." Many Chinese leaders might like to see their sway extend throughout the region, and beyond. China's military is not so subtly preparing the capability to defeat U.S. forces in Asia in order to prevent intervention in any conflict on its periphery. No serious student of China doubts the enormous ambitions of both the leadership and the masses. But, unlike Hitler and Mussolini, the Chinese tyrants do not urgently need quick geographical expansion to demonstrate the glory of their country and the truth of their vision. For the moment, at least, success at home and global recognition of Chinese accomplishments seem to be enough. Since Chinese fascism is less ideological than its European predecessors, Chinese leaders are far more flexible than Hitler and Mussolini.

Nonetheless, the short history of classical fascism suggests that it is only a matter of time before China will pursue confrontation with the West. That is built into the dna of all such regimes. Sooner or later, Chinese leaders will feel compelled to demonstrate the superiority of their system, and even the most impressive per capita GDP will not do. Superiority means others have to bend their knees, and cater to the wishes of the dominant nation. Just as Mussolini saw the colonization of Africa and the invasion of Greece and the Balkans as necessary steps in the establishment of a new fascist empire, so the Chinese are likely to demand tribute from their neighbors--above all, the Chinese on the island nation of Taiwan, in order to add the recovery of lost territory to the regime's list of accomplishments. Even today, at a time when the regime is seeking praise, not tribute, in the run-up to the Olympic Games, there are bellicose overtones to official rhetoric.

The short history of classical fascism suggests that it is only a matter of time before China will pursue confrontation with the West.

How, then, should the democracies deal with China? The first step is to disabuse ourselves of the notion that wealth is the surest guarantor of peace. The West traded with the Soviet Union, and gave them credits as well, but it did not prevent the Kremlin from expanding into the Horn of Africa, or sponsoring terrorist groups in Europe and the Middle East. A wealthy China will not automatically be less inclined to go to war over Taiwan, or, for that matter, to wage or threaten war with Japan.

Indeed, the opposite may be true--the richer and stronger China becomes, the more they build up their military might, the more likely such wars may be. It follows that the West must prepare for war with China, hoping thereby to deter it. A great Roman once said that if you want peace, prepare for war. This is sound advice with regard to a fascist Chinese state that wants to play a global role.

Meanwhile, we should do what we can to convince the people of China that their long-term interests are best served by greater political freedom, no matter how annoying and chaotic that may sometimes be. I think we can trust the Chinese leaders on this one. Any regime as palpably concerned about the free flow of information, knows well that ideas about freedom might be very popular. Let's test that hypothesis, by talking directly to "the billion." In today's world, we can surely find ways to reach them.

If we do not take such steps, our risk will surely increase, and explosions of rage, manipulated or spontaneous, will recur. Eventually they will take the form of real actions.

Michael A. Ledeen is the Freedom Scholar at AEI.

E-zwich Smartcard Launched
By Samuel Amoako and David Adadevoh
Tuesday, 29 April 2008
E-ZWICH smartcard, a universal electronic system that facilitates easy access to and transfer of money has now become part of financial transactions in Ghana.

The new system which is also designed to remove the cumbersome and insecure processes of using cash, was launched in Accra yesterday by President J.A. Kufuor, with a call on corporate bodies and government agencies to use it to ensure transparency and integrity on payrolls.

E-zwich is an electronic payment system that allows one to make payments for goods and services or transfer money to others without having to carry physical cash.

Available at all banks countrywide, the system involves the loading of money onto the smart card after registering with any bank without necessarily having an accounts with that bank.

President Kufuor said the introduction of the system has the potential of transforming the payments landscape, the financial services industry and the general conduct of business in the country.

He said accessing the technology was an integral part of government’s overall vision of making Ghana the gateway to the West Africa sub-region and transforming her into a major financial hub.

The President said that globalisation has come with a major challenge of adopting best practices in all spheres of endeavour especially within the macro economy in order to survive in the market.

He said it was against that background that the government has pursued polices to develop and modernise the financial sector to enable it to play a key role in resource mobilisation for increased investment.

With the reforms and the stability of the macro-economy, President Kufuor said the nation was witnessing dramatic growth in the banking sector.

He pointed out, however, that inspite of the impressive growth of financial institutions, an estimated 80 per cent of the eligible population was still "un-banked" or "under-banked" and seemed not to have access to financial services.

With the introduction of the e-zwich, he said financial services should be extended to that large segment of the population who constitute what is described as the "informal sector".

Kwadwo Baah-Wiredu, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, commended the Bank of Ghana for coming out with a system that will deepen the change in the country’s financial sector.

