November 27, 2007
OP-ED COLUMNIST
Follow the Fundamentals

By DAVID BROOKS
Beijing

Lou Dobbs is winning. He’s not winning personally. He’s not going to start winning presidential awards or elite respect. But his message is winning. Month by month the ideas that once prevailed on the angry fringe enter the mainstream and turn into conventional wisdom.

Once there was a majority in favor of liberal immigration policies, but apparently that’s not true anymore, at least if you judge by campaign rhetoric. Once there was a bipartisan consensus behind free trade, but that’s not true anymore, either. Even Republicans, by a two-to-one majority, believe free trade is bad for America, according to a Wall Street Journal/NBC poll.

Once upon a time, the fact that hundreds of millions of people around the world are rising out of poverty would have been a source of pride and optimism. But if you listen to the presidential candidates, improvements in the developing world are menacing. Their speeches constitute a symphony of woe about lead-painted toys, manipulated currencies and stolen jobs.

And if Dobbsianism is winning when times are good, you can imagine how attractive it’s going to seem if we enter the serious recession that Larry Summers convincingly and terrifyingly forecasts in yesterday’s Financial Times. If the economy dips as seriously as that, the political climate could shift in ugly ways.

So it’s worth pointing out now more than ever that Dobbsianism is fundamentally wrong. It plays on legitimate anxieties, but it rests at heart on a more existential fear — the fear that America is under assault and is fundamentally fragile. It rests on fears that the America we once knew is bleeding away.

And that’s just not true. In the first place, despite the ups and downs of the business cycle, the United States still possesses the most potent economy on earth. Recently the World Economic Forum and the International Institute for Management Development produced global competitiveness indexes, and once again they both ranked the United States first in the world.

In the World Economic Forum survey, the U.S. comes in just ahead of Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Germany (China is 34th). The U.S. gets poor marks for macroeconomic stability (the long-term federal debt), for its tax structure and for the low savings rate. But it leads the world in a range of categories: higher education and training, labor market flexibility, the ability to attract global talent, the availability of venture capital, the quality of corporate management and the capacity to innovate.

William W. Lewis of McKinsey surveyed global competitive in dozens of business sectors a few years ago, and concluded, “The United States is the productivity leader in virtually every industry.”

Second, America’s fundamental economic strength is rooted in the most stable of assets — its values. The U.S. is still an astonishing assimilation machine. It has successfully absorbed more than 20 million legal immigrants over the past quarter-century, an extraordinary influx of human capital. Americans are remarkably fertile. Birthrates are relatively high, meaning that in 2050, the average American will be under 40, while the average European, Chinese and Japanese will be more than a decade older.

The American economy benefits from low levels of corruption. American culture still transmits some ineffable spirit of adventure. American students can’t compete with, say, Singaporean students on standardized tests, but they are innovative and creative throughout their lives. The U.S. standard of living first surpassed the rest of the world’s in about 1740, and despite dozens of cycles of declinist foreboding, the country has resolutely refused to decay.

Third, not every economic dislocation has been caused by trade and the Chinese. Between 1991 and 2007, the U.S. trade deficit exploded to $818 billion from $31 billion. Yet as Robert Samuelson has pointed out, during that time the U.S. created 28 million jobs and the unemployment rate dipped to 4.6 percent from 6.8 percent.

That’s because, as Robert Lawrence of Harvard and Martin Baily of McKinsey have calculated, 90 percent of manufacturing job losses are due to domestic forces. As companies become more technologically advanced, they shed workers (the Chinese shed 25 million manufacturing jobs between 1994 and 2004).

Meanwhile, the number of jobs actually lost to outsourcing is small, and recent reports suggest the outsourcing trend is slowing down. They are swamped by the general churn of creative destruction. Every quarter the U.S. loses somewhere around seven million jobs, and creates a bit more than seven million more. That double-edged process is the essence of a dynamic economy.

I’m writing this column from Beijing. I can look out the window and see the explosive growth. But as the Chinese will be the first to tell you, their dazzling prosperity is built on fragile foundations. In the United States, the situation is the reverse. We have obvious problems. But the foundations of American prosperity are strong. The U.S. still has much more to gain than to lose from openness, trade and globalization.

A Glimmer of Hope at Annapolis
November 26, 2007 1930 GMT

By George Friedman

U.S. President George W. Bush will host a meeting Nov. 27 between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in Annapolis, Md. This is fairly banal news, as the gathering seems intended to give the impression that the United States cares what happens between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The last such meeting, the Camp David summit between Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak, sponsored by then-President Bill Clinton, was followed by massive violence. Therefore, the most we have learned to hope for from such meetings is nothing. This one will either be meaningless or catastrophic.

