The Case of Bilal Hussein

MICHAEL J. TOTTEN
WEB ONLY

Last week, Associated Press photographer (and alleged insurgent collaborator) Bilal Hussein was released from custody after an Iraqi tribunal decided his case fell under an amnesty law passed earlier in 2008. The United States military had accused Hussein of working with insurgent groups in Anbar Province, in part because of his uncanny ability repeatedly to photograph insurgents in action.

I don’t know if he’s guilty or not, and he deserves the presumption of innocence. Either way, his case brings attention to an issue most consumers of news from Iraq rarely consider: the fact that large media companies--the Associated Press and other news wire agencies and newspapers--work with some sketchy characters in Iraq.

Iraq is full of such sketchy characters, as everyone knows, and large media companies require an enormous staff and network of locals to produce daily news coverage. They can’t cover breaking news every day in a low-intensity war zone without them, especially if violent activity--car bombs, fire fights, assassinations, and the like--are the bulk of what makes up the news. Someone is killed almost every day in Iraq, but the chances that an individual writer or photographer will happen to be present as an eyewitness are minuscule. Reporters who cover breaking daily news spend much of their time on the phone with stringers and sources. They don’t personally investigate every incident in the field. It just isn’t physically possible if they're required to write every day about what happens in a country the size of California, especially when it can take literally days to travel from one part of Baghdad to another.

I’m sure media companies are careful about who they hire, but it’s hard to make the right call every time in a bewildering and inscrutable place like Iraq. Terrorists and insurgents are and have been supported by a substantial percentage of the local population. It’s nearly impossible to build a firewall thick enough to keep them all out.

Even the U.S. military can’t do it. I spent a week with the 82nd Airborne at a small forward operating base in Baghdad where three thoroughly vetted translators were caught working for the enemy. If such people can infiltrate the Army, how much easier must it be to infiltrate the likes of the Associated Press and Reuters? The military is more motivated and more able to screen its employees than a multinational corporation. Media companies don't have the same caliber of intelligence assets, nor do newspapers and wire agencies depend on reporters, photographers, and stringers for their own security.

Bilal Hussein is a native of Fallujah. To an extent it made sense to hire him--or at least someone like him. He was “safely” able to work in the city during the heat of battle in 2004 without the protection of American soldiers, something no Western reporter would dare try.

Many Iraqi journalists do terrific work for Western media companies, and they do it bravely: most journalists killed in Iraq are Iraqi. At the same time, though, it’s undoubtedly risky to hire them. Few Fallujans today sympathize with the insurgents. But an enormous number did in 2004. How could the Associated Press possibly know for certain that local employees weren’t pulled from the ranks of insurgents or sympathizers? Even military intelligence officers didn’t know who most of the insurgents were then, and they were there on the ground.

Newspapers and news wire agencies could work around this problem by relying more strictly on eye-witness reports from trusted journalists embedded with combat soldiers. But there are problems with this model, too. Embedded reporters rarely get scoops or breaking news. Their reports are usually more accurate and in-depth, but they’re also hyper-local. Editors would have to change their definition of news, pitch the daily violent factoid reports over the side, accept the fact that they will miss most of the stories, and lay off much of their staff. The problem may not be solvable. But Bilal Hussein’s case, whatever its merits, should force everyone--the AP, the military, and news consumers alike--to re-examine their assumptions and options.

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April 29, 2008
ADVERTISING
A New Mideast Paper Vows to Be Different

By HEATHER TIMMONS
ONE of the Middle East’s wealthiest ruling families has a new asset: The National, a newspaper that promises independence from its royal owners.

The paper, an English-language daily based in Abu Dhabi, published its first issue on April 17, under close scrutiny in the Middle East and abroad. With its pledge to emulate Western newspaper standards and to “help society evolve,” The National is an anomaly in the Middle East, where most media are tightly controlled by the government.

“We aim to produce an excellent newspaper out of the region” that will set a new standard for other publications to aspire to, said Hassan M. Fattah, the deputy editor, who was a correspondent for The New York Times in the Middle East before joining The National. “Being government-owned does not equal being government-run,” he said. “There are no ministers sitting in my office” telling the paper what to write.

