Iraq: Al-Basrah Clashes Could Prove Ominous

By Sumedha Senanayake

Fierce clashes between radical Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's militia, the Imam Al-Mahdi Army, and government forces in the southern Iraqi city of Al-Basrah have sparked concern that the situation could quickly spiral out of control.

The fighting initially broke out after the Iraqi government launched a major military operation, Sawlat al-Fursan (Attack of the Knights), in the city in an attempt to restore order. Al-Basrah has been mired in violence and thuggery for months -- since the pullout of British forces -- as rival militias and criminal gangs vie for control of the port city. While the major actors in the Al-Basrah power play are the Al-Fadilah Party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, (ISCI) and the Sadrists, reports suggest that the operation was focused primarily on the Sadrists.

Al-Sadr has responded with a call for nationwide acts of civil disobedience, and senior leaders within his group have issued veiled threats that continued targeting of Sadrists will lead to a "civil revolt." The violence in Al-Basrah has also spread northward to the towns of Al-Kut and Al-Hillah, well as to the Baghdad slum of Al-Sadr City.

The fighting in Al-Basrah and beyond might indicate an unraveling of the cease-fire called by al-Sadr in August that is credited with reducing the overall level of violence. If that is the case, then Iraq could be headed toward another bloody cycle of violence.

The operation in Al-Basrah looks like a bold display of force by the Iraqi government. It could signal the government's increasing assertiveness as it takes over greater security responsibilities from the British, who handed much of the governorate over last year. The operation was planned and carried out entirely by the Iraqi military -- aside from some air cover by multinational forces -- and it could provide a crucial test of the government's ability to stand on its own.

Success could hand Prime Minister al-Maliki and his beleaguered government a major political victory. Critics have maligned al-Maliki as a weak and ineffectual leader, and a decisive victory in Al-Basrah could strengthen his position in the eyes of Iraqis and the broader Arab world.

But the Al-Basrah campaign is also a calculated risk that could prove disastrous for the prime minister if it goes awry, particularly as al-Maliki is personally overseeing it. The perception could arise that he drastically overestimated the ability of his forces; if the operation becomes protracted and casualties mount, it could result in a severe public backlash.

Moreover, anything short of a relatively quick and decisive victory could indicate that Iraqi forces are still unprepared to assume responsibility for national security. Such a scenario has repercussions for the presence of British troops, who have been training Iraqi forces in Al-Basrah. With the handover of much of Al-Basrah to the Iraqi authorities, there has been considerable pressure in Britain to withdraw the remaining 4,100 British troops in the region. But the reduction of British troop numbers in Iraq is predicated on the assumption that Iraqi forces will be able to take over security operations in the region.
Why Now?

There appear to be several factors behind the timing of the al-Maliki government's launch of these Al-Basrah operations. First, Al-Basrah is vitally important to Iraq's economy and to its overall stability, and any significant volatility in that southern city would be keenly felt throughout the rest of country. The city is Iraq's only major port and oil hub, and insecurity there would endanger the export of Iraq's main commodity: oil. Al-Basrah is the departure point for nearly 90 percent of Iraq's oil exports to world markets.

Second, the security situation in Al-Basrah has deteriorated to the point where the Iraqi government had little choice but to act to restore order. Reports suggested that armed groups had taken over hospitals and universities in an effort to impose their brand of religion or political agendas.

Al-Basrah's female residents also came under increasing pressure, including threats and harassment for wearing what their accusers considered inappropriate attire. In a March 20 report in "Al-Azzam," residents were gripped by fear after the discovery around the city of several women's mutilated bodies. Police officials claimed they arrested an armed gang that eventually admitted to killing nine women, but local officials suggest that other similar gangs operate relatively unhindered in the city.

Finally, the deteriorating situation in the city might have created an ideal pretext for the preeminent Shi'ite party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), to remove or weaken its main political rival, the Sadrists. The ISCI has kept a wary eye on the growing influence of al-Sadr's political movement in southern Iraq.

The ISCI might also have been spurred to action by the Presidential Council's approval on March 19 of the governorates law, which should pave the way to provincial elections on October 1. There is a widely held belief that the Sadrists are poised for huge gains in the Shi'ite-dominated south in the October ballot. The ISCI, the single-most-powerful political entity in the ruling coalition, could use the chaos in Al-Basrah to press al-Maliki to move against al-Sadr's followers, the Al-Mahdi Army, in a bid to significantly weaken the group before the voting.

