Murtha Lied; Marines Were Tried (And Acquitted)

By Ben Johnson
FrontPageMagazine.com | 6/18/2008

ON MAY 17, 2006, JOHN MURTHA, HE OF THE UNASSAILABLE “WAR HERO”/“PATRIOT” mythos, assailed his fellow Marines in Haditha as murderers “in cold blood.” The super-patriot made this indictment, in front of an international audience, before an investigation had concluded. His spurious charges seem to have done those eight men charged little legal damage – but they have caused incalculable harm to the United States armed forces still in the field.
At Camp Pendleton yesterday, military judge Col. Steven Folsom dismissed all charges against Lt. Col. Jeffrey R. Chessani, the highest-ranking officer accused in the Haditha massacre-of-justice. The ruling makes him the seventh of eight accused in the Haditha skirmish to have charges dismissed. In Chessani’s case, his charges were dropped without prejudice – meaning they could be filed again later, but CentCom could not be part of the process, as there had been fear the judge had an inappropriately close relationship with one of the investigators. Chessani had been accused of violating a lawful order and dereliction of duty in reporting the incident.
The antiwar Left morphed reporting errors into a “cover-up,” much as it deformed a self-defense operation against terrorists hiding amidst Iraq’s civilian population as an imperial assault on 24 blameless Iraqi civilians cowering “as if in prayer.”
Lt. Col. Chessani can now be reunited with his six young children.“We hope it’s over,” said his attorney Brian Rooney.” We believe it should be over.” Rooney added, “We’ve had to go through a two-year process to prove what we knew from the beginning.”
Rooney referred to the report of the military’s internal investigation, issued in March 2006, two months before Murtha denounced his own military before the world. (Watch Murtha slander our troops.) The report concluded, “there is no evidence that the Marines intentionally set out to target, engage, and kill non-combatants.”
Every trial to date has proven the report truthful and Murtha a calumnious liar:
In April 2007, the government offered immunity to Sgt. Sanick P. Dela Cruz in exchange for his testimony. He promptly changed his story five times.
In August 2007, Lt. Gen. James Mattis pronounced 22-year-old Lance Cpl. Justin Sharratt absolutely “innocent” of all wrongdoing.
At the same time, Lt. Gen. Mattis waved charges of dereliction of duty against Capt. Randall Stone, saying Stone’s actions did not “rise to the level of criminal behavior.”
One month later, prosecutors granted immunity to Capt. Lucas McConnell, who was not at the scene, in exchange for his testimony.
In April 2008, the government dismissed all charges against 26-year-old Lance Cpl. Stephen Tatum “with prejudice.” Although an eyewitness testified Tatum acted with malice aforethought, Tatum passed his lie detector test, while his accuser failed his. His adversary, a native of Venezuela, also happened to be “trying to get his application for U.S. citizenship released by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, which is holding up his papers.” Tatum nearly broke down on the stand last July, telling the judge: “I am not comfortable with the fact that I might have shot a child…That is a burden I will have to bear.”
Two weeks ago, a jury found Lt. Andrew Grayson “not guilty” of multiple counts of making false official statements and one count of attempting to deceive.
At present, charges remain only against Staff Sgt. Frank D. Wuterich, those for lesser charges than “murder,” premeditated or otherwise. Wuterich has sued Jack Murtha for defamation , but the damage done to his reputation and that of his squad is overshadowed by the cloud Murtha placed over the entire United States armed forces, for partisan political gain.
Even the infamously left-leaning Reuters (which refuses to call the 9/11 hijackers “terrorists”) noted, “The reports brought international condemnation on U.S. troops in Iraq and famously inspired Rep. John Murtha, a Democrat from Pennsylvania and critic of the war, to charge that the Marines had killed the civilians ‘in cold blood.’” The damage of Murtha’s single news conference alone can hardly be overestimated. Al-Jazeera beamed the Johnstown Democrat’s lurid tales throughout the Muslim world.
However, the lie did not end with that infamous announcement. The Left quickly hooked onto the alleged slaughter as a convenient bludgeon against the president – although in practice they swung mostly at our troops. A headline at The DailyKos trumpeted, “Iraqi Massacre: It’s Not Just Haditha.” Über-leftist Robert Fisk similarly asked, “Could Haditha be just the tip of the mass grave?”
As David Horowitz and I explain in our new book, Party of Defeat, this is but the tip of the Left’s lies about American soldiers in harm’s way. Unlike every other conflict in American history, with the exception of the Civil War, our troops have had to enter combat as the same politicians who voted to send them into battle divided the nation, poisoned their name around the world, and subverted their own morale.
The last may be the most overlooked part of the Haditha atrocity. (I speak here of Murtha’s persecution of the innocent.) The ability of U.S. soldiers to prosecute a war and defend themselves (and us) against the terrorist enemy is the cruelest casualty of the Party of Defeat’s war against our troops. Chessani’s lawyer Brian Rooney observed, “You need to trust what your battlefield commanders are telling you and give them the benefit of the doubt.” McConnell’s defense lawyer, Kevin McDermott, stated last year: “You don't want the lance corporal, the 19-year-old kid with the M-16, thinking twice about pulling the trigger for fear that he’ll end up being investigated if in fact he reasonably believes there are insurgents involved with the attack upon him.”
American soldiers have lost their lives because of witch-hunts like those of Murtha against the Haditha innocents. In Party of Defeat, David and I recount the story of Navy SEAL Marc Luttrell. Luttrell led his fellow SEALS on a covert mission in Afghanistan when they were sure a group of local goat-herders had spotted them and were about to report them to al-Qaeda warlords. The group considered shooting the spies but desisted, knowing the fire they would come under for “murdering” innocent Afghan civilians – some teenaged, to boot. Al-Qaeda terrorists rained fire upon them within an hour, killing 19 American soldiers. Luttrell reflected he and his men remained “tortured, shot, blown up, my best buddies all dead, and all because we were afraid of the liberals back home, afraid to do what was necessary to save our own lives.” (Emphasis added.)

