November 19, 2007
Brazil Discovers an Oil Field Can Be a Political Tool

By ALEXEI BARRIONUEVO
RIO DE JANEIRO, Nov. 17 — With the price of oil hovering near $100 a barrel, the discovery of the biggest deep-water oil field off the southeastern coast has the potential to transform Brazil into a global energy powerhouse and to reshape the politics of this energy-starved continent.

While Brazil’s state oil company, Petrobras, has known of the field for more than a year, it only finished assessing its full potential in recent months. It announced on Nov. 8 that the field held some five billion to eight billion barrels of crude oil and natural gas.

The announcement has everyone in the region, and beyond, taking notice. A field that size — the biggest in the world since a discovery in Kazakhstan in 2000 — is a potential political game-changer for Brazil.

In the next five years it is conceivable that Brazil could move ahead of Mexico and Canada in total oil reserves, becoming second only to Venezuela and the United States in the energy pecking order of the Americas.

This is heady stuff for Brazil, a country that only last year became a net energy exporter mostly because of its aggressive push into sugar-cane ethanol and hydroelectric power.

“All of a sudden Brazil is emerging as an energy power,” said Peter Hakim, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a policy group in Washington focusing on Latin America. “Everything they have developed, from soybeans to sugar to oil is suddenly working. They have had amazing luck.”

There is little doubt that the find gives Brazil new influence against energy players like Bolivia and Venezuela, and not just in the economic competition among energy suppliers, but in the political arena as well.

Much to the chagrin of the United States, Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez, has used his nation’s oil wealth to aggressively push a leftist agenda at home and abroad. The Brazilian field, known as Tupi, now has the potential to lend more weight to Brazil’s more moderate, leftist approach.

Already countries around the region have been quick to sense the potential threats and benefits. With news of the discovery coming just ahead of a meeting of Latin American leaders in Santiago, Chile, Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, acknowledged there during the meeting that he was being “treated with a certain deference” by the other leaders.

Mr. Chávez nervously jested that Mr. da Silva was now an “oil magnate.” He also quickly suggested that the two nations create an Amazonian energy region similar to the Caribbean and Andean integration efforts Venezuela had been pushing for.

“Now Lula has some cards to put on the table with Chávez,” said Roberto Teixeira da Costa, an economist who serves on the board of the private equity arm of Brazil’s development bank. “It is good to have some counterweight in Latin America.” It seems the discovery has already given Mr. da Silva more confidence in standing up to Mr. Chávez and his protégé, the Bolivian president, Evo Morales.

Petrobras on Tuesday pulled out of a natural gas project with Venezuela, citing “technical and economic reasons.” It denied the pullout had anything to do with the Tupi discovery.

A cartoon in the Brazilian newspaper O Globo showed Mr. da Silva sunbathing atop an oil gusher one day, and breathing a black substance into the face of Mr. Morales the next. “There’s Lula, full of gas: be careful Morales!” the caption read.

The turnabout is dramatic. Just two years ago Mr. Morales announced the nationalization of his nation’s energy reserves. The step was a firm slap to Brazil, which had invested in Bolivia. Now analysts expect the new field will allow Brazil to take a tougher stand in its negotiations with Bolivia over new gas contracts and investments in Bolivia’s nationalized gas sector.

Mr. da Silva basked in the sudden possibilities, declaring that “Brazil would obviously participate in OPEC,” the global oil cartel, and already felt free enough to weigh in on its politics, saying that the organization should reduce oil prices.

He also insisted that Brazil would not “pull back even one millimeter” from its push into biofuels. Brazil is sitting on the most abundant farmland in the world, which it has been using a part of to produce sugar cane for ethanol.

Not least, though the new oil will not be online for at least five years, the announcement of the size of the field may help Mr. da Silva blunt criticism at home that Brazil was heading into an energy crisis because of a shortage of natural gas.

It has also raised hopes of easing the energy crisis among Brazil’s neighbors, notably Argentina and Chile, which have been struggling with a lack of natural gas of their own.

Argentina has consistently cut off the flow of gas to Chile for the past two winters, causing Chile to scramble to find supplies elsewhere, and Bolivia’s nationalization has raised doubts about its ability to supply its neighbors’ growing energy demand.

“Every country in Latin America is aiming for energy independence, because they don’t have that much trust in their neighbors,” Mr. Hakim said.

