Thursday, May. 22, 2008
Well-Oiled Machine
By Erik Heinrich/Fort McMurray
Correction Appended: June 3, 2008

Standing on a wooden platform located deep inside his open-pit mine, Pat Crisby, a plainspoken Newfoundlander, makes a startling observation. "We move enough dirt to fill the SkyDome in 48 hours," says Crisby, a fiftyish manager at Syncrude Canada Ltd., a company that is the Incredible Hulk of North America's biggest and richest resource deposit: Alberta's oil sands. The idea of filling the 60,000-seat home of the Toronto Blue Jays (now called Rogers Centre) with sticky, bitumen-laced soil from the Aurora North mine in a weekend is mind-boggling. But it puts the business conducted on this chunk of boreal real estate into perspective: there are 173 billion bbl. of crude contained in an area roughly the size of Florida. It just has to be dug up.

Syncrude, headquartered just north of Alberta's booming Fort McMurray, is a consortium of U.S. and Canadian oil companies including Imperial, Petro-Canada and ConocoPhilips that produces 350,000 bbl. of light, sweet crude per day from tar sands at three mines on the banks of the Athabasca River. About two-thirds of that gets piped to the U.S. Syncrude accounts for about 27% of the 1.3 million bbl. extracted by oil companies every 24 hours from this stark landscape of jack pine, spruce and poplar forests shot through by a bright northern light.

But it pales by comparison with what's just around the corner. Canada is poised to become Venezuela north--without the loopy President and the deadweight national oil company as unwanted partners--as the biggest oil boom in North American history hits terminal velocity. An estimated $124 billion will be invested from 2007 to 2012, according to the Athabasca Regional Issues Working Group, an industry association. Production in Alberta's oil sands will more than quadruple, to about 5 million bbl. daily, by 2015; Canada currently exports an average of 1.9 million bbl. daily (from all sources) to the U.S., more than any country, including Saudi Arabia. That's about 20% of total U.S. imports. "Canada has emerged as an energy superpower," says economist Peter Tertzakian of Calgary-based ARC Financial Corp., an energy-investment firm with a nearly $1.9 billion asset portfolio. He adds that going forward, 10% to 15% of the world's incremental oil production will come from Canada's oil sands.

And you have ExxonMobil to thank (or blame) for it. The U.S. giant got hammered by investors following its first-quarter earnings report. Profits were $13 billion, but production was falling. Yet in Canada, Exxon has muscled aside some of its Syncrude partners and parachuted in a new management team to meet aggressive expansion targets. "Everything up here is American, pretty much," says an oil worker earning $130,000 a year, a fairly typical salary in Fort McMurray, which has earned the nickname Fort McMoney because it has the nation's highest average income. The timing seems right for Canada too. Carpenters and truck drivers are fetching six-figure wages in Alberta--and working in -50°F (-46°C) temperatures in the winter--but Canada's traditional manufacturing hub of southern Ontario is suffering, ironically, because of its ties to the U.S. auto industry. And Canada's strengthening loonie has shed its huge cost advantage to the dollar.

The bulk of Canada's new energy will get pushed through an expanded pipeline network straight to waiting U.S. upgrading plants and refineries, a majority of which are located in such Midwestern states as Minnesota, North Dakota and Ohio. Shell, Chevron, British Petroleum and Total S.A. of France, along with about 20 smaller but no less ambitious players, are also transforming Alberta's boreal oil patch into the primary supplier of feedstock for an integrated North American energy market. "Canada is extremely important to U.S. energy security," says Rob Routs, executive director of oil sands at Netherlands-based Royal Dutch Shell PLC, the world's No. 2 oil company, with annual revenue of $355.8 billion, which plans to boost production in Canada's north nearly fivefold, to 700,000 bbl. per day, by the middle of the next decade.

Somewhat surprisingly, Canada has been reluctant to acknowledge its newly minted status as an energy power broker. "We need to start acting like an OPEC-level player with an ability to change the world economy," says Ross Jacobs of Fort McMurray, a Liberal who was recently defeated in a bid to represent his district in Alberta's provincial legislature. "Canadians need to start thinking globally."

Yet they can't even think nationally. Relations between the maverick western province and Ottawa have always been stormy. In the 1970s, at a time of skyrocketing fuel prices, leftist Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau promoted a National Energy Program of self-sufficiency and Canadian ownership of oil and gas development, which ignited a turf war with Alberta. Alberta won, which means so did the U.S., because the oil could be freely traded.