"This new system is a great landmark in the history of Ghana as our payment systems can be compared with those in other parts of the world," he said.

Dr Paul Acquah, Governor of the Bank of Ghana, said a cursory examination of the payments system’s landscape revealed that it was dominated by cash transactions hence the need to introduce the new system.

"The statistics indicate that after 50 years of independence about 80 per cent of the bankable public in Ghana do not have a bank account," he said.

"This situation has arisen because the traditional payment systems offered by the major banking institutions do not address the key requirements of the un-banked population due to the difficulty in opening bank accounts which involved a lot of paper works," he said.

The design of the e-zwich he said, was a collaboration between the Bank of Ghana, Ghana Association of Bankers and Net One Company of South Africa which provided the technology and technical support.

The e-zwich the Governor said would transform the payments system to enable those without bank accounts to transact business without necessarily going to the bank.

You're running out of oil - Bush

PRESIDENT George Bush yesterday told leaders of the oil-rich states of the Middle East that they must face up to a future without their precious hydrocarbons.
In a stark warning, he said their supplies were running out and urged them to reform and diversify their economies. The outgoing United States president told the World Economic Forum, meeting in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, that it was tiADVERTISEMENTme to "prepare for the economic changes ahead".

Mr Bush's family name is inextricably linked to the oil industry, and this was his strongest statement yet on the future of global supplies.

He told the conference: "The rising price of oil has brought great wealth to some in this region, but the supply of oil is limited, and nations like mine are aggressively developing alternatives to oil.

"Over time, as the world becomes less dependent on oil, nations in the Middle East will have to build more diverse and more dynamic economies."

Mr Bush also used his speech to call for more investment in people and "extending the reach of freedom", as well as urging other nations to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and to isolate Syria.

He particularly mentioned women's rights, saying they were key to building powerful economies. He cited Egypt as a model for the development of professional women, girls going to school in Afghanistan and women joining political parties in Iraq and Kuwait.

In an apparent criticism aimed at Saudi Arabia, he told the forum: "This is a matter of morality and of basic math. No nation that cuts off half its population from opportunities will be as productive or prosperous as it could be. Women are a formidable force, as I have seen in my own family and my own administration. As the nations of the Middle East open up their laws and their societies to women, they are learning the same thing."

The president's speech was made only days after he urged Saudi Arabia to increase oil production to ease prices at the pumps, as millions around the globe face increasing costs of filling up and even more grapple with rising food bills.

The future of Scotland's own North Sea oil supply is an issue for both politicians and consumers, who were given a taste of limited fuel shortages during the Grangemouth refinery dispute.

The US has turned dramatically towards biofuels, with Congress raising the federal requirement for using the oil alternative from 6.5 billion gallons last year to nine billion gallons this year. As a consequence, about a quarter of the American corn crop was used for biofuels last year, driving up the price of corn and, hence, also the price of food for millions of families.

Predictions of when the world's oil supplies will fall below global demand range from as early as the next decade, to as late as 2050. Mr Bush has been criticised throughout his term in office for not encouraging more energy alternatives in the US, and for allowing controversial drilling explorations for new fossil-fuel supplies in often environment-ally sensitive areas, such as Alaska.

Analysts warned last night that few in the Middle East, which has two-thirds of the world's oil reserves, are likely to heed Mr Bush. Many have already started diversifying their economies and do not like being preached to by someone so unpopular in the region.

Gerald Butt, editor of the authoritative Middle East Economic Survey, said: "The Gulf states have been trying to diversify their economies away from oil for years, so they'll say, 'This is like teaching your grandmother to suck eggs'.

"Arab states don't like being told what to do by outsiders, and especially by America, whose standing in the region is very low. Bush's comments will be dismissed as unwarranted interference."

Although he praised parts of the Arab world, commentators said Mr Bush had angered many with a speech at the Israel parliament last Thursday, in which he offered unflinching support for the Jewish state but mentioned the Palestinian dream of statehood only once.

Walid Khadduri, a Beirut-based consultant, pointed out that the Gulf states had already been investing windfall profits from high oil prices in major infrastructure projects, including education and housing, and in diversifying their industrial bases.

He said: "Bush's credibility is zero anyway. I really don't know anyone who follows what he says, especially after what has happened in Iraq and then his Knesset speech the other day."

The knock-on effect of rising fuel costs has led to increasing food prices and subsequent riots around the globe, as high prices hit some of the world's poorest.

There is now a desperate attempt to find oil from alternative sources to keep the supply flowing.

