Iran's chief of staff expands threat of Strait of Hormuz closure
DEBKAfile Special Report
July 10, 2008, 12:13 PM (GMT+02:00)

Iran's chief of staff Maj. Gen Hasan Firuzabadi
Chief of staff Maj. Gen. Hasan Firuzabadi said Saturday, July, 5, Iran’s strategy is to keep the Strait of Hormuz in “southern Iran” open, but “if the country’s interests are jeopardized in the region, we will not let any ship pass through.”
DEBKAfile’s military sources report that this statement, quoted by the official IRNA agency, enlarges on earlier threats by the IRGC commander Ali Jafari that the waterway would be closed if Iran was attacked. Iran’s “strategic interests in the region” cited now by Firuzabadi could extend to attacks on its allies and terrorist arms, Syria, Hizballah or Hamas.
It is in keeping with Iran’s refusal to give up uranium enrichment in its reply to the six-power proposals for ending the nuclear standoff.
Iran offered nothing more than negotiations, its standard gambit for spinning out time to achieve progress on its nuclear bomb program.
The latest drumbeat from Tehran also posed a fresh challenge to Washington after Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned on July 2 that the US would not let Iran block the strategic waterway through which 40 percent of the world’s oil supplies are transported.
The New York Times Saturday quoted Tehran as stating: “The time for negotiations from the condescending position of inequality has come to an end,”
in its response to the incentives package offered by the five UN Security Council members plus Germany. The letter made no reference to the proposal of preliminary talks to start with a mutual six-week “freeze” both on a fourth round of UN Security Council sanctions and on the expansion of Iran’s uranium enrichment program.
Further hardening its position, Tehran’s reply to the proposals presented last month by Europeam Union foreign executive Javier Solana denounces such sanctions as “illegal.” Chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili was named to lead the delegation in comprehensive negotiations.
By failing to address the “freeze-for-freeze” approach, in which high hopes of a more accommodating Iranian approach had been pinned, Tehran has put an end to the optimistic intimations emanating from Washington, Europe and Israeli officials in the last two weeks. Some American sources were certain that a closed Iranian parliamentary conference Monday, June 30, had endorsed the mutual freeze offer.
DEBKAfile’s Iranian sources add: The Iranian reply to Solana demonstrates that Tehran was not intimidated by the implied threats of an imminent US and/or Israel attack on its nuclear facilities published in the last two weeks; neither is Iran deterred from continuing to enrich uranium by the prospect of more sanctions. Even in accepting the offer of negotiations, the Islamic Republic stiffly denies any world power the right to strike a “condescending position.”

DeYoung, author of "Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell," is senior diplomatic correspondent and an associate editor of The Washington Post.

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Karen DeYoung: Welcome. Lots of questions here about whether Iraq is demanding a timeline for U.S. withdrawal, status of forces agreement, etc. I'll try to explain.

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San Diego: Why did negotiations for the status of forces agreement collapse? Was it because of an impasse, a lack of sufficient time/will, etc.? Also, is the Iraqi government planning to recess for the month of August, as it did last year? Was that also a factor?

Karen DeYoung: The negotiations didn't collapse. What started in March were bilateral negotiations over two separate documents--a status of forces agreement to provide a legal framework for U.S. military presence and activities in Iraq, and a "strategic framework agreement" that would set a course for a longterm economic, political, cultural and security relationship between Iraq and the United States. The strategic framework negotiating teams have been moving ahead fairly steadily. The SOFA negotiating teams got deeply bogged down by the end of May, a situation that got even more difficult when the terms of a U.S. draft proposal were leaked. It basically allowed U.s. military to continue doing what it has been doing--conducting military operations and detaining Iraqi civilians when and where it wanted, without asking Iraqi permission. Also gave blanket immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law for U.S. military, DOD personnel, and U.S. DOD security contractors. Iraqis balked at this as an infringement on their sovereignty--not least because it's a political hot potato and elections are pending. Particularly sensitive is a "timeline" for withdrawal. To make a long story short, it was decided last month not to go for the full monty on a SOFA, but to do what the military calls a "temporary operating protocol" that will cover the most urgent needs of the military for the next year or so, while continuing to talk about the longerm SOFA. They have papered over the operations and detainee control issues by forming a joint high level U.s.-Iraq committee that has titular control over both, and the Americans have agreed to include a "time horizon" for withdrawal...a kind of notional date when they'll withdraw from more visible positions in Iraqi cities, etc., assuming all is calm.

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Karen DeYoung: Excuse the delay in the above long answer. I got called away for a few minutes in mid-typing. Will go on a bit after time limit to get to your questions.

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Princeton, N.J.: Two similar questions: First, are they any plans to get the 5 million displaced persons in and out of Iraq back to their homes, particularly if they came from an ethnically cleansed area such as Baghdad or Kirkuk? Based on the history of civil strife from the 30 years war to Bosnia, I believe there is a high probability that many (more than 2 million) will have to die before stability can be achieved. Even if you only believe there is just a possibility of such a catastrophe, should we have some plans to deal with it? Do we?