No one working in the oil sands complains about the big paychecks, but beyond the project a serious backlash is growing against the economic and environmental pressures that come with maxing out oil production. A shortage of housing in Fort McMurray has pushed the price of an average home to more than $600,000. Two-bedroom apartments rent for about $3,500 a month. "The tar sands are being developed in an unsustainable fashion from virtually every point of view," says Jack Layton, leader of the New Democratic Party (NDP).

The bigger issue for Canada is that Alberta will get locked into the upstream rungs of an integrated North American energy market, while high-tech jobs head south, along with raw bitumen. "A Wild West approach to development is raising costs and acting as a disincentive for big energy companies to invest in upgrading and refining operations in Alberta," says Gil McGowan, head of the Alberta Federation of Labour, the province's largest union, representing 140,000 workers.

But Ed Stelmach, premier of Alberta, has little time for McGowan and other critics. "If you take Alberta out of the equation, there's very little growth in Canada," says Stelmach, whose Progressive Conservative Party has a cozy relationship with Big Oil. But Stelmach's critics are getting louder as concerns mount over outsize greenhouse-gas emissions from the oil sands. At a recent fund-raising dinner in Edmonton for his party faithful, two Greenpeace activists rappelled from the ceiling of a hall, unveiling a banner that read $TELMACH: THE BEST PREMIER OIL MONEY CAN BUY. It was Greenpeace's typically great political theater, but Stelmach won't entertain any cries for a moratorium on new projects.

And neither will Exxon. Down the road a few kilometers from Syncrude's Aurora mine, at the company's corporate headquarters, Tom Katinas has been shaking things up since he arrived from Exxon, based in Irving, Texas, in April 2007. "In the past, people came in at the bottom and worked their way to the top," says Katinas from his fourth-floor corner office, in a Sopranos-style drawl that reveals his Brooklyn roots. "There weren't enough new ideas."

The recently arrived president and ceo of Syncrude, along with a group of 25 handpicked Exxon executives, is sure to introduce plenty of change over the life of a 10-year service contract signed by their parent company. "Many Syncrude managers took a golden handshake rather than deal with Exxon," says a person familiar with the overhaul taking place.

Why is an American oil company, the biggest in the world, with annual revenue of $390 billion, calling the shots at Canada's biggest oil-sands producer? Syncrude, founded in 1964, when commercialization of the oil sands wasn't economically viable, epitomizes the tangled web of partnerships and deals that is Alberta's energy sector. The company has seven partners, but Syncrude's biggest shareholders are a pair of Calgary-based operators, Canadian Oil Sands Trust and Imperial Oil Ltd., which together own a 61.7% stake. It's through its controlling position in Imperial that Exxon has become master at Syncrude.

The planned expansion at Syncrude from 350,000 bbl. per day to 500,000 bbl. may have been too important for Exxon's future to leave to anyone but the A-team from Texas. "My job is to build a strong operational foundation," says Katinas, whose previous assignments have taken him to Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the U.K. In addition to Syncrude and Imperial, the biggest operators in the oil sands are Suncor Energy Inc., a Canadian-owned company, and Albian Sands Energy Inc., a joint venture of Shell, Chevron Corp. and Marathon Oil Corp. This tight clutch of companies accounts for 75% of all production in the oil sands.

And they all have their foot on the gas. At the Aurora North mine, a giant shovel fills up another 797B Caterpillar heavy hauler with a 400-ton load of material that--after being spun in what looks like the world's largest cement mixer to separate the bitumen from the sand--will eventually yield 200 bbl. of oil. "A year from now, that mountain won't be there," says Crisby, referring to the black wall of bitumen-rich soil gradually being demolished by shovel, dozer and a convoy of heavy haulers that operate around the clock.

The mega-projects across Alberta's oil sands rival some of humankind's greatest engineering achievements, including the pyramids of Giza and the Great Wall of China. After thousands of years, those ancient projects still bear witness to history. Conservative estimates predict the tar sands will give out in just 70 years. Their legacy to Canada is yet to be written, but it may be a great deal bigger than expectations. With new deposits still being found and technologies improving, the sands could produce for a couple of hundred years more. Forget Venezuela. Canada may become the new Saudi Arabia, the last great oil kingdom, right on the U.S. border.