Chief among those liberals who cost Luttrell’s friends their lives was one Rep. John Murtha, D-PA, the Speaker of the House’s first choice for House Majority Leader. Murtha is best known for:
In the words of the New York Times, “Trading Votes for Pork Across the House Aisle” – and threatening those who try to derail his gravy train;
Being named an unindicted co-conspirator in Abscam;
Slandering his fellow Marines at Haditha;
Refusing to apologize for slandering our men in uniform (or even discuss an apology);
Lying about troop morale; and
Advocating al-Qaeda’s foreign policy for more than 25 years.
As FrontPageMag.com wrote in an editorial last December, “It’s (Past) Time for Murtha to Resign.” Sadly, as David Horowitz and I found in researching our book, his absence will leave behind a den of radicals eager to take up where he left off.
Party of Defeat is available from the FrontPage Magazine Bookstore for $15, a 30 percent discount and less than Amazon.com. Autographed and personalized copies are also available; details are on the Bookstore webpage. Please call your local bookstores and ask them to stock the new book Party of Defeat by David Horowitz and Ben Johnson, if they don't already have it in stock.
Ben Johnson is Managing Editor of FrontPage Magazine and author of the book 57 Varieties of Radical Causes: Teresa Heinz Kerry's Charitable Giving.

June 17, 2008, 1:03 pm
Iraq Closeup: The Next Battleground
By ERIC OWLES

Amara is located in a rural, marshy region of Iraq. (Credit: The New York Times)
A closer look at our coverage on Iraq.

BAGHDAD — For the fourth time this year, the Iraqi Army has troops assembled around a city dominated by militias. The military is setting up checkpoints and preparing to take control of the southern city Amara. American troops are ready to lend aerial support and logistics. An offer of amnesty for the Mahdi Army militias who surrender is set to expire on Wednesday. Will Amara be the site of the Iraqi Army’s fourth cease-fire in a row?

Why Amara?

Iraqi officials say that militias and weapons smuggling from Iran has created a chaotic situation. The city is also located in the only province in Iraq where the local government is run by politicians aligned with Moktada al-Sadr, the Shiite cleric who is both a political rival of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and the leader of the Mahdi Army militia group. A successful operation in Amara could provide another place where Malaki could declare political and military victories - although whether they will have achieved them is far from clear. In other places where Malaki has undertaken military operations — Basra, Sadr City and Mosul — there is a debate about the factors that ended the fighting. To be sure, the Iraqi Army’s presence was important, but in Basra and Sadr City there were also truces declared and many Mahdi Army fighters withdrew. The same could happen in Amara.

Inside the City

The city of Amara is located 230 miles southeast of Baghdad in a rural, marshy region along the border with Iran. It is the capital of Maysan Province, a region dominated by tribal Shiites. About 350,000 people live in the city, making Amara smaller than the sites of the three previous military assaults.