There is an interesting twist to this meeting, however. The Arab League voted to encourage Arab foreign ministers to attend. The Saudis have announced they will be present, along with the Egyptians and Jordanians who were expected there. Even the Syrians said they will attend, as long as the future of the Golan Heights is on the table. We would expect the Israelis to agree to that demand because, with more bilateral issues on the table, less time will need to be devoted to Palestinian issues. And that might suit many of the Arab states that are ambivalent, to say the least, about the Palestinians.

We have written of the complex relations between the Palestinians and the Arabs, although the current situation is even more complex. Abbas is from the Palestinian group Fatah, Arafat's political vehicle. Fatah was historically a secular, socialist group with close ties to Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt and the Soviet Union. It also was regarded as a threat to the survival of the Arab monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. When Syria invaded Lebanon in 1975, it was not to fight the Israelis or the Lebanese Christians, but to drive out Fatah. Given this history, it is ironic that the Arab League has decided to sanction attendance at the Annapolis Conference. The Saudis and the Syrians are particularly hostile to Fatah, while the Jordanians and the Egyptians have their own problems with the group.

Behind this strange move are the complexities of Palestinian politics. As PNA president, Abbas is charged with upholding its charter and executing PNA foreign policy. But another group, Hamas, won the last parliamentary elections and therefore controlled the selection of the prime minister. Such splits are not uncommon in political systems in which there is a strong president and a parliamentary system, as in France.

But in this case the split ripped the Palestinians apart. The problem was not simply institutional, but geographic. The Palestinian territories are divided into two very different parts -- the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The former was dominated by Jordan between 1948 and 1967, the latter by Egypt. They have very different social and economic outlooks and political perspectives. In June, Hamas rose up and took control of Gaza, while Abbas and Fatah retained control of the PNA and the West Bank.

This created an historic transformation. Palestinian nationalism in the context of Israel can be divided into three eras. In the first era, 1948-1967, Palestinian nationalism was a subset of Arab nationalism. Palestine was claimed in whole or in part by Egypt, Jordan and Syria. In the second era, 1967 to mid-2007, Palestinian nationalism came into its own, with an identity and territorial demands distinct from other Arab powers. An umbrella organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), consisting of diverse and frequently divided Palestinian movements, presided over the Palestinian national cause, and eventually evolved into the Palestinian National Authority.

Recently, however, a dramatic shift has taken place. This was not simply the Hamas victory in the January 2006 elections, although the emergence of an Islamist movement among the Palestinians represented a substantial shift among a people who were historically secularist. It was not even the fact that by 2007 Hamas stood in general opposition to the tradition of the PLO, meaning not only Fatah but other Palestinian secular groups. The redefinition of the Palestinian issue into one between Islamists and secularists had been going on for a while.

Rather, it was the rising in Gaza that dramatically redefined the Palestinians by creating two Palestinian entities, geographically distinct and profoundly different in outlook and needs. The idea of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, divided by Israel, was reminiscent of Pakistan in its first quarter-century of existence -- when what is today Pakistan and Bangladesh, divided by India's thousands of miles, were treated as one country. It was a reach.

Suddenly in June, a new reality emerged. Whatever the Palestinian charter said, whatever the U.N. resolutions said, whatever anyone said, there were now two Palestinian entities -- "states" is a good word for them, though it upsets everyone, including the Palestinians. Hamas controlled Gaza and Fatah controlled the West Bank, although neither saw this situation as final. The PNA constantly threatened to reassert itself in Gaza, while Hamas threatened to extend its revolution to the West Bank. Either might happen, but for now, the Palestinians have split along geopolitical lines.

From Israel's point of view, this situation poses both a problem and an opportunity. The problem is that Hamas, more charismatic than the tired Fatah, opposes any settlement with Israel that accepts the Jewish state's existence. The opportunity is, of course, that the Palestinians are now split and that Hamas controls the much poorer and weaker area of Gaza. If Hamas can be kept from taking control of the West Bank, and if Fatah is unable to reassert its control in Gaza, the Israelis face an enemy that not only is weakened, but also is engaged in a long-term civil war that will weaken it further.

To bring this about, it is clear what Israel's goal should be at Annapolis. That is, to do everything it can to strengthen the position of Abbas, Fatah and the PNA. It is ironic, of course, that Israel should now view Fatah as an asset that needs to be strengthened, but history is filled with such ironies. Israel's goal at Annapolis is to cede as much as possible to Abbas, both territorially and economically, to intensify the split in the Palestinian community and try to strengthen the hand of the secularists. Israel, however, has two problems.