While the ISCI's militia (the Badr Organization) has been involved in the power struggle in Al-Basrah, most reports suggest that the main target has been the Al-Mahdi Army. That would lend credence to the argument that there are motives to the military operation beyond the reimposition of law and order in Al-Basrah.

Indeed, such a notion was underscored by Sheikh Ahmed al-Ali, a representative of al-Sadr's movement in Al-Basrah, in an interview with Al-Jazeera satellite television on March 25. Al-Ali alleged that while "this ongoing operation in Al-Basrah appears to be security-related,... in fact, it is a political one."
Cease-Fire In Jeopardy

U.S. military officials have stressed repeatedly that one of the main reasons for the steep drop in violence during the U.S. troop surge is the cease-fire declared by al-Sadr in August. With the massive Iraqi military operation under way in Al-Basrah, that agreement clearly is in serious jeopardy.

The Sadrists accuse the U.S. and Iraqi forces of exploiting the truce to arbitrarily arrest al-Sadr sympathizers. The Al-Basrah operation could push al-Sadr to abandon the cease-fire and call on his militia to return to the streets in self-defense.

The collapse of the cease-fire could have disastrous consequences for Iraqi stability. The relative lull in assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings that accompanied it might end, wiping out some of the gains of the U.S. "surge" in Baghdad and its surrounding areas.

Continued instability in Al-Basrah and in the south might also force the United States to intervene. Already burdened with trying to root out Al-Qaeda in Iraq and stabilize the central regions, U.S. planners can ill afford to shift valuable resources to quell a major conflict in the south.

Sumedha Senanayake is an RFE/RL contributing analyst

Bush: Violence in Iraq 'Defining Moment'

Mar 28 12:00 PM US/Eastern
By TERENCE HUNT
AP White House Correspondent

WASHINGTON (AP) - President Bush says the recent increase in violence in oil-rich southern Iraqi and parts of Baghdad presents "a defining moment in the history of Iraq" as the government seeks to rout out Shiite militias.
"It's going to take awhile, but it's a necessary part of the development of a free society," Bush said at a White House news confernce with visiting Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.

Bush's comments followed U.S. airstrikes in both the southern city of Basra and in a Shiite militia stronghold in Baghdad. The renewed violence came as tensions rose among followers of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr angered by a crackdown that has threatened to unravel a militia cease-fire.

Copyright 2008 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed

U.S. Steps Up Unilateral Strikes in Pakistan
Officials Fear Support From Islamabad Will Wane
By Robin Wright and Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, March 27, 2008; A01

The United States has escalated its unilateral strikes against al-Qaeda members and fighters operating in Pakistan's tribal areas, partly because of anxieties that Pakistan's new leaders will insist on scaling back military operations in that country, according to U.S. officials.

Washington is worried that pro-Western President Pervez Musharraf, who has generally supported the U.S. strikes, will almost certainly have reduced powers in the months ahead, and so it wants to inflict as much damage as it can to al-Qaeda's network now, the officials said.

Over the past two months, U.S.-controlled Predator aircraft are known to have struck at least three sites used by al-Qaeda operatives. The moves followed a tacit understanding with Musharraf and Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani that allows U.S. strikes on foreign fighters operating in Pakistan, but not against the Pakistani Taliban, the officials said.

About 45 Arab, Afghan and other foreign fighters have been killed in the attacks, all near the Afghan border, U.S. and Pakistani officials said. The goal was partly to jar loose information on senior al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants, by forcing them to move in ways that U.S. intelligence analysts can detect. Local sources are providing better information to guide the strikes, the officials said.

A senior U.S. official called it a "shake the tree" strategy. It has not been without controversy, others said. Some military officers have privately cautioned that airstrikes alone -- without more U.S. special forces soldiers on the ground in the region -- are unlikely to net the top al-Qaeda leaders.

The campaign is not designed to capture bin Laden before Bush leaves office, administration officials said. "It's not a blitz to close this chapter," said a senior official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of ongoing operations. "If we find the leadership, then we'll go after it. But nothing can be done to put al-Qaeda away in the next nine or 10 months. In the long haul, it's an issue that extends beyond this administration."

Musharraf, who controls the country's military forces, has long approved U.S. military strikes on his own. But senior officials in Pakistan's leading parties are now warning that such unilateral attacks -- including the Predator strikes launched from bases near Islamabad and Jacobabad in Pakistan -- could be curtailed.