Just last week Michelle Bachelet, Chile’s president, rejected an offer from Mr. Chávez of subsidized gasoline for the struggling public transportation system in Santiago. Ms. Bachelet said she was convinced that Chileans could resolve the system’s problems “ourselves.”

Meanwhile, Petrobras, which has developed into a leading expert on deep-water oil exploration, will have to work hard to tap the find.

To coax the oil from Tupi, engineers will have to drill up to 16,000 feet below the sea floor through salt and rocks, in water depths of up to 10,000 feet, an undertaking that is at the frontier of the industry’s technological ability, according to PFC Energy, a consultancy in Washington.

Even if the field turns out to be a good deal bigger than Petrobras has estimated publicly, Brazil still could not match Venezuela’s 80 billion barrels of oil reserves. The Tupi field, if it holds at least 5 billion barrels, could push Brazil past 17 billion barrels.

“This is oil that is promised for the future, not for today or tomorrow,” said Larry Goldstein, director of the Energy Policy Research Foundation in Washington. “If I was Chávez I wouldn’t be losing a lot of sleep — not yet.”

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

November 19, 2007
Op-Ed Columnist
Israel, Palestine, Crab Cakes

ROGER COHEN
I would like to invest hope in the Annapolis Middle East peace conference, or meeting, or parley, or whatever the term is. Really, I would. The 59-year battle for the same land of Zionist and Palestinian national movements has not been good for anyone.

I’d like to feel hopeful although no firm date has been set, and it’s not clear who’s coming, and it’s six years too late, and Israel has chosen to lure tourists for its 60th anniversary next year with a photo of an Israeli “cowboy” on a Golan Heights ranch, which hardly seems the ad campaign of a country about to trade land for peace.

I don’t want to despair although Ehud Olmert, the Israeli prime minister, is beset by criminal investigations, and President Bush is forlorn, and the only man who makes both these leaders look powerful is the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, who controls only the West Bank wing of his national movement.

Hopelessness is no option although the current “West Bank first” strategy comes just two years after a “Gaza first” approach. This had Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declaring in 2005 how critical it was to “seize the moment” — before the moment evaporated and Hamas grabbed control of Gaza.

Remember all the faith placed in Gaza and its greenhouses, all the talk of a “trial run” for Palestinian statehood after Israel’s withdrawal? Remember the way Palestinian elections were talked up? It’s not good to remember. There’s too much memory in the Middle East, too many graves. They get in the way.

Eyes to the future, I refuse to allow the latest fighting in Gaza between Hamas and Abbas’s Fatah to make me despondent, even when Mahmoud Zahar, a Hamas leader, tells me in a phone call that: “Without unification of the West Bank and Gaza, Abbas cannot represent the Palestinian side at Annapolis.”

Zahar, a doctor, predicts the get-together in Annapolis, Md., will be “a unique example of failure.” He counters my inquiries about a Hamas recognition of Israel with three questions:

“First, what is the border of Israel? And what happens to Jerusalem? And what happens to Palestinian refugees in the camps?”

Here we go — the old conundrums. Hamas cannot be ignored forever. But I console myself that the Annapolis meeting, tentatively planned for Nov. 26, is not about a peace settlement. It is about setting a framework for talks, defining principles, rallying regional support.

Perhaps the Saudis, under heavy U.S. pressure, will show up, although they are so risk-averse and have staked so much on Palestinian unity, I doubt King Abdullah will. Perhaps the Syrians will ignore Golan cowboy ads and appear, but I wonder. Perhaps fear of Iran will lead Sunni Arab states to show public support for Israel. Perhaps.

Still, despair is a nonstarter, even if a minister in Olmert’s government is already voting for legislation to block any eventual division of Jerusalem. So what if Annapolis looks like Rice’s transparent, last-gasp bid for a “legacy achievement”?

What matters are the two peoples. But even basic principles are problematic. One core demand of Olmert and his foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, is for up-front Palestinian recognition of Israel “as a Jewish state.” But Saeb Erekat, a moderate Palestinian negotiator, has said that “Palestinians will never acknowledge Israel’s Jewish identity.”

Livni wants clarity on the Jewish character of Israel, which has a large Arab minority, as quid pro quo for recognition of Palestine and as insurance against mass Palestinian return.

