Why the Iraq War Won't Engulf the Mideast
Iraq, Middle East, Islamic World
Ray Takeyh, Fellow
Steven A. Cook, Fellow
Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
International Herald Tribune
JUNE 28, 2007 —
Long before the Bush administration began selling "the surge" in Iraq as a way to avert a general war in the Middle East, observers both inside and outside the government were growing concerned about the potential for armed conflict among the regional powers.
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Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt.
This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there.

It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country.

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq.

The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq.

Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict.

Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries.

In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom.

Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight.

Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight.

As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary.

So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq.

The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

Iraq's civil war is the latest tragedy of this hapless region, but still a tragedy whose consequences are likely to be less severe than both supporters and opponents of Bush's war profess.

How the Iraq War Has Empowered Iran
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Diplomacy
Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
The Brookings Institution
MARCH 21, 2008 —
In the approach to the five-year anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, senior officials from the two most important allies of the new Iraqi government visited Baghdad to mark the occasion. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was greeted by his Iraqi counterparts with all the elaborate pomp and circumstance associated a state visit, the first by an Iranian leader in 30 years and the first of any regional leader since the 2003 invasion. Two weeks later, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney also made his way to Baghdad. However, despite his infamous pre-war prediction that U.S. forces would be greeted with “sweets and flowers,” security conditions forced him to travel under a blanket of secrecy, on a plane carrying a specially reinforced trailer for his sleeping accommodations in a country where 155,000 American troops patrol.
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The contrast between Ahmadinejad’s triumphal reception and Cheney’s furtive and fortified stopover speaks volumes about the strategic legacy of the Bush Administration’s decision to use military force to remove the bloody dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Of the many American illusions and delusions surrounding this war, the Administration’s calculations with respect to Iran were among the most wildly off base. Instead of generating a liberal, secular democracy whose reverberations would drive out Iran’s clerical oligarchs, the disastrous Bush policies fostered a sectarian Iraq that has helped empower Iranian hardliners. Rather than serving as an anchor for a new era of stability and American preeminence in the Persian Gulf, the new Iraq represents a strategic black hole, bleeding Washington of military resources and political influence while extending Iran’s primacy among its neighbors.

Like so much else that went wrong in Iraq, the post-war dynamic between Baghdad and Tehran should have been easy to foresee. Iran’s leaders cultivated enduring ties with all the significant Iraqi opposition groups over the course of their long adversarial relationship with Saddam Hussein. None of these groups could have been considered wholly-owned clients of the Islamic Republic, but their varying degrees of intimacy with and fealty toward Tehran almost universally surpassed their tactical cooperation with Washington in the run-up to the war and its aftermath. Moreover, as the only organized political forces in the post-war period, the Shia and Kurdish oppositionists were uniquely positioned to take advantage of the power vacuum, facilitated in no small part by retention of their militias.

American officials relied upon the expectation that the two countries’ nationalist identities would outweigh any sectarian cohesion, a conclusion supported by the experience of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. But the U.S. failed to anticipate that in post-war Iraq, sectarian and nationalist interests have been largely conflated for the newly-dominant Shia and Kurds, propelling their leaders to utilize the benefits of an alliance with Tehran to entrench their own positions. Moreover, the Bush Administration appears to overestimated the significance of ideology in framing Iran’s approach to the new Iraq, hoping that a heavy-handed effort to export the Islamic revolution would alienate Iraqis. Instead, Tehran has behaved far more prudently, opting to support a democratic framework that privileges Iran’s allies in Iraq. At the same time, Tehran has sought to increase the cost of a continued American presence in Iraq through support to insurgents, in order to maximize its own position within the country and leverage vis-à-vis Washington.

Iran’s strategic and financial investments in Iraq reflect the regime’s deeply-held conviction that Tehran has an existential interest in ensuring a friendly government in Baghdad, one that is no longer capable of threatening Iran directly or on behalf of the international community. For Iran’s post-revolutionary leaders and society, the 1980-88 war represents the single most influential formative experience, inculcating a persistent sense of strategic vulnerability and a willingness to do whatever necessary to ensure the survival of both the Iranian nation and the Islamic state. This worldview underlies Tehran’s assiduous and wide-ranging extension of influence in post-war Iraq.

