Iraq: Former Official Says Political Parties 'Failing' To Work Together

PRAGUE, October 16, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- Kamran al-Karadaghi, a former chief of staff for Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, says that Iraq's political climate will not improve until the country's leaders find the political determination to make "very hard decisions." He also discussed the current tensions between Turkey and Iraq's Kurds, as well as the issue of "normalizing" the disputed region of Kirkuk.

Al-Karadaghi, also a former editor in chief of RFE/RL's Radio Free Iraq, talked to RFE/RL Iraq analyst Kathleen Ridolfo at RFE/RL headquarters in Prague on October 15.

RFE/RL: Many in the West are concerned with the Iraqi parliament's performance and its failure to pass outstanding legislation. Can you talk about this failure and whether the prospects for passing legislation are good?

Kamran al-Karadaghi: The problem with the parliament is the way the parliament acts and the procedure of the parliament. The parliament consists of representatives of different political groups, who were elected not individually by the electorate, but they were elected as part of lists. In a way, there is really no free member of the parliament. [Parliamentarians] cannot really decide [anything] on their own, it's all political maneuvering, it's all [based on the] positions of their political groups. So, you can't talk about the failure of the parliament, but you have to talk about the failure of the political groups who have representatives in the parliament.

RFE/RL: The Shi'ite and Kurdish alliances in parliament formed the "moderates' front" a couple of months ago, and it seemed the idea was to join together and try to constitute a majority so that legislation would be pushed through. That didn't appear to play out the way they had hoped.

Al-Karadaghi: My opinion, my own observation in Iraq...[is] this was not the only reason or the main reason was not to establish a majority in parliament to pass laws and things. But I think it was also part of the political process in Iraq, part of the struggle between the political groups...it was an attempt to get out of the bottle by breaking the existing status quo of the political alliances in Iraq.

These parties, the two main Kurdish parties, the Shi'a alliance, and Al-Da'wah Party -- and one cannot say the entire Al-Da'wah Party, it was more the Prime Minister [Nuri al-Maliki], who is the official leader of the Al-Da'wah Party -- and the Islamic Party.... There was an alliance between the two main Kurdish parties [known as the Kurdistan Coalition], SCIRI [a reference to the Shi'ite party led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, now known as the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, or SIIC] and the Islamic Party. The hope was that the Islamic Party would join, but they didn't.

This is the way now how the Iraqis work. They always try to find something alternative or something parallel [to keep their options open]. So, when this didn't work and the Islamic Party didn't join this new [moderates' front], they [instead] invented this so-called three-plus-one, the three members of the Presidency Council plus the prime minister....

So I don't think there was a direct attempt to try and secure a majority in the parliament, because they all know, the political parties, that there is always [going to be] a shift in the political groups. One day the political groups side with an alliance, the next day they side with another party.

Some people think that the four parties which tried to establish [the moderates' front, that this] was a mistake because it alienated the Sunnis. Some think that it was a good step and that the Sunnis failed to join them. But this is all part of the failure of the political leadership in Iraq.

RFE/RL: Since the moderates' front was formed, Tariq al-Hashimi, the Sunni Arab leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party and Iraqi vice president, has since gone into talks with other parties, such as the Shi'ite Al-Fadilah Party and several other smaller parties. The idea was that these groups together would try to form a counteralliance in parliament. What are the prospects that this will actually happen, given the diverse positions of these parties?

Al-Karadaghi: I don't think it will work.... All the political parties and groups in Iraq have different interests. It is very difficult for all of them to agree on one target, [one issue] like for example before the regime change in Iraq. There was one purpose: to topple the regime. But now...they are in power. So they have different [views,] whether it is Al-Fadilah Party, or Sadrists, or others, the Islamic Party....

The Islamic Party, maybe they have an interest [shared position] with Al-Fadilah on one issue, but they cannot afford to lose the Kurds as allies on other issues. So, it is really very difficult [to move forward] unless all the main political leaderships of different parties find the determination within themselves...to take very hard decisions, nothing will work.

Shi'ite Parties' Agreement Fragile

RFE/RL: There was an agreement forged last week between Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and the SIIC. It was described in the press as an agreement that will bring peace to the southern region. Again, given the diverse positions of the two groups, what is the likelihood that that would happen, and if you know, what is the real motivation for this agreement being forged?