In the early days of the war, rival militias would engage in frequents gun battles. Government buildings were overrun after the British military withdrew from the city’s western outskirts in 2006.

The situation wasn’t always so bleak. Correspondent Sabrina Tavernise traveled to the city in July 2006. She found men playing dominoes into the late evening in a coffee shop along the Tigris River. Previously the game had been banned as un-Islamic and it was dangerous to stay outside past dark. Tavernise reported that “the story of how Amara, the capital of a leaf-shaped province called Maysan, came to be relatively safe for its citizens — even as danger increased for the British — is a hopeful tale of small-town camaraderie, fierce independence and, above all, tribal power.”

The Militias

Iraqi military commanders said some of the militia leaders from Basra had escaped to Amara. Now a similar dynamic may be playing out in Amara, which is no longer a refuge. Residents in Amara said militia members had already fled the city and they were afraid that the civilians left behind would be the main victims of the Iraqi Army. Iraqi commanders have stressed that they are targeting elements of Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia and not his political supporters.

We don’t yet know whether the Iraqi Army will face opposition and if so, how large the fight will be. However, militias in the area are well armed. Rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, mortars and rockets are all commonly supplied by the Iranians. But even if the militia leaders have fled, the presence of Iraqi troops may be able to slow the use of the city as a hub for weapons imported from Iran.

The Iraqi Security Forces

Iraqi troops are massed at an airport outside the city and a local stadium. Over the weekend they reached the city center. A district police chief said Iraqi forces raided 68 homes in Maysan Province and found ammunition and explosives.

“This operation will be just like the operations in Basra and Mosul,” said General Hameed Nabeel, the commander of the Iraqi Army First Brigade, which is garrisoned in Maysan Province.

Share Your Thoughts

What’s next for the rural city of Amara? Would another operation by Iraqi forces be viewed in America as proof that the country is stable enough for more U.S. troops to withdraw? Iraqis who have lived in Amara or soldiers who have been stationed in Maysan Province are encouraged to share their thoughts on the city in the comment box below.

Both Egypt and Turkey are taking bigger roles in regional peace process with Hamas and Israel, and Syria, Israel.

The two stage peace process could start as soon as June 19 with a cease fire followed up by the opening of a border crossing for greater supply access. Then followed by prisoner exchanges between the two groups.

source: thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog

Talking to Iran

OP-Ed: “The Problem With Talking to Iran,” by Amir Taheri, Wall Street Journal, 28 May 2008, p. A17.
OP-ED: “How to Have Successful Negotiations,” by Dennis Ross, Wall Street Journal, 24-25 May 2008, p. A11.

OP-ED: “It’s All About Leverage: Countering the strategy of Iran & Friends,” by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 1 June 2008, p. WK12.

Great piece by Taheri distinguishing between Iran-the-revolutionary-movement and Iran-the-nation-state.

Iran-the-movement has been a colossal failure: not delivering at home and not spreading effectively anywhere else—save where the Iranians buy loyalty from those with fewer options than they have.

Taheri points out the dichotomy nicely: some states, like Iraq, are able to deal with Iran-the-nation-state on a host of issues, but with the United States, we remain trapped in battling the revolutionary movement because that dynamic suits the mullahs’ purposes best (and Bush-Cheney’s).

The thing is, you never really defeat the revolutionary movement, you simply get the nation-state to rein it in on its own, because there are better deals to be made.

For now, with Iran, all those better deals run eastward, with states that currently have no ambition to rein in its behavior (just not their definition of a rising great power).

Taheri makes fun of the idea of measly carrots being contemplated: spare parts for this and that. Granted, so long as we elevate Iran-the-revolutionary-movement to the status of Nazi Germany, that does seem weak. But the question begs: why elevate this crappy revolution so? Simply because Ahmadinejad shoots off his mouth?

To me, Iran’s much like the terrorism threat in general: this is all we’ve got left to worry about. So yeah, deal with it, but don’t inflate it beyond all measure, including plans for missile defense in Poland. To me, that’s just greedy programs of record looking for problems to solve, which is pathetic given our casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Yes, Iran “meddles” in these places. Duh! They’re right next door!

You put a neighbor in play with tens of thousands of your “meddling” troops and you expect Iran to sit back? Our expectations here are stunning, given our bellicose rhetoric.

Ross’ point is somewhat better: don’t reward nonstate actors but don’t cut yourself off from dialogue with state actors—just because they do things you don’t approve of. When push really comes to shove, you can always act, but short-circuiting dialogue by—again—preemptively making Iran the equivalent of Nazi Germany or—better yet—the entire Soviet Union (McCain) is silly.