As developments repeatedly refuted its initial assumptions about the dynamics between Iraq and Iran, the Bush Administration at first sought refuge in denial, absurdly predicting that each new carefully-orchestrated leadership transition in Iraq would generate more distance between Tehran and Baghdad. More recently, the Administration has moved more forcefully, seeking aggressively to obstruct Iranian support to militias and insurgents. These actions are necessary to ensuring greater security for American forces in Iraq, but ultimately the real means of protecting Iraq’s sovereignty from intrusive neighbors does not involve expanding U.S. presence and responsibility within the country. In the long term, Iraqi leaders will only begin to differentiate themselves from Tehran when they are forced to grapple independently with the painful alternatives of governing and assume greater responsibility for their country’s security.

In addition, the broader American strategy appears fated to repeat the sort of ill-informed misapprehensions that informed the Bush Administration’s initial steps in Iraq. In response to growing regional trepidations about Iran’s activities in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, Washington has endeavored to transform a strategic deficit into an advantage. The concept was catalyzed by the July 2006 war in Lebanon, which Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice characterized at the time as “the birth pangs of a new Middle East.” Rice was widely lambasted for her tin ear, but the rhetoric signaled the Administration’s decision to embark on building a new platform for America’s role in the region. Initiatives such as the Gulf Security Dialogue and GCC-plus-two discussions (Egypt and Jordan) were intended to capitalize on Sunni Arab concerns about the rising tide of Iranian influence to leverage a more assertive posture vis-à-vis Tehran in exchange for their support for a revived Arab-Israeli peace process.

However, beyond routine exchange of pleasantries and a new stream of arms sales running into the tens of billions of dollars, it is unclear what these initiatives have actually accomplished. Shortly after its rejuvenation at Annapolis, the peace process quickly descended once again into violence, stalemated by the incapacity of both sides to undertake meaningful unilateral concessions. And despite their significant misgivings about Iran, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf have made clear – through a series of visits and high-level dialogue – that they will not form the bulwark of an anti-Iranian coalition, even as they privately urge Washington to resolve the Iran problem. For their part, Iran’s leaders have demonstrated some awareness of the need to maintain a constructive relationship with Riyadh and the Gulf states, dispatching envoys to Riyadh repeatedly over the past several years to assuage concerns over Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric and Iran’s escalating tensions with the West.

As with all aspects of the Iraq dilemma, there are no magic bullets that will ameliorate the significant setbacks for U.S. interests inherent in the extension of Iran’s influence in Iraq. Five years into this endeavor, neither rhetoric nor alliance-building will enable Washington to reset the clock to 2003. We will have to utilize multiple instruments and approaches to contend with a newly ascendant Iran – containment, active deterrence, and even accommodation and engagement. Tehran has shrewdly exploited the opportunities presented by America’s stumbling in Iraq; the challenge for the next Administration will be to acknowledge the realities of regional dynamics and regain the strategic advantage.