Potential sources in Canada would cost almost three times as much to produce as conventional crude oil because they have to be extracted from tar sands. Although the supply, in Alberta, is estimated to be second in size only to Saudi Arabian reserves, the production costs are unlikely to offer much relief for consumers.

While the Bush presidency has tried to reduce its dependence on foreign oil, it has yet to decrease fuel use, say critics.

While the UK produces about 0.3 per cent of the world's supply of oil and uses about 2 per cent, the US produces 2.5 per cent but uses 24 per cent.

Family dynasty is soaked in black gold

BOTH George H Bush and George W Bush will be remembered almost as much for their connections to oil as to the presidency.

Bush Snr owes his fortune to Texas crude, while his son also took posts in the industry before following in his father's footsteps into politics.

Commentators have accused Bush jnr's drive to war in Iraq as merely a quest for oil, with potentially billions of dollars in profit to be made from opening up the country's oil reserves – if Iraq was ever stable.

George Bush Snr, who was president from 1989 to 1993, became a millionaire off the oil industry by the age of 40 in Texas. He started the Bush-Overby Oil Development company in 1951 and co-founded the Zapata Petroleum Corporation two years later. He served as the firm's president from 1954 to 1964. He then entered politics.

After gaining an MBA from Harvard University, Bush Jnr worked in the family oil businesses.

He became a senior partner and chief executive officer of Arbusto Energy, Spectrum 7 and Harken Energy.

Arbusto Energy obtained financing early on from James Bath, a close Bush family friend and in 1979 the sole US business representative of Salem bin Laden, head of the wealthy Saudi family and brother of Osama bin Laden.

Barnett: What will America do when Iran gets nuclear weapons?

By Thomas P.M. Barnett
Sunday, May 18, 2008

Hillary Clinton promises she'd obliterate Iran if it used nuclear weapons against Israel, suggesting that, as president, she'd return the "favor" - in spades. Putting aside campaign rhetoric, the senator raises an excellent point: What will America do when Iran gets nuclear weapons?

Many national security experts still think Washington can stop Tehran's reach for the bomb. I am not one of them.

Iran has already achieved a sloppy, asymmetrical form of nuclear deterrence, meaning we can't stop it from "getting nuclear" unless we "go nuclear" pre-emptively, something we won't do.

America could stop Iran with a massive conventional invasion, but that's not something we can pull off in time.

We also can't eliminate Iran's program through conventional bombing. We can certainly raise a lot of sand, but Iran's been smart enough to distribute its assets and bury them deep underground, learning from Israel's strikes against Iraq decades ago.

Yes, Israel might strike pre-emptively with nukes. That remains the big wild card.

But let's be clear that Israel would be protecting its long-standing regional monopoly on weapons of mass destruction.

That monopoly hasn't kept Israel safe from conventional military attack; Israel's military superiority does that. It also hasn't prevented terrorism, even though Israel maintains a world-class defensive capacity there, too.

All Tel Aviv's WMD monopoly generates is diplomatic opportunity: as soon as somebody else in the region gets a few nukes to challenge Israel's roughly 200 warheads, the world's great powers will collectively force direct negotiations leading to - at least - a bilateral strategic arms treaty between the two states.

Why? We'll all find the resulting situation too much to bear, not just in the West but far more in the East, which relies on Persian Gulf energy too much to suffer such strategic uncertainty.

What does that get us? It gets us Iran having to recognize Israel to achieve its primary goal in pursuing a nuclear capacity - namely, America's promise not to engage in forcible regime change in Tehran.

Since that goal will effectively be achieved by Tehran's looming nuclear capacity, anyway, then we're heading into a different dynamic: simultaneously creating a stable nuclear stand-off between Israel and Iran, a dyad that quickly becomes a triad if Saudi Arabia decides that Arab Sunnis need their own nuclear champion to balance the Persian Shia.

For many regional and nuclear experts, such developments would constitute an almost unthinkably unstable strategic situation, but again, the only way to stabilize such a situation would be to force a trilateral or even regional security scheme that acknowledges each state's nuclear weapons explicitly and links those capabilities to one another through the condition of mutually assured destruction.

Pursued intelligently by outside great powers, Iran's reach for the bomb could end up being the event that makes real peace in the Middle East truly possible.

No, I don't expect any outside great powers, especially the United States, to acquiesce to Iran's nuclear efforts. I expect them to try and stop that outcome from unfolding, but once those efforts prove insufficient, then we'll collectively shift to the dynamics I've just described.

When that moment comes, one thing will have to be made crystal clear to Tehran: If Iran attacks Israel with nuclear weapons, the United States would retaliate massively with nuclear weapons, effectively ending Iran's existence as a nation.