"We have always said that as for strikes, that is for Pakistani forces to do and for the Pakistani government to decide. . . . We do not envision a situation in which foreigners will enter Pakistan and chase targets," said Farhatullah Babar, a top spokesman for the Pakistan People's Party, whose leader, Yousaf Raza Gillani, is the new prime minister. "This war on terror is our war."

Leaders of Gillani's party say they are interested in starting talks with local Taliban leaders and giving a political voice to the millions who live in Pakistan's tribal areas. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte and Assistant Secretary of State Richard A. Boucher heard the message directly yesterday from tribal elders in the village of Landi Kotal in the Khyber area.

"We told the visiting U.S. guests that the traditional jirga [tribal decision-making] system should be made effective to eliminate the causes of militancy and other problems from the tribal areas," said Malik Darya Khan, an elder. "We also told them that we have some disgruntled brothers" -- an indirect reference to local Taliban and militants -- who should be pulled into the mainstream through negotiations and dialogue, he said.

"The tribal turmoil can be resolved only through negotiations, not with military operations," Khan added. But he and others have said little specifically about how the new government should cope with foreign fighters, causing the Bush administration to engage in heavy lobbying on that issue.

President Bush called Gillani on Tuesday, for example, to stress the importance of the U.S.-Pakistani alliance and to emphasize that "fighting extremists is in everyone's interest," a White House spokesman said.

Daniel Markey, a former State Department policy planning staffer who is now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said "the new faces" in Pakistan's leadership "are not certain how they want to manage their relationship with the United States. You can't blame them," because they are pulled in opposite directions by their electorate and the Bush administration.

But Kamran Bokhari, a Pakistani who directs Middle East analysis for Strategic Forecasting, a private intelligence group in Washington, said the new government will almost certainly take a harder line against such strikes. "These . . . are very unpopular, not because people support al-Qaeda, but because they feel Pakistan has no sovereignty," he said.

The latest Predator strike, on March 16, killed about 20 in Shahnawaz Kot; a Feb. 28 strike killed 12 foreign militants in the village of Kaloosha; and a Jan. 29 strike killed 13 people, including senior al-Qaeda commander Abu Laith al-Libi, in North Waziristan.

U.S. intelligence officials estimate that al-Qaeda has several hundred operatives in the Waziristan tribal region. "But as we learned on 9/11, it only takes 19," said the senior U.S. official. "These are not Tora Bora bomb-everything operations," he added, referring to the blanket bombing of Afghanistan's mountainous area where al-Qaeda leaders were hiding in late 2001.

A spokesman at CIA headquarters declined to comment on the strikes. The agency officially maintains a policy of strict secrecy regarding its counterterrorism operations in the border region and does not announce Predator strikes.

But other U.S. officials said that after months of prodding, the Bush administration and the Musharraf government this year reached a tacit understanding that gave Washington a freer hand to carry out precision strikes against al-Qaeda and its allies in the border region. The issue is a sensitive one that neither side is willing to discuss openly, the officials said.

Asked to comment, Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell denied that the two governments have an "arrangement" or an "understanding." But he said that they face a mutual enemy and that "everything we do to go after terrorists operating there is in consultation and coordination with the Pakistani government."

Thomas H. Johnson, a research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., said: "People inside the Beltway are aware that Musharraf's days are numbered, and so they recognize they may only have a few months to do this. Musharraf has . . . very few friends in the world -- he probably has more inside the Beltway than in his own country."

The administration's intensified effort against al-Qaeda also has benefited from shifting loyalties among residents of the border region. Some tribal and religious leaders who embraced foreign al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters as they fled from Afghanistan in 2001 now see them as troublemakers and are providing timely intelligence about their movements and hideouts, according to former U.S. officials and Pakistan experts.

"They see traffic coming and going from the fortress homes of tribal leaders associated with foreign elements, and they pass the information along," said Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistani journalist in Washington and the author of a book on Pakistan's army. "Some quick surveillance is done, and then someone pops a couple of hundred-pound bombs at the house."

Yet despite a series of strikes, some U.S. military officers and experts question whether the strategy will be effective and worth its political costs.

"Jarring information loose is a method, but is it the most productive method? No. You need exploitation, troops on the ground. It's a huge operational stress, and it's probably not going to get the senior leadership," said a military officer with long experience in the region.