First, Israeli politics is in gridlock. Olmert remains as prime minister even after the disaster in Lebanon in 2006, because no real successor has emerged. The operant concept of the Israelis is that the Palestinians are unstable and unpredictable. Any territorial concession made to the Palestinians -- regardless of current interest or ideology -- could ultimately be used against Israel. So, creating a Palestinian state in the West Bank would turn what is a good idea now into a geopolitical disaster later, should Abbas be succeeded by some of the more radical members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade -- a group that carried out suicide bombings during the intifada. Israel's obsession with the unpredictability of the Palestinians and its belief in territorial buffers cannot be overcome by a weak government. Thirty years ago, it took Menachem Begin, heading a strong government from the right, to make peace with the Egyptians.

At the same time, the Israelis are terrified at the idea that Hamas will topple Fatah and take control of the Palestinian community as a whole. As Olmert was quoted as saying Nov. 23, "We cannot maintain the status quo between us and the Palestinians ... it will lead to results that are much worse that those of a failed conference. It will result in Hamas taking over Judea and Samaria, to a weakening or even the disappearance of the moderate Palestinians. Unless a political horizon can be found, the results will be deadly." Olmert clearly understands the stakes, but with Benjamin Netanyahu to his right, it is unclear whether he has the political weight to act on his perception.

For Olmert to make the kind of concessions that are needed in order to take advantage of the geopolitical situation, he needs one thing: guarantees and controls over the evolution of Hamas. We have seen Fatah go from what the Israelis consider the devil incarnate to a moderating force. Things change. If Hamas can be brought into the political process -- and the split between Gaza and the West Bank maintained -- Israel will be in a superb position. But who can moderate Hamas, and why would Hamas moderate?

Enter the Saudis. The Arab League resolution gave them cover for attending the Annapolis talks -- which is the reason they engineered it. And the Saudis are the one force that has serious leverage with Hamas, because they underwrite much of Hamas' operations. Hamas is a Sunni Islamist group and as such has a sympathetic audience in Riyadh. Indeed, in many ways, Hamas is the Saudi answer to the secular Fatah. Therefore, if anyone can ultimately deliver Hamas, it would be the Saudis. But why would they?

On the surface, the Saudis should celebrate a radical, Islamist Palestinian movement, and on the surface they do. But they have become extremely wary of radical Islamism. Al Qaeda had a great deal of sympathy in the kingdom, but the evolution of events in the Islamic world since 9/11 is far from what the Saudis wanted to see. Islamist movements have created chaos from Pakistan to Lebanon, and this has created opportunities for a dangerous growth in Shiite power, not to mention that it has introduced U.S. forces into the region in the most destabilizing way possible.

At the end of the day, the Saudis and the other royal families in the Persian Gulf are profoundly conservative. They are wealthy -- and become wildly wealthier every day, what with oil at more than $90 a barrel -- and they have experienced dangerous instability inside the kingdom from al Qaeda and other radical Islamist movements. The Saudis have learned how difficult it is for the state to manage radical Islamism, and the way in which moral (and other) support for radicals can destabilize not only the region, but Saudi Arabia as well. Support in parts of the royal family for radical Islamist movements seems dicier to everyone now. These are movements that are difficult to control.

Most important, these are movements that fail. Persistently, these radical movements have not taken control of states and moved them in directions that align with Saudi interests. Rather, these movements have destabilized states, creating vacuums into which other movements can enter. The rise of Iranian power is particularly disturbing to the Saudis, though so is the persistent presence of U.S. forces. A general calming of the situation is now in the Saudi interest.

That means that the Saudi view of Hamas is somewhat different today than it was 10 years ago, when Riyadh was encouraging the group. A civil war among the Palestinians would achieve nothing. Nor, from the Saudi perspective, would another intifada, which would give the Americans more reason to act aggressively in the region. The Saudis have moved closer to the Americans and do not want them to withdraw from Iraq, for example, though they do wish the Americans would be less noisy. A Hamas grab for power in the West Bank is not something the Saudis want to see now.

Simply by participating in the Annapolis conference, the Saudis have signaled Hamas that they want a change of direction -- although Hamas will resist. "The period that will follow the Annapolis conference will witness an increase of the resistance against the Zionist occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," said Mussa Abu Marzuq, top aide to Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal. Perhaps, but a confrontation with the Saudis is not something that Hamas can afford now or in the future.

The Saudis want to stabilize the situation without destroying Hamas (which is very different from al Qaeda, given that it stems from the Muslim Brotherhood tradition). The Israelis want to maintain the split between Hamas and Fatah and limit Hamas' power without eliminating it -- they like Fatah looking toward the Israelis for protection. Fatah badly needs to deliver concessions from Israel to strengthen its hand. The Americans can use a success and a change of atmospherics in the region.