Al-Karadaghi: Of course [SIIC] and the Sadrists have a history of rivalry, especially between the two clans of al-Hakim and al-Sadr. And it still exists. But, there were some reasons for this [agreement].

First, now you have Ammar al-Hakim [son of ailing leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim,] who is in charge of [SIIC]. He is young, he is energetic, and he has some ideas and he wanted to show leadership. And the same thing with Muqtada. But we should not forget also that Iran played a major role in this. The Iranians have an interest to keep the Shi'a together and these two groups are powerful among the Shi'a. So, there are some domestic and some outside reasons for this alliance.

And I would say also the marja'a, [Shi'ite clerical leadership, headed by Grand Ayatollah Ali] al-Sistani and others, feel the rivalry and the differences between the Shi'a groups have gone too far, and they want to keep it under control.

Maybe it will work for awhile but I don't think this will [have] a real significant development in the future.

RFE/RL: Ammar al-Hakim came out in favor of the establishment of federal regions over the weekend and al-Sadr's office reacted very strongly against al-Hakim's statement.

Al-Karadaghi: So, here you are, yes. This is also a problem within the Shi'a alliance, the approach to the position regarding federalism. [SIIC] is for, Ammar al-Hakim especially...even more than his father, I would say. And we all know that for the Kurds this is essential. But other groups, Fadilah are against it, the Sadrists are against it. These will always be reasons to weaken any new alliance of the kind between Ammar al-Hakim [and al-Sadr].... It's not an alliance really. They made an agreement [and] I think it will have an effect for the short term but not for the long term.

Kirkuk Referendum To Be Delayed

RFE/RL: Kirkuk is a big topic right now because of the upcoming planned resolution. From Kurdish officials we hear that plans for a December referendum to determine whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdistan region is still on target, but we hear from other sources that it has already been agreed that the referendum will be delayed due to the tension the issue is causing between the Kurds and Arab parties in Iraq.

Al-Karadaghi: From the beginning it was obvious that it was very difficult to keep within the timetable [outlined in the constitution] for practical reasons at least. You cannot have a referendum without solving several other issues. Article 140 [of the constitution, which applies to Kirkuk] says there must be a process of normalization. Normalization is different than referendum. Normalization means first you have to solve the problem of the deportees, and of the settlers, the Arab settlers.

Second, you have to solve the problem of the borders between provinces -- the administrative issues -- because the Kurds have claims on some territories they say were part of the Kurdish autonomous region but under Saddam Hussein they deliberately took these territories and attached them to [other governorates like] Tikrit, Diyala, and others.

So, you have to solve all these problems. The problem of the Arab settlers is also not that easy [to solve]. Even within [Article] 140, the Kurds themselves have always said there is a difference between the Arabs who originally lived in Kirkuk and the Arabs who were brought by Saddam Hussein for the reason of ethnic cleansing and to change the demography of Kurdistan. The process now [has] started to give compensation. There are Arabs who signed petitions that they want to leave. But it's not an easy process, it's difficult. For practical reasons, it will not happen by the end of this year.

Maybe some Kurds also were not very careful [in making] these statements insisting either by the end of the year or it will be doomsday.... They should be more practical about these issues. But, I don't think the tensions or the opposition from Arabs against Article 140 will change the view of the Kurds. The Kurds are committed to implementing, they want Article 140 to be implemented, but they will also show some flexibility on the process of implementing 140, and they will [allow] some time for it to happen.

Turkey, Iraq, Kurds Must Communicate

RFE/RL: We have to ask you about Turkey. The Turkish government is seeking permission from parliament to possibly launch a large-scale incursion into Iraq. What do you think the ramifications of such an incursion will be? We saw statements from Jabar Yawar, the Kurdish regional minister for peshmerga affairs, saying that peshmerga militia forces will be ready to respond to any incursion. Will peshmerga who have joined the army and are based south of the Kurdistan region be called back to the region, and what would be the ramifications of such a move?

Al-Karadaghi: First of all, the Turkish government say that getting a permission from parliament does not mean automatically that they will go inside [Iraq]. They want to secure the permission, especially with the military, to have a free hand to do whatever, whenever they decide to do something.