She’s right to want this; she’s wrong to push for the principle now. Why should Palestinians offer anything when the West Bank is a shameful place offering a primer on colonialism and Israeli settlements have grown almost unabated? Nascent Palestine is in pieces, invisible behind a reassuring fence-wall.

While the Bush administration looked away, Israelis and Palestinians lost sight of each other. Perhaps, in the end, the only way to stave off hopelessness is to think that at least Annapolis will enable them to commit to seeing each other more. They can set up working groups, renounce violence, set deadlines.

All the “final-status issues” — Jerusalem, borders, refugees, settlements, water and security — will have to be left for later. Even protracted attempts to frame the principles for discussion of these matters have failed.

“The best we can hope for is an agenda of conflict management and not have illusions of conflict resolution,” said Shlomo Avineri, an Israeli political scientist.

More than 200,000 Israeli settlers, the jihadist infiltration of the conflict and the deep split in the Palestinian movement have created physical and mental barriers even a strong U.S. president would find hard to shift. Bush is weak.

Hope is a shrinking refuge. Annapolis looks like a looming photo-op. Even photo-up-plus would be something at this stage.

•

Blog: iht.com/passages.

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

November 19, 2007
U.S. Considers Enlisting Tribes in Pakistan to Fight Al Qaeda

By ERIC SCHMITT, MARK MAZZETTI and CARLOTTA GALL
This article was reported and written by Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti and Carlotta Gall.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 — A new and classified American military proposal outlines an intensified effort to enlist tribal leaders in the frontier areas of Pakistan in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, as part of a broader effort to bolster Pakistani forces against an expanding militancy, American military officials said.

If adopted, the proposal would join elements of a shift in strategy that would also be likely to expand the presence of American military trainers in Pakistan, directly finance a separate tribal paramilitary force that until now has proved largely ineffective and pay militias that agree to fight Al Qaeda and foreign extremists, officials said. The United States now has only about 50 troops in Pakistan, a Pentagon spokesman said, a force that could grow by dozens under the new approach.

The new proposal is modeled in part on a similar effort by American forces in Anbar Province in Iraq that has been hailed as a great success in fighting foreign insurgents there. But it raises the question of whether such partnerships can be forged without a significant American military presence on the ground in Pakistan. And it is unclear whether enough support can be found among the tribes.

Altogether, the broader strategic move toward more local support is being accelerated because of concern about instability in Pakistan and the weakness of the Pakistani government, as well as fears that extremists with havens in the tribal areas could escalate their attacks on allied troops in Afghanistan. Just in recent weeks, Islamic militants sympathetic to Al Qaeda and the Taliban have already extended their reach beyond the frontier areas into more settled areas, most notably the mountainous region of Swat.

The tribal proposal, a strategy paper prepared by staff members of the United States Special Operations Command, has been circulated to counterterrorism experts but has not yet been formally approved by the command’s headquarters in Tampa, Fla. Some other elements of the campaign have been approved in principle by the Americans and Pakistanis and await financing, including $350 million over several years to help train and equip the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force that currently has about 85,000 members and is recruited from border tribes.

Ever since the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration has used billions of dollars of aid and heavy political pressure to encourage Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s president, to carry out more aggressive military operations against militants in the tribal areas. But the sporadic military campaigns Pakistan have conducted there have had little success, resulting instead in heavy losses among Pakistani Army units and anger among locals who have for decades been mostly independent from Islamabad’s control.

American officials acknowledge those failures, but they say the renewed emphasis on recruiting allies among the tribal militias and investing more heavily in the Frontier Corps reflect the depth of American concern about the need to address Islamic extremism in Pakistan.

The new counterinsurgency campaign is also a vivid example of the American military’s asserting a bigger role in a part of Pakistan that the Central Intelligence Agency has overseen almost exclusively since the Sept. 11 attacks.

Small numbers of United States military personnel have served as advisers at the division and corps level of the Pakistani Army in the tribal areas, giving planning advice and helping to integrate American intelligence, according to one senior American officer with long service in the region.

In the past, American Special Forces have gone into foreign countries to work with local militaries to improve the security of those countries in ways that help American interests. Under this new approach, the number of advisers would increase, officials said.

