Bush Visits a Ukraine Deeply Split Over Bid to Join Western Alliance
By Peter Baker
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, April 1, 2008; A12

KIEV, Ukraine, March 31 -- The hundreds of thousands of demonstrators who camped out on Independence Square here three years ago toppled a pro-Russian government in favor of a Western-oriented coalition that pledged to move this former Soviet republic closer to the rest of Europe.

But by the time President Bush arrived here Monday to hail the emerging democracy and urge the NATO alliance to put Ukraine on the path to membership, the mood on the square had changed. "Yankee Go Home," read one sign. "NATO Hands Off Ukraine," read another. A hand-painted banner unfurled around the square used a four-letter obscenity to describe what both Bush and NATO should do.

Communists are no longer a dominant force in this society, but the thousands flying hammer-and-sickle flags on the square did reflect a broad division in a country situated on the edge of east and west.

Although Bush strongly supports President Viktor Yushchenko's aspirations to join NATO, the Ukrainian public is deeply split over the idea, in the face of Russian opposition. Western European governments, also concerned about Moscow's reaction, are divided.

Bush landed here Monday night and was welcomed with the traditional gift of bread and salt in advance of meetings Tuesday aimed at promoting Ukraine's candidacy. He heads Tuesday evening to Bucharest, Romania, for a three-day NATO summit where the issue will be debated. The alliance is poised to offer membership to Croatia, Albania and Macedonia; Bush wants to offer a map toward membership further down the road for Ukraine and its fellow former Soviet republic Georgia.

"We feel a gap in our security because all of our neighbors, to east and west, are in some sort of security arrangement," Oleksandr Chalyi, a foreign policy adviser to Yushchenko, said in an interview, referring to NATO and Russian-led alliances. "Only we participate in neither. We don't want to return back to the Russian security system." If NATO rebuffs Ukraine, he added, it would mean "the last page of the Cold War is not turned."

Moscow warned again Monday that even negotiations for membership for Ukraine and Georgia would cross a "red line" for Russia. President Vladimir Putin has threatened to target the two countries with nuclear missiles if they join the alliance.

"We are not a source of threats," Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov told foreign journalists in a conference call. But "membership to NATO will in no way contribute to stability in the country. To the contrary, it will lead to additional tension."

What Ukraine and Georgia want out of the Bucharest summit are "membership action plans," known as MAPs, that would lead eventually to full status in the alliance. The MAP process can take years -- it took nine years for Albania, for example -- and forces applicants to meet NATO standards for democratic institutions and military capabilities.

Although Canada and nine NATO members in Eastern Europe also support road maps for the two aspirants, Germany and others say they are not ready, especially given Ukraine's internal divisions and Georgia's struggles with two breakaway republics. Because NATO operates by consensus, opposition would nix any move in Bucharest.

Bush still hopes to finesse the issue. "We think it's very, very, very important that Georgia and Ukraine, that we welcome their aspirations to be part of NATO," national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley told reporters on Air Force One. "And the president has made clear we think the best way to do that is to offer the MAP at Bucharest, and that's what the president is pushing hard for."

Putin plans to go to Bucharest and has sway with European nations that rely on Russian gas and oil. His advisers have suggested Russia would help NATO in Afghanistan by allowing planes to cross Russian airspace if Georgia and Ukraine are not put on the membership path. "We are ready to cooperate," Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told the newspaper Izvestia. "But we shall speak out firmly against any tendencies that are damaging to our interests."

Ukraine, a country long fractured between its Russian-influenced eastern regions and its European-oriented western areas, remains torn over NATO. A February poll found that 50 percent of Ukrainians oppose membership compared with 24 percent in favor, nearly the reverse of public sentiment before the Orange Revolution of 2004. But proponents take heart from the fact that opposition has fallen by 10 percentage points since last year.

"We're leading the protest to demonstrate to the world and to Ukraine that not everybody is happy about the idea of joining NATO," said Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz, a former parliament speaker. "The NATO issue creates a big problem for us with Russia. That's the main worry."

Correspondent Peter Finn in Moscow contributed to this report.