Karen DeYoung: Little progress made on the refugee issue. The International Crisis Group this week published a lengthy report on refugees, which you can find on their site. It calls on the Iraqi government--which has said a lot but done little--to spend some of their oil surplus on helping those running out of money in Syria and Jordan. And calls on the international community to start paying more attention. Those relative few (out of about 5 million displaced within and outside Iraq) who have returned home have done so largely because they've run out of resources to stay away.

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Minneapolis: What's going to keep Afghanistan from becoming the next Iraq (though they've had years to regroup and learn our modus operandi), and what will prevent Iraq from becoming the next Lebanon? (I don't see how pullout/redeployment solves any of our problems, both from a counterinsurgency standpoint and from a logistical one (i.e. a friend of mine is on his fifth tour). Thank you.

Karen DeYoung: Things are not going well in Afghanistan. Although there seems to be widespread agreement more foreign troops needed, it's not at all clear that will be the answer.

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Arlington, Va.: Sen. Obama pointed to Malaki's call for a timetable in his op-ed outlining his plan to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq, but the BBC is now reporting that Malaki did not say what was widely and incorrectly reported. What he actually said was "the direction is towards either a memorandum of understanding on their evacuation, or a memorandum of understanding on programming their presence." What is the position of the Malaki government? Have they clarified their statement? When will The Post print a correction or clarification?

washingtonpost.com: Iraq faces dilemma over US troops (BBC, July 14)

Karen DeYoung: See above response. Maliki said he wanted "either a memorandum of understanding for the departure of forces or a memorandum of understanding to set a timetable for the presence of the forces, so that we know [their presence] will end in a specific time." I think the Iraqis agree on some kind of conditions-based departure. But Maliki also wants some dates to counter pressure from Sadr and others who have demanded a "timetable."

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Freising, Germany: How is the oil business doing in Iraq these days? I've read that technical support agreements were pending between the Iraqi government and international oil companies, but is there any hope of increasing production in the short or medium term?

Karen DeYoung: They're somewhere between 2.5 and 3 million bpd--not great, but high oil prices have meant a lot more money. Oil ministry still shooting for 5 million, but it's been very slow going. The contracts are to improve production in existing fields. Development and longer term production contracts still await passage of a hydrocarbons law.

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Stone Harbor, N.J.: The poll today shows voters equally divided for/against the Iraq conflict. Why is it, do you think, that so many commentators and journalists keep trumpeting that the majority of Americans want us out immediately? Is it wishful thinking on their part (hoping Obama will be elected) or are they really so out of touch?

washingtonpost.com: Poll Finds Voters Split on Candidates' Iraq-Pullout Positions (Post, July 15)

Karen DeYoung: Split in today's Washington Post poll is between those who agree with Obama's 16-month combat troop withdrawal timetable, and those who favor McCain's "conditions-based" approach with no timetable. Respondents also split down the middle on who they think better able to handle the war in general. A sizeable and largely unchanged majority (63 percent) say the war was not worth fighting in the first place, although there is a slight uptick (up to 46 percent from 40 percent) who say current U.s. policy is making some progress in restoring civil order.

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Seattle: Easy one: Is Maliki's call for a timeline a negotiating tactic, an attempt to boost domestic support, or genuine? Probably a combination of all three, but which is primary, in your opinion?

Karen DeYoung: I agree it's all three. A realization that he can't have it both ways--can't say things are better, Iraqi security forces are doing great, but we still need as many Americans here for the forseeable future. Iraqis are tired of seeing so many American soldiers around. That's one of the reasons why the "time horizon" now being negotiated is likely to be initially for withdrawal from more visible positions in Iraqi cities, rather than withdrawal from the country altogether.

The Rise of the Chechen Emirate?

by Dmitry Shlapentokh
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2008, pp. 49-56
http://www.meforum.org/article/1931
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Chechnya has been at war with Russia for generations. By 1999, when the second Chechen war broke out, two resistance groups had emerged: nationalists and jihadists. While long simmering below the surface, the schism between the two camps erupted publicly in 2006 on the Internet after Akhmed Khalidovich Zakaev, the moderate foreign minister of the shadow Chechen government, argued that the goal of the Chechen resistance should be an independent Chechen state modeled after Western democracies and integrated into the global community. Movladi Udugov, a jihadist and editor of Kavkaz Center, the best-known online resistance publication, vehemently disagreed and declared that for real Muslims, spiritual bonds should be more important than blood ties. He argued that he would rather embrace ethnic Russians who had converted to Islam than Chechens who had strayed from their religion. There was no point modeling society after Western states, he contended, because all non-Muslim states, or those that are Muslim only in name but not in essence, are corrupt. Instead, Chechens should fight for the establishment of a global caliphate.

In October 2007, this ideological conflict led to a definitive split when Sheikh Doku (Dokka) Khamatovich Umarov, shadow president of the Chechen Republic, threw his support behind Udugov. Umarov endorsed the dissolution of the republic and its replacement by an Islamist "emirate" and argued that Chechens, as Muslims, cannot live outside Islam and must defend all Muslims. The dispute between Umarov and Zakaev provides insight not only into the future direction of the Chechen movement but also into the tactics and strategy of global jihadists and the resistance they face from nationalist Muslims.