We’re perceived as weak right now by Iran, as Ross and Friedman argue, so talks in our current state of weakness won’t go anywhere. We’ve made our beds in the region and we’re stuck in them for now, and that tie-down impresses no one, so we get a lot of disrespect in return—going all the way back to Katrina.

Don’t want to be fielding so much disrespect? Well, then we gotta build back up our respect in this world, and that won’t happen by making bold threats we can’t follow through on. Hell, that’s what Israel is for right now.

Can we get leverage, as Friedman puts it, quickly? No. All we can do quickly is de-escalate the rhetoric and, in my opinion, stop acting like Iran is the mother of all regional threats. I mean, that sort of myopia didn’t get us solid decision-making on Iraq, so why assume it would work this time with Iran?

Once de-escalated, then we need to approach the situation slowly but surely, building bridges where we can and signaling firm resistance where we must—you know, just like we did with the Sovs.

Ah, but the Iranians are “crazy.” I forgot.

Ever think that’s a bad fallback position? Calling your enemies “crazy” because they want things you don’t want them to have?

Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett on June 17, 2008 1:45 PM Permalink | Comments (2)

The Costs of Relying on Aging Dictators

by Caroline Sevier
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2008, pp. 13-22
http://www.meforum.org/article/1923
Send
RSS

Almost as soon as it started, the democratization agenda that the Bush administration hoped would be the lodestar of its post 9-11 foreign policy has been all but shelved. The insurgency and sectarian bloodshed in Iraq, the regional threat posed by an expansionist Iran, and the Palestinian civil war have combined to help resurrect the U.S. embrace of regional stability as a foreign policy priority and have convinced President George W. Bush to reduce his emphasis on transformative diplomacy. Leaders such as Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd al-'Aziz, whom many administration officials viewed as embarrassing allies during Bush's first term, now enjoy a renaissance of U.S. support. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, for example, said little as Mubarak crushed liberal dissidents, and shortly before Bush met the Saudi king, he parried questions after a Saudi court sentenced a 19-year-old rape victim to 200 lashes and six months in jail.[1]

But even as U.S. policy once again organizes around the idea that strongmen bring stability, Washington will soon face the downside of such a strategy: Aging rulers die; replacement leaders are frequently weak, and transitions can be volatile. Instability is a looming threat in four Western-allied dictatorships that many in Washington currently embrace as bulwarks of stability: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Oman.

The leaders of these countries have ruled for a combined total of ninety-nine years. Together, they have presided over significant transformations. But, in recent years, each has struggled to enact economic reforms to accommodate growing populations, to contain Islamism, and to encourage their respective societies to reconcile tradition with constructive political and economic pursuits. Amidst dangerous internal and external challenges, and in the absence of transparent mechanisms of succession that enjoy public approval, the inevitable moment of succession risks provoking crises that will challenge new leaders to the fullest.

Egypt: Republican Monarchy?

Egypt is a chief U.S. ally, the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance after Iraq and Israel, and with a population of eighty million, it is home to one out of every three Arabs. Much Egyptian succession speculation centers on Hosni Mubarak's son, Gamal. A favorite among Western diplomats, Gamal Mubarak was educated at the American University in Cairo, later worked as an investment banker in Cairo and London for Bank of America[2] and founded and chaired a private equity fund, MedInvest Associates, Ltd. In 1998, he created the Future Generation Foundation, a nongovernmental organization that provides job training to young entrepreneurs in Egypt. In April 2007, Gamal married Khadiga el-Gammal, the daughter of a prominent Egyptian businessman.

Gamal's rise through the ranks of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) has been meteoric. In 2000, his father appointed him to the General Secretariat of the NDP. In September 2002, at the NDP's eighth annual congress, Gamal became head of the newly created Policy Secretariat, a group of young, Western-educated economists, businessmen, and academics.[3] After only six years in the NDP, Gamal became assistant secretary general to the party.[4] The state-controlled press has kept Gamal and his projects in the spotlight. In 2003 as policy secretariat head, he introduced and passed legislation to abolish Egypt's state security courts, remove the penal code's labor penalty, and create a National Council for Human Rights.[5] In recent years, Hosni and Gamal Mubarak have appeared together in public and on television at state events, fuelling Egyptian speculation about Gamal's future role.