Dave Marash: Why I Quit
The veteran newsman says Al Jazeera English’s mission changed
By Brent Cunningham
Fri 4 Apr 2008 11:26 AM

In February 2006, David Marash, a veteran correspondent (and substitute host) for ABC’s Nightline, raised eyebrows in the U.S. journalism world when he took a job as the Washington anchor for Al Jazeera English, the new sister channel of the Arabic-language news operation in Qatar. For American viewers, Marash brought instant credibility to the new channel, even as it struggled to find a cable outlet that would agree to put it on the air. Eyebrows rose again last week when Marash announced that he was quitting Al Jazeera English because of what he considered anti-American bias in the channel’s coverage. CJR’s Brent Cunningham spoke with Marash yesterday.

Brent Cunningham: Would you elaborate on your decision to quit?

David Marash: It’s been a gradual process, and defining it all, is that with corporate encouragement, over the first two years of the channel’s existence, I have made myself effectively the American face of the channel and vouched for its credibility and value. And over the last seventeen months there have been several changes at the channel which put things on the air that, frankly, I could not vouch for. If I had just been another employee I might have just dropped my head and let it all wash over, because it is the nature of our business that every place you work occasionally does things that embarrass you. But I felt an extra measure of responsibility.

Now, as anchor, I was in position to vouch for at least half of the material that went on air because I got to speak it and I could edit it on the fly if I felt that there were any inaccuracies or imbalances in it. But when the proposal was made that I leave the anchor chair [he was informed of this in December and his last day as anchor was March 13] and become a sort of heavy correspondent, I knew that I would never be able to have the kind of editorial input or control that would put me in a position to honestly vouch for anything. Furthermore, when I was taken off that meant that there were zero American accents in any of the presenter roles at Al Jazeera. And it occurred to me that this was just one part of a series of decisions that diminished editorial input from the United States. It got to the point where I feel that in a globe where Al Jazeera sets a very, very high reporting standard, and a very, very high standard for both numerical and qualitative and authentic standing, that the United States was becoming a serious exception to their role, and a place where the journalism did not measure up to the standards that were set almost everywhere else by Al Jazeera English’s very fine reporting.

BC: What are some examples of the kinds of stories that made you uncomfortable?

DM: There was a series entitled “Poverty in America” which, in the first place, was done in a way that illustrates some of the infrastructural problems that disturbed me greatly. The idea of a series about poverty in America was broached by the planning desk in Doha. The specifics of the plan were so stereotypical and shallow that the planning desk in Washington said that we think this is a very bad idea and recommend against it and won’t do it. And so the planning desk in Doha literally sneaked a production team into the United States without letting anyone in the American news desk know, and they went off and shot a four-part series that was execrable. That was essentially, if I may say so, here a poor, there a poor, everywhere a poor poor.

Now, there is poverty in America, and there is a very wide gulf between rich and poor in America and that is a trend for which there are stories to be reported. But this series reported nothing beyond the stereotype and the mere fact that there were homeless people living on the street in Baltimore, for example. Well, were they there as a consequence of mental illness that was not properly cared for because of a generation of a policy of de-institutionalization? Al Jazeera didn’t know because they didn’t ask. Frankly they didn’t know enough to ask. It was enough for them to show poor people living in wretched conditions in a prosperous American city and decry it. Then they went to South Carolina and found a town that—I know this is going to shock you, Brent—had very rich people and, on the other side of the railroad tracks, very poor people. And the wretchedness of the poor people’s living conditions was enumerated. In fact this memorable question and answer exchange occurred:

Q: What’s it like to live with rats in your home? A: Bad. [laughs]
The economic divide is a story and the reasons why, over a long period of time in this South Carolina town there should be very little transmigration across the line between rich and poor, is a story. The sources of wealth of the rich may be a story. The lack of opportunities for the poor may be a story. But again, you gotta report all these things. This series merely named them in a very accusatory way. This to me is the very quintessence of what television news should not be doing. And by the way is not the kind of reporting you see very much elsewhere on Al Jazeera English.

There was another story about the plight of indigenous people in Chiapas. Again, real story. But the point of this story seemed to be that they were victims of NAFTA. Now, again, does NAFTA create problems among rural farmers in Mexico? Yeah. But the situation in Chiapas is at best only marginally affected by that. It has much more to do with race and class issues in Mexico, their relations with the Mexican national government, the adversarialism of the Chiapas state government, and the cultural dislocation and deprivation that not only predates NAFTA, it almost predates the states of Mexico and the United States. And also has a lot to do with the command and control of the indigenous movement by the most peculiar Subcomandante Marcos and his Zapatista allies, who have an interest in isolating if not in depriving this group of people. So again, it was really shoddy reporting.