Absent that firm guarantee, we'd put Israel into the scary situation of worrying about their second-strike capability.

And, yes, America would need to make the same position clear to a nuclear-capable House of Saud.

Too scary to contemplate? Hardly.

We've covered this territory before and ended great power wars across the Eurasian landmass in the process. Now, we're simply facing similar possibilities - and dangers - in the Middle East.

In this journey, offering the right promises to wage unlimited war will get us the best opportunities to forge a permanent peace.

Thomas P.M. Barnett (tom@thomaspmbarnett.com) is a visiting scholar at the University of Tennessee's Howard Baker Center and the senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC.

May 18, 2008
OP-ED COLUMNIST
Obama and the Jews

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Pssst. Have you heard? I have. I heard that Barack Obama once said there has to be “an end” to the Israeli “occupation” of the West Bank “that began in 1967.” Yikes!

Pssst. Have you heard? I have. I heard that Barack Obama said that not only must Israel be secure, but that any peace agreement “must establish Palestine as a homeland for the Palestinian people.” Yikes!

Pssst. Have you heard? I have. I heard that Barack Obama once said “the establishment of the state of Palestine is long overdue. The Palestinian people deserve it.” Yikes! Yikes! Yikes!

Those are the kind of rumors one can hear circulating among American Jews these days about whether Barack Obama harbors secret pro-Palestinian leanings. I confess: All of the above phrases are accurate. I did not make them up.

There’s just one thing: None of them were uttered by Barack Obama. They are all direct quotes from President George W. Bush in the last two years. Mr. Bush, long hailed as a true friend of Israel, said all those things.

What does that tell you? It tells me several things. The first is that America today has — rightly — a bipartisan approach to Arab-Israeli peace that is not going to change no matter who becomes our next president. America, whether under a Republican or Democratic administration, is now committed to a two-state solution in which the Palestinians get back the West Bank, Gaza and Arab parts of East Jerusalem, and Israel gives back most of the settlements in the West Bank, offsetting those it does not evacuate with land from Israel.

The notion that a President Barack Obama would have a desire or ability to walk away from this consensus American position is ludicrous. But given the simmering controversy over whether Mr. Obama is “good for Israel,” it’s worth exploring this question: What really makes a pro-Israel president?

Personally, as an American Jew, I don’t vote for president on the basis of who will be the strongest supporter of Israel. I vote for who will make America strongest. It’s not only because this is my country, first and always, but because the single greatest source of support and protection for Israel is an America that is financially and militarily strong, and globally respected. Nothing would imperil Israel more than an enfeebled, isolated America.

I don’t doubt for a second President Bush’s gut support for Israel, and I think it comes from his gut. He views Israel as a country that shares America’s core democratic and free-market values. That is not unimportant.

But what matters a lot more is that under Mr. Bush, America today is neither feared nor respected nor liked in the Middle East, and that his lack of an energy policy for seven years has left Israel’s enemies and America’s enemies — the petro-dictators and the terrorists they support — stronger than ever. The rise of Iran as a threat to Israel today is directly related to Mr. Bush’s failure to succeed in Iraq and to develop alternatives to oil.

Does that mean Mr. Obama would automatically do better? I don’t know. To me, U.S. presidents succeed or fail when it comes to Arab-Israeli diplomacy depending on two criteria that have little to do with what’s in their hearts.

The first, and most important, is the situation on the ground and the readiness of the parties themselves to take the lead, irrespective of what America is doing. Anwar Sadat’s heroic overture to Israel, and Menachem Begin’s response, made the Jimmy Carter-engineered Camp David peace treaty possible. The painful, post-1973 war stalemate between Israel and Egypt and Syria made Henry Kissinger’s disengagement agreements possible. The collapse of the Soviet Union and America’s defeat of Iraq in the first gulf war made possible James Baker’s success in putting the Madrid peace process together.

What all three of these U.S. statesmen had in common, though — and this is the second criterion — was that when history gave them an opening, they seized it, by being tough, cunning and fair with both sides.

I don’t want a president who is just going to lean on Israel and not get in the Arabs’ face too, or one who, as the former Mideast negotiator Aaron D. Miller puts it, “loves Israel to death” — by not drawing red lines when Israel does reckless things that are also not in America’s interest, like building settlements all over the West Bank.

It’s a tricky business. But if Israel is your voting priority, then at least ask the right questions about Mr. Obama. Knock off the churlish whispering campaign about what’s in his heart on Israel (what was in Richard Nixon’s heart?) and focus first on what kind of America you think he’d build and second on whether you believe that as president he’d have the smarts, steel and cunning to seize a historic opportunity if it arises.