Already, the paper has attracted some serious competition: on Monday, The Financial Times of London said that it was introducing a new edition for the Middle East, with editorial offices based in Abu Dhabi. The first issue comes out on Tuesday.

“We have identified a strong and growing demand for high-quality global independent news and analysis across the gulf region,” Lionel Barber, editor of The Financial Times, said in a news release. “This demand reflects how the gulf has quickly become a financial and business powerhouse.”

•

Whether the region becomes a bastion for free speech is another matter. Until last September, journalists who wrote critical stories in the United Arab Emirates could be jailed for defamation, and the United Arab Emirates recently signed on to an Arab League charter asking media not to offend local leaders. The English-language channel of Al Jazeera, the Qatar-based broadcaster, recently lost some high-profile Western journalists, in part because of disagreements about coverage.

Nevertheless, The National has built its staff of 200 from newspapers around the world, including The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times and The Telegraph of Britain. The paper has had no problem hitting a start-up goal of 30 percent advertising in its pages (and 70 percent editorial content), and has had to turn away potential advertisers who wanted space in its first few issues, Mr. Fattah said.

The National is owned by Mubadala Development Company of Abu Dhabi, an investment and venture capital arm of the government which is led by the crown prince, Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan. The owners have given the paper’s executives five years to break even.

Abu Dhabi, by far the largest of the seven royalty-ruled territories that make up the United Arab Emirates, has been raising its profile as an international center of investment, tourism and finance, and The National is seen as part of an overall movement of change to appeal to outsiders.

The National, which aims at expatriate and local professionals in Abu Dhabi, has published a few articles with criticisms of the region, like one about severely overcrowded private schools, which limit companies’ abilities to attract new people. It has also printed controversial opinion pieces, one asking Arabs to welcome Jewish investors to the region and another warning that Emirate culture is disappearing.

The National has delved into regional news, offering a detailed account of former President Jimmy Carter’s trip to Syria and a buildup of Syrian troops on the Lebanese border. It has also printed its share of fluff — the wife of the British ambassador to Abu Dhabi’s perfect day in the Emirate includes Starbucks, Pilates, a blow dry and a seafood dinner.

The National is printing 80,000 copies, has 30,000 trial subscribers and has set a subscription rate of about $110 a year, but whether it can succeed in being independent and not attract the ire of the ruling families is unclear.

Martin Newland, the editor in chief, has fielded numerous questions about the paper’s independence, particularly after a memo he wrote to the staff that noted “we are not here to fight for press freedom” was leaked to outside media. Reached by cellphone one evening as he was having dinner with his wife, he said, “This is good news for journalism and good news for the region, so let’s get the hell off censorship.” He added that he was tired of having “the whole issue of a multimillion-dollar launch of a newspaper constantly distilled down to issues of censorship.”

Mr. Newland said the biggest difficulty in setting up the newspaper so far had been managing the logistics of getting 150 expatriate employees moved to an area where real estate prices are high and human resources and infrastructure are negligible. “If you come as an editor, you have to get loo paper for the bogs, sign off on taxi chits and listen to people 8,000 miles from home” who cannot find a place to live, he said. Then he returned to dinner.

•

Attracting talented reporters to Abu Dhabi has been one of the biggest problems, said Mr. Fattah, the deputy editor. “It was very hard to convince Americans to come here,” he said, because they think of it as a scary place. “One reporter wanted to do combat training” before she came, he said, when in reality the biggest killer in Abu Dhabi is obesity.

So far The National is drawing some guarded praise. “I looked very carefully to see if I could find any evidence that they were censoring themselves, and I didn’t see it,” said Josh Friedman, director of international programs at Columbia University’s graduate school of journalism. For example, the paper, which is available online at www.thenational.ae, referred to Hamas fighters as “militants,” Mr. Friedman said, a type of description that is rare in the Middle East.

While the articles about Abu Dhabi government announcements were not “hard hitting,” Mr. Friedman said, the paper carried others that could be considered critical.

