https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1312
A Great White Fleet for the 21st Century
By Lieutenant Commander David K. Richardson, U.S. Navy, Major Lane V. Packwood, Idaho Army National Guard, and Daniel E. Aldana
With the elevation of humanitarian assistance/disaster response to a core mission of the Navy in the new maritime strategy, it is time to develop an international humanitarian-centric fleet in the Pacific theater.
There should be no mistaking that the newly released A Cooperative Strategy For 21st Century Seapower is a significant shift in naval strategy for the United States. Since the time of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt's Project Sixty in 1970 and Admiral Stansfield Turner's writing of "Missions of the U.S. Navy" in 1974, the core missions of American seapower have remained relatively constant over the last four decades: power projection, sea control, deterrence, and naval presence.1 While leaders in the Navy debated the order of priority and the implementation of these missions over the years, the focus on these four core missions themselves varied little. That is, until now.
With the release in October of the Navy's newest maritime strategy, co-authored for the first time in conjunction with the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, the strategic landscape has significantly changed. The four core missions, much the same since the time of Admiral Zumwalt, have now been expanded to six. These two additional missions are maritime security and humanitarian assistance/disaster response. Surprisingly, little is said in the new strategy that outlines how these additional core capabilities will be implemented.
Furthermore, the elevation of humanitarian assistance and disaster response to a core capability of U.S. maritime power is a new development that may have serious implications for force structure, organization, and training. Even though the U.S. armed forces have participated in humanitarian missions with distinction for some time, many questions remain. Specifically, how will the Sea Services assume this new core capability? Will our Sailors who go to sea in carrier strike groups and combatant vessels, forces that are arguably overtasked with the four traditional missions, also be trained and expected to take on this humanitarian role?
The debate on this issue is increasing, and the new maritime strategy clearly anticipates this controversy when it states in its introduction that "there is a tension . . . between the requirements for continued peacetime engagement and maintaining proficiency in the critical skills necessary to fighting and winning in combat."2 There is little doubt that our current combatant maritime forces can assume this new core capability, as they have shown the ultimate in flexibility and adaptability in meeting these types of tasks in the past. Simply put, our forces consistently show that they are willing and able to do "more with less." And one only needs to look at the Navy's response a few years ago to the devastating tsunami in Southeast Asia to see that maritime forces often provide the only means available to respond quickly in times of humanitarian crisis.
A Bold New Idea
But a larger issue is at stake here. As the new maritime strategy suggests, that larger issue is the challenge of implementing this new strategy in a way that does not degrade the combat capability of our maritime forces. Unfortunately, it does not provide any concrete recommendations on how to establish this new core capability without applying old models of employing combatant forces. To best meet this challenge, we propose a bold new idea, the concept of a 21st-century Great White Fleet.
In the first decade of the 20th century, President Theodore Roosevelt sent the original Great White Fleet, consisting of 16 battleships that were distinctly painted white, around the globe to display the military might of an emerging world power. "Widely considered one of the greatest peacetime achievements of the U.S. Navy," this fleet conducted a 43,000-mile, 14-month circumnavigation from 1907-1909 that included 20 port calls on six continents.3 Interestingly enough, in the final leg of its voyage, the original Great White Fleet responded to a devastating earthquake in Messina, Sicily. Once the ships arrived on the scene of this natural disaster, the "Sailors did everything they could to assist the beleaguered city."4
Now, one hundred years after the original Great White Fleet, this name can be recycled to meet the challenges of a new century. Instead of displaying the military might of one nation, this new Great White Fleet can be international in nature, and consist of humanitarian platforms that work together with nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations (NGOs/IGOs) to ease human suffering. Centered on the capabilities of the USNS Mercy (T-AH-19), this new humanitarian force can consist of hospital ships, high-speed craft, airlift platforms, and even old amphibious ships that are converted to fulfill a hospital ship mission.
The recent deployment of the USNS Comfort (T-AH-20) to Central and South America showed the impact this idea could have on a specific region. Over a four-month period, the Comfort deployed to Southern Command's area of responsibility with personnel on board from Canada, U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Public Health Service, Project Hope, and Operation Smile. During this time, the humanitarian forces on this one ship treated more than 98,000 patients in 12 nations.5 Imagine this type of capability, magnified many times over in personnel and available platforms, on constant deployment throughout a region of the world. Imagine not one, but six USNS Comfort-type ships, sailing the waters of the globe with NGOs/IGOs embarked, helping those in need, even before disaster strikes.