Here is the delicate balance: Abbas has to receive more than he gives. Otherwise his credibility is shot. The Israelis find it difficult to make concessions, particularly disproportionate ones, with a weak government. But there are different kinds of strengths. Begin could make disproportionate concessions to the Egyptians because of his decisive political strength. Olmert is powerful only by default, though that is a kind of power.

It is interesting to think of how Ariel Sharon would have handled this situation. In a way he created it. By insisting that Israel withdraw from Gaza, he set in motion the split in the Palestinian community and the current dynamic. Had he not had his stroke, he would have tried to make Annapolis as defining a moment as the Begin-Sadat summit. It would be a risky move, but it should be recalled that few besides Begin believed that the Camp David Accords on the Sinai would have lasted 30 years. But that is merely editorializing. The facts on the ground indicate an opportunity to redefine the politics of the region. There are many factors lining up for it, the concessions Olmert would need to make in order to box Hamas in might simply be beyond his ability.

So long as no one mentions the status of Jerusalem, which blew up the Camp David meetings under Clinton, there is, nevertheless, a chance here -- one we take more seriously than others.

This is a great article by Barnett.

The idea of ‘democracy’ as victory is such an incomplete answer for Iraq and other emerging markets. Its really more about ECONOMIC CONNECTIVITY... THE BROADER BAND OF ECONOMIC CONNECTIVITY the GREATER THE VICTORY.

The test of success isn’t a perfect democracy which is something of its own contradiction even in our great nation which is really REPUBLIC. The bottom line is that REPRESENTATIVE forms of governments have a better record of creating broad band economic connectivity that do non representative forms of government.

So to see Iraq’s struggling representative form of government which is rife with corruption, doesn’t mean success. The hope is that over time broad band economic connectivity as Iraq continues to decentralize into regional decision making and you will see this happen to an increasingly greater degree. Kurdistan, Iraq is a great example of increasing evidence of broadband economic connectivity with neighbors such as Turkey is a great sign of SUCCESS in Iraq.

So congratulations to Macedonia for their progress in connecting with the global economy.

Enjoy!

Dan.

Barnett: A glimpse of what real victory looks like

By Thomas P.M. Barnett
Sunday, November 25, 2007

I recently caught a glimpse of what victory will look like in this long struggle against radical extremism, and it didn't involve a trial or a corpse or a parade.

Actually, it's an advertisement you've probably already run across in the back pages of the Economist or Wall Street Journal. Its message is disarmingly simple: Invest in Macedonia.

Now, I know what you're thinking: "Macedonia? Isn't that one of those lousy Balkan countries we fought in a while back?"

The answer is, sort of.

The Balkan Wars (1991-2001) encompassed the break-up of Yugoslavia, which until that time constituted a federation of six republics. Three successive wars defined Yugoslavia's initial fracturing: Slovenia's secession in 1991, the 1991-95 Croatian war of independence, and the infamous Bosnian civil war of 1992-95.

Additional conflicts ensued among the Albanian populations of Kosovo (1997-99), southern Serbia (2000-01) and Macedonia (2001).

After the United Nations failed to stem the initial armed conflicts and incidences of genocide, U.S.-led NATO forces intervened twice in the second half of the 1990s, leaving behind peacekeepers who continue serving today - under UN auspices - in Kosovo, a Serbian province still seeking independence.

Of the six independent states to emerge - so far - from the ruins of Yugoslavia, Macedonia is arguably least well known internationally, in large part because it escaped mass bloodshed following its quiet departure in 1991.

Thanks to a continuing naming dispute with Greece, Macedonia is still formally known in global circles as the "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," or FYROM - an awkward moniker befitting its centuries of living anonymously under other civilizations' great empires.

Having joined the United Nations in 1993, Macedonia seeks future membership in both NATO and the European Union, which named it a "candidate country" two years ago. Roughly the size of Vermont and landlocked amidst Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, Macedonia offers little beyond its location as a major transportation corridor between larger economic players.

To that end, Macedonia, with the help of the U.S. Agency for International Development, made itself the first all-broadband wireless country of its size - or larger - in the world. The name of that USAID program, Macedonia Connects, is wonderfully symbolic of this small country's dogged determination to join the global economy.

So when I first came across those "Invest in Macedonia" ads, I couldn't help but think to myself that this is what victory would look like in places like Iraq and Afghanistan - not our victory but theirs.

The ad, appropriately enough, is one big sales job. Describing itself as the "new business heaven in Europe," the unspoken come-on in the ad seems to be, "if you can't afford Croatia any more, try us instead!"

Most impressively, the ad promises that investors can register their new company in four hours or less. Try matching that in your average developing country, and you'd be lucky to get your papers signed in four months!