Newspapers have thrived in the Arab-speaking world for decades; Al-Ahram in Egypt, published since 1876, has five million readers, for example. But freedom of the press has remained elusive. “If it doesn’t work, so what, and if it does work, it would be great,” Mr. Friedman said, “because that area of the world needs a free press.”

April 29, 2008
OP-ED COLUMNIST
Demography Is King

By DAVID BROOKS
Fifty-five years ago, 80 percent of American television viewers, young and old, tuned in to see Milton Berle on Tuesday nights. Tens of millions, rich and poor, worked together at Elks Lodges and Rotary Clubs. Millions more, rural and urban, read general-interest magazines like Look and Life. In those days, the owner of the local bank lived in the same town as the grocery clerk, and their boys might play on the same basketball team. Only 7 percent of adult Americans had a college degree.

But that’s all changed. In the decades since, some social divides, mostly involving ethnicity, have narrowed. But others, mostly involving education, have widened. Today there is a mass educated class. The college educated and non-college educated are likely to live in different towns. They have radically different divorce rates and starkly different ways of raising their children. The non-college educated not only earn less, they smoke more, grow more obese and die sooner.

Retailers, home builders and TV executives identify and reinforce these lifestyle clusters. There are more niche offerings and fewer common experiences.

The ensuing segmentation has reshaped politics. We’re used to the ideological divide between Red and Blue America. This year’s election has revealed a deep cultural gap within the Democratic Party, separating what Stuart Rothenberg calls the two Democratic parties.

In state after state (Wisconsin being the outlier), Barack Obama has won densely populated, well-educated areas. Hillary Clinton has won less-populated, less-educated areas. For example, Obama has won roughly 70 percent of the most-educated counties in the primary states. Clinton has won 90 percent of the least-educated counties. In state after state, Obama has won a few urban and inner-ring suburban counties. Clinton has won nearly everywhere else.

This social divide has overshadowed regional differences. Sixty-year-old, working-class Catholics vote the same, whether they live in Fresno, Scranton, Nashua or Orlando.

The divide has even overshadowed campaigning. Surely the most interesting feature of the Democratic race is how unimportant political events are. The candidates can spend tens of millions of dollars on advertising, but they are not able to sway their opponent’s voters to their side. They can win a stunning victory, but the momentum doesn’t carry over from state to state. They can make horrific gaffes, deliver brilliant speeches, turn in good or bad debate performances, but these things do not alter the race.

In Pennsylvania, Obama did everything conceivable to win over Clinton’s working-class voters. The effort was a failure. The great uniter failed to unite. In this election, persuasion isn’t important. Social identity is everything. Demography is king.

Over the years, different theories have emerged to describe the educated/less-educated divide. Conservatives have gravitated toward the culture war narrative, dividing the country between the wholesome masses and the decadent cultural elites. Some liberals believe income inequality drives everything. They wait for an uprising of economic populism. Other liberals divide the country morally, between the enlightened urbanites and the racist rednecks who will never vote for a black man.

None of these theories really fit the facts. It’s more accurate to say that the country has simply drifted apart into different subcultures. There’s no great hostility between the cultures. Americans have a fuzzy sense of where the boundaries lie. But people in different niches have developed different unconscious maps of reality. They have developed different communal understandings of what constitutes a good leader, of what sort of world they live in. They have developed different communal definitions, which they can’t even articulate, of what they mean by liberty, security and virtue. Demographic groups have begun to function like tribes or cultures.

We can all play the parlor game of trying to figure out why Obama, a Harvard Law grad, resonates with the more educated while Clinton, a Yale Law grad, resonates with the less educated. I’d throw in that Obama’s offer of a secular crusade hits a nerve among his fellow bobos, while Clinton’s talk of fighting and resilience plays well down market.

But these theories only scratch the surface. The mental maps people in different cultures form are infinitely complex and poorly understood even by those who hold them. People pick up millions of subtle signals from body language, word choice, facial expressions, policy positions and biographical details. Efforts to rebrand a candidate to appeal to down-market voters are inevitably crude and counterproductive.