And you don’t see that in Africa, in Latin America, in the Middle East, in Asia, on Al Jazeera. You see state-of-the-art, world-class reporting, and south of the equator I don’t think anyone will give you much of an argument that Al Jazeera has become the most authoritative news channel on earth. And so, I took it particularly amiss, and it was for me, as their voucher endorser and brand face especially problematic, that their standard for journalism on Al Jazeera in the United States didn’t seem consistently to be as good as their standards elsewhere. And let me rush to add that yes, Al Jazeera has in Rob Reynolds, one of the best TV correspondents in America, in the world, and Kris Saloomey in New York is a very competent and growing correspondent, and Mike Kirsch, their stringer in California, is network quality. But for more than a year Kirsch wasn’t even there and they were trying to cover the country with two people; can’t be done.

BC: You must have sought assurances that this kind of thing wouldn’t happen?

DM: In fact, the prospectus for the channel and the channel that I hawked, if you will, is different from the channel today. It is different infrastructurally and editorially, in that the original concept was literally cosmopolitan—the whole world covered from many points of view representing the whole world. That was the logic of having four news centers in Doha, London, Washington, and Kuala Lumpur. All four were supposed to be autonomous, to initiate their own assignment decisions and lineup priorities. And the sum total of the four points of view was to put a truly cosmopolitan, multipolar gloss on the world. Over the last nine months, in particular, bureau autonomy has almost completely disappeared and rather than being a multivoiced, multipolar news channel, I think Al Jazeera English is now an authentic regional voice, much in the manner of Al Jazeera Arabic, although they are in no way a translation of each other—they are two thoroughly different and independent channels. Just as Al Jazeera Arabic can rightfully claim to be a first-class news organization with high professional standards, but one that authentically represents the point of view and interests of the region defined by the Arabic language, less defined by but certainly involved in the Islamic faith, and most particularly the gulf region, I think that Al Jazeera English is a very competent, very professional news organization that does a particularly great job south of the equator, but tends to report almost everything from the point of view of either the Arabic-speaking world or at the very least what you might call the post-colonial world. And since I’m not authentically those things, I don’t belong there.

BC: What changed?

DM: I think that the world changed about nine, ten months ago. And I think the single event in that change was the visit to the gulf by Vice President Cheney, where he went to line up the allied ducks in a row behind the possibility of action against Iran. And instead of getting acquiescence, the United States got defiance, and instead ducks in a row the ducks basically went off on their own and the first sort of major breakthrough on that was the Mecca agreement, which defied the American foreign policy by letting Hamas into the tent of the governance of the Palestinian territories. This enraged the State Department and was one crystal clear sign that the Mideast region was now off campus, was off on its own. And it is around this time, and I think not coincidentally, that you see the state of Qatar and the royal family of Qatar starting to make up their feud with the Saudis, and you start to see on both Al Jazeera Arabic and English a very sort of first-personish, “my Haj” stories that were boosterish of the Haj and of Saudi Arabia. And you start to see stories of analysis in The New York Times where regional people are noting that Al Jazeera seems to be changing its editorial stance toward Saudi Arabia. I’m suggesting that around that time, a decision was made at the highest levels of [Al Jazeera] that simply following the American political leadership and the American political ideal of global, universalist values carried out in an absolutely pure, multipolar, First Amendment global conversation, was no longer the safest or smartest course, and that it was time, in fact, to get right with the region. And I think part of getting right with the region was slightly changing the editorial ambition of Al Jazeera English, and I think it has subsequently become a more narrowly focused, more univocal channel than was originally conceived.

BC: This doesn’t bode well for AJE as a credible journalistic operation.