As for investor benefit packages, which the ad declares "will be approved within 10 business days," try these on for size: no corporate tax for 10 years; 5 percent individual income tax for five years; free connections to gas, electricity, sewer and water; and concessionary land leases for up to 75 years.

All that for joining a free economic zone (FEZ) with "immediate access to main international airport, railroad and vital road corridors."

As an international businessman who focuses on infrastructure development, let me tell you, that sort of offer gets my attention, along with the fact that the World Bank's "Doing Business 2008" report just named Macedonia the fourth-best reforming economy in the world. China was ninth.

What I like about the ad is how shamelessly Macedonia sells its existing connectivity to attract even more: FEZs, transportation hubs and free trade agreements encompassing 650 million consumers.

Toss in cheap labor and nationwide wi-fi, and you've got yourself a country just itching to be "exploited."

And, yeah, that's what victory looks like for your average failed state: getting yourself off the front page and into the business advertising section.

One last image: The ad includes a map that delineates, in successive 500 kilometer rings, Macedonia's connective grasp across Europe. Think about that for a second: not the reach of Macedonia's missiles but its economic ambition.

Show me a similarly plausible "invest in Iraq" advertisement, and I'll be the first to light up your cigar.

Thomas P.M. Barnett is a visiting scholar at the University of Tennessee's Howard Baker Center and the senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC. Contact him at tom@thomaspmbarnett.com.

© 2007 Knoxville News Sentinel

November 23, 2007
Plan Increases Role of G.I.’s in Iraq Training

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 — With violence in Iraq on the decline and a quarter of American combat brigades scheduled to leave by July, commanders plan to give the remaining brigades an expanded role in training and supporting Iraqi forces, according to officials involved in a confidential military review of the next phase of the American troop deployment.

The plan, not yet in final form, is intended to transfer more of the security burden in Iraq to the Iraqis without giving up the gains that the Americans have made in recent months in pacifying the most violent areas and weakening the Sunni insurgency.

The approach is strikingly different from the plans advocated by many United States politicians, including some Democratic presidential contenders, who have called for a rapid withdrawal of American combat brigades from Iraq — the very units that American commanders see as playing a central role in the transition toward Iraqi control.

It is intended to supplement the longstanding American efforts to recruit, equip and advise Iraqi forces by strengthening their ability to deal with a diverse array of threats. The plan also reflects the vision of American commanders of the evolving role of American combat units after President Bush’s troop reinforcement plan runs its course next summer.

Under the approach, some American combat brigades due to stay behind would slim down their fighting forces and enlarge the teams mentoring Iraqis. Within a 3,000-member brigade, for example, one or two battalions might help train the Iraqis while the rest would be retained as quick-reaction forces to back up the Iraqis if they ran into stiff resistance.

The precise arrangements would vary depending on the threats and the quality of Iraqi forces in specific regions, and brigade commanders would have considerable leeway in deciding how many soldiers to commit to mentoring. But the shift toward training would be gradual, reflecting what commanders say have been lessons learned from the failure of earlier, overhasty efforts to transfer responsibility to the Iraqis.

Even after President Bush’s “surge” of troops is over in mid-July and the number of brigades shrinks to 15 from the current level of 20, American units in some of the more highly contested areas would continue their combat roles. That is based on an assessment that the situation in Iraq is too uncertain and the Iraqi security forces in many areas too unsteady for an abrupt transfer of responsibilities.

The proposal for a new mix of forces is part of a broad review of the projected American military posture in Iraq for a phase that would begin in the second part of 2008. No final decisions have been made on the pace of further reductions or the details of how the plan would be carried out in Iraq. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the senior American commander in Iraq, has told Congress that he will not issue new recommendations until March after an assessment of conditions. The basic approach, however, has begun to emerge.

“The White House has been informed conceptually,” said one senior Bush administration official, referring to planning. “Fundamentally, this concept is not going to change.”

Transferring security to the Iraqis was at the core of the initial United States strategy in Iraq. Gen. George W. Casey Jr., General Petraeus’s predecessor as Iraq commander, voiced optimism last year that the Iraqi military and police might be just 12 to 18 months from assuming the main responsibility.

But efforts to quickly transfer authority often backfired. In Diyala Province, for example, Iraqi Army commanders carried out a sectarian agenda, detaining local Sunni leaders whom American commanders were trying to engage, and failing to curb the inroads made by Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a largely Iraqi insurgent group that American intelligence officials say has foreign leadership. After much of Baquba, the provincial capital, fell under insurgent control, the American military was forced to mount an offensive in June to reclaim the city.