Oil Sands For more images of Syncrude's Alberta operation, go to time.com/oilsands

The original version of this article misidentified Canada’s New Democratic Party as the National Democratic Party

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Energy

Double, double, oil and trouble
May 29th 2008
From The Economist print edition

AFP

Is it “peak oil” or a speculative bubble? Neither, really
AFTER oil hit its recent record of $135 a barrel, consumers and politicians started to lash out in every direction. Fishermen in France have been blockading ports and pouring oil on the roads in protest. British lorry drivers have paraded coffins through London as a token of the imminent demise of the haulage industry. In response, Gordon Brown, Britain's prime minister, is badgering oil bosses to increase production from the North Sea, while Nicolas Sarkozy, the president of France, wants the European Union to suspend taxes on fuel.

In America, too, politicians are haranguing oil bosses and calling for tax cuts. Congress has approved a bill to prevent the government from adding to America's strategic stocks of oil, and is contemplating another to enable American prosecutors to sue the governments of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) for market manipulation.

But the most popular scapegoats are “speculators” of the more traditional sort. OPEC itself routinely blames them for high prices. The government of India is so sure that speculation makes commodities dearer that it has banned the trading of futures contracts for some of them (although not oil). Germany's Social Democratic Party proposes an international ban on borrowing to buy oil futures, on the same grounds. Joe Lieberman, chairman of the Senate's Homeland Security Committee, is also mulling regulation of some sort, having concluded that “speculators are responsible for a big part of the commodity price increases”. The assumption underlying such ideas is that a bubble is forming, and that if it were popped, the price of oil would be much lower.

Others assume the reverse: that the price is bound to keep rising indefinitely, since supplies of oil are running short. The majority of the world's crude, according to believers in “peak oil”, has been discovered and is already being exploited. At any rate, the size of new fields is diminishing. So production will soon reach a pinnacle, if it has not done so already, and then quickly decline, no matter what governments do.

As different as these theories are, they share a conviction that something has gone badly wrong with the market for oil. High prices are seen as proof of some sort of breakdown. Yet the evidence suggests that, to the contrary, the rising price is beginning to curb demand and increase supply, just as the textbooks say it should.

Stocks, bonds and barrels
Those who see speculators as the culprits point to the emergence of oil and other commodities as a popular asset class, alongside stocks, bonds and property. Ever more investors are piling into the oil markets, the argument runs, pushing up the price as they do so. The number of transactions involving oil futures on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), the biggest market for oil, has almost tripled since 2004. That neatly mirrors a tripling of the price of oil over the same period.

But Jeffrey Harris, the chief economist of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which regulates NYMEX and other American commodities exchanges, does not see any evidence that the growth of speculation in oil has caused the price to rise. Rising prices, after all, might have been stimulating the growing investment, rather than the other way around. There is no clear correlation between increased speculation and higher prices in commodities markets in general. Despite a continuing flow of investment in nickel, for example, its price has fallen by half over the past year.

By the same token, the prices of several commodities that are not traded on any exchange, and are therefore much harder for speculators to invest in, have risen even faster than that of oil. Deutsche Bank calculates that cadmium, a rare metal, has appreciated twice as much as oil since 2001, for example, and the price of rice has risen fractionally more.

Investment can flood into the oil market without driving up prices because speculators are not buying any actual crude. Instead, they buy contracts for future delivery. When those contracts mature, they either settle them with a cash payment or sell them on to genuine consumers. Either way, no oil is hoarded or somehow kept off the market. The contracts are really a bet about which way the price will go and the number of bets does not affect the amount of oil available. As Mr Harris puts it, there is no limit to the number of “paper barrels” that can be bought and sold.

That makes it harder for a bubble to develop in oil than in the shares of internet firms, say, or in housing, where the supply of the asset is finite. Ultimately, says David Kirsch of PFC Energy, a consultancy, there is only one type of customer for crude: refineries. If speculators on the futures markets get carried away, pushing prices so high that refineries run at a loss, they will simply shut down, causing the price to fall again. Moreover, speculators do not always assume that prices will rise. As recently as last year, the speculative bears on NYMEX outweighed the bulls.