Gamal's succession is far from assured, though. Egyptian politicians resent the political manipulation that has enabled Gamal's rise. An internal document of the leftist National Progressive Unionist Party (Tagammu) scornfully cites "hidden attempts to bequeath the regime to President Mubarak's 39-year-old son, Gamal."[6] On March 26, 2007, Hosni Mubarak's rubber-stamp parliament passed an amendment to Egypt's constitution empowering the vice president to assume the role of president should the president die or become incapacitated.[7] This has led to speculation that Gamal Mubarak might become vice president, a position left unfilled since Mubarak ascended from the vice presidency to succeed President Anwar Sadat after his assassination in 1981. "He is the son of the president, the most powerful man in the group. Tell me one person who can say he will nominate against him," warned George Ishak, deputy coordinator of the opposition Kifaya movement.

Nor does Gamal necessarily enjoy the support of the military, many of whose officers view the president's son as young, inexperienced, and not representative of their ranks as he has never served in Egypt's military. Since the Egyptian military, led by Gamal Abdul Nasser, overthrew the monarchy in a 1952 coup, the republic's three presidents have emerged from the army's ranks, and the military has played an integral role in Egyptian state and society.[8] Gamal has no formal military background. While loath to make public statements against the government, former military officers have expressed their concerns on the question of presidential succession. "It will be Mubarak's mistake of a lifetime if an inheritance of power took place," said former defense minister and intelligence chief Amin Hewaidy.[9] If Gamal attempts to become an economic reformer, he will face further military opposition, given how the Egyptian military profits from its tax-exempt status, which enables it to compete with private entrepreneurs, and from its use of conscripts as low-cost labor.[10]

Despite the passage of constitutional amendments ostensibly aimed at promoting democracy, the Egyptian government continues to employ business-as-usual tactics to prevent any opposition groups, liberal or otherwise, from ascending to power. These groups—especially the illiberal but organized Muslim Brotherhood—might seek advantage from any transition period. In March 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood took to the streets to display its discontent with mass arrests of fellow members.[11] The secular-nationalist Kifaya has also demonstrated and clashed with police.[12] Al-Ghad, a secular opposition party licensed in 2004, may once again rise under the leadership of Ayman Nour, who challenged Mubarak in the 2005 presidential election but was subsequently imprisoned.[13] Egypt's military, staunchly loyal to Mubarak, may use his demise as grounds to reaffirm their privileged role in Egypt's politics and economy.[14]

U.S. diplomats have embraced Gamal in the hope that his image as a reformer will prove true, and he will be able to push a backward and corrupt Egyptian economy into the twenty-first century. In 2006, Gamal traveled to Washington to meet high level administration officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley,[15] suggesting to the Egyptian public that Gamal enjoys a U.S. endorsement. But this reputation elicits scorn from a considerable number of conservative Egyptian nationalists already wary of U.S. motives.

Whoever succeeds Mubarak will have to face down significant challenges from Islamists and religious conservatives. Many viewed Mubarak's 2007 constitutional reforms as a spurious attempt to preserve the authority of his ruling party against challenges from religious conservatives. Article 5 of the revised constitution, for example, prohibits the formation of political parties that are based on religious platforms. While the Mubarak government successfully crushed Islamist terrorism in the 1990s, insurgent cells could emerge again should Islamists detect weakness after the president's death. Stifled under Mubarak, some local extremists have migrated elsewhere to join the ranks of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.[16] The unknowns of succession could lead opposition parties and radicals to assert themselves more forcefully. U.S foreign policy planning, which has for so long considered Egypt as an anchor of stability in the Middle East, may be turned upside down should Gamal not be able to consolidate control.

Saudi Arabia: Generational Challenge

Since the death of Abdul Aziz "Ibn Saud" in 1953, succession in the oil-rich kingdom has passed to Ibn Saud's sons. Until 1992, the approximately 7,000 members of the royal family chose crown princes through an informal consensus that considered factors such as seniority, maternal lineage, and alliances with full brothers, all of which could help give a prince the influence to gain the throne.[17] Such horizontal succession, however, led to geriatric kings: King Abdullah bin Abdu Aziz al-Saud, who formally took the crown in 2005 is eighty-three years old; Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud is only a year younger. Ibn Saud's youngest son Miqrin is 64 years old and may assert his claim.[18]

In 1992, King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud granted himself and his successors the right to appoint or dismiss a crown prince and enlarged the pool of potential successors to include the grandsons of ‘Abd al-Aziz, thereby increasing the number of candidates to almost 150.