The core message is that even if you take away the ideological differences between the parties, you are still left with profound social gulfs within the parties. There’s poignancy to that. The upscale liberals who revere Obama have spent their lives championing equality and opposing privilege. But they’ve smashed the old WASP social hierarchy only to create a new educational one.

Apr 12, 2008
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JD12Ak03.html


US edges closer to engaging Iran
By M K Bhadrakumar

April is the cruelest month, breeding
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire, stirring
Dull roots with spring rain.

T S Eliot's famous opening lines from The Waste Land come to mind as Washington confirms that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is heading for the Middle East to attend an international conference regarding the Iraq situation, in Kuwait on April 22. This will be no ordinary run-of-the-mill international conference. It's about Iraq. And Rice may well bump into her Iranian counterpart, Manouchehr Mottaki.

The big question is, as Eliot wrote, will they "drink coffee, and talk for an hour?" Indeed, will Mottaki call Rice "the hyacinth girl"? All that US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack would say at his press briefing on Wednesday was that "there's nothing


on the schedule for them to meet". He wouldn't make promises, nor rule out anything. But then Tehran hasn't yet announced Mottaki's participation at the Kuwait conference.

McCormack, however, volunteered an estimation that the Iranians have incrementally thawed in recent months. He added, "There was a sort of avoidance [initially] on the part of the Iranians. But that's changed ... They [Rice and Mottaki] didn't have what I would describe as any substantive conversations, but there was some interaction [at a previous Istanbul meet on Iraq]."

So, if the "iceman cometh" from Tehran, this could undoubtedly turn out to be one of the most crucial missions undertaken by Rice in her diplomatic career. The entire Middle East will be watching, attentively looking for clues in Rice's gait, her demeanor. They will want to know whether Washington is taking the plunge for unconditional talks with Tehran.

Everyone knows that when the Americans talk to the Iranians, finally, the kaleidoscope of Middle Eastern politics will have irrevocably shifted. The stakes are particularly high for the Middle East's "pro-West" sclerotic rulers. There is already serious unrest in Egypt, a key US ally. Helena Cobban, the contributing editor of the Boston Review and veteran writer on the Middle East, promptly put down in her blog a recollection from the great Cairo riots of 1977, when the late Mohammed Hassanein Heikal told her as he sat in his lovely Nile-side office at the al-Ahram newspaper that "the Egyptian people are like the Nile: they run deep and apparently quietly - until the point where suddenly they burst their banks".

There is surely expectation in the air, as Egypt is still in many respects the weightiest of all Arab countries. En route to Kuwait, Rice is taking care to stop in Bahrain for an exclusive meeting on April 21 with her counterparts from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. McCormack was short on specifics, merely saying, "I would expect they'd talk a lot about Iraq." Surely, there is a lot on their minds - especially regarding Iran.

The pro-West regimes in the Middle East will be keen to hear from Rice the import of a series of signals in recent days suggestive of a maneuvering in the Iran policy of the George W Bush administration. What is very obvious is that a lot of back-channel contacts are going on - rearranging the deckchairs, as it were. On balance, it certainly appears that the US Congressional testimonies by the top US commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus and the US ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, earlier in the week in Washington, turned out to be a low-key affair that was deliberately, almost ostentatiously, mild in rhetoric against Iran.

Crocker at one point said, "We support constructive relations between Iran and Iraq," and he went on to acknowledge, "Iran has a dialogue with everyone" - the good, the bad and the ugly - in the Iraqi Shi'ite community. There was the customary criticism of Iran arming and training "special groups", but Crocker balanced it by saying Iran has a relationship with every group in Iraq, not just Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army, which was the US's main adversary in the recent fighting in the southern Iraqi city of Basra. These are important signals by way of exchanging glances.

Tehran promptly responded at the Foreign Ministry level on Wednesday, but with a routine statement to the effect that the US, by accusing Iran, was finding an alibi for the failure of its "surge" policy in Iraq and was "playing with words". But the statement concurred that Iran had no favorites in Iraq. The Foreign Ministry spokesman said Tehran accepted that the measures taken by the Nuri al-Maliki government in Baghdad against the "militants" aimed at establishing "security and stability in that war-ravaged country". No senior Iranian leader bothered to join issue with Petraeus or Crocker. Why should they? The Iranians said the minimum needed by way of a rejoinder for the sake of record, and indicated they'd move on.