There is, admittedly, a growing category of inherently bullish investment funds that seek to track commodity-price indices, in which oil is usually the biggest component. Politicians have begun to denounce these “index funds”, since they make money for their investors only if prices rise. According to Mr Lieberman, they have grown in value from $13 billion to $260 billion over the past five years. This surge of investors betting on rising prices, many observers contend, has become a self-fulfilling prophecy, helping to push prices ever higher and thus attract yet more investment.

But Bob Greer, of PIMCO, an asset-management firm, argues that even index funds make unlikely suspects. For one thing, they too invest in futures, rather than in physical supplies of oil. So every month, they must trade contracts that are about to fall due for ones that will not mature for several months. That makes them big sellers of oil for prompt delivery.

What is more, their growth is not as impressive as it first appears. Paul Horsnell of Barclays Capital, an investment bank, puts the total value of index funds and other similar investments at $225 billion. That is less than half the market capitalisation of Exxon Mobil, he points out, and a tiny fraction of the $50 trillion-odd of transactions in the oil markets each year. Although index funds have grown quickly, that growth stems in large part from the rise in value of the futures they hold, rather than from fresh investment flows. He estimates that index funds swelled by $13 billion in the first quarter of this year, for example, of which all but $2 billion derives from the rise in commodity prices.

Back to basics
Mr Harris of the CFTC, for one, believes that the oil price is still a function of supply and demand. For the past few years, the world's production capacity has grown only sluggishly. Meanwhile, demand, especially from the developing world, has been growing faster. So there is hardly any slack in the system. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are thought to be able to increase their output from today's levels, and even then, there are doubts, since Saudi Arabia, in particular, is secretive about the state of its oil industry.

That leaves the oil market at the mercy of even small disruptions to supply. Prices tend to jump each time militants sabotage an oil pipeline in Nigeria, bad weather threatens production in the Gulf of Mexico, or political clouds gather over the Persian Gulf.

The problem is exacerbated by a growing mismatch between the type of oil being produced and the refineries that must process it. The most common benchmark prices, including the one used in this article, refer to “light” crude, the least viscous sort, which produces the most petrol and diesel when refined. “Heavy” oil, by contrast, yields more fuel oil, which is used mainly for heating.

At the moment, diesel is in short supply and there is a glut of fuel oil. That makes processing heavy oil unprofitable for some refineries, since the gains from diesel are outweighed by losses on fuel oil. As refineries turn instead to lighter grades, it pushes their prices yet higher. The discount on heavier crudes has risen to record levels. But even then, points out Ed Morse, of Lehman Brothers, another investment bank, Iran is having trouble selling the stuff. It is storing huge quantities of unsold oil on tankers moored off its coast.

Presumably, Iran and other heavy-oil producers will eventually be obliged to drop prices far enough to make processing the stuff worth refiners' while. In the longer run, more refineries will invest in the equipment needed to crack more diesel out of heavy oil. Both steps will, in effect, increase the world's oil supply, and so help to ease prices.

But improving an existing refinery or building a new one is a slow and capital-intensive business. Firms tend to be very conservative in their investments, since refineries have decades-long life-spans, during which prices and profits can fluctuate wildly. It can also be difficult to find a site and obtain the right permits—one of the reasons why no new refineries have been built in America for over 30 years. Worse, new kit is becoming ever more expensive. Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), a consultancy, calculates that capital costs for refineries and petrochemical plants have risen by 76% since 2000.

Much the same applies to the development of new oilfields. CERA reckons that the cost of developing them has risen even faster—by 110%. At the same time, oilmen remain scarred by the rapid expansion of output in the late 1970s, in response to previous spikes in prices, that led to a glut and so to a prolonged slump. Exxon Mobil claims that it still assesses the profitability of potential investments using the same assumptions about the long-term oil price as it did at the beginning of the decade, for fear that prices might tumble again. Environmental concerns are also an obstacle: America, for one, has banned oil production off most of its coastline.

Increasing nationalism on the part of oil-rich countries is adding to the difficulties. Geologists are convinced that there is still a lot of oil to be discovered in the Middle East and the former Soviet Union, but governments in both regions are reluctant to give outsiders access. Elsewhere, the most promising areas for exploration are also the most technically challenging: in deep water, or in the Arctic, or both. Although there have been big recent discoveries in such places, they will take longer to develop, and costs will be higher. The most expensive projects of all involve the extraction of oil from bitumen, shale and even coal, through elaborate processing. The potential for these is more or less unlimited, although analysts put the costs as high as $70 a barrel—more than the oil price this time last year.