Chechen Resistance

Tension in Chechnya existed during the Soviet period and grew through the Gorbachev years. Chechen resistance erupted openly in 1994.[1] As the first Chechen war (1994-96) proceeded, the friction between nationalist resistance leaders and their Islamist counterparts grew. By the start of the second Chechen war in 1999, jihadists began pressing the Chechen government. A certain Khanif, a contributor to Chechenpress, argued that the jihadists began to press the Chechen government almost from the start of the second Chechen war. In 1999, Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen president who took power after the death of Dzjokhar Dudaev in 1996, introduced Islamic law. Three years later, Shamil Salmanovich Basayev (1965-2006), one of the best-known radical commanders, declared the Chechen state to be a "dead body."[2] The jihadists apparently had become the leading force in the Chechen resistance and proclaimed that turning to jihad was the only way to victory.[3]

The Formal Split

The Chechen leadership's divorce was nasty. Both sides sought to delegitimize the other. Umarov, the Islamist, argued that those who represent the Chechen resistance should be in the Caucasus risking their lives, not enjoying comfort in exile. He painted Zakaev and his nationalist followers as not only having ceased to be Muslims but also as pawns of adventurers like Boris Berezovsky, a corrupt tycoon prominent during the Yeltsin era (1991-99) who escaped to the West following Russian president Vladimir Putin's accession. Guilt by association was a frequent theme. Jihadist websites show Zakaev not only in the company of Berezovsky but also of Yurii Filshtinskii, a Russian-Jewish émigré and historian who had coauthored a book with the late Alexander Litvinenko accusing the Russian secret police, Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), of staging bombings in several apartment buildings in 1999 to create a pretext for Russia to launch the second Chechen war. Indeed, Russian authorities accused Chechens of the bombings. Putin, in his position as prime minister and Yeltsin heir, proclaimed that he would pursue terrorists everywhere and launch a full-fledged assault on Chechnya.

The jihadist sites also presented Zakaev as an associate of Ramzan Kadyrov, the Putin-appointed Russian viceroy of Chechnya, and, by extension, an ally of Putin himself.

Zakaev supporters, on the other hand, depicted jihadists as Islamist Bolsheviks, fanatics lacking strategy and indifferent to ordinary Chechens. Such an accusation resonates among Russians and those living among them: Vladimir Lenin was indifferent to the outbreak of World War I because, he believed, the misery accompanying that conflict could catalyze revolution.[4] As Lenin cooperated with anyone—even German Kaiser Wilhelm—to achieve his aims, so too did Zakaev accuse Umarov of striking bargains with his arch foe Putin. After all, both Putin and the Islamists sought political gain at the expense of Chechen blood. Abdul-Malik Isaev, a contributor to Chechenpress, explained:

In 1917, the major ideologists of Bolshevism, following the bidding and [with] the money received from Germany, staged a military coup in Russia and proclaimed the words that became famous: "Comrades! Revolution, the necessity of which the Bolsheviks have [fore]told for such a long time, has finally taken place!" Today in Chechnya, the events are essentially the same—Dokka [Umarov] has confirmed his decision to promulgate a "Caucasian emirate," the "necessity" of which our "Islamist-radicals" of Bolshevik "mazhab" have [fore]told for a long time. The traitors of the Chechen people still await Shari‘a court for their provocative call for a Dagestan campaign, putting their knives in the back of our people and our state.[5]

While Lenin believed that only he could interpret Marxism, Umarov and Udugov––the "green commissars"––believed that they alone were the true interpreters of Islam. Many Chechen government officials distanced themselves from Umarov after his October 2007 declaration of an emirate.[6] As foreign minister, Zakaev declared himself leader of the Chechen government-in-exile and demanded that Chechen representatives abroad should follow his orders.[7] Umarov's declaration of an emirate took the Chechen parliament by surprise; and after receiving no answer from Umarov to the question of how he could occupy a position that does not exist in the Chechen constitution,[8] Zhaloud Lema Sarliapov, chairman of the Chechen parliament, proclaimed that power in the Chechen Republic should belong to parliament, and not to the president, who had actually abdicated his position.[9] Others, such as the Chechen veterans of its Russian wars and a parliamentarian who was also the brother of Chechnya's former vice president, also took Zakaev's side. Sultan Asaev, a colonel in the resistance army, said that Chechens who had suffered in fighting the "fascist dictatorship" should protest the creation of an "emirate" that would lead to even greater tragedy.[10] Salambek Amaev, a former military commandant and representative of the Chechen Republic in Poland, also protested.[11]

Zakaev also won the support of the Chechen "elders" who in traditional society are seen as the ultimate moral authorities. Alla Dudaev, widow of the first Chechen president, Dzjokhar Dudaev, argued that the promulgation of the emirate was a betrayal of her martyred husband's life's work. [12] Chechen elders in Istanbul, Udugov's city of residence, also flocked to Zakaev's side despite Udugov's assertions to the contrary.[13] Zakaev also received considerable support from the approximately half-million strong Chechen diaspora. The consuls of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and representatives of the Chechen diaspora stated that if Umarov believed he needed more titles to engage in the liberation of the Caucasus, he could just resign from the presidency of the Chechen Republic and take whatever title he wished.[14]