DM: If the goal is to be true to the idea of multipolar transparency, then this is very bad news. And I admit that I find that to be a higher goal than being a thoroughly respectable, thoroughly professional, but somewhat regional or region-specific voice. And I think that Al Jazeera is headed in that slightly lesser but still to me very respectable, and in terms of viewing choices, very necessary channel. And the coverage of Latin America and Africa in particular is just so terrific, that if that’s the only reason you would watch is to stay up on the half of the planet that none of our networks or news channels are going to tell us much about, you would want to watch it for that alone. But you know, the thing that I loved best about the original concept was the sort of fugue of points of view and opinions, because I think that’s what desperately needed in the world. We need to know, for example, in America, how angry the rest of the world is at Americans. Our own news media tend to shelter us from this very unpleasant news. So if you watched and every piece seemed tendentious and pissed you off, and I don’t think that would be the case, but even if worst case the channel turned shrill and shallow, you would still want to watch them on the principle that millions—tens of millions—of people watch them every day and you need to know what’s going on in their brains.

Iraq: Future Of Awakening Councils In Limbo

By Sumedha Senanayake

The security situation in the Al-Tharthar area in the central Salah Al-Din Governorate has stabilized since Al-Qaeda in Iraq was driven out of the region, Al-Arabiyah satellite television reported on March 30. It said that one of the main reasons behind the improved security in Al-Tharthar was the presence of local awakening councils.

Awakening councils are coalitions of mostly Sunni tribes that have been established in eight governorates in an effort to root out terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Some of the groups involved in the awakening movement had previously fought in the insurgency against U.S. troops.

The movement began in the western Al-Anbar Governorate in 2006 when several Sunni tribes, fed up with Al-Qaeda in Iraq's tactics of indiscriminate bombings and killings, formed a loose coalition called the Al-Anbar Awakening Council. Within a year, Al-Qaeda had been driven out of the governorate.

The formation of awakening councils to combat Al-Qaeda has proven to be one of the most effective counterinsurgency campaigns by the U.S. military in Iraq. The fighters are entirely on the U.S. payroll and often work closely with U.S. and Iraqi forces. Last year, U.S. President George W. Bush singled out the formation of the Al-Anbar Awakening Council as the main reason the governorate was now essentially free of an Al-Qaeda presence.

During the recent reconciliation conference held in Baghdad on March 18-19, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki heaped praise on the awakening movement, saying they had defended "Iraq against terrorism."

However, members of the various awakening movements have voiced displeasure over how they have been treated by the U.S. military and the Iraqi government.

Frustration At U.S. Treatment

The pan-Arabic newspaper "Al-Hayat" reported on March 22 that an awakening movement in the town of Al-Taji, to the north of Baghdad in the Salah Al-Din Governorate, threatened to cease all activity until they were paid. Colonel Sa'ad Aziz Sulayman, the leader of the awakening council in Al-Taji, complained that his fighters have not been paid their salaries, approximately $300-$700 each, for nearly two months.

A similar report appeared in "The Guardian" on March 24 saying leaders of several awakening councils in central Iraq threatened to go on strike because the United States had not paid them regularly. The British daily said thousands of fighters would go on strike unless their salaries of $10 per day resumed.

Abu Abd al-Aziz, the head of the council in Abu Ghurayb, said nearly 500 of his fighters have quit, and he accused U.S. forces of using the awakening councils and later abandoning them. "The Americans got what they wanted. We purged Al-Qaeda for them and now people are saying why should we have any more deaths for the Americans," he said. "They have given us nothing."

Moreover, there been several recent incidents where U.S. military operations have ended up killing and wounding awakening-council fighters. The most recent incident occurred on March 22 when a U.S. air strike near the central town of Samarra killed six members of a local awakening council who were manning a checkpoint.

Abu Furuq, a leader of the awakening council in Samarra, expressed his dismay at the attack, and noted that the fighters were wearing reflective vests, clearly identifying them as members of the awakening council.

Losing Patience With Government

Many in the awakening movement have also expressed their frustration with the Iraqi government and its slowness in integrating the fighters into the security forces. While al-Maliki has repeatedly praised the movement, he only begrudgingly agreed in December 2007 to incorporate some of the Sunni fighters into the police and army.

The Shi'a-led government has kept a wary eye on fighters from the awakening movement, some of whom were previously part of the insurgency. The vetting process has been extremely slow, some would say deliberately so.

In what will certainly anger members of the awakening movement, "Al-Azzam" reported on April 1 that Prime Minister al-Maliki honored the militias aligned with the two top Shi'ite parties in the United Iraqi Alliance, the Al-Da'wah Party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). They were lauded for fighting alongside Iraqi forces against Muqtada al-Sadr's militia in Al-Basrah, and approximately 10,000 fighters from the two militias were absorbed into the security forces.