Local politicians also complain that the strikes only encourage militants to undertake retaliatory actions in urban areas. The politicians point to the recent string of suicide bombings of high-profile government targets in Rawalpindi, Lahore and Islamabad as evidence that militants are determined to take revenge for losses in the tribal areas.

"There's no way Pakistan can afford to follow a policy that is causing a war at home," said Khawaja Imran Raza, a top spokesman for former prime minister Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League-N faction. "There's a need to revisit the policy and there's a need to reassess because the domestic cost is so huge. We have lost a prime minister -- our top opposition leader. We have lost generals, and just look at our losses in Lahore."

In 2005, the United States also attacked al-Qaeda sites in tribal areas, killing top operative Abu Hamza Rabia. In 2006, a Predator strike targeting three top al-Qaeda operatives killed only local villagers.

U.S. strategy could backfire if missiles take innocent lives. "The [tribal] Pashtuns have a saying: 'Kill one person, make 10 enemies,' " Johnson said. "You might take out a bad guy in one of these strikes, but you might also be creating more foot soldiers. This is a war in which the more people you kill, the faster you lose."

Correspondent Candace Rondeaux in Islamabad and special correspondent Imtiaz Ali in Peshawar, Pakistan, contributed to this report.

UK sets up force for failing states in wake of Iraq
Wed Mar 19, 2008 11:40am EDT
By Katherine Baldwin

LONDON (Reuters) - British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced plans on Wednesday for a civilian rapid reaction force that would come to the aid of fragile or failing states, saying he had learned lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan.

The 1,000-strong force comprising police, emergency service personnel, judges and trainers would be on standby to be deployed to provide humanitarian assistance to ailing nations or help with post-war reconstruction and peacekeeping.

Ultimately, he said, having such a resource would be in the best interests of Britain's own security.

"We must have civilian experts and professionals ready to deploy quickly to assist failing states and to help rebuild countries emerging from conflict, putting them on the road to economic and political recovery," Brown told parliament as he unveiled a new national security strategy.

"(It is) a lesson learnt from recent conflicts ranging from Rwanda and Bosnia to Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia."

Brown urged European Union and NATO partners "to set high and ambitious targets for their own contributions".

The United States and Britain, who five years ago invaded Iraq together, have recognized they could have done more to prepare for the aftermath of the conflict and limit the chaos that continues to cause death and destruction in the country.

Critics of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars say they have created breeding grounds for anti-Western militant groups and put Britain in the firing line for Islamist attacks.

Bombings by British Islamists killed 52 people on London's transport network in 2005.

Brown, unveiling a broad-ranging national security document, said the threat from failing and unstable nations posed as big a threat to Britain as nuclear weapons proliferation did.

He identified a new breed of threats -- climate change, pandemics, computer warfare and the safety of energy supplies -- and said the focus should be on fighting poverty and disease, which he called the "drivers" of conflict and instability.

Recent tensions between Britain and Russia have raised questions about the security of energy supplies.

Brown said he would continue to campaign to prevent nuclear proliferation by bargaining with non-nuclear countries. He announced an international conference in London later this year to help non-nuclear states meet their energy needs.

The national security strategy is part of an attempt to make the public more aware of the threats the nation faces, to win support for foreign wars and increase vigilance at home.

But the opposition Conservative Party said Brown's statement "sounded more like a list than a strategy" and critics accuse the government of exaggerating the threat to win support for tough anti-terrorism laws.

The government plans to disclose hitherto confidential information on risks facing Britain and a new forum of military and security experts, academics and others will help advise a national security committee set up last year, Brown said.

March 28, 2008
Harvard’s $34.9 Billion Endowment Makes Its Choice for New Chief

By GERALDINE FABRIKANT
The Harvard Management Company, which oversees the university’s $34.9 billion endowment, appointed Jane Mendillo, the chief investment officer at Wellesley College, as its president and chief executive on Thursday.

The appointment is a homecoming of sorts for Ms. Mendillo, who has run Wellesley’s endowment since 2002. She served in a variety of capacities at Harvard Management before joining Wellesley, where she reshaped a portfolio that grew to $1.7 billion by June 30, 2007, the end of Wellesley’s fiscal year, from $1 billion when she started.