While Chechnya has newspapers, most are controlled and do not permit open debate. Most Chechens, especially those in the diaspora, turn to websites for news and to debate ideas. The editorial boards of some Chechen websites dissociated themselves from Umarov. The board of the Daymohk news agency, which had served since the administration of former Chechen president Abdul Khalim Sadulaev (2005-06) as presidential spokesman, severed its connection with Umarov.[15] The split divided other Internet papers into two camps. While the Chechentimes adopted a pro-Umarov position, Chechenpress contributor Mairbek Taramov urged readers to be aware that the Chechentimes had nothing to do with the old Chechen Times, which had been "the vehicle of a European-oriented group of Chechens."[16]

Lastly, the declaration of the emirate antagonized Chechnya's foreign supporters. Adam Borovskii, consul of the Chechen Republic in Poland, proclaimed that he and "his Polish friends" had done their best to liberate Chechnya. But now, after the promulgation of the emirate, he saw the Chechen leaders identifying themselves with Al-Qaeda, something with which he wanted no connection.[17] Zakaev became de facto leader of the Chechen government-in-exile.

Delegitimizing Jihadists

Any divorce is difficult. In order to justify the schism to the broader Chechen community, Zakaev developed a number of arguments to justify his claim to leadership. First, he argued, since Umarov had implicitly abandoned the presidency, he, Zakaev, could not be his representative.[18] In Umarov's stead, parliament should take power.

Second, Zakaev argued that the declaration of the emirate made it impossible to cooperate with Kadyrov's government. Even before the February 2007 split, Zakaev had developed the notion that Moscow was losing control over Chechnya and that Kadyrov's regime had become part of the Chechen opposition. For example, he argued that its security forces and militia are perhaps 70 to 80 percent former members of the resistance, who uphold Chechen independence in their heart.[19] Kadyrov's trend toward independence provided the opportunity, Zakaev suggested, for compromise with the moderate segments of the Chechen resistance. The declaration of the emirate upset any chance at compromise. Udugov and Umarov wanted, Zakaev implied, a war without end.[20]

Pushing this further, Zakaev put forth a third argument: that Russian intelligence played a role in the declaration of an emirate. He alleged that the FSB had met with and bribed members of the Chechen resistance; rumors spread that about half a billion dollars changing hands.[21] These Russian agents, Zakaev said, had convinced Umarov to abrogate the Chechen constitution, abolish the Chechen state, and proclaim an emirate, thereby giving Moscow justification for war against the Chechen resistance by arguing that it was fighting against a branch of Al-Qaeda.[22]

The corruption argument resonated. Larisa Volodimerova, a contributor to Chechenpress, suggested that Udugov and Putin cynically collaborated to profit at the expense of the Chechen people.[23] Others noted that many jihadist leaders lived in luxury. Udugov, for example, lived well in Istanbul with his four wives, seemingly with no regard for the families of jihadists killed and wounded in Chechnya. [24] Chechenpress contributor Turko Dikaev stated with an air of irony that it might turn out that the reason for Umarov's promulgation of the emirate was quite personal and quite petty. Beyond profit, the move would enable Umarov to purge Zakaev since a foreign ministry would no longer be necessary.[25]

Most of Zakaev's supporters accepted his arguments. Umarov's desire to build an emirate defied logic. One contributor to Ichkeria FR—the Internet publication of the Chechen diaspora in France—said that Umarov justified his plan to create an emirate by arguing it would help Chechens find support for their struggle among the other people of the Caucasus although a regional emirate based on Islam rather than nationality would require the dissolution of the Chechen state. Absent the emirate declaration, Chechens could preserve their own state and strike alliances with the other people of the Caucasus.[26] Zakaev's backers countered that idea by noting that Umarov's actions would alienate the Chechen resistance from the major global powers and by suggesting that even if bribery did not motivate Umarov, he had certainly overestimated the importance of Islam in Chechen life.

Chechenpress contributor Larisa Volodimerova argued that those who proclaimed the emirate repeated mistakes made by past Chechen leaders, such as Shamil, who tried to create a theocratic state: They believed that Islam would solidify the Chechen ranks and make them resolute fighters for independence. But the Islamization of Chechen life and theocratic despotism led to the opposite result: Chechens resent autocracy, theocratic or otherwise, and chose not to fight for it.[27] El'mira Magometova, another Chechenpress contributor, argued that Chechens had never regarded Islam as an essential aspect of their national identity and noted that Islam only came to Chechnya in the seventeenth century. Further, she argued, a major reason for Imam Shamil's defeat in 1859 was Chechens' intolerance toward monarchy; many assumed Shamil had such ambitions. Another contributor stated that he could, of course, be regarded as a heretic, but he did not believe the Qur'an could be used as a detailed guide in present-day society: It could only provide a general outline for behavior.[28] Vakhi Surko, another Chechenpress contributor, argued that those who promulgated the emirate and joined the global jihadist movement had alienated the global community.[29] A certain Iskander, a contributor to Chechenpress, stated that the supporters of the emirate actually said that they intended to engage in a war with the entire world, which he said is sheer madness.[30] Irchula Shmaiser, another contributor, supported this view. She stated that the jihadists are mocked as insane because they actually propose jihad without end.[31]

While the emirate's proponents said they were not bothered by the absence of international support—the global community does not care about Chechen suffering, they argued—Surko countered that, however true, needless antagonism of the international community was a misstep since it drew the world closer to Russia because of international antagonism to Al-Qaeda and its jihad. But the belief that Putin and Islamists cooperated resonates in the North Caucasus. Chechen writers blame the 1999 war in Dagestan, launched after terrorists blew up apartment buildings in Moscow and Volgodonsk, on both Putin and the Islamists. Subsequent Islamist terrorist attacks in Dubrovka and Beslan provided the Kremlin with justification to continue its war against Chechen civilians.[32] In the view of other Chechenpress contributors, events suggest a Putin role.[33] "There is a clear understanding that Udugov worked together with the FSB,"[34] one Chechen writer declared.