Geopolitical Diary: Brazil Maneuvers For Better Position

March 26, 2008

Traditionally, the hegemon of a geopolitical region has maintained economic, resource, military and political dominance. Brazil has sought to fulfill this role for the South American region since colonial times. Despite its current superiority in most of these areas, Brazil has lacked political confirmation of this hegemony.
However, an opportunity presented itself during the recent Andean diplomatic crisis for Brazil to rise to the role of protectorate for the continent. Brazil has proposed a security council of South America, an organization meant to resolve such disputes in house, without foreign mediators. The council will be discussed between Brazilian President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez when the two meet March 26. The question remains however, does Brazil have enough clout in the aforementioned areas to influence other countries to join?
Brazil’s economy as a whole is booming — not in the usual cyclical fashion of emerging markets, but in sustained growth. Unlike other countries that have enacted economic cures for the short term (such as Argentina), Brazil has kept tight a fiscal policy allowing for its growth to be sustained and stable. Brazil has kept interest rates high to curb inflation. Despite this, foreign investment increased nearly 84 percent in 2007. Domestic demand is growing substantially as well, which means Brazil isn’t solely dependent on exports. Despite Petrobras’ emergence as a resource powerhouse, Brazil’s future isn’t entirely set on commodity prices, as is the case in Venezuela. Also, Brazil’s budget isn’t financed in large part by oil revenue, such as in Mexico. Brazilian international reserves are at all-time highs, and the tight fiscal controls have given the country a fair amount of room to maneuver.
Brazil also maintains a resource advantage. Hydroelectric, nuclear and liquefied natural gas power are being developed to satisfy domestic demand in the hopes of reducing or eliminating any dependence Brazil might have on its neighbors. In addition, Brazil also is using Petrobras and its power investments to gain influence over its neighbors. For example, Petrobras continues to invest heavily in Bolivian natural gas. This gives Brazil priority in receiving Bolivia’s natural gas shipments. Since Bolivia acts as the primary supplier of natural gas to other regional powers such as Argentina and Chile, these investments are invaluable political leverage. Brazil uses the same tactic for hydroelectric power in Paraguay. Add all of this to Brazil’s large and growing oil/ethanol reserves, and you have an energy superpower well prepared for the future.
To back all of this up Brazil has the strongest military in South America, positioned in the region’s most strategic location. Brazil already maintains the largest air force and navy in the region. According to an October 2007 announcement, the government will increase defense spending by 50 percent for 2008. Most of that will be spent on updating equipment. Colombia has a well-trained infantry force focused on counternarcotics operations in addition to counterinsurgency-style equipment, much of which is maintained with U.S. aid. While Venezuela has been in talks with Russia to make large military purchases such as late-model SU-30 “Flanker” fighter jets and Kilo-class diesel electric submarines, no country comes close to the military might of Brazil.
Brazil’s greatest advantage may be geographic. Its main population centers are well protected. A buffer of dense but unpopulated Amazon separates it from its northern neighbors, while a river basin protects it from its main rival Argentina. Brazil also has poured investment into Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia, garnering enough influence to use them as buffers as well. But the country’s legal borders give it access to almost every country on the continent.
The proposal has its obstacles to overcome, however. There are strong nationalistic sentiments among the countries of Latin America. It may be more difficult to convince leaders that cooperation is necessary or even possible. Already Chavez and his cohorts have begun forming their own leftist alliance, and it may not be in their political interest to subject themselves to further political pressure within the framework of such a council.
Regardless of the obstacles, Brazil still needs the right political platform from which to act as the region’s undisputed leader. It tried before, such as when it lobbied for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. But the proposed organization, if adopted, would do much more to unify the countries under Brazilian influence. The council would act together on peacekeeping missions, fight organized crime, conduct joint military exercises and develop a defense policy for the region as a whole. As the largest power in the region, Brazil can promote Latin American independence as its duty, a message that should resonate well with the politically left in Brazil and elsewhere

Filmgoers get a taste of the good life
Luxury exhib chain plans $35 film tickets
By MARC GRASER
A recession may be looming, but a group of investors thinks Americans are ready to pony up $35 for a movie ticket.
Village Roadshow Ltd., Act III, Lambert Entertainment and the Retirement Systems of Alabama pension fund have partnered to bring the luxury cinema circuit Village Roadshow Gold Class Cinemas to the U.S.

The partners will spend $200 million to build 50 theaters nationwide over the next five years, with the first two venues set to open in South Barrington, a suburb of Chicago, and the Seattle suburb of Redmond in October. Others are planned for Fairview, Texas, near Dallas-Fort Worth, and Scottsdale, Ariz.

Each complex will sport theaters featuring 40 reclining armchair seats with footrests, digital projection and the capability to screen 2-D and 3-D movies, as well as a lounge and bar serving cocktails and appetizers, a concierge service and valet parking.

But the circuit will especially push its culinary offerings -- made-to-order meals like sushi and other theater-friendly foods from on-site chefs (a service button at each seat calls a waiter). Moviegoers will have to pay extra for any food they order, however.

The Burbank-based company's hoping to attract 10 million "upscale and affluent" consumers per year to its theaters that will be housed in high-end shopping centers and malls. Each complex will typically house eight screens.

"It's a new way to go to the movies," said Graham Burke, managing director and CEO of Village Roadshow Ltd. "It's like what Mercedes is to a Toyota or like flying first class in an airplane."