Succession is still complicated. In practice, there are distinct factions among brothers who share the same mother in the polygamous royal family. The late King Fahd assigned his six full brothers to important positions in the government, forming a group known as the Sudairi Seven. The Sudairi are a more conservative element within both the royal family and Saudi society as a whole, serving even after Fahd's 2005[19] death as a check on King Abdullah's attempts at domestic reform.[20] The minister of the interior, Prince Nayef, has a much closer relationship with Wahhabi clerics than does Abdullah. By leaning toward hard-line Islamism, Nayef is able to secure a measure of domestic stability and support against liberal activists and critics of the religious and political establishment.[21] Allying himself with King Abdullah as a reformer who faced "obstacles before him," Prince Talal, half-brother to the king and father to Prince Alwaleed, a prominent Saudi tycoon, has criticized the alleged "monopoly on Saudi power by one faction" within the Saudi royal family, which has been "holding executive power for some seventy years." Though he did not name members of the faction, his comments were directed toward princes Sultan and Nayef, two of Saudi Arabia's most powerful princes and also contenders to the throne.[22]

Saudi officials, cognizant of the potential for family strife should the king's successor not enjoy broader family support, have moved to modify succession even further. In October 2006, Saudi officials drafted an "Allegiance Institution Law," which empowers a council of ruling family members to reject the king's designated successor.[23] While the Allegiance Law provides for more transparency in the transition of power than otherwise stipulated under the country's Basic Law, succession remains opaque, and the potential for feuding or impasse among the royal family is very real. Indeed, while the oldest generation may accept that succession will pass them by, each surviving son of Ibn Saud jockeys furiously to ensure that his progeny are placed on the throne. This struggle for power and the tenacity of those seeking to preserve family alliances may erode political stability in the kingdom.

Whoever succeeds Abdullah in Saudi Arabia will face myriad problems. Saudi oil wealth has inhibited the advance of meaningful reform by cushioning the consequences of corrupt and inefficient governance. Even with oil prices near an all-time high, a population growth rate of 2.06 percent has left authorities in Riyadh scrambling to address an unemployment rate unofficially recorded at 30 percent.[24] As Saudi princes conspicuously siphon the kingdom's oil revenue, Saudis see the royal family's religious rhetoric as being at odds with its conduct. The sight of Saudi princes gambling, drinking alcohol, and cavorting with prostitutes aggravates popular resentment and the widening socioeconomic divide.

After years of resistance, King Abdullah has acknowledged that Saudi Arabia has a terror problem.[25] Al-Qaeda struck at the kingdom and at foreigners it hosted in the years after 9-11. On May 12, 2003, suicide bombers killed thirty-four at a foreign national housing compound in Riyadh, and over subsequent months, there were nine attacks that took twenty-one lives.[26] In the face of such a terror campaign, the Saudi leadership enacted reforms to dampen Islamist fervor and became more aggressive in rooting out homegrown terrorists. The Saudi government began to arrest clerics who supported terrorism. Younger clerics remain undeterred, however, and continue to preach anti-Americanism and to incite violence. Saudi authorities tolerate many such clerics on the condition that they do not condone terrorist attacks against Saudi targets.[27]

Many wealthy Saudis—including some in the royal family—donate money to charities or other organizations that support religious extremism abroad, leading Saudi Arabia to become an epicenter of the financing of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.[28] While Saudi authorities claim to have prosecuted individuals for terror financing and have frozen the assets of a number of other such malefactors,[29] such sanctions remain limited. Still, the Saudi government has created a number of laws to gain greater oversight of money transfers and charity expenditures such as limiting charitable organizations to the use of a single bank account and prohibiting such organizations from making or receiving cash payments.[30] Still, problems remain: Significant oil revenues are controlled by independent interests within the royal family, which do not necessarily lend themselves to monitoring by an incestuous Saudi government.[31]

Saudi succession will come at a delicate time, both internally and externally. Saudi reforms are inchoate, succession unclear, and interest groups many. Any new Saudi leader will also face external challenges: The Iranian nuclear program has bolstered Iranian confidence and prestige, and Iranian authorities have agitated Saudi Arabia's large Shi‘i population, forcing Riyadh to worry about internal order. Primitive Wahhabi, anti-Shi‘i attitudes only exacerbate the internal challenges, despite recent moves to build a Saudi identity that transcends sect and regional origin. Saudi authorities often cite the 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers U.S. military facility that killed nineteen U.S. servicemen and injured more than 350 as evidence of the Iranian threat: While the perpetrators were Saudi, Iran's Revolutionary Guards organized the attack and trained many of the terrorists who executed it.