Not only might the emirate help Putin justify war against the Chechen resistance, [35] but it could drive a wedge between Chechnya and the West.[36] The West might be transformed from passive and often sympathetic observers into Chechnya's enemy and Russia's helper. Even after the September 2004 school massacre in Beslan, many Westerners expressed sympathy toward the Chechen cause.[37] Since that attack, there have been no major terrorist attacks against civilians. Should there be, however, Moscow would be able to link Chechen resistance with international terrorism. Prior to Udugov's statements, most Americans did not regard the Chechen resistance as part of the global terrorist movement.[38]

Nor would reliance on global Islamism necessarily help Chechnya. Khanif suggested that the umma, the global community of Muslims who band together for justice and liberty, is an illusion, existing more in the minds of jihadist ideologues than in real life. He questioned the assumption that Muslim people and Muslim governments care about Chechens. The Muslim world is not only disunited but also corrupt and remains the "old, sinful man." The mythical heroic umma united for the common struggle is similar to the mythical global proletariat whose heroic faculties and sense of solidarity exist only in the minds of believers.[39] One contributor to Chechenpress proclaimed that the Chechen people are more the victims of Islamists than of Putin.[40]

The conflict between Islamists and nationalists is irreconcilable and may lead to internecine violence within the Chechen resistance. While Zakaev may entrench himself in Europe as a good, "moderate" nationalist, Islamists will increasingly consolidate the battlefield. Chechnya might be for them just a weak link in the global chain of the "worldwide revolution." While Chechens will form the entirety of the moderate nationalists, the jihadists will embrace a variety of ethnic groups connected not just with foreign jihadists but with a network of Islamic—and possibly non-Islamic––extremists all over Russia. In this way, the Islamist movement in Chechnya parallels the Bolshevik movement in Russia in the years prior to World War I.

Conclusion

What of the implications of the schism within the Chechen movement? Jihadists are unpopular among many in the Chechen diaspora, most of whom would like to be seen as legitimate political refugees promoting an understandable cause rather than representatives of an Al-Qaeda type movement. Western politicians sympathetic to Chechen nationalism will certainly side with Zakaev. In embattled Chechnya, quite a few—at least judging by Internet discussions—might opt for Kadyrov's rule, which provides some modicum of stability and a chance for gainful employment for Chechen youth. Still, the small but dedicated groups of jihadists will not evaporate because of the lack of recruits: Regardless of what Chechens think of their cause, jihadists can attract Islamic extremists from across Russia and around the world.

What would be the implications of the small, dedicated bands of religious zealots in the Caucasus for Russia and ultimately the world? Here, comparison between Bolsheviks and jihadists is enlightening. Those who study the Bolshevik movement offer many arguments for its victory. Some credit Lenin's political genius; others, Marxist ideology or the centralized structure of the party. These elements played important roles, but there is another aspect of the story, which is the Bolshevik similarity to a religious movement. Bolshevik messianism led the movement to persist even when Russia's political and social order was stable. For Lenin, as well as for many other radicals in Europe, the revolution was just an abstraction. In fact, Russia had not experienced a mass upheaval since the Pugachev rebellion in the late eighteenth century, and Europe had not experienced a major revolution since that of the Paris Commune in 1871. Still, the Bolsheviks faithfully believed both in their providential mission and in the instability of the global order and persisted. So when they appeared to be right, and the global order collapsed in the wake of WWI, they were quick to take advantage of the opportunity. The same could be said about the jihadists. If Russia remains stable, the jihadists' influence on Russia and global politics most likely will be marginal. But if a breakdown happens—what Russians call katastroika—the extremists and jihadists, like the Bolsheviks before them, will play an important role in shaping events, at least in the North Caucasus. If this were indeed to happen, the present split in the Chechen resistance would be seen as important as the split between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks more than a hundred years ago.

Dmitry Shlapentokh is an associate professor at Indiana University-South Bend.