On its part, Tehran would have noticed that its own announcement on Tuesday regarding the addition of another 6,000 centrifuges to its nuclear reprocessing plant at Natanz also turned out to be an uneventful affair. Washington barely took notice. There were no threatening noises of fire and brimstone. The mood was almost one of stoic calm. In fact, coinciding with the Iranian announcement, senior US officials were quoted in The New York Times as offering further "incentives" to Iran, if only Tehran suspended uranium enrichment and negotiated with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany. "We are willing, within the boundaries of what is acceptable to us, to consider an elucidation of the incentive track," said a US official, who of course asked not to be named.

Similarly, Iran also took in its stride the massive five-day civil defense drill starting on April 6 ordered by Israel, which was the first under the National Security Authority established last September and involving the entire Israeli security apparatus and billed as its largest-ever mobilization. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak was uncharacteristically blunt in his statement that the drill aimed at preparing the country for a new conflict. Israeli National Infrastructure Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer threatened that the "Iranians are provoking us through their allies Syria and Hezbollah, [providing] them with much weaponry, and with that we have to contend".

But Tehran shrugged off the Israeli temper tantrums. No senior figure felt it necessary to comment publicly. A lone commentary by the Tehran Times newspaper observed philosophically that the Israeli "move has raised suspicions in regional countries, which are well aware of the evil nature of the Zionist regime". On the other hand, Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najar explained that the Iranian missile capability is only intended as a "deterrent defense power", which Iran is entitled to have, given the missile attacks during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988).

Such restraint is unusual in Israel-Iran rhetoric. Ironically, Iran's Fars news agency, which is close to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), leaked a story virtually absolving Israel of the responsibility for the murder of top Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyeh on February 12 in Damascus, over which tensions were building in the region, even as the Syrian investigation report on the murder was due to be released. Fars quoted "well-informed sources" to the effect that Saudi Arabia was behind the murder.

Fars named Saudi Prince Banda al-Sultan, formerly Saudi ambassador in Washington, as responsible and that the Saudis were retaliating for the 1996 car bomb attack at the Abdul Aziz airbase in Khobar near Dahran in Saudi Arabia, which was allegedly planned and executed by Mughniyeh. The Fars report would have brought a welcome relief to Israeli intelligence, since the prevailing impression in the region was that Syria would accuse Israel of involvement in Mughniyeh's assassination, which in turn would be the signal for Hezbollah to retaliate and for Israel to hit at Lebanon and possibly even Syria.

These are unusual happenings. All this while through the past week, Middle Easterners have been furiously chatting away that war is imminent. The prevailing mainstream opinion seems to be that "the prospect of a US military strike against Iran is increasing", as Gao Zugui, deputy director of the Institute of Security and Strategy, wrote in the government newspaper China Daily on Thursday.

But it is over Iraq that Tehran is making overtures. Tehran knows the US position is eroding fast in Iraq. The continuing mortar attacks on the Baghdad Green Zone are indeed a great humiliation for Washington. An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman issued a statement on Wednesday condemning the attack on the Green Zone, the intention being to distance itself from provocative acts against the US. The statement was issued a day after the Iranian spokesman acknowledged the receipt of an official communication from the US suggesting a next round of talks on the Iraq situation.

Equally significant was the visit by former Iraqi prime minister Ibrahim Jaafari to Tehran this week. It is well known that Jaafari has close links with the US and Britain. In all likelihood, he acted as a "back channel". The Iranian hosts took great pains to emphasize in talks with Jaafari that Tehran could be depended on as a collaborator for the stabilization of the Iraqi situation. The secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, assured Jaafari, "Iraq's security is of utmost importance for Iran and Iran will spare no efforts to help maintain security in Iraq." The head of the Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, also spoke in similar vein. Conceivably, Jaafari's consultations were aimed at preparing the ground for US-Iran talks regarding Iraq.