At the same time, some people who know the situation well think maybe the Turks won't launch a wide-scale [incursion] into Iraq. [Rather], this is part of putting a strong pressure on the Kurds, really, not on the Iraqi government. Ankara knows the Iraqi government does not have the means of doing anything militarily in Kurdistan. It's the Kurdish peshmerga.

If you follow the Turkish press, commentators, you feel [that] the Turkish government and the military think they will have this experience like they had with Syria. They put a lot of pressure on Syria, they employed their army on a huge scale along Syria's borders, and Syria caved in [and] kicked [Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah] Ocalan [out] from Syria....

The Kurds of course, are also obliged to make these kinds of statements, to be on the alert. There are Kurdish peshmerga who are part of the Iraqi Army, but the main [peshmerga] forces are still in the Kurdistan area. There are some units outside Kurdistan, but in territories and provinces attached to Kurdistan -- in Diyala, they don't have a lot now in Baghdad -- they were there for a while in Baghdad and now they've [left]. But, now what they are doing outside the Kurdish provinces is to secure roads, secure oil pipelines, and these kinds of things.

I am sure that, God forbid it comes to a confrontation, they will of course abide by the Kurdish leadership, by the leadership of the Kurdistan administration. But, as I said, there are a lot of political activities [talks] still going on. The Kurds sometimes don't show flexibility regarding their relationship with Ankara.

It's true, the Turks are very difficult to deal with. Since the regime change in Iraq, and especially after the constitution [was approved], and the fact that now you have a legal administration in Iraqi Kurdistan which is recognized by the Iraqi Constitution, to pretend now that [Kurds] don't exist is wrong. But this is now how Ankara is behaving.

And I think Baghdad also has very limited options. The fact that they signed a [security] agreement with Turkey recently has two sides. One, Baghdad knows that they can't do anything in Kurdistan. On the other hand, this agreement can also put Ankara in an embarrassing position because if they go into Iraq, according to the agreement, they cannot go into Iraq without permission from Baghdad. And Baghdad is not ready to give such a permission.

So, things are still balanced. But if there will be a large-scale interference, it will have very bad consequences for the Kurds, first, and also for relations between Ankara and Baghdad, the United States, Europe...it's very unpredictable. There can be [many] different complications.

RFE/RL: If the Kurdish peshmerga serving in the national army are called back to Kurdistan, how will it impact the security situation south of the region, because now they are helping secure areas where Al-Qaeda is active in Iraq. Will it have a huge impact on the security situation?

Al-Karadaghi: No, I don't think it will have a huge impact on the security situation in Arab areas. Because [participation] is still limited in some areas. They are securing roads...even if these units stay where they are, it will not have a big effect on the capability of the Kurdish forces. Because the Kurds have now really a huge army of fighters.

Charlemagne

Brussels rules OK
Sep 20th 2007
From The Economist print edition

Illustration by Peter Schrank

How the European Union is becoming the world's chief regulator
A VICTORY for consumers and the free market. That was how the European Commission presented this week's ruling by European judges in favour of its multi-million euro fine on Microsoft for bullying competitors. American observers had qualms. Would a French company have been pursued with such vigour? Explain again why a squabble among American high-technology firms ends up being decided in Brussels and Luxembourg (where Euro-judges sit)? One congressman muttered about sneaky protectionism and “zealous European Commission regulators”. It certainly seemed zealous of the competition commissioner, Neelie Kroes, to say that a “significant drop” in the software giant's market share was “what we'd like to see”.

More broadly, the ruling confirms that Brussels is becoming the world's regulatory capital. The European Union's drive to set standards has many causes—and a protectionist impulse within some governments (eg, France's) may be one. But though the EU is a big market, with almost half a billion consumers, neither size, nor zeal, nor sneaky protectionism explains why it is usurping America's role as a source of global standards. A better answer lies in transatlantic philosophical differences.

The American model turns on cost-benefit analysis, with regulators weighing the effects of new rules on jobs and growth, as well as testing the significance of any risks. Companies enjoy a presumption of innocence for their products: should this prove mistaken, punishment is provided by the market (and a barrage of lawsuits). The European model rests more on the “precautionary principle”, which underpins most environmental and health directives. This calls for pre-emptive action if scientists spot a credible hazard, even before the level of risk can be measured. Such a principle sparks many transatlantic disputes: over genetically modified organisms or climate change, for example.