[1] James Hughes, Chechnya, From Nationalism to Jihad (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), pp. 16-18.
[2] Khanif, "Khimera v. Chechne," Chechennews, Oct. 29, 2007.
[3] Lorenzo Vidino, "How Chechnya Became a Breeding Ground for Terror," Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2005, pp. 57-66.
[4] Christopher Reed, Lenin: A Revolutionary Life (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 107.
[5] Abdul-Malik Isaev, "Pritcha pro otrublennuiu golovu," Chechenpress (Tblisi, Georgia), Dec. 1, 2007.
[6] Amir Dokka, "Declaration of the Caucasian Emirate," Kavkazcenter.com (Grozny, Chechnya; Tblisi, Georgia), Nov. 22, 2007.
[7] "Press-reliz MID CHRI," Chechenpress, Nov. 1, 2007.
[8] "Soobshchenie Press—Sluzhby Parlamenta Chechenskoi Respubliki Ichkeriia," Chechenpress, Nov. 5, 2007.
[9] "Postanovlenie Parlamenta CHRI, No. 1-Bl," Chechenpress, Nov. 6, 2007.
[10] Sultan Asaev, "Obrashchenie," Chechennews, Oct. 28, 2007.
[11] "Zaiavlenie Salambeka Amaeva," Chechennews, Oct. 22, 2007.
[12] Alla Dudaeva, "Obrashchenie k Glave Natsional'noi Sluzhby Informatsii CHRI Movladu Udugovu," Chechennews, Oct. 25, 2007.
[13] Administratsiia CIA, "Chechenpress ob adnoi Udugovskoi fal'shivke," Chechenpress, Nov. 3, 2007.
[14] "Gosudarstvennyi suverenitet i nezavisimost Chechenskoi Respubliki nedelimy, nezyblemy," Ichkeria FR (Paris), Oct. 24, 2007.
[15] "Zaiavlenie Informatsionnogo Agenstva Daymohk," Daymohk (Baku, Azerbaijan), Nov. 3, 2007.
[16] Mairbek Taramov, "Obrashchenie k redaktoram SMI CHRI," Chechenpress, Nov. 4, 2007.
[17] Adam Borovskii, "Ia ni khochu byt' predstavitelem Severokavkazskikh Emiratov," Chechennews, Oct. 26, 2007.
[18] "Zaiavlenie Ministra Inostrannykh Del CHRI," Chechenpress, Oct. 31, 2007.
[19] Akhmed Zakaev, "Kadyrov prodolzhaet politiku dekolonizatsii Chechni-Akhmed Zakaev," Caucasus Times.com (Prague), Feb. 27, 2007.
[20] Akhmed Zakaev, "Sdelat' takoe zaiavlenie bylo moim dolgom," Chechenpress, Nov. 1, 2007.
[21] Rava Prezhnii, "U menia takoe vpechatlenie chto menia lishili Rodiny," Chechenpress, Nov. 5, 2007.
[22] "Zaiavlenie Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del CHRI," Ichkeria FR, Oct. 21, 2007.
[23] "Kruglyi stol. Zasedanie pervoe," Chechenpress, Oct. 30, 2007.
[24] Rubati Mitsaev Laramtsa, "Nas ne nado uchit'," Chechenpress, Nov. 2, 2007.
[25] Turko Dikaev, "Zabludshie i pribludshie," Chechenpress, Nov. 1, 2007.
[26] Musa Taipov, "Kakoe gosudarstvo my stroim?" Ichkeria FR, Nov. 5, 2007.
[27] Larisa Volodimerova, "Sovremennaia istoriia khorosho zabytoe staroe," Chechenpress, Oct. 30, 2007.
[28] "Kruglyi stol. Zasidanie pervoe," Chechenpress, Oct. 30, 2007.
[29] Vakhi Surko, "Vrag v mecheti," Chechenpress, Oct. 30, 2007.
[30] Iskander, "Pis'mo Amiru Chechni," Chechenpress, Nov. 5, 2007.
[31] Irchula Shmaiser, "Romanticheskoe puteshestvie," Chechenpress, Nov. 1, 2007.
[32] Prosto Chechenets iz Groznogo, Seichas Zhitel' Strasburga, "Sukiny deti," Chechenpress, Nov. 6, 2007.
[33] David Kudykov, "Vremia ispytaniia na zrelost'," Chechenpress, Nov. 2, 2007.
[34] "Kto otdaet prikazy?" Chechenpress, Nov. 6, 2007.
[35] "Kruglyi stol. Zasedanie pervoe," Chechenpress, Oct. 30, 2007.
[36] "V itoge k chemu ia prishel?" Daymohk, Nov. 9, 2007.
[37] See, for example, Richard Pipes, "Give the Chechens a Land of Their Own," The New York Times, Sept. 9, 2004.
[38] Nadezhda Banchik, "O palachakh i zhertvakh, ili o sukinykh detiakh i sukinykh (krestnykh) ottsakh," Chechenpress, Nov. 9, 2007.
[39] Khanif, "Khimera v Chechne," Chechennews, Oct. 29, 2007.
[40] Vladimir Krapivinsky, "Kogo nam vsem blagodarit' za Vtoruiu voiny?" Chechenpress, Nov. 8, 2007.

Related Topics: Central Asia, Radical Islam, Russia/Soviet Union | Summer 2008 MEQ

Leaving the Left

By Jacob Laksin
FrontPageMagazine.com | 7/15/2008

Not so long ago, Barack Obama was the darling of the anti-war Left. On a host of national security issues – Iraq, Iran, government surveillance of terrorists – Obama preached a friendly gospel and was worshipped in turn as a political “messiah.” The liberal grassroots, sensing a kindred spirit in the Illinois Senator, rewarded him with the Democratic nomination. Nothing could come between Obama and his base.