The key to making this new Great White Fleet a reality is cooperation with our allies and international partners. As first outlined by then-CNO Admiral Mike Mullen in the "1,000-ship Navy" concept, the United States must foster international partnerships to meet the growing challenges of globalization. The question then becomes, where do we begin?
Begin In The Pacific
Certainly an argument can be made that the Great White Fleet concept is applicable to many different regions of the world. The press attention given to the Comfort's recent SOUTHCOM deployment is a perfect example of this. And few could argue that this concept and the capacity it implies would be ideally suited for the humanitarian challenges faced throughout Africa Command's future area of responsibility. However, we argue that the Pacific theater is the ideal starting point for the birth of the new Great White Fleet.
First and foremost, the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility makes up over half the earth's surface, contains nearly 60 percent of the world's population, and is home to the world's six largest armed forces.6 Additionally, the vast distances involved with PACOM's predominately maritime areas of operation, sometimes described as the "tyranny of distance," makes responding to natural disasters in the Pacific theater a significant challenge. More important, a recent United Nations report clearly stated, "the Asian and Pacific region is the most disaster-prone region in the world, accounting for around 80 percent of all natural disasters worldwide and some 90 percent of deaths from natural disasters since 1900."7
Given these facts, a clear argument can be made for building up a humanitarian-assistance and disaster-response capability in the Pacific theater. Surely this concept could expand in the decades ahead to include a worldwide Great White Fleet capacity, but the process must begin and be tested somewhere. Once the Pacific model is perfected, it could expand to Southern Command, Africa Command, the Mediterranean, and every region of the globe.
Beginning in the Pacific theater, we suggest the following four steps be taken to make this vision a reality:
• Persuade Japan, Russia, China, India, and Australia to take the lead with us in building an international Great White Fleet.
The new maritime strategy clearly articulates that "no one nation has the resources required" to counter the vast amount of emerging threats.8 Therefore, engaging with international partners to meet the increasing challenges of humanitarian assistance and disaster response makes sense. We suggest Japan, Russia, China, India, and Australia only as a starting point and as nations that could potentially build and deploy a hospital ship and other humanitarian platforms in the near future. In the spirit of the 1,000-ship Navy, every nation should be engaged in this effort, and provide whatever humanitarian forces they can. Smaller nations could easily contribute personnel, helicopters, cargo aircraft, and humanitarian supplies. But as Vice Admiral John G. Morgan Jr. and Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio outlined in the November 2005 Proceedings, "Without question, the first and predominant contributors to the 1,000-ship Navy are navies of the international community."9
• Leverage the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program to help fulfill the vision of an international Great White Fleet.
The concept of the Great White Fleet can be fulfilled by partnering the shipbuilding capacity of many of the nations suggested above. This said, the foreign military sales program of the United States offers another avenue for building an international construct to this vision. Specifically, as the United States decommissions general purpose amphibious assault ships (LHAs) in the coming years, the potential for transforming these ships from a kinetic to a humanitarian/hospital ship platform and selling them to international partners should not be underestimated. In this way, the LHA of today can easily become a humanitarian assistance platform, and a centerpiece of tomorrow's international Great White Fleet.
• Develop and execute humanitarian-centric, multi-national exercises to train the Great White Fleet and build humanitarian assistance and disaster response capability.
Existing exercises in the Pacific like Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) already train our forces in traditional missions of power projection and sea control. In recent years, our current military exercises have increasingly included humanitarian assistance phases at the expense of training in other core mission areas. We suggest the development of a new exercise, Cooperative Relief Exercise Pacific (CORE-PAC), that will focus solely on humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Centered on Great White Fleet platforms, this biennial exercise could begin in Guam and then rotate every two years to a new host nation in the Pacific. In this way, CORE-PAC could take its place next to RIMPAC as a model of cooperation that trains forces in new core capability areas without sacrificing training in traditional military missions.
• In pursuing this vision, leverage the resident expertise within the Pacific Command at the Asia-Pacific Center For Security Studies (APCSS) and the Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE).
In realizing the Great White Fleet vision, PACOM has resident expertise in humanitarian assistance and disaster response located at APCSS in Honolulu and the COE at Tripler Hospital. These organizations, both located in Hawaii, have significant experience in holding conferences and building partnerships throughout the region. This expertise should be tapped, especially in developing doctrine, organization, and training that will go into humanitarian exercises such as CORE-PAC.