Nonetheless, PFC Energy has examined projects that are already under way, and concluded that global oil production will grow by over 3m barrels a day (b/d) over the course of this year and next. In particular, it expects production outside OPEC to grow by about 500,000 b/d both years—a marked increase from the near stagnation of recent years.

Meanwhile, the high price is clearly beginning to crimp demand. The growth in global consumption last year was barely a quarter what it was in 2004 (see chart); this year, it is likely be even lower. In rich countries (or at least among the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a rough proxy), the effect is even more pronounced. Consumption has been falling for the past two and a half years.

Poorer countries' demand for oil is still rising, albeit at a slowing pace. That is partly because their economies are growing faster, and partly because their consumers are shielded from the rising price through subsidies. But the increasing expense of such measures is forcing governments to water them down or scrap them altogether (see article). That, in turn, should further sap consumption.

Oil pique
China's growing thirst for oil is often put forward as one of the main factors behind today's higher oil prices. Demand for diesel there, for example, rose by over 9% in the year to April. But Mr Morse argues that such growth might not last. The government has ordered oil firms to increase their stocks of fuel by 50% to be sure there are no embarrassing shortages during the Olympics. It is also planning to run some power plants near Beijing on diesel rather than coal, in an attempt to reduce pollution during the games. These measures are helping to boost China's demand for diesel, but the effect will be transitory.

In the short run, neither demand for nor supply of oil is very elastic. It takes time for people to replace their old guzzlers with more fuel-efficient cars, or to switch to jobs with shorter commutes, or to move closer to public transport. By the same token, it can take ten years or more to develop an oilfield after its discovery—and that does not include the time firms need to bolster their exploration units.

Gary Becker, an economist at the University of Chicago, has calculated that in the past, over periods of less than five years, oil consumption in the OECD dropped by only 2-9% when the price doubled. Likewise, oil production in countries outside OPEC grew by only 4% every time the price doubled. But over longer periods, consumption dropped by 60% and supply rose by 35%. The precise numbers may be slightly different this time round, but the pattern will be the same

The oil price

Recoil
May 29th 2008
From The Economist print edition

Painful though it is, this oil shock will eventually spur huge change. Beware the hunt for scapegoats

IN THE early 1970s a fourfold rise in the price of oil almost brought the world to a standstill. The shock of the Arab embargo left a deep mark in many countries: America subjected its cars to fuel-efficiency standards, France embraced nuclear power—though sadly shoene rukku, or “energy-conscious fashion”, the inspiration for Japan's fetching short-sleeved business suit, was ahead of its time.

Thirty-five years on, oil prices have quadrupled again, briefly soaring to a peak of just over $135 a barrel. But, so far, this has been a slow-motion oil shock. If the Arab oil-weapon felt like a hammer-blow, this time stagnant oil output and growing emerging-market demand have squeezed the oil market like a vice. For almost five years a growing world shrugged it off. Only now is it recoiling in pain.

This week French fishermen clogged up the port of Dunkirk and British lorry-drivers choked roads into London and Cardiff. Nicolas Sarkozy, France's president, suggested subsidising the worst affected and curbing taxes on petrol; Britain's beleaguered government is being pressed to forgo its tax increases on motorists. In America falling house prices have left consumers resentful—and short of money. Congress and presidential candidates have been drafting schemes and gas-tax holidays like so many campaign leaflets.

Gordon Brown, Britain's prime minister, thinks the big oil producers can be persuaded to come to the rescue. But only Saudi Arabia shows any enthusiasm for that. Elsewhere, output is growing agonisingly slowly. That is causing hardship and recrimination. But it could also come to represent an opportunity. The slow-motion shock seems irresistible today, but in time it will give rise to an equally unstoppable and more positive slow-motion reaction (see article).

Action replay
It is clear that high oil prices are hurting many economies—especially in the rich world. Goldman Sachs reckons consumers are handing over $1.8 trillion a year to oil producers. The wage-price spiral of the 1970s has been avoided, but the income shock is painful. Beset by scarce credit, falling asset prices and costly food, developed-country households are hardly well-equipped to foot the oil bill. America's emergency tax rebate, voted this year to help people cope with the credit crunch, has in effect been taken right away again.