American officials said these security improvements complemented a package of assistance from the Agency for International Development and the State Department for the seven districts of the tribal areas that amounted to $750 million over five years. These improvement and would involve work in education, health and other sectors. The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is also assisting the Frontier Corps with financing for counternarcotics work.

Some details of the security improvements have been reported by The Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post. But the classified proposal to enlist tribal leaders is new.

“The D.O.D. is about to start funding the Frontier Corps,” one military official said, referring to the Department of Defense. “We have only got a portion of that requested, but it is enough to start.”

Until now, the Frontier Corps has not received American military financing because the corps technically falls under the Pakistani Interior Ministry, which is normally outside the Pentagon’s responsibility.

But American officials say the Frontier Corps is in the long term the most suitable force to combat an insurgency. The force, which since 2001 has increasingly been under the day-to-day command of Pakistani Army units, is now being expanded and trained by American advisers, diplomats said.

The training of the Frontier Corps remains a concern for some. NATO and American soldiers in Afghanistan have often blamed the Frontier Corps for aiding and abetting Taliban insurgents mounting cross-border attacks.

“It’s going to take years to turn them into a professional force,” one Western military official said. “Is it worth it now?”

At the same time, military officials fear the assistance to develop a counterinsurgency force is too little too late. “The advantage is already in the enemy hands,” one Western military official said.

Local Taliban and foreign fighters in Waziristan have managed to regroup and reorganize since negotiating peace deals with the government in 2005 and 2006, and last year they were able to fight all through the winter, the official said. Militants have now emerged in force in the Swat area, a scenic tourist region that is a considerable distance inland from the tribal areas on the border.

The planning at the Special Operations Command intensified after Adm. Eric T. Olson, a member of the Navy Seals who is the new head of the command, met with General Musharraf and senior Pakistani military leaders in late August to discuss how the military could increase cooperation in Pakistan’s fight against the extremists.

A spokesman for the command, Kenneth McGraw, would not comment on any staff briefing paper that had been circulated for review. Mr. McGraw said Friday that after Admiral Olson returned from his trip, he “energized the staff to look for ways to develop opportunities for future cooperation.”

A senior Defense Department official said that Admiral Olson also prepared a short memorandum outlining how Special Operations forces could assist the Pakistani military in the counterinsurgency, and that he shared that document with several senior Pentagon officials.

Four senior defense or counterterrorism officials confirmed that planning was under way at the command headquarters.

One person who was briefed on the proposal prepared by the Special Operations Command staff members, and who spoke on condition of anonymity because the briefing had not yet been approved, said it was in the form of about two dozen slides. The slides described a strategy using both military and nonmilitary measures to fight the militants.

One slide showed a chart that categorized one to two dozen tribes by location — North Waziristan and South Waziristan, for example — and then gave a brief description of their location, their known or suspected links to Al Qaeda and Taliban, and their size and military abilities.

The briefing said that United States forces would not be involved in any conventional combat in Pakistan. But several senior military and Pentagon officials said elements of the Joint Special Operations Command, an elite counterterrorism unit, might be involved in strikes against senior militant leaders under specific conditions.

Two people briefed on elements of the approach said it was modeled in part on efforts in Iraq, where American commanders have worked with Sunni sheiks in Anbar Province to turn locals against the militant group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the homegrown Sunni extremist group that American intelligence agencies say is led by foreigners .

The success of these efforts, together with the consensus in military and intelligence circles that the grip of the original Al Qaeda in the tribal areas continues to tighten at a time when the Pakistani government is in crisis, led planners at the Special Operations Command to develop the strategy for the tribal areas.

A group of Pakistan experts convened in March by the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that empowering tribal leaders, known as maliks, could be an effective strategy to counter the rising influence of Islamic religious leaders and to weaken Al Qaeda. But a report on the session found that such successes “would be difficult to achieve, particularly in the north (Bajaur) and south (North and South Waziristan).”

Many tribal leaders have been killed by the Taliban in the tribal areas, leaving the tribal system largely destroyed.

“The face on this would be a local one,” said one person who has been briefed on the proposal. But that person cautioned that whether a significant number of tribal leaders joined an American-backed effort carried out by Pakistani forces was “the $64,000 question.”