American military officials assert that the situation has changed, which may make it easier for the Iraqi forces to assume more of a security role. Partly as a result of the American troop reinforcements and a new counterinsurgency strategy, violence has subsided, making security more manageable. Many Sunnis now reject Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, and thousands have volunteered in local neighborhood watch organizations.

In addition, the Iraqi military is expanding. It is creating three new divisions, including the 11th Iraqi Army Division to be established in Baghdad over the next several months. That unit will enable nine battalions sent to the capital from other regions to return home, strengthening the Iraqi military presence in those areas.

All told, the number of Iraqi soldiers is to grow from almost 200,000 by year’s end to 255,000 by the end of 2008. “The Iraqis have been able to recruit and fill to capacity,” said Brig. Gen. Robin Swan, who oversees the training of the Iraq Army.

In Mosul, only a single battalion of American troops — in concert with a large number of Iraqi soldiers and police officers — helps provide security for a city of more than a million. Still, considerable challenges remain. The Iraqi Army has only about half the noncommissioned officers it needs. Another important weakness, said Maj. Gen. Benjamin R. Mixon, who recently completed his tour as the senior American commander in northern Iraq, is that Iraqi military training has been focused on developing the skills of individual soldiers, not on fighting as a unit.

“They don’t have a collective training program right now,” General Mixon said in an interview. “They put a jundi out there and the way he learns to fight is by getting shot at,” he added, using the Iraqi term for a soldier.

Some experts also remain skeptical that a largely Shiite army and police force can ever reliably enforce the peace equitably if American forces rapidly draw down. “The binding constraint is sectarian politics,” Stephen Biddle, a military expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, said.

American officers acknowledge the problems but assert that progress can be made if the United States does not rush the process.

“Don’t do it too fast,” said Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, who oversees the training of Iraq’s security forces. “Transfer those responsibilities that you can to the organizations that can handle them and withhold responsibility from organizations that can’t.”

A number of efforts are under way to improve the training and quality of Iraqi forces. A national network of training centers is being expanded to train Iraqi units near their home areas. To address the shortage of noncommissioned officers in the army, 10 percent of the most promising recruits are being promoted to corporals while efforts are being made to encourage former army officers to rejoin.

A chronic shortage of officers also afflicts the Iraqi police, which is no small problem since only officers are authorized to make arrests. Two new police academies are to be established, and the normal three-year training program is being shortened for college graduates. The Americans are also trying to adjust the sectarian balance of the Iraqi police by pressing the Iraqi government to recruit more Sunnis, though such efforts have been frustrated in some areas like Diyala Province.

Teams of American advisers are working with the Iraqi Defense and Interior Ministries in an attempt to improve their ability to manage and sustain the force.

American combat brigades, however, are to play a key role in augmenting the training and encouraging Iraqi units in the field to take more responsibility. Advocates of the plan say that brigades are well suited for this mission.

Many brigade commanders have done multiple tours in Iraq, giving them considerable experience in dealing with local leaders, Iraqi forces and the diverse spectrum of threats. The commanders have an array of abilities to draw on. In addition to directing infantry units, they can order air artillery strikes, arrange for medical evacuations and access a broad selection of intelligence.

Brigades oversee the small 11-to-15-member advisory teams that work with the Iraqi Army and the police. The State Department’s provincial reconstruction teams, which advise the Iraqis on economic projects and ways to improve local governments, are also attached to combat brigades.

An American official said that each brigade commander would be allowed to decide how many soldiers to assign to expanded training and advising efforts, when American forces should carry out military operations and when they should stand back and let Iraqi forces take the lead.

The approach is already being tried in some areas like Falluja, where Marine squads have taken up positions in police stations while other combat forces have been removed from the city.

“You enable brigade commanders and then decentralize authority to him to take account of conditions on the ground,” the official said. “He can set the dials on how much the U.S. is in the lead, how much you teach the Iraqis to do and how much you can simply back up the Iraqis.”

In some areas, the commanders might allocate an entire battalion to augment training efforts. In others, one company in the battalion might focus on training while the remaining companies carry out combat operations with the Iraqis.

The type of training could vary. General Mixon, for example, said that a brigade might concentrate on collective training: teaching Iraq platoons and companies to fight effectively as units. The brigade commanders, officials say, are in the best position to evaluate the threats in their areas, the abilities of the Iraqi forces they work with and the local political situation. Previous efforts to shift responsibility to the Iraqis faltered in part because the efforts were influenced by American officials too removed from the battlefield, officials say.

“We had too-centralized this process a couple of years ago when we were in the transition business,” the senior official added. “We got it wrong in too many local places like Diyala and segments of Baghdad.”