It is difficult to be judgemental about back-channel contacts. But, at any rate, following Jaafari's consultations in Tehran, the mass demonstration that Muqtada had threatened on the streets of Baghdad on Wednesday on the fifth anniversary of the US occupation of the city was abruptly called off. As Patrick Cockburn, the Independent newspaper's ace hand in Iraq, told Mother Jones magazine in a recent interview, the idea that Muqtada is a maverick cleric and a firebrand is completely contrary to his track record - "one of those absurd journalistic cliches that takes on a life on its own". Cockburn adds that Muqtada is in fact "very cautious, never pushing things too far, trying not to be pushed into a corner". And there are rumors Muqtada is sheltering at present in the holy city of Qom in Iran.

How do these trends add up? First, Iran is taking care to ensure that tensions with Israel remain under check. It doesn't appear to be Iran's game plan to encourage Hezbollah to have a go at Israel. The Fars news agency report on the death of Mughniyeh forecloses a Hezbollah revenge attack on Israel, which would have in all probability triggered a chain reaction provoking Israel into a war, in which Iran might unwittingly or accidentally get embroiled.

Second, Iran is constantly taking precautions not to provoke the US unnecessarily. The emphasis, on the other hand, is on the positive role that Tehran can play as a factor of stability in the Iraq situation. The overall Iranian strategy of maximizing its influence with the various Iraqi groups remains very much in place. But according to a survey by WorldPublicOpinion.org (WPO) released in Washington on Monday, the Iranian public believes that the threat of a military attack by the US has substantially reduced, though the deep distrust of American intentions remains.

In sum, Tehran is displaying flexibility, which is possible with the consolidation the regime has managed in domestic politics. There is no doubt that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is in absolute control. The IRGC is riding high. According to the American poll by WPO, two-thirds of Iranians found satisfaction with both Iran's form of government and the performance of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Indeed, 74% of Iranians trusted their government to act in the best interests of the nation.

Any long time observer of Iran will agree that the regime possesses the authority today to talk one-to-one with the US and won't have to look over the shoulder and worry about lone snipers in the corridors of power taking a pot shot at it while it engages the "enemy" at the gates.

From Washington's point of view, for the first time in a long while, perhaps, it may set aside the gnawing worry that in the Byzantine world of Iranian politics, it is indeed talking to the right person in Tehran and won't end up pinned and wriggling on the wall in embarrassment. If diplomacy is all about timing, Rice should engage Mottaki.

M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).

unedited
The Iraqi Army IS standing UP and America’s are fading to background

If one was to listen to the constant drum beat of the democratic party about Iraq, the words ‘failure’, ‘failed policy’, ‘its time for the Iraqi’s to stand up’, etc. come to my mind.

While I’m clear that I’m NOT a democrat, I am like the majority of Americans on the political spectrum, that being ‘right of center’. I am not an ideologue with a blind party loyalty. I think that is dangerous. My loyalty is to my country and how we can improve not only our countries standing, but also bringing to light mistakes for the purpose to make corrective actions, improvements and progress.

While the ‘plan’ for Operation Iraqi Freedom had its fair share of bone head assumptions and was not as quick to adjust as I would have liked to have seen as an documentary film maker, the reality is that we have adjusted, the strategy has been shifted under General Patraeus, and the war is being won.

The soundbytes below in this New York Post article are a great example of ammunition in the media war that seem to be sitting on the supply room shelf. If this good news was cycled and re-cycled thru the headline news as much as I hear about the 4% (some 1000 Iraqi troops) or so Iraqi that fled from battle, I’m certain the American people would have a different perception about the USA’s involvement in Iraq.

The reality is that the Iranian government is lying in wait to win, by proxy, a war in which they would dominate the southern region of Iraq in the Basra. The news is encouraging, the Iraqi army is getting stronger, and it would appear that the fight for nationalism, as opposed to sectarian loyalties, is winning.