After years of cool relations following 9-11, Washington once again relies on Riyadh as a diplomatic partner. Not only do U.S. policymakers now consider a strong Saudi Arabia as a counterbalance to Iran, but State Department officials also look at Saudi authorities as partners in the Middle East peace process and in supporting nationalist factions in Lebanon against their pro-Syrian counterparts.[32] Saudi authorities even went so far as to issue religious edicts against Hezbollah for provoking war with Israel in 2006.[33]

Each likely successor will maintain the Saudi security alliance with the United States. But, U.S.-Saudi relations have been strained in recent years, and some kings may approach their ties to Washington differently than others. In this context, succession will put Saudi Arabia in play. Any U.S. policy today—from the Middle East peace process to the Middle East Partnership Initiative, which emphasizes civil society, economic reforms, political participation, and development as part of a broader U.S. public diplomacy effort in the Middle East[34]—depends on both Egyptian and Saudi goodwill. The departure of both or even one of these states from the U.S. sphere will force significant changes in the U.S. Middle East posture.

Tunisia: North Africa's Police State

Uncertain successions not only will put major U.S. allies in play but also the smaller, less acknowledged, but strategically important states such as Tunisia and Oman. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, now seventy-one, acceded to Tunisia's presidency in a 1987 coup, vowing to bring order to chaos. Ben Ali has created stability but only at the expense of almost all civil liberties. In terms of political freedoms, Tunisia races Syria and Libya to the basement of the Arab world.

The result has been a government entirely reliant on Ben Ali as the dictator and an eviscerated multiparty system. Many reforms have been superficial. For example, while the Tunisian government in 2002 relaxed candidacy requirements to allow multi-person elections, neither the state-controlled media nor the security services allowed opposition candidates to campaign. At the same time, Ben Ali lifted restrictions that would have prohibited his third term and raised the age limit of the presidency to enable his continued incumbency. In subsequent elections, he won a fourth term, capturing 94.5 percent of the votes in an election plagued by fraud.[35]

The threat of imprisonment has quelled national dissidents and multiparty activity. In 2005, Tunisian authorities suspended the general assembly of the Tunisian human rights league and Tunisian journalists' union and froze financial assets to the Arab Institute for Human Rights.[36] Statements such as that by William Burns, at the time assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, that Tunisia is an exemplar for "moderation and tolerance,"[37] breed cynicism. Islamism and anti-Western rejectionism have become the main outlets for political dissent.

Tunisian officials do not apologize for their stance on political dissent, which they view as having protected Tunisia from the terrorism rampant in neighboring countries. Hosting a regional conference on terrorism, Ben Ali declared, "We have always reaffirmed our total rejection of all forms of fanaticism and extremism and of the violence and terrorism they generate."[38] Many Islamists, especially members of the extremist An-Nahdha party, remain in prison.[39]

While ensuring that Tunisia did not become a new Algeria was a Western interest, U.S. failure to encourage systematic reform leaves Tunisia susceptible to instability following Ben Ali's death. There are no credible plans for succession, and there are few if any Tunisian officials with the experience, skills, or popular support that would make them plausible leaders. While the ruling Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique (RCD) party retains a stranglehold on government positions, Ben Ali has frequently shuffled cabinet positions to deter members from developing loyal constituencies, increasing the likelihood of a struggle for power within the party upon Ben Ali's death.[40] Anti-Americanism is widespread, and Tunisian Islamist leaders, many of whom have taken shelter in Europe, can be counted on to attempt to make their mark on Tunisian society when Ben Ali passes. The Tunisia of 2018 may be very different from the Tunisia of 2008.

Oman: Uncertainty in a Strategic Cornerstone

Decades of quiet have left the Sultanate of Oman out of sight and out of mind for most Western policymakers. Yet its stability is of critical importance to the West. Situated on one side of the Strait of Hormuz, 30 percent of the world's oil supply passes along its coast.