This approach differs from proposals by some counterinsurgency experts, like Lt. Col. John Nagl, that the Army establish a permanent corps of highly trained advisers and use it as the principal means to train Iraqi and foreign forces elsewhere.

It is also radically different from that advocated by some foreign policy specialists, who have urged the United States to quickly withdraw combat brigades while leaving behind a limited number of trainers. Such a strategy was outlined by the Iraq Study Group, a panel led by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III and former Representative Lee H. Hamilton, and a variant of this approach has been embraced by Senator Barack Obama in his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination.

The rancorous debate in Washington has centered on troop withdrawal schedules. But the American command’s planning suggests less public but equally fundamental differences over the military structures that the generals say are needed to manage the transition toward Iraqi control.

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

In Iraq, a Lull or Hopeful Trend?
Signs of Declining Violence Leave Residents, U.S. Commanders Cautious
By Joshua Partlow and Naseer Nouri
Washington Post Foreign Service
Friday, November 2, 2007; A01

BAGHDAD, Nov. 1 -- From store clerks selling cigarettes by generator power, to military commanders poring over aerial maps, Iraqis and Americans are striving to understand the sharp decrease in violence over the past several months and what it might herald for the future of Iraq.

The number of attacks against U.S. soldiers has fallen to levels not seen since before the February 2006 bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra that touched off waves of sectarian killing, according to U.S. military statistics released Thursday. The death toll for American troops in October fell to 39, the lowest level since March 2006, and the eighth-lowest total in 56 months of fighting, according to the Web site icasualties.org, which tracks military fatalities.

An unofficial Health Ministry tally showed that civilian deaths across Iraq rose last month compared with September, but the U.S. military found that such deaths fell from a high this year of about 2,800 in January to about 800 in October.

"This trend represents the longest continuous decline in attacks on record and illustrates how our operations have improved security since the surge was emplaced," Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the commander of day-to-day military operations in Iraq, said at a briefing for reporters. The momentum, Odierno said, was "positive" but "not yet irreversible."

But Iraq defies sweeping statements about safety or danger. Both Iraqis and U.S. soldiers are wrestling with a basic question: Is the declining violence a lull in the war or the beginning of a long road to peace?

"My feeling is that this decrease in the violence is temporary," said Saleh al-Mutlak, a secular Sunni who leads the Iraqi National Dialogue Front political party. "It's temporary because the United States cannot maintain this number of troops in the areas where they are in. And if they do so, there will be no normal life in these areas."

For Abdul Amir Jumaa, a shopkeeper in central Baghdad, the geography of his personal security is expanding but still has definite borders. He feels safe enough to travel to a wholesale market for crates of lemon soda and cartons of cigarettes, but does not yet dare send his daughter back to high school. He feels safe enough to drive his new Peugeot throughout his own Karrada neighborhood, but not in the Sunni districts across the Tigris River. His family's entertainment is watching satellite television at home because they are still afraid to venture to parks or restaurants.

"The people used to talk all about 'security is bad, security is bad,' but in the past month, everywhere we go, everyone is talking about how things are improving," he said. "Before the war, it was still much better than now. It has not gotten to that level yet."

In many areas of Iraq, U.S. soldiers are finding fewer corpses on their daily patrols. Some areas once under the sway of the Sunni insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq have witnessed striking reversals. And Baghdad sounds quieter than last year: There are fewer deep, resonating explosions from car bombs, and the constant clatter of gunfire has become sporadic.

In western Baghdad's Amiriyah district, where 14 U.S. soldiers were killed in May alone, there has not been a roadside bomb explosion since Aug. 7, said Lt. Col. Dale Kuehl, the battalion commander in the area. The last mortar or rocket attack was in July.

"The local population has decided that the objectives of al-Qaeda are not consistent with their goals," Kuehl said. "Al-Qaeda overplayed their hand in Amiriyah and the locals rose up against them." While there is a need for improved electrical, trash collection and sewage systems, and for a tangible commitment from Iraq's Shiite-led government to help Sunni neighborhoods, Kuehl said, the drop in violence has dramatically improved what soldiers call the "atmospherics" of the neighborhood: There are more pedestrians, shoppers and vehicles on the streets.

"I have eaten dinner in several homes and even went to a wedding. None of this would have been feasible six months ago," he said. "I hesitate to say we have turned a corner. Insurgencies tend to be fairly resilient and can come back if the underlying causes of the insurgency are not addressed in the political realm."

American soldiers last winter counted an average of 275 murders per week in northwestern Baghdad; now the weekly average is down to 10 to 15, said Lt. Col. Steven Miska, a deputy brigade commander stationed in the Shiite enclave of Kadhimiyah. One factor, Miska said, was the public decision of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to "freeze" for six months the activities of his Mahdi Army militia.