From the perspective of the Sunni-dominated awakening movement, there is clearly a sectarian motivation involved. The Shi'ite fighters seemed to have been granted instant entrance into the army and police, while the Sunni fighters, who have expelled Al-Qaeda from several governorates, continue to be forced to wait.

Furthermore, seeing Shi'a being given preferential treatment only underscores the sense of collective marginalization felt by the Sunni Arab community. Such actions will certainly not assuage Sunni fears that they have no place in the new Iraq.

Potentially Huge Problem

One of the major problems facing both the Iraqi government and the United States is what to do with the approximately 80,000 fighters that comprise the awakening movement. The government said it would eventually absorb only 25 percent of them into the security forces. The remaining 75 percent likely face a bleak future of unemployment.

This would be a disastrous scenario that would eerily parallel the disbanding of the Iraqi Army by the Coalition Provisional Authority, arguably one of the biggest U.S. miscalculations in Iraq. The dissolution of the army left thousands of unemployed, alienated, and armed men with no hopes for the future and holding a huge grudge. They along, with the disbanded Ba'athists, formed the backbone of an extremely tenacious and deadly insurgency.

Likewise, casting off thousands of armed Sunni fighters once they are no longer needed could leave them ready recruits for insurgent groups. It should not be forgotten that some of the groups that joined the awakening movement formerly belonged to the anti-U.S. insurgency. Therefore, in desperate circumstances where unemployment is high and opportunities few, a cash offer may be the only recruiting method insurgent groups need to lure the fighters back.

Monday, March 31, 2008

Iraq: Al-Qaeda Killing Field Found Near Farming Village

By Richard Tomkins

ZAHAMM, IRAQ -- Villagers digging in an abandoned pomegranate orchard in the Diyala River Valley have unearthed the remains of at least 52 people murdered by Al-Qaeda in Iraq during its two-year reign of terror in the area.

The first victim, whose head had been placed at his feet, was found on March 26 by a local village head and a U.S. Army officer who had been given the orchard's location by a man who said he had been kidnapped by Al-Qaeda last August and taken to a "jail" there, but managed to escape before execution.

"Smell that?" Captain Vince Morris, of Iron Company, 3rd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, asked when he approached the orchard on that exploratory visit. No one answered. No one needed to. The gagging stench of rotting flesh was unmistakable. And it was much too strong for the contents of just one grave.

At least 51 additional clumps of remains were uncovered in two, two-hour digs by volunteers from surrounding villages later in the week. The oldest remains were in separate, shallow graves. The freshest remains -- the skeletons still had muscle and flesh holding the bones together -- were in several mass graves, the bodies heaped upon each other.

Most were unearthed with their wrists tied behind their backs and with a bullet hole in the skull. Some were covered with a piece of cloth when dumped into the hole; others were not. And then there was the body that was wrapped in plastic.

"The ones in plastic are really bad," a U.S. soldier says. "They're just bags of mush."

Zahamm is a village located about 5 kilometers north of the town of Himbus in Diyala Governorate's "bread basket." When Al-Qaeda declared Diyala Governorate the seat of its so-called Islamic State of Iraq caliphate, the Himbus area became the terrorist group's main training, weapons-storage, and transit area.

No Music, No Smoking

"When they first came into the area they said they were mujahedin fighting the occupation forces. But later they started forcing people from their homes and taking money. People who worked for the Iraq Army or the Iraqi police were punished," says Sheikh Abbas Husayn Khalaf, the leader of Taiyah village.

"They imposed their rules: no music, no smoking, the women had to wear the veil, and there were no wedding celebrations. No one was allowed out after 5 p.m. Some people were shot in front of the people in the street, others were kidnapped, killed, and put in the mass graves."

Sheikh Abbas, sentenced to death by Al-Qaeda for "stirring up people" against them, fled north and hid with relatives, returning to Taiyah only infrequently and surreptitiously. Fourteen people from his village were snatched by Al-Qaeda, he said, including a cousin -- the brother of the man who led soldiers to the killing field.

Last week's excavation sessions only lasted about two hours each. "They're beat. Just look at their faces," Captain Morris, who had helped organize the search and was present to document the finds, says of the volunteers. "I don't think they'll do this much longer today."