Stuck for answers, politicians have been looking for scapegoats. Top of the list are the speculators profiting from other people's hardship. Some $260 billion is invested in commodity funds, 20 times the level of 2003. Surely all that hot money has supercharged the demand for oil? But that is plain wrong. Such speculators do not own real oil. Every barrel they buy in the futures markets they sell back again before the contract ends. That may raise the price of “paper barrels”, but not of the black stuff refiners turn into petrol. It is true that high futures prices could lead someone to hoard oil today in the hope of a higher price tomorrow. But inventories are not especially full just now and there are few signs of hoarding.

If the speculators are not to blame, what about the oil companies, which have failed to increase output in spite of record profits? Profiteering, say some. However, that accusation doesn't stand up to much scrutiny either. The oil price is set in a market. For Shell, Exxon et al to hoard oil underground would be to leave billions of dollars of investment languishing unused. Others fear that oil is pricey because it is running out. But there is little evidence to support the doctrine of “peak oil” in its extreme form. The Middle East still seems to contain a sea of the stuff. Even if new finds elsewhere have been rarer and less accessible than in the past, vast quantities of oil could now be profitably stripped from tar sands and shale.

The truth is more prosaic. Finding and developing new oil fields is an expensive and time-consuming business. The giant new fields in the deep water off Brazil are unlikely to produce oil for a decade or more. Furthermore, oil is perverse. When prices are low, oil-rich countries welcome the low-cost, high-tech and well-capitalised oil firms. When prices are high, countries like Russia and Venezuela kick them out again. Likewise the engineers, survey ships and seismic rigs that oil firms need to find and produce new deposits are expensive right now. The costs of finding oil have, temporarily, doubled precisely because everybody wants to give them work.

Hope at the bottom of the barrel
So the oil shock will take time to abate. Some greens may welcome that, seeing three-figure oil as a way of limiting greenhouse emissions. Conservation will indeed increase. But everything high prices achieve could be done better by sensible carbon taxes. As well as curbing oil use, high prices have put tar sands in business which create far more carbon dioxide than conventional oil. Profits are going to ugly oil-fed regimes, not Western exchequers. And the wild unpredictability of prices will blunt the effect of dear oil on people's behaviour.

From this perspective, governments should speed up the adjustment—or at least stop delaying it. Half the world's people are sheltered from fuel prices by subsidies—which, perversely, have boosted demand and mostly benefited the better off. Now countries like Indonesia, Taiwan and Sri Lanka have begun to realise that they can ill afford this. Cutting fuel taxes in the rich world makes no sense either (see article). There are better ways to return cash to struggling voters.

The 1970s showed how demand and supply, inelastic in the short run, eventually give rise to conservation and new production. When all those new fields are on-stream, when the SUVs have been sold and the boilers replaced, the downcycle will take hold. By then the slow-motion oil shock could have catalysed momentous change. Right now motorists have no substitute for oil. But it is no coincidence that car companies are suddenly accelerating their plans to sell electric hybrids that are far cheaper to run than petrol or diesel cars at these prices. The first two oil shocks banished oil from power generation. How fitting if the third finished the job and began to free transport from oil's century-long monopoly.

June 26, 2008
OP-ED COLUMNIST
Books, Not Bombs

By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF
AMMAN, Jordan

The dirty little secret of the Iraq war isn’t in Baghdad or Basra. Rather, it’s found in the squalid brothels of Damascus and the poorest neighborhoods of East Amman.

Some two million Iraqis have fled their homeland and are now sheltering in run-down neighborhoods in surrounding countries. These are the new Palestinians, the 21st-century Arab diaspora that threatens the region’s stability.

Many youngsters are getting no education, and some girls are pushed into prostitution, particularly in Damascus. Impoverished, angry, disenfranchised, unwanted, these Iraqis are a combustible new Middle Eastern element that no one wants to address or even think about.

American hawks prefer to address the region’s security challenges by devoting billions of dollars to permanent American military bases. A simpler way to fight extremism would be to pay school fees for refugee children to ensure that they at least get an education and don’t become forever marginalized and underemployed.

We broke Iraq, and we have a moral responsibility to those whose lives have been shattered by our actions. Helping them is also in our national interest, for we’ll regret our myopia if we allow young Iraqi refugees to grow up uneducated and unemployable, festering in their societies.