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

November 19, 2007
U.S. Considers Enlisting Tribes in Pakistan to Fight Al Qaeda

By ERIC SCHMITT, MARK MAZZETTI and CARLOTTA GALL
This article was reported and written by Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti and Carlotta Gall.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 — A new and classified American military proposal outlines an intensified effort to enlist tribal leaders in the frontier areas of Pakistan in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, as part of a broader effort to bolster Pakistani forces against an expanding militancy, American military officials said.

If adopted, the proposal would join elements of a shift in strategy that would also be likely to expand the presence of American military trainers in Pakistan, directly finance a separate tribal paramilitary force that until now has proved largely ineffective and pay militias that agree to fight Al Qaeda and foreign extremists, officials said. The United States now has only about 50 troops in Pakistan, a Pentagon spokesman said, a force that could grow by dozens under the new approach.

The new proposal is modeled in part on a similar effort by American forces in Anbar Province in Iraq that has been hailed as a great success in fighting foreign insurgents there. But it raises the question of whether such partnerships can be forged without a significant American military presence on the ground in Pakistan. And it is unclear whether enough support can be found among the tribes.

Altogether, the broader strategic move toward more local support is being accelerated because of concern about instability in Pakistan and the weakness of the Pakistani government, as well as fears that extremists with havens in the tribal areas could escalate their attacks on allied troops in Afghanistan. Just in recent weeks, Islamic militants sympathetic to Al Qaeda and the Taliban have already extended their reach beyond the frontier areas into more settled areas, most notably the mountainous region of Swat.

The tribal proposal, a strategy paper prepared by staff members of the United States Special Operations Command, has been circulated to counterterrorism experts but has not yet been formally approved by the command’s headquarters in Tampa, Fla. Some other elements of the campaign have been approved in principle by the Americans and Pakistanis and await financing, including $350 million over several years to help train and equip the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force that currently has about 85,000 members and is recruited from border tribes.

Ever since the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration has used billions of dollars of aid and heavy political pressure to encourage Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s president, to carry out more aggressive military operations against militants in the tribal areas. But the sporadic military campaigns Pakistan have conducted there have had little success, resulting instead in heavy losses among Pakistani Army units and anger among locals who have for decades been mostly independent from Islamabad’s control.

American officials acknowledge those failures, but they say the renewed emphasis on recruiting allies among the tribal militias and investing more heavily in the Frontier Corps reflect the depth of American concern about the need to address Islamic extremism in Pakistan.

The new counterinsurgency campaign is also a vivid example of the American military’s asserting a bigger role in a part of Pakistan that the Central Intelligence Agency has overseen almost exclusively since the Sept. 11 attacks.

Small numbers of United States military personnel have served as advisers at the division and corps level of the Pakistani Army in the tribal areas, giving planning advice and helping to integrate American intelligence, according to one senior American officer with long service in the region.

In the past, American Special Forces have gone into foreign countries to work with local militaries to improve the security of those countries in ways that help American interests. Under this new approach, the number of advisers would increase, officials said.

American officials said these security improvements complemented a package of assistance from the Agency for International Development and the State Department for the seven districts of the tribal areas that amounted to $750 million over five years. These improvement and would involve work in education, health and other sectors. The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is also assisting the Frontier Corps with financing for counternarcotics work.

Some details of the security improvements have been reported by The Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post. But the classified proposal to enlist tribal leaders is new.

“The D.O.D. is about to start funding the Frontier Corps,” one military official said, referring to the Department of Defense. “We have only got a portion of that requested, but it is enough to start.”

Until now, the Frontier Corps has not received American military financing because the corps technically falls under the Pakistani Interior Ministry, which is normally outside the Pentagon’s responsibility.

But American officials say the Frontier Corps is in the long term the most suitable force to combat an insurgency. The force, which since 2001 has increasingly been under the day-to-day command of Pakistani Army units, is now being expanded and trained by American advisers, diplomats said.

The training of the Frontier Corps remains a concern for some. NATO and American soldiers in Afghanistan have often blamed the Frontier Corps for aiding and abetting Taliban insurgents mounting cross-border attacks.

“It’s going to take years to turn them into a professional force,” one Western military official said. “Is it worth it now?”

At the same time, military officials fear the assistance to develop a counterinsurgency force is too little too late. “The advantage is already in the enemy hands,” one Western military official said.