In Europe corporate innocence is not assumed. Indeed, a vast slab of EU laws evaluating the safety of tens of thousands of chemicals, known as REACH, reverses the burden of proof, asking industry to demonstrate that substances are harmless. Some Eurocrats suggest that the philosophical gap reflects the American constitutional tradition that everything is allowed unless it is forbidden, against the Napoleonic tradition codifying what the state allows and banning everything else.

Yet the more proscriptive European vision may better suit consumer and industry demands for certainty. If you manufacture globally, it is simpler to be bound by the toughest regulatory system in your supply chain. Self-regulation is also a harder sell when it comes to global trade, which involves trusting a long line of unknown participants from far-flung places (talk to parents who buy Chinese-made toys).

A gripping new book* by an American, Mark Schapiro, captures the change. When he began his research, he found firms resisting the notion that the American market would follow EU standards for items like cosmetics, insisting that their American products were already safe. But as the book neared completion, firm after firm gave in and began applying EU standards worldwide, as third countries copied European rules on things like suspected carcinogens in lipstick. Even China is leaning to the European approach, one Procter & Gamble executive tells Mr Schapiro, adding wistfully: “And that's a pretty big country.”

The book records similar American reactions to the spread of EU directives insisting that cars must be recycled, or banning toxins such as lead and mercury from electrical gadgets. Obey EU rules or watch your markets “evaporating”, a computer industry lobbyist tells Mr Schapiro. “We've been hit by a tsunami,” says a big wheel from General Motors. American multinationals that spend money adjusting to European rules may lose their taste for lighter domestic regulations that may serve only to offer a competitive advantage to rivals that do not export. Mr Schapiro is a campaigner for tougher regulation of American business. Yet you do not have to share his taste for banning chemicals to agree with his prediction that American industry will want stricter standards to create a level playing-field at home.

Winning the regulatory race
One American official says flatly that the EU is “winning” the regulatory race, adding: “And there is a sense that that is their precise intent.” He cites a speech by the trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson, claiming that the export of “our rules and standards around the world” was one source of European power. Noting that EU regulations are often written with the help of European incumbents, the official also claims that precaution can cloak “plain old-fashioned protectionism in disguise”.

Europe had no idea the rest of the world was going to copy its standards, retorts a Eurocrat sweetly. “It's a very pleasant side-effect, but we set out to create the legislation we thought that Europe needed.” At all events, America's strategy has changed. Frontal attempts to block new EU regulations are giving way to efforts to persuade Brussels to adopt a more American approach to cost-benefit analysis. That would placate students of rigour, who accuse some European governments of ignoring scientific data and pandering to consumer panic (as shown by European campaigns against “Frankenstein foods”).

But rigour can quickly look like rigidity when it involves resisting competition. There is a genuine competition to set global regulatory standards, as Europe and America have discovered. There are also rising protectionist pressures. Perhaps zealous EU regulators may be what jumpy consumers need if they are to keep faith with free trade and globalisation. Viewed in such a light, even Microsoft's champions might hope that this week's verdict will help global competition in future.

America and Iran
The other struggle in the Gulf
Sep 6th 2007
From The Economist print edition

What the rest of the world can do to stop America and Iran from talking themselves into a fight

Reuters
MOST Americans and much of the world is fixated on what General David Petraeus, the American ground commander in Iraq, intends to say when he reports to Congress next week (see article). But in the meantime American relations with Iran appear to be going from bad to worse.

The two countries are used to trading insults, but they have now become explosive. The more George Bush flounders in Iraq, the greater his temptation to blame Iran. On August 28th he called Iran the world's leading supporter of terrorism, claimed that its nuclear programme had put the Middle East “under the shadow of a nuclear holocaust” and authorised his commanders to confront Iran's “murderous activities”. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's president, sounds almost as if he is goading Mr Bush to attack. As a “master of tabulation and calculation”, he told Iranian students this week, he had concluded that the country's enemies “dare not fight us”.