“My husband and I have decided to pull our three children out of school,” said Yussra Shaker, a college-educated English teacher who fled Iraq and went to Jordan when her 15-year-old son was shot in the leg in a kidnapping attempt. Ms. Yussra deeply believes in education, and her eyes welled with tears as she described the decision to withdraw her children because of school fees and beatings by Jordanian students.

“My children are very good students, and the teachers like them,” Ms. Yussra explained, “and so the local children beat them up even more.”

Ms. Yussra’s family is Christian, but most of those fleeing Iraq are Sunni Muslims — and some of them may have shot at Americans or brutalized Shiites in the ongoing sectarian conflict. One Sunni family I visited came from Falluja after their house was blown up, possibly by Americans, and they have decorated their leaking apartment with a huge poster of Saddam Hussein.

This family was composed of two wives of one man (who was back in Iraq, living in a tent) and their five children. The eldest son was a surly young man in his 20s who looked as if his preferred interaction with Americans might have involved an AK-47 in his arms.

Yet the family also has four small children and was nine months behind in its rent and in danger of being thrown out on to the street. I visited them at 2 p.m., and nobody in the house had eaten anything so far that day.

Iraqi refugees don’t get help in part because this is a problem that almost everybody wants to hide. Syria and Jordan worry that if the refugees get assistance, then they will stay indefinitely. The U.S. doesn’t want to talk about a crisis created by our war, and Iraq’s Shiite leaders don’t much care about Sunnis or Christians displaced by Shiite militias.

“It’s among the largest humanitarian crises in the world today,” said Michael Kocher, a refugee expert at the International Rescue Committee, which recently published a report on the crisis. “It’s getting very little attention from the Security Council on down, which we feel is scandalous and also bad strategy.”

It’s easy to blame the surrounding countries, such as Jordan and Syria, for not being more hospitable to Iraqis. But those countries have, however grudgingly, tolerated the influx despite the burden and political risk.

Iraqi refugees are hard to count but may now amount to 8 percent of Jordan’s population of six million. The average Jordanian family, which opposed the war in the first place, is now bearing a cost that may be as much as $1,000 per year for providing for the refugees.

In contrast, last year the United States took in only 1,608 Iraqis. European countries have done better, but they believe that America created the refugee crisis and should take the lead in resolving it.

“Apathy towards the crisis has been the overwhelming response,” Amnesty International said in a report last week.

We have already seen, in the case of Palestinians, how a refugee diaspora can destabilize a region for decades. If Jordan were to collapse in part from such pressures, that would be a catastrophe — and the best way to prevent that isn’t to give it Blackhawk helicopters, but help with school fees and school construction.

If we let the Iraqi refugee crisis drag on — and especially if we allow young refugees to miss an education so that they will never have a future — then we are sentencing ourselves to endure their wrath for decades to come. Educating Iraqis may not be as glamorous as bombing them, but it will do far more good.

I invite you to comment on this column on my blog, www.nytimes.com/ontheground, and join me on Facebook at www.facebook.com/kristof.

June 1, 2008
METRICS
Wasted Energy

By HANNAH FAIRFIELD
It's gone before you even knew it was there: As energy is unlocked from fuels at power plants, two-thirds of the energy consumed to create electricity is lost.

The laws of thermodynamics dictate that conversion efficiency will never be 100 percent, because heat is lost at every step of the conversion process. But new technologies may be able to greatly increase conversion efficiency, moving from an overall rate of 36 percent to closer to 50 percent.

At present, coal — in all its carbon-belching inefficiency — is king because it's cheap. Still, the use of natural gas to create electricity has been rising rapidly, in part because of more-efficient gas turbines.

Natural gas prices have been climbing, however, and coal prices could rise as well.

"High fossil fuel prices will drive technology and innovation, because they respond to price signals," said Frank A. Wolak, an economist at Stanford. "Technology can improve efficiency by working the margin, gaining 10 to 15 percent. That's money."

Adding a carbon tax or regulating carbon trading could also change price incentives, increasing demand for nuclear and renewable energy sources.

"Once the cost of burning fossil fuels doubles, the renewable energy options begin to look really good," said Jon G. McGowan, a mechanical engineer at the University of Massachusetts.