His hunch, voiced early in the digging, proved true. The eyes of the volunteers were a mixture of fatigue and trauma -- the horror of Al-Qaeda's rule had revisited them in a particularly brutal fashion. And discarded clothing found nearby -- including children's clothing -- held the promise of things to come.

Only one portion of the orchard -- Al-Qaeda acquired it by killing its Shi'ite owner -- had been excavated, and there were two more orchards nearby that needed to be searched as well.

"If you find them [Al-Qaeda], kill them. Kill all of them," says Karinhi Marzi al-Shumari, an elderly woman from the village of Al-Haruniyah who was watching the disinterment.

The elderly woman said her son, Muhammad Jaber, 42, was taken away by Al-Qaeda last July when he repeatedly refused to join the group.

As she slapped herself, wailed aloud, and raised her hands skyward, other women scoured the field and picked up scattered bits of paper, trying to find information as to what happened to their loved ones.

Those unearthed so far have had proper burials. Villagers cut bed sheets to make shrouds and took the remains by truck to a cemetery.
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty © 2008 RFE/RL, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Iraq's Benchmarks


By Frederick W. Kagan
Posted: Thursday, April 3, 2008

ARTICLES
The Daily Standard
Publication Date: April 3, 2008


Resident Scholar
Frederick W. Kagan

As the reduction in violence in Iraq has become incontestable (the insistence of early critics that no such reduction was possible notwithstanding), war opponents have fallen back on their next line of defense--that the military progress has not been matched by the political progress it was supposed to enable. This talking point, however, is also outdated and invalid. The Bush administration, commanders and ambassadors in the field, and supporters of the effort to win in Iraq have long pointed to evidence of grassroots reconciliation and political progress. This evidence is growing and the importance of these developments is becoming increasingly apparent. But critics have long dismissed these developments on the grounds that they meant nothing if the central government did not meet the key benchmarks established in 2007 as the basis for continued American support. For most of 2007, such critics at least had some facts on their side--the Iraqi Government quickly moved to achieve most of the security-related benchmarks, but key legislative benchmarks remained stalled. The facts no longer support this argument, however. As a recent study by the U.S. Institute of Peace noted, "It may be that February 13, 2008 will be remembered as the day when Iraq's political climate began to catch up with its improved security situation--or, more to the point, when Iraqi leaders discovered the key to political compromise and reconciliation."

As the tally below shows, the Government of Iraq has now met 12 out of the original 18 benchmarks set for it, including four out of the six key legislative benchmarks. It has made substantial progress on five more, and only one remains truly stalled. One can argue about the scoring of this or that benchmark, but the overall picture is very clear: before the surge began, the Iraqi Government had accomplished none of the benchmarks and was on the way to accomplishing very few. As the surge winds down, it has accomplished around two-thirds of them and is moving ahead on almost all of the remainder. To say in the face of these facts that Iraq has made "little" or "no" political progress is simply false-to-fact.

Some critics more willing to wrestle with unpleasant (to them) realities have argued that the laws that have been passed and the steps taken to meet the non-legislative benchmarks are flawed (and, therefore, don't count). This argument is highly disingenuous. Opponents of benchmarks (including the author) always argued against them on the grounds that simply getting Iraqis to "check the box" was not an appropriate way to measure progress. Defenders of the benchmarks insisted that we needed clear metrics. Well, the metrics they demanded and wrote into law are pretty clear, and the Iraqis have met most of them. Last year, critics accused the Bush administration of "moving the goalposts" by pointing to local reconciliation rather than national benchmark legislation. Now the shoe is on the other foot--those who most shrilly demanded a set of arbitrary benchmarks are now insist that the Iraqi Government's achievements in meeting them aren't enough. Who's moving the goalposts now?