"The overall trend is very heartening, obviously, but I would definitely shy away from trying to attribute it to one particular thing," Miska said. "There are a lot of factors that play into why we have this relative calm."

Some U.S. military commanders say President Bush's decision to send about 30,000 additional soldiers to Iraq, and their move from sprawling bases to small outposts in violent neighborhoods, played a leading role in the decline. Iraqi and U.S. officials also argue that the drop in attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq stemmed mostly from the decision by other Sunni insurgent groups to embrace a partnership with U.S. soldiers and abandon their complicity with al-Qaeda in Iraq's campaign of killing and religious fundamentalism. The resulting new armed groups, known by the American military as volunteers or concerned local citizens, have taken the place of a sometimes deficient, corrupt or nonexistent Iraqi police force.

In Diyala province, one of the deadliest for U.S. soldiers and Iraqis earlier this year, there has been an "absolutely dramatic decrease of violent acts" since U.S. reinforcements arrived and made an aggressive effort to partner with these resident volunteers, said Col. David Sutherland, the top American commander in Diyala.

"Al-Qaeda controlled their lives. Now the attacks, [car bombings] and violent acts are few and far between," he said. "We're seeing new businesses open every day, the children are back in school, public distribution system of food is throughout the province, and we're seeing an increase in essential services."

Even with lower casualty numbers, the quantity of violence indicates that militias and insurgents remain active in many areas. Large parts of southern Baghdad remain a battleground where U.S. soldiers, steadily encroaching Shiite militias and persistent fighters from al-Qaeda in Iraq clash. Attacks, unless particularly deadly, often pass with little notice outside the neighborhood in which they occur.

Many formerly mixed Sunni-Shiite areas have become largely the domain of one sect, since millions of Iraqis have fled their homes for other countries or other parts of Iraq over the years. "It's much harder to conduct sectarian cleansing if you've got a homogenous neighborhood which has a local volunteer security force which is on the lookout for those people," Miska said.

Casualty numbers themselves are inconsistent. The U.S. military said about 800 civilians were killed in October, but an unofficial tally by the Health Ministry showed that 1,448 civilians had died violently, including those whose bodies were dumped without identification. An official provided the data, which showed an increase in deaths compared with September, on condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to release it publicly.

It is difficult to determine whether the underlying animosity between sectarian groups, which has driven so much violence, has diminished or whether attacks have become more difficult to carry out.

Outside Baghdad, many Iraqis interviewed still perceive grave threats from violence. They live in walled-off neighborhoods or under the relative protection of their ethnic group.

Basim Hamdi, 32, a Shiite merchant from Balad, about 50 miles north of Baghdad, described life in his city as a "sectarian fire."

"The security situation in Balad is so bad compared with last year," he said. "No one from here can go outside the city except for emergencies, and no Sunni can get in."

As some threats in Iraq have subsided, new ones have emerged. Turkish soldiers now threaten major incursions and regularly shell mountainous Kurdish villages in the north in an attempt to combat separatist guerrillas.

"Violence has not been reduced. This year was the bloodiest for all of the people in Kirkuk," said Hewa Fatih Abdullah al-Shwani, a Kurdish businessman who lives north of the city. He used to travel south to Baghdad and Basra to coordinate cement shipments, but now deals exclusively with Kurdish colleagues or arranges for his merchandise to come from neighboring Iran and Turkey.

"I do not see any improvement because terrorists keep changing their plans," he said. "When you arrest a thousand, you will find another thousand more because of unemployment, mistakes, chaos and the weakness of the central government."

Perceptions of safety and risk can change in an instant. One 50-year-old Sunni government employee, a lifelong resident of the northern Baghdad Sunni enclave of Adhimiyah, said that he knew his neighborhood was dangerous but that he felt comfortable because he knew his neighbors and because of his standing in the community.

On Monday, however, as he was driving to a market, gunmen stopped the man, who asked that his name not be published to protect his security. They bound his hands and feet with shoelaces, put a mask over his head and forced him into the trunk of their car, he said. One of the gunmen told him: "Do not beg me or say, 'I didn't do anything.' I do not know you and I only follow my orders," he recalled. "I received an order to take you and now I am waiting for another order, either to kill you or release you."

The next afternoon his captors released him unharmed. "I do not know what to do now. I do not leave my house. I've gathered my family around me and won't let my children go to school," the man said. "I thought it was safe to stay here."

Staff writer Ann Scott Tyson at the Pentagon, correspondent Amit R. Paley and special correspondents Saad al-Izzi in Baghdad, Muhanned Saif Aldin in Tikrit and Saad Sarhan in Najaf and other Washington Post staff in Iraq contributed to this report.

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