Local Taliban and foreign fighters in Waziristan have managed to regroup and reorganize since negotiating peace deals with the government in 2005 and 2006, and last year they were able to fight all through the winter, the official said. Militants have now emerged in force in the Swat area, a scenic tourist region that is a considerable distance inland from the tribal areas on the border.

The planning at the Special Operations Command intensified after Adm. Eric T. Olson, a member of the Navy Seals who is the new head of the command, met with General Musharraf and senior Pakistani military leaders in late August to discuss how the military could increase cooperation in Pakistan’s fight against the extremists.

A spokesman for the command, Kenneth McGraw, would not comment on any staff briefing paper that had been circulated for review. Mr. McGraw said Friday that after Admiral Olson returned from his trip, he “energized the staff to look for ways to develop opportunities for future cooperation.”

A senior Defense Department official said that Admiral Olson also prepared a short memorandum outlining how Special Operations forces could assist the Pakistani military in the counterinsurgency, and that he shared that document with several senior Pentagon officials.

Four senior defense or counterterrorism officials confirmed that planning was under way at the command headquarters.

One person who was briefed on the proposal prepared by the Special Operations Command staff members, and who spoke on condition of anonymity because the briefing had not yet been approved, said it was in the form of about two dozen slides. The slides described a strategy using both military and nonmilitary measures to fight the militants.

One slide showed a chart that categorized one to two dozen tribes by location — North Waziristan and South Waziristan, for example — and then gave a brief description of their location, their known or suspected links to Al Qaeda and Taliban, and their size and military abilities.

The briefing said that United States forces would not be involved in any conventional combat in Pakistan. But several senior military and Pentagon officials said elements of the Joint Special Operations Command, an elite counterterrorism unit, might be involved in strikes against senior militant leaders under specific conditions.

Two people briefed on elements of the approach said it was modeled in part on efforts in Iraq, where American commanders have worked with Sunni sheiks in Anbar Province to turn locals against the militant group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the homegrown Sunni extremist group that American intelligence agencies say is led by foreigners .

The success of these efforts, together with the consensus in military and intelligence circles that the grip of the original Al Qaeda in the tribal areas continues to tighten at a time when the Pakistani government is in crisis, led planners at the Special Operations Command to develop the strategy for the tribal areas.

A group of Pakistan experts convened in March by the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that empowering tribal leaders, known as maliks, could be an effective strategy to counter the rising influence of Islamic religious leaders and to weaken Al Qaeda. But a report on the session found that such successes “would be difficult to achieve, particularly in the north (Bajaur) and south (North and South Waziristan).”

Many tribal leaders have been killed by the Taliban in the tribal areas, leaving the tribal system largely destroyed.

“The face on this would be a local one,” said one person who has been briefed on the proposal. But that person cautioned that whether a significant number of tribal leaders joined an American-backed effort carried out by Pakistani forces was “the $64,000 question.”

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia (AP) - In his opening address of a rare OPEC summit, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez warned the United States on Saturday that oil prices would further surge if the U.S. contemplates an attack against his country or Iran.
The summit of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries opened Saturday in Saudi Arabia, with heads of states and delegates from 12 of the world's biggest oil-producing nations listening to a recitation from the Quran.

After the quotes from Islam's holy book, Chavez warned that the U.S. should not target OPEC members for foreign policy reasons.

"If the United States attempts the madness of invading Iran or attacking Venezuela again, the price of oil is probably going to reach $200, not just $100," Chavez said.

While Iran has been in a standoff with the U.S. over its nuclear program, left-wing Chavez is a bitter antagonist of President Bush.

"We are witnessing constant threats against Iran. I think OPEC should strengthen itself in this capacity and demand respect for the sovereignty of our nations, if the developed world wants a guaranteed supply of oil."

It was the third full OPEC summit since the organization was created in 1960.

The run-up to the meeting was dominated by speculation over whether OPEC would raise production following recent oil price increases that have closed in on $100.

U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman called on OPEC to increase production earlier this week, but cartel officials have said they will hold off any decision until the group meets next month in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

They have also cast doubt on the effect any output hike would have on oil prices, saying the recent rise has been driven by the falling dollar and financial speculation by investment funds, rather than any supply shortage.

Saudi Arabia opposed a move by Iran on Friday to have OPEC include concerns over the falling dollar included in the summit's closing statement after the weekend meeting.