Legislative Benchmarks (4 accomplished; 2 underway; 1 stalled)

Benchmark January 2007 March 2008
Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Baathification. Not done Passed by CoR on January 12, 2008; approved by Presidency Council in February 2008.
Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens equitably. Not done Not done. Draft law of July 2007 still under consideration in a CoR committee. The Kurds are the major holdup here. But the provincial powers act and the 2008 budget do this de facto. The 17 percent share of Iraq's oil revenue given to the Kurds in the 2008 budget represented the short-term compromise on this issue, with negotiations on the longer-term legislation continuing.
Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions. Underway This was never desirable. The Kurdish Regional Government, however, is up and running, and a law has been passed that would allow provinces to form regions after April 2008. We can fairly say that this is moving ahead while hoping that it does not happen.
Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections. Not done Passed by CoR on February 13, 2008; vetoed by Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi on February 26, 2008; veto withdrawn and law approved by Presidency Council on March 19, 2008. Provincial powers law set October 1, 2008 as date for elections; Presidency Council has reiterated support for that date; United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq announced on February 14, 2008, a new procedure for selecting key elections officials; that procedure was set in motion on February 21, 2008.
Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty. Not done Passed by CoR on February 13, 2008; signed by Presidency Council on February 26, 2008.
Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the constitution of Iraq. Not done Laws have been passed and decrees have been issued declaring that only the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are legitimate armed forces. The movement of former insurgents into Concerned Local Citizens groups is a major part of accomplishing this task. Moqtada al Sadr's ceasefire (extended for another six months) is another element of it. Maliki's recent push to disarm Sadrist militias in Basra and elsewhere is evidence of the Iraqi Government's determination to accomplish this goal, even if it is not yet capable of doing so.
Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the constitutional review. Not done CoR formed a Constitutional Review Committee in September 2006. It was originally supposed to report back in May 2007, and submitted a draft, but has since been granted an extension through August 2008. On the other hand, most of the key provisions in the Iraqi constitution requiring review involve the rest of the benchmark legislation, so this can be fairly said to be underway.
Security Benchmarks (All 7 accomplished)

Benchmark January 2007 March 2008
Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP). Not done The government has been supporting the BSP in all of these areas, with or without specific committees being formed.
Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations. Underway Done--over and above, in fact. Far more than three brigades have rotated through Baghdad, to say nothing of the Iraqi brigades fighting actively in Anbar, Ninewah, Salah ad Din, Babil, Diyala, Wasit, Qadisiya, Basra, and elsewhere. The Iraqi Government is forming a new division in Baghdad (the 11th) to eliminate the need to keep moving forces from provinces into the capital. When that formation is complete, there will be three Iraqi Army divisions permanently stationed in or near the capital (the 6th, the 11th, and the 9th Mechanized Division based in Taji).
Providing Iraqi commanders with all authority to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. Not done Done. Both U.S. and Iraqi forces have regularly targeted both Sunni and Shiite militias. The emphasis in this benchmark was on operations against Shia militias. Again, the recent operations in Basra highlight the renewed and increasing determination of the Iraqi Government to accomplish this goal.
Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said "the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation." Not done Done--there are no "safe havens" in Iraq for outlaws. U.S. and Iraqi conventional and special forces have targeted Sunni and Shiite militias and criminals from Kurdistan to Basra, including Sadr City.
Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security. Not done Done. Attacks against Sadrist positions in Basra are the start of an assault on the last bastions of militia control of local security in Iraq.
Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad. Underway Done. Iraqi forces operating in Mosul have adopted this technique on their own as well, planning and establishing JSSs similar to those developed in Baghdad.
Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently. Underway Done. Forty new ISF battalions will come on line this year. The Government of Iraq concentrated 30,000 ISF troops in Basra recently and launched a major offensive operation with virtually no Coalition ground support. Iraqi military units in the Najaf-Hillah-Karbala-Diwaniyah-Kut area repelled Special Groups attacks during this fight with little or no Coalition Forces ground support in many cases.

Government Performance Benchmarks (1 accomplished; 3 underway)

Benchmark January 2007 March 2008
Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected. Hard to measure Hard to measure--but the minority parties seem to think so, judging by the unanimous passage of key benchmark legislation recently.
Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenue for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis. Not done The government has achieved equity on this point: all groups think they are being discriminated against. Progress in spending the budget has been significant, and the government is working actively to improve it.
Ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces are providing evenhanded enforcement of the law. Not done It is hard to give a definitive "red light" or "green light" to this--some Americans do not think that American law enforcement does this. But enormous progress has been made since January 2007.
Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces. Not done There has been progress here, but significant challenges remain.
Benchmarks accomplished: 0 12
Progress being made: 5 5
No progress: 13 1

Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at AEI.