Village Roadshow founded the Gold Class Cinemas chain in Australia in 1997. It has since expanded to other countries, including Singapore and Greece.

Company execs said bringing the chain to the U.S. is a "natural extension" of the brand.

"The demand for luxury moviegoing in the U.S. is very strong, and by working with our partners, we are delivering on that demand in a way never before experienced by the American consumer," said Kirk Senior, CEO of Village Roadshow Gold Class Cinemas.

In addition to its initial complexes in Illinois, Washington, Texas and Arizona, company also plans to build in California, Florida, Nevada, Pennsylvania and New York.

Gold Class Cinemas won't be the first luxury theater circuit in the U.S. Regal Entertainment, Cinemark, National Amusements and Sundance Cinemas offer similar services, including high-end food and concierges, at much cheaper prices of around $12-$18 per ticket.

Idea is that plushing up the current moviegoing experience will encourage auds that typically stay home to watch movies via their pricey home theaters to venture out again. But it's also a way for exhibs to make more money: Concession sales are kept by theater chains, while a little more than half of each ticket sold is split with the studios. Selling sushi and a glass of wine will command higher prices than popcorn and soda.

There are an estimated 300 high-end multiplexes operating in the U.S.

If the recession is stressing out some businesses, exhibitors aren't sweating just yet. Entertainment has long been shown to be recession-proof. And that's exactly the attitude Village Roadshow is taking.

"This is a top-end experience," Burke said. "People want to get away from their blues. I don't think the recession will affect it one iota."

Captured documents reveal multiple links between Saddam, Al Qaida

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon's Institute for Defense Analyses reviewed 600,000 documents, known as the Harmony data base and captured in the Iraq war.
The report said Saddam's intelligence services began working with Al Qaida elements against the United States as early as 1993. The president ordered attacks on the U.S. military presence in Arab League states, particularly in Somalia, where Al Qaida was active.

Translator Amir Mohsen shows off a Saddam Hussein picture while searching through documents at the former Mukhabarat (Iraqi Intelligence Service) building in Baghdad.
A 1993 memorandum from the Iraqi Intelligence Service to Saddam discussed a plan to train operatives from Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Jihad, cited in the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, was founded by Ayman Zawahiri, today the No. 2 figure in Al Qaida.
In 1999, Iraq began supporting an unidentified Islamic Kurdish group. Two years later, Iraqi intelligence was said to have recruited suicide bombers for attacks in Saudi Arabia.

But the documents also demonstrated Saddam's distrust of Al Qaida. An alleged architect of the 1993 bombing of New York City's World Trade Center, Abdul Rahman Yassin, was imprisoned in Iraq under orders from Saddam, who did not believe the Islamic insurgent.

The institute concluded that it could not find a "smoking gun" to link the Saddam regime to Al Qaida strikes. Iraq was not found to have directly cooperated with Al Qaida in attacks on Western or Arab targets. Instead, the Pentagon report found that Saddam agreed to train Al Qaida operatives in Iraq.

"The rise of Islamist fundamentalism in the region gave Saddam the opportunity to make terrorism, one of the few tools remaining in Saddam's 'coercion' tool box," the report, titled "Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents," said.

"Is there anything in the captured archives to indicate that Saddam had the will to use his terrorist capabilities directly against the United States?" the report asked. "Judging from Saddam's statements before the 1991 Gulf War with the United States, the answer is yes."

The institute concluded that Saddam's relationship with Al Qaida was similar to the workings of cocaine rings in Colombia during the 1990s. Those gangs remained rivals even as they cooperated to expand the market for cocaine.

"Recognizing Iraq as a second, or parallel, 'terror cartel' that was simultaneously threatened by and somewhat aligned with its rival helps to explain the evidence emerging from the detritus of Saddam's regime," the report said.

Most of Saddam's targets were said to have been Iraqi nationals. The report said Saddam sought to use Islamic and other insurgents against the United States and his enemies, but the plots failed because of what appeared to have been incompetence.

"Evidence that was uncovered and analyzed attests to the existence of a terrorist capability and a willingness to use it until the day Saddam was forced to flee Baghdad by coalition forces," the report said. "The answer to the question of Saddam's will in the final months in power remains elusive."