The reality is that Arabs have a deep distrust of Persian’s and vice versa. The only thing that would unite the two enemies is fighting a larger outside enemy as the axiom “my enemies enemy is my friend” suggest. The USA has in large part been considered an enemy with many weird twists. On the one hand the traditionally subordinate majority of Shia in Iraq have been the majority under Saddam Hussein. Yet, they are now the ruling majority in the new Iraq’s political system. They have used democracy to gain control yet there is deep suspicion of Americans since post Gulf War 1, when President H.W. Bush told them to ‘rise up’ against Saddam and the US would be behind them. They rose up, and were then victims of genocide to tune of some 100,000 as I recall. So now that there has been the careful building of forces with the excellent training and integration of US troops as their ‘instructors’ and examples, and the mission has changed to protecting the Iraqi people from the insurgents (both Al Queda and Shia militia’s funded by Iran) it is resulting in SUCCESS! So kudos' to the Iraqi’s for standing up to the Iranian efforts to control their southern region of Basra.

While it is true that the Iraqi fighters are improving, and have a ways to go, they are doing well considering they are merely a few years in “on the job training.” I remember when I was in Baghdad and part of an group of journalist interviewing General Yassim, who heads the Iraqi Defense Ministry, I asked him how the training was different for the new Iraq Army than under Saddam. His answer was pretty simple. He said his troops were being trained ‘on the job’.

While the Iraqi troops are getting better, the reality is that they lack competent and seasoned logistics and air support. However this is a work in progress. Think how long it took S. Korea with N. Korea right at the border to build up and become successful and an solid ally to the USA. We are still there after 50 years!

I like what John McCain says about involvement in Iraq in his much distorted comment about being there for ‘50-100 years’. His larger point was that it is about American deaths not American presence. Much better our presence there than the Iranian presence taking control. The mullah’s don’t give a damn about anything but their control and manipulation of resources and people just like they exhibit in Iran today against the will of its people. Folks who suggest otherwise just don’t understand the reality there.

So three cheers for the Iraqi’s for standing up to the Iranians in Basra this last month. Plus six cheers for our guy and gals in there backing them up and helping them build a new Iraq. I know its unpopular to give the current president any kudo’s but is certainly looks to me like The Iraqi Army IS standing UP and American forces are fading to background.
==================================================================================================

“Only a year ago, the ISF had been unable to provide three brigades (some 9,000 men) to help the US-led "surge" restore security in Baghdad. This time, the ISF had no difficulty deploying 15 brigades (30,000 men) for the battle of Basra.

The Iran-backed side lost more than 600 men, with more than 1,000 injured. The ISF lost 88 dead and 122 wounded...

The battle for Basra showed that Iraq has a new army that's willing and able to fight. If the 15 brigades that fought are a sample, the new Iraq may have an effective army of more than 300,000 before year's end...

Tehran tried to test the waters in Basra and, as an opportunist power, would've annexed southern Iraq under a quisling administration had that been attainable at a low cost. Once it became clear that the cost might be higher than the Quds force expected, Tehran opted to back down.

IRAN'S BUSTED IRAQ BID
By AMIR TAHERI
http://www.nypost.com/php/pfriendly/print.php?url=http://www.nypost.com/seven/04102008/postopinion/opedcolumnists/irans_busted_iraq_bid_105852.htm

April 10, 2008 -- A GAMBLE that proved too costly.
That's how analysts in Tehran describe events last month in Basra. Iran's state-run media have de facto confirmed that this was no spontaneous "uprising." Rather, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) tried to seize control of Iraq's second-largest city using local Shiite militias as a Trojan horse.

Tehran's decision to make the gamble was based on three assumptions:

* Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki wouldn't have the courage to defend Basra at the risk of burning his bridges with the Islamic Republic in Iran.

* The international force would be in no position to intervene in the Basra battle. The British, who controlled Basra until last December, had no desire to return, especially if this meant getting involved in fighting. The Americans, meanwhile, never had enough troops to finish off al-Qaeda-in-Iraq, let alone fight Iran and its local militias on a new front.

* The Shiite clerical leadership in Najaf would oppose intervention by the new Iraqi security forces in a battle that could lead to heavy Shiite casualties.