Until 1970, the Sultanate of Oman was one of the world's most reclusive and backward states. With British orchestration, Sultan Qaboos took the throne from his outmoded father Sultan Said bin Taimur in 1970. Subsequent British pressure ensured that the then-30-year-old Qaboos opened his kingdom and ushered in reforms, dragging the sultanate kicking and screaming into the twentieth century. On the Index of Economic Freedom, Oman is ranked third freest among the seventeen countries in the Middle East/North Africa region; its economy overall is ranked forty-second freest in the world, reflecting a score higher than the regional average.[41] In a presumed commitment to economic liberalization, Oman became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2000, and in 2006, signed a free trade agreement with the United States.[42]

Oman has also been a somewhat reliable strategic partner. In 1979, Qaboos quietly supported the U.S. Camp David initiative that helped Jerusalem and Cairo establish diplomatic relations.[43] The main evidence of Oman's friendly geopolitical role was its willingness to host large United States Air Force bases in 1981, the first facilities access agreement of its kind in the region. In 1990, Oman renewed an agreement to allow the United States military access to military bases situated on the Strait of Hormuz and, the following year, Oman supplied troops to the Arab contingent of Joint Forces Command East for Operation Desert Storm.[44] However, perhaps reacting to domestic anti-Americanism, Oman has been a less consistent ally in recent years. In 2006, Oman voted with the United States at the United Nations only 7.6 percent of the time, only slightly more than Libya and Syria.[45] In the wake of 9-11, Oman refused for several days to allow its airfield to be used in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, the military operation that freed Afghanistan from the Taliban.

Succession is uncertain in Oman. For as much as Qaboos opened his sultanate to economic liberalization, he did not permit dilution of his political control. His rule has encompassed not only the responsibilities of head of state but also those of prime minister, defense minister, finance minister, foreign affairs minister, and chairman of the central bank.[46] Because Qaboos has never been married and has no offspring, there is no obvious successor.

Rather than identify an heir to his throne during his tenure, Qaboos has vested the authority to do so in his family following his death. The rules of succession, as stipulated by the Basic Law enacted by Qaboos in 1996, decree that Qaboos' family will select a successor within three days of the throne falling vacant. Should the ruling family council fail to reach consensus, the Defense Council will defer the decision to a letter written by the sultan in which he will have named his choice of successor who, according to the Basic Law, must only be a Muslim of sound mind and the legitimate son of Omani Muslim parentage.

This process leaves room for a number of scenarios; thus far the identity of the next ruler appears to be entirely unknown. Oman's character changed radically between Sultan Said bin Taimur and Qaboos, and with so much power invested in the individual leader, it is always possible that the character of the government could change radically again. Certainly, neighboring states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran will seek to influence the outcome. While Muscat has long pursued a policy of friendship to all its neighbors, the Iran-Oman Parliamentary Friendship Group in the sultanate has become more active in recent years.[47] It remains unclear, however, whether anyone in Washington has thought of aiding Oman's succession in the manner that Britain did decades ago to ensure an outcome favoring continued relative stability.

Qaboos' successor will face other serious challenges in a society with deep social cleavages. Residual effects of the 1962-75 Dhofar war remain with enduring differences between the more cosmopolitan, prosperous, coastal regions and the more conservative interior. While Qaboos, with support from Great Britain and Iran, suppressed the insurgency, regional states might seize upon any succession uncertainty to undercut Oman's stability again.

Despite Oman's economic liberalization, the sultanate remains dependent on the oil revenues that account for 75 percent of the country's export earnings and 40 percent of its gross domestic product. But oil production is declining and is bearing on the country's economy: In 2006, Oman's gross domestic product grew at a rate of only 4.2 percent compared to 5.7 percent the year before. In all likelihood, Omani oil production will continue to decline.[48] Such declining economic growth is taking place in the context of an increasing population. By 2025, the population of Oman is expected to have grown almost 20 percent from its current 2.7 million,[49] exacerbating an already double-digit unemployment rate.[50] Such indicators and the reforms necessary to reverse them may force the untested new ruler to face domestic instability.

Conclusion

Many Western policymakers seek stability in the Middle East, and their European counterparts fear that instability might catalyze emigration from Arab states to European ones. U.S. policymakers additionally worry that succession crises will provide opportunities for Islamists and other radicals to challenge new, inexperienced, and potentially weak rulers. The failure of so many outgoing rulers to encourage substantive political reforms has left the region perhaps prone to even greater instability.

The rules of biology make it unlikely that the region's political dinosaurs will last much longer. And, despite the fact that more than 300 million Arabs will soon have new rulers, there have been few efforts undertaken to encourage smooth, pro-Western successions, or even contingency planning should succession struggles go awry. The stability-promotion that has marked the final years of the Bush administration might end up proving as successful as the democracy-promotion that marked the first term of the Bush administration.

Caroline Sevier is manager of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.