Whatever the master of tabulation may think, there is however a danger that America will at some point dare to strike Iran, either as part of its battle against Iranian-supported Shia militias inside Iraq, or in order to cripple its nuclear programme. Here, too, Mr Ahmadinejad is no help. No sooner had the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported at the end of August that Iran was going slow on uranium enrichment than he popped up to say the opposite. Iran, he said, had achieved its aim of running 3,000 uranium-enriching centrifuges and would add a new cascade every week.

If America and Iran are really intent on talking each other into a fight, the rest of the world can do little to prevent it. But there are ways to reduce the chances of a war by accident.

The most urgent is to persuade America that it does not have to deal with Iran's nuclear delinquency on its own. Since July 2006 the UN Security Council has passed three binding resolutions ordering Iran to stop enriching uranium until it shows that, in spite of a history of fibbing, its nuclear intentions are peaceful. To their credit, Russia and China supported these resolutions—including two imposing mild economic sanctions—despite both countries' commercial interests in Iran. But as Mr Ahmadinejad boasts, Iran has ignored the UN. If the Russians and Chinese are serious about preventing proliferation and shoring up the authority of the Security Council, they should now be more willing to help the Americans and Europeans produce a new resolution with sharper teeth.

The rest of the world should also inject more backbone into the IAEA. Mohamed ElBaradei, its director-general, is anxious to keep Iran in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and inspectors in the country—and to ward off an American military strike. These are honourable aims: an attack on Iran's nuclear sites might not succeed and could well start a war. But he is now falling into the trap of letting Iran earn a spurious seal of approval for activities his agency cannot properly monitor.

Iran and the IAEA have just announced a new understanding on future co-operation. It is a dreadful one. Though it lists several areas where inspectors have outstanding questions, it allows Iran to drip-feed information. The questions have to be in writing by the middle of this month. There is no real deadline for Iran's answers. Unless inspectors accept Iran's version of events and “close the file” on each successive subject, the Iranians won't provide the next set of answers, and so on. This leaves inspectors hard put to raise new questions when new information comes to hand. Iran has accredited a new list of inspectors—but only after barring those it found too intrusive.

Missing the point
The point of the recent succession of IAEA and UN resolutions, given Iran's history of lies and cover-ups, was to halt all enrichment and plutonium work. Yet the work is continuing. Mr ElBaradei has said it is pointless asking Iran to stop all enrichment work, since it has already mastered many of the skills. But others have these skills and do not use them. Mr ElBaradei's argument is that it is better to let Iran continue limited work under close supervision. The trouble is that his agency has no idea where else Iran is doing nuclear work, and so no idea where else these skills may be applied.

Mr Bush's approach to Iran has long been flawed. By appearing to threaten its regime after it had helped America to unseat the Taliban in Afghanistan, he may have confirmed it in its hostility and reinforced its desire for a bomb. More recently America and Iran have come to see each other as rivals for mastery of the post-Saddam Gulf. Their own interest, and the interests of the Middle East, would probably be better served if they explored the possibility of some sort of grand bargain. But that seems impossible if the Iranians think they have a clear run to a nuclear bomb. The region would be a good deal safer if the rest of the world did more to disabuse them.

New naval strategy: Preventing wars
Maritime officials to focus on humanitarian missions to encourage stability
The Associated Press
Updated: 8:04 a.m. PT Oct 17, 2007
WASHINGTON - In the first major revision of U.S. naval strategy in 25 years, maritime officials said Wednesday they plan to focus more on humanitarian missions and improving international cooperation as a way to prevent conflicts.

"We believe that preventing wars is as important as winning wars," said the new strategy announced by the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard.

The strategy reflects a broader Defense Department effort to use aid, training and other cooperative efforts to encourage stability in fledgling democracies and create relationships around the globe that can be leveraged if a crisis does break out in a region.

"Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, trust and cooperation cannot be surged," says the 16-page document entitled "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower."

Show of force
It also says forces will be concentrated "where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our friends and allies our commitment to security" — something the U.S. did earlier this year in sending an additional aircraft carrier to the Gulf region as a show of force toward Iran.

"Credible combat power will be continuously posted in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends ... and deter and dissuade potential adversaries," the strategy document said.