The Iranian plan - developed by Revolutionary Guard's Quds (Jerusalem) unit, which is in charge of "exporting the Islamic Revolution" - aimed at a quick victory. To achieve that, Tehran spent vast sums persuading local Iraqi security personnel to switch sides or to remain neutral.

The hoped-for victory was to be achieved as part of a massive Shiite uprising spreading from Baghdad to the south via heartland cities such as Karbala, Kut and al-Amarah. A barrage of rockets and missiles against the "Green Zone" in Baghdad and armed attacks on a dozen police stations and Iraqi army barracks in the Shiite heartland were designed to keep the Maliki government under pressure.

To seize control of Basra, Quds commanders used units known as Special Groups. These consist of individuals recruited from among the estimated 1.8 million Iraqi refugees who spent more than two decades in Iran during Saddam Hussein's reign. They returned to Iraq shortly after Saddam's fall and started to act as liaisons between Quds and local Shiite militias.

In last month's operation, Quds commanders used the name and insignia of the Mahdi Army, a militia originally created by the maverick cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, as a cover for the Special Groups.

Initially, Quds commanders appeared to have won their bet. Their Special Groups and Mahdi Army allies easily seized control of key areas of Basra when more than 500 Iraqi security personnel abandoned their positions and disappeared into the woodwork.

Soon, however, the tide turned. Maliki proved that he had the courage to lead the new Iraqi Security Force (ISF) into battle, even if that meant confronting Iran. The ISF showed that it had the capacity and the will to fight.

Only a year ago, the ISF had been unable to provide three brigades (some 9,000 men) to help the US-led "surge" restore security in Baghdad. This time, the ISF had no difficulty deploying 15 brigades (30,000 men) for the battle of Basra.

Led by Gen. Mohan al-Freiji, the Iraqi force sent to Basra was the largest that the ISF had put together since its creation five years ago. This was the first time that the ISF was in charge of a major operation from start to finish and was fighting a large, well-armed adversary without US advisers.

During the Basra battles, the ISF did call on British and US forces to provide some firepower, especially via air strikes against enemy positions. But, in another first, the ISF used its own aircraft to transport troops and materiel and relied on its own communication system.

The expected call from the Najaf ayatollahs to stop "Shiite fratricide" failed to materialize. Grand Ayatollah Ali-Muhammad Sistani, the top cleric in Iraq, gave his blessings to the Maliki-launched operation. More broadly, the Shiite uprisings in Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf and other cities that Quds commanders had counted upon didn't happen. The "Green Zone" wasn't evacuated in panic under a barrage of rockets and missiles.

After more than a week of fighting, the Iraqis forced the Quds commanders to call for a cease-fire through Sadr. The Iraqi commander agreed - provided that the Quds force directly guaranteed it. To highlight Iran's role in the episode, he insisted that the Quds force dispatch a senior commander to finalize the accord.

The Iran-backed side lost more than 600 men, with more than 1,000 injured. The ISF lost 88 dead and 122 wounded.

Some analysts suggest this was the first war between new Iraq and the Islamic Republic. If so, the Iraqis won.

To be sure, the Iranian-backed side lost partly because Iran couldn't use its full might, especially its air force. (That almost certainly would've led to war between Iran and the US-led coalition in Iraq.)

The battle for Basra showed that Iraq has a new army that's willing and able to fight. If the 15 brigades that fought are a sample, the new Iraq may have an effective army of more than 300,000 before year's end.

But the battle also showed that the ISF still lacks the weapons systems, including attack aircraft and longer-range missiles, needed to transform tactical victories into strategic ones. The Iranian-sponsored Special Groups and their Mahdi Army allies simply disappeared from the scene, taking their weapons with them, waiting for another fight.

Tehran tried to test the waters in Basra and, as an opportunist power, would've annexed southern Iraq under a quisling administration had that been attainable at a low cost. Once it became clear that the cost might be higher than the Quds force expected, Tehran opted to back down.

Yet this was just the first round. The struggle for Iraq isn't over.