Now something has. In a word: reality. As he courts the national electorate, Obama can ill-afford to sing from the same activist hymnal that propelled him, ever so narrowly, past Hillary Clinton. So it is that to the hair-pulling dismay of his supporters, Obama is leaving the Left – for the moment, at least.

It started with Iraq. During the primaries, Obama ran as the candidate of immediate withdrawal. Cheering the anti-war faithful, he pledged to remove all troops within 16 months – facts on the ground be damned. That promise, indeed, endures on his campaign website, which states that “Obama will immediately begin to remove our troops from Iraq. He will remove one to two combat brigades each month and have all of our combat brigades out of Iraq within 16 months.”

Or will he? On the campaign trail, Obama is beating a hasty retreat from retreat. No longer wedded to precipitous withdrawal, he now avers that he will “refine” his position after meeting with military commanders in Iraq later this month. Obama maintains that his position remains unchanged, but the claim is untenable. Where previously he would have imposed artificial timelines, risking chaos and worse with a too-hasty exit, he now appears to accept that the responsible position is to defer to military strategists.

This alone has given his devotees fits. But Obama has gone further. Belatedly but still unpalatably for his former fans, he has upbraided the fons et origo of the netroots, MoveOn.org, for its smearing last fall of Gen. David Petraeus as “General Betray Us.” By mainstream standards, the criticism was of little consequence. But among a political cohort famously intolerant of dissent – witness their passionate hatred of Sen. Joseph Lieberman – it constituted a betrayal in its own right.

On Iran, too, Obama is a changed man. Last fall, he made much of Hillary Clinton’s support for a nonbinding resolution to designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization. Though he missed the vote, Obama did not hide his disdain for Clinton’s position. As he lectured at the time: “I strongly differ with Sen. Hillary Clinton, who was the only Democratic presidential candidate to support this reckless amendment.”

But what was “reckless” then is all too reasonable now. Just last month, Obama revealed that he favored designating the Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist group after all. Likewise, Obama has stopped emphasizing his pledge, much admired on the left side of the blogosphere, to meet with Iranian leaders without preconditions.

If Obama’s deviations were solely rhetorical, the Left would have little cause to worry. As it happens, however, the senator’s votes have undergone a similar shift. Most prominently, Obama has reversed course on electronic wiretapping. Back when he was competing for the netroots’ support, Obama promised to filibuster any bill that offered retroactive immunity for telecom companies cooperating with the U.S. government. But last week he voted in favor of just such a bill.

Expectedly, the senator’s spurned supporters up in arms. Not only have establishment media like the New York Times bemoaned the “new and not improved” Obama, but his younger admirers have turned against him. On left-wing hubs like the Daily Kos, Obama has been savaged for his turnaround on the wiretapping bill. Ariana Huffington, writing on her vanity website the Huffington Post, bitterly condemned his “realstupidpolitik.” So badly has the faith in Obama been shaken that commenter on Talking Points Memo wondered dejectedly if “perhaps we should get off our high horses and stop believing in Obama as a messiah.”

Reassuring as this political divorce is, there is less to Obama’s repositioning than meets the eye. On Iraq, Obama’s position is nakedly opportunistic, capitalizing as it does on the universally acknowledged success of the surge strategy that he opposed. There is every reason to think that, should conditions in Iraq deteriorate, Obama would reverse himself again.

Obama can at least claim consistency for his position on Iran. That is not entirely to his credit, however. His newly hawkish rhetoric notwithstanding, Obama is still offering the same policy – “direct, aggressive, and sustained diplomacy” – that has manifestly failed to deter Tehran in recent years.

With respect to wiretapping, Obama voted wisely last week. But it is not insignificant that he also supported three amendments that would have vitiated the bill, among them a provision to strip communications companies of immunity – a measure that would make it much more difficult for private companies to cooperate with the government on counterterrorism efforts. It inspires no confidence in his judgment that Obama fails to understand this elemental point.

Still, this is a marked improvement from the Obama of the primaries. The country’s most liberal senator last year is more reluctant to play the part. To talk chalk this up to political expediency is to miss the point. Whatever his beliefs, Obama has shown himself to be a far shrewder politician than many imagined. Just as notable, his strategic feints have underscored that the antiwar Left’s positions on crucial national security matters are out of synch with the mainstream. If, as the netroots insist, the country has turned resolutely leftward on these issues, why then is Obama so eager to break ranks with them?

Ultimately, Obama’s political evolution is not, to crib a phrase, the kind of change one can believe in. But it is a welcome change all the same.

Jacob Laksin is a senior editor for FrontPage Magazine. He is a 2007 Phillips Foundation Journalism Fellow. His e-mail is jlaksin@gmail.com

The Unheeded Threat


By Newt Gingrich
Posted: Monday, July 14, 2008

ARTICLES
The Ripon Forum (June/July 2008)
Publication Date: July 14, 2008


Senior Fellow
Newt Gingrich

I was proud to help create the Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security and later serve on it once I stepped down as Speaker. Our report, released in early 2001, stated that the greatest threat to America's national security was a weapon of mass destruction going off in an American city, most likely from terrorists.