New Ways Of Thinking
It is important to note that the Great White Fleet concept will not solve all the problems in the Pacific theater. But if this vision is realized, it could provide an important multi-national humanitarian force that is actively engaged, forward deployed, and spread across the region. This force will not necessarily need to sail together in formation and respond only when a disaster strikes. But rather, multiple hospital ships or humanitarian platforms could be simultaneously visiting different countries. These forces could focus on building disaster response capacity within these nations, as well as addressing root causes of human suffering that are so prevalent. This force could then come together every two years in a new location for CORE-PAC, an exercise that will hone skills for the day when catastrophic events occur and the entire force is needed in one location.
A Cooperative Strategy For 21st Century Seapower clearly states, "This strategy requires new ways of thinking."10 We put forward this concept of the Great White Fleet to do just that. In trying to address the complexity of the new century, there is no one idea or concept that will address the wide variety of challenges that we will face. But we can identify the gaps, and work aggressively to address them.
The new maritime strategy ends by declaring that "seapower is a force for good . . . as it joins with others to promote security and prosperity across the globe."11 In addressing the capability gaps and staying true to the intent of the overall strategy, the 21st century Great White Fleet answers the call.
1. Peter M. Swartz. "U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies & Concepts (1970-2007): Insights for the U.S. Navy of 2008 & Beyond." PowerPoint presentation, Center for Naval Analyses, Center for Strategic Studies, 23 August 2007, accessed www.cna.org/documents/7-12-07_%20brf.pdf, 20 October 2007.
2. ADM Thad Allen, GEN James Conway, & ADM Gary Roughead. "A Cooperative Strategy For 21st Century Seapower," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2007, p. 15.
3. JO2 Mike McKinley. "The Cruise of the Great White Fleet." Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, accessed http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/gwf_cruise.htm, 9 November 2007.
4. Ibid.
5. USNS Comfort: Humanitarian Mission, United States Southern Command Partnership for the Americas, 24 October 2007, accessed http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=6, 9 November 2007.
6. PACOM Fact Sheet, Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, accessed http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml, 12 November 2007.
7. United Nations Report, State of the Environment in Asia and the Pacific 2005, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), p. 17, accessed http://www.unescap.org/esd/environment/soe/2005/download/Part/8.pdf, 12 November 2007.
8. Allen, Conway, & Roughead. "A Cooperative Strategy For 21st Century Seapower," p. 16.
9. VADM John G. Morgan Jr. and RADM Charles W. Martoglio. "The 1000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2005, accessed /magazines/proceedings/archive/story.asp?STORY_ID=247, 12 November 2007.
10. Allen, Conway, & Roughead. "A Cooperative Strategy For 21st Century Seapower," p 20.
11. Ibid.
Lieutenant Commander Richardson is a Surface Warfare Officer with experience in destroyers, frigates, and minesweepers. He has a BS in Systems Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy, an MS in Leadership from the Naval Postgraduate School, and an MA with distinction in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.
Major Packwood is a Field Artillery Officer with the Idaho Army National Guard. Currently a student at the Naval War College, College of Naval Command & Staff, he has a BA from Brigham Young University and an MA in Political Science from UCLA. He was a battery commander in Iraq.
Mr. Aldana is an analyst with the U.S. government. Currently a student at the Naval War College, College of Naval Command & Staff, he has a BA in Political Science from the University of California, Irvine.
The Great White Fleet Concept was developed and presented by students in Seminar 21 as part of a Final Exercise in the National Security Decision Making course at the Naval War College, College of Naval Command & Staff. The students in Seminar 21 developed a Power Point presentation that addressed their assessment of future environment and threats in the Pacific theater out to 2016, as well as their recommendations for theater strategy guidance based on this assessment. The results were briefed in early November at the Naval War College to a distinguished panel that included Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
Members of Seminar 21 included LCDR Charles Brown IV, USN, LT Curtis Cruthirds, USN, LCDR J.J. Elias, USN, LCDR Michael Elliot, USN, LCDR Steve Ilteris, USN, LCDR Chris Legrand, USN, LCDR Patrick Olsen, USN, MAJ Lane Packwood, IDARNG, MAJ Jason Plourde, USAF, LCDR Dave Richardson, USN, MAJ Ed Rodgers, USMC, MAJ Chad Scholes, USAF, and MAJ Stewart Van Buren, USA. Faculty moderators were Professor Jeff Norwitz, Dr. Paul Smith, and Dr. Kathleen Walsh.
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