Ms. Mendillo’s appointment brings to an end a difficult period for Harvard, which hired Mohamed A. El-Erian in 2005 to run the endowment. Just shy of his second year at Harvard, however, Mr. El-Erian left to return to the Pacific Investment Management Company as a member of its senior management team. He had been at Pimco for seven years before joining Harvard. His abrupt departure came after that of the former president and chief executive, Jack Meyer, who had run the endowment for 15 years and accumulated a stellar record. Mr. Meyer now heads Convexity Capital, a $9 billion hedge fund.

In a telephone interview on Thursday, Ms. Mendillo who is 49, made it clear that she planned to stay at Harvard for the foreseeable future. “I worked at Harvard for 15 years,” she said. “I was at Wellesley for six years and my intent is to stay at Harvard for a very long time and take a long-term view of the portfolio.”

Ms. Mendillo, who was appointed after a six-month search, joins a growing number of women who are running some of the nation’s largest university endowments. Ten years ago, just 2 of the nation’s 25 largest endowments were run by women. With Ms. Mendillo’s appointment, that number has jumped to six. After appointing Drew G. Faust as president last year, Harvard now has women serving in two prominent posts.

The university’s decision was greeted with enthusiasm by people who have worked with her and in the endowment world in general. “She is an excellent choice,” Mr. Meyer said in a telephone interview on Thursday. “She is smart. She is soft spoken, but she is a tough negotiator.”

Mr. Meyer recalled that when Ms. Mendillo worked on real estate investment for Harvard, “she went down to Texas by herself and negotiated with two people that represented the seller of the property.”

“She did a terrific job,” he said. “She did it alone and came back with a transaction that was much better than what we were aiming for.”

Lulu Wang, a Wellesley alumna who heads the investment firm Tupelo Capital and was chairwoman of Wellesley’s investment committee when it hired Ms. Mendillo, said, “She left us in a very strong position and with a well-qualified investment team in place.”

When Ms. Mendillo joined Wellesley, the college had a more traditional investment portfolio of stocks and bonds. She led a program to diversify it into a more sophisticated array of investments that included hedge funds and private equity. That strategy, pioneered by David Swensen at Yale, has been widely adopted by many of the nation’s university endowments.

In the last fiscal year, Wellesley’s endowment, the nation’s 32nd largest, generated a 22.7 percent return, better than the 21.3 percent average for universities with endowments of $1 billion or more, according to data compiled by the National Association of College and University Business Officers.

Over a five-year period, Wellesley posted a 13.5 percent average annualized return. While that trailed the 13.9 percent average for the peer group, experts generally agree that it takes several years before the strategy of a new chief investment officer is in place.

In her 15 years at Harvard, Ms. Mendillo developed a strong familiarity with its investment approach. She was an equities analyst in domestic stocks. “After that I was a principal in the private equity group and then I was vice president of trust for five years,” she recalled. From there she moved on to become vice president for private equity and eventually vice president for external management across a variety of asset classes, she said.

When Ms. Mendillo left Harvard in 2002, she effectively oversaw $7 billion, or about one-third of the endowment’s assets at the time. Its holdings included investments in real estate, emerging markets and natural resources.

Still in leaving Wellesley to return to Harvard, which has the nation’s largest university endowment, Ms. Mendillo faces enormous challenges. While Harvard already has a sophisticated portfolio, overseeing such a large fund can make it tough to find enough good money managers who can accommodate the large amounts of capital that Harvard has to invest. The current environment is particularly difficult though James Rothenberg, chairman of Harvard Management’s board, said on Thursday that the endowment was up since the start of fiscal 2008.

When Ms. Mendillo joins Harvard in July, she will be asked to fill some rather large shoes. Mr. Meyer recorded annual returns of 15.9 percent on average over 15 years, bested only by Yale University.

However, he ran into controversy when some alumni objected to the compensation paid to him and in particular two of his star managers, who each earned about $25 million in 2004 managing portions of Harvard’s money internally. Mr. Meyer left in the wake of that criticism.

Over the years, an increasing amount of Harvard’s endowment has been handed over to outside managers so that they now handle about 70 percent of its assets. Partly as a result, compensation packages for internal managers last year were far smaller. For example, Mr. El-Erian earned $6.5 million in fiscal 2007, and Andrew Wiltshire, who oversees natural resources investments, took home $6 million. While no details of Ms. Mendillo’s Harvard compensation package are yet public, at Wellesley she earned $607,874 in fiscal 2006.

Ms. Mendillo is a graduate of Yale University and the Yale School of Management. She worked for a period as a management consultant for Bain & Company. She is on the Yale University Investment Committee but will give up that post later this year.

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