Very few paid attention to the findings, but that changed a few months later when the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 showed just how vulnerable we are. Spurred by the attacks, the United States has made significant investments to address this threat, many of which were adopted from the recommendations found in the report. There is no doubt that the issue of our security will be a significant part of our political debate for years to come.

Tragically, the same cannot be said for what the report found to be the second greatest threat to America's national security--the failure of America's math and science education system. Little focus has been paid to just how dangerous it is to allow other countries, especially non-democracies, to become the high-tech centers of the world.

If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.

This is especially dangerous because Hart-Rudman was hardly the first report to warn us of the threat posed by the failure of our education system. "A Nation at Risk" released in 1983 said, "If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war. As it stands, we have allowed this to happen to ourselves." Little more than marginal change has been enacted since these reports were issued, and it is unlikely there will ever be a September 11th type of wake-up-call in the realm of math and science education that will motivate us towards dramatic action.

The result of our inaction is obvious. The United States continually ranks near the bottom in OECD rankings of student mathematical achievement. The National Science Foundation found that in 2005 only 35% of U.S. eighth graders were deemed to be proficient in math. China and India graduate five times as many engineers as the United States.

There are those who will argue that the solution is more money for our schools. The facts show that money alone is not the answer. When President Reagan received the "A Nation at Risk" report in 1983, the United States was in the midst of a massive increase in education spending. Per pupil expenditures in constant dollars had increased from $4,060 dollars in 1970 to almost $6,000. "A Nation at Risk" showed that regardless of this nearly 50% increase in spending there was little progress to report. Despite President Reagan's warning, national education spending per pupil in constant dollars has increased again by approximately 50% since 1983, with 2005 spending at $9,266. Meanwhile, test results have continued to flat-line.

So, as we look for solutions to rapidly improve math and science education in the United States, it is important that we distinguish between merely investing more in our current education bureaucracies and actually investing in math and science education. The former would simply be doing more of what we are already doing and expecting a different result. Albert Einstein defined this as the definition of insanity. The latter will require bold leadership to force through needed changes in the current system and to develop new systems of learning that are very different than what we are used to and totally outside the current education system.

School choice must be included in our set of solutions. In addition to the urgent national security need for improving our educational system, there is also the moral imperative of liberating students in poor neighborhoods from an environment that will cripple their lives. School choice will provide immediate relief to those trapped in failing schools. Furthermore, introducing market forces to our education system by forcing schools to compete for students will inspire improvement faster than the slow, cumbersome movement of the education bureaucracy.

We should also experiment with offering direct incentives to students to accelerate their pace of learning beyond what is expected of them by school curricula. Imagine if students who finish high school early were given the cost of their remaining years in the form of scholarships. This would cost the taxpayers nothing and motivate students--especially those in poorer neighborhoods--to learn as rapidly as possible.

A more radical idea is to pay students directly for getting a B or better in their math and science classes. The idea offends many who either believe learning should be its own reward or don't think we should place special value on math and science over the arts, humanities, and social sciences. However, if we are serious that the failure of our math and science education is the second greatest threat to America's national security, there is nothing wrong with providing extra motivation for students to succeed in areas where we have the most urgent need. Money is a powerful motivator in every other area of American life. Why should education be any different?

Of course, an essential part of allowing students to learn on their own, independent of the set patch of the school curriculum is developing a clearinghouse of knowledge that is accessible to everyone for free. The federal government can play a role by contributing to the Library of Congress online learning programs that teach basic math through trigonometry and calculus as well as the physical sciences.

This initiative would be especially powerful combined with initiatives like Nicolas Negroponte's One Laptop per Child, which has produced a durable, $189 laptop specifically designed for young children. These laptops operate on an innovative peer-to-peer networking system that allows near-universal internet access over large areas despite a lack of traditional wireless coverage. Much focus has been paid in recent years to putting computers in the classroom. Instead, we should focus on putting the classroom in the computer. Compare the cost of these laptops to what most schools spend on textbooks, and you begin to see how such an investment would pay immediate dividends. Furthermore, immersing all students from a very early age in an interactive, dynamic learning environment--accessible from anywhere where students are allowed to learn at their own pace on the paths of their choice--will do more to build a culture of independent, life-long learning in America than any of the normal, bureaucratic, curriculum-based education models we have in America today.

By empowering parents to remove their children from failing schools, allowing every child access to sources of instruction and knowledge from a young age, providing the proper incentives, and allowing them the freedom to learn at their own pace and path, we can rapidly develop a culture of learning that produces math and science expertise far faster and cheaper than we could possibly hope to achieve inside the current education bureaucracy. Of course, these solutions will still provoke enormous opposition from those with vested interests in the current education system. They will recognize that such alternative systems of learning represent a threat to their livelihood.

However, after decades of trying to achieve substantial reform within the current education system, developing alternative, competitive learning systems has to be a substantial part of our strategy to rapidly improve math and science education. Without an enormous push from our nation's leaders to educate Americans about the urgency of bold action, we can expect a "slow bleed" of our technological dominance until our national security apparatus lags far behind that of China or even Russia or India.

This would be a far more dangerous world than the one America has known for the last half century.

Newt Gingrich is a senior fellow at AEI.