The strategy was being unveiled before naval representatives of 100 countries who are attending an international symposium on the seas at the Naval War College. It will be described to them by Navy Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations; Gen. James T. Conway, commandant of the Marine Corps, and Adm. Thad W. Allen, commandant of the Coast Guard.

It represents the first time that the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard have all collaborated on a single, common strategy for defending the U.S. homeland and protecting U.S. interests overseas.

Winning hearts and minds
Defense Secretary Robert Gates hinted at the cooperative strategy during his recent five-country swing through Central and South America. Pointing to the recent tour of the Navy hospital ship, the USNS Comfort, which delivered medical care to people in 12 Latin American countries, Gates said such aid is critical to solidifying U.S. bonds with other nations. The USS Peleliu amphibious ship recently returned from a four-month tour in the Pacific and the USS Fort McHenry is heading this week for a seven-month mission along the west coast of Africa.

Adm. Mike Mullen — who just left his job as head of the Navy to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — has said he sees the Navy's humanitarian work as key to the effort to defeat terrorism by winning hearts and minds.

When Roughead succeeded Mullen at the Navy last week, he called in a speech for more international partnerships to make the Navy a "force for good" around the globe.

© 2007 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21343519/

Oct 18, 4:34 PM (ET)
http://apnews.myway.com/article/20071018/D8SBS7PO0.html

By PAISLEY DODDS

(AP) A scene of devastation after an explosion at a procession of Pakistan's former Prime Minister...
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KARACHI, Pakistan (AP) - Two explosions went off Thursday night near a truck carrying former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on her celebratory return to Pakistan after eight years in exile, killing at least 30 people and wounding more than 100, an official said. Party workers and police said Bhutto was unhurt.
Associated Press photographer B.K. Bangash at the scene said he saw between 50 and 60 dead or badly injured people. He said some of the bodies were ripped apart.
An initial small explosion was followed by a huge blast just feet from the front of the truck carrying Bhutto during a procession through Karachi. The blast shattered windows in her vehicle and set a police escort vehicle on fire.
Those traveling atop the truck with Bhutto climbed down, with one man jumping off while others used a ladder. Bhutto's lawyer, Sen. Babar Awan, said that the former premier was safe.

(AP) This is a frame from TV after an explosion went off near the vehicle carrying former premier of ...
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Police Chief Azhar Farooqi told Dawn News that Bhutto was rushed from the area under contingency plans.
"She was evacuated very safely and is now in Bilawal House," Farooqi said, referring to Bhutto's residence in Karachi.
Ghulam Mohammed Mohtaram, the provincial home secretary, said at least 30 people were killed and more than 100 injured. He said the main force of the blast appeared to be taken by the police vehicle.
Footage from the scene of the blasts showed bodies on the ground, lying motionless, under a mural that read "Long Live Bhutto."
Men grabbed several stretchers with injured people from ambulances and rushed them into what appeared to be a hospital emergency room, while others carried the wounded in their arms. Many of the wounded were covered in blood, and some had their clothes ripped off.

(AP) This is a frame from TV moments after an explosion went off near the vehicle carrying former...
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Several motorcycles also lay on their sides. Flames burned in the center of the street after the explosions.
After the blast, pickup trucks filled with men rushed away from the scene and others began to run, but many more stayed and milled in between the police vehicle and those of the procession.
More than 150,000 jubilant supporters had surrounded the convoy carrying Bhutto amid massive security in Karachi.
Authorities had urged her to travel in Karachi by helicopter to reduce the risk of attack. But Bhutto, hated by radical Islamists because she supports the U.S.-led war on terrorism, brushed off the concerns.
"I am not scared. I am thinking of my mission," she had told reporters on the plane. "This is a movement for democracy because we are under threat from extremists and militants."
Bhutto recently courted controversy in Pakistan by saying that she would cooperate with the American military in targeting Osama bin Laden, and authorities warned that Islamic militants could launch suicide attacks and roadside bombings against her.
Asked about such threats on Wednesday in Dubai, Bhutto said Islam forbids suicide bombings and attacks on her. "Muslims know if they attack a woman they will burn in hell," she said.
The government of Sindh province, of which Karachi is the capital, had appealed to Bhutto to abandon plans for a snail-paced grand procession through Karachi, saying it would leave her vulnerable. The government said the main threat was from Taliban and al-Qaida.