Who Should Establish Rule of Law in Iraq?

By Ilya Shapiro : 22 Aug 2007



BAGHDAD—Last week I argued here that establishing Rule of Law in Iraq is both possible and realistic, but that this process must take into account local customs and achieve both popular legitimacy and elite buy-in to work. Now I turn to the mechanics of implementing Rule of Law (ROL): Who should do it? Who should lead? Does the United States have the capacity for this? What about longer-term solutions beyond the particularities of Iraq?

1. The Case for Civilian Leadership

ROL, like agriculture, industry, sewage, and all the other aspects of modern life are, by definition, civilian functions. Just like civil engineers build bridges and power plants, interfacing with their counterparts in the host country, it is judges, police trainers, corrections experts, and the like who should be standing up courts, police, and prisons—the three legs of the ROL stool.

After all, while the modern military does have lawyers (JAGs), they specialize, understandably, in military law: rules of engagement, operational law, international agreements, violations of the Uniform Military Code of Justice (UMCJ). Not to mention the non-legal officers who are inevitably involved in rule of law efforts through the chain of command.

Moreover, civilian and military officials have different "feedback horizons." ROL is an especially long-term endeavor, not susceptible to measurement against monthly "benchmarks" that can be put into neat PowerPoint slides for presentation to superior officers. It is useful to know, sure, how many trials take place, how many police go through training, how much of a new prison's capacity remains, etc. But those numbers can be misleading indicators of the strength of a legal regime and its legitimacy in the eyes of the people to whom it is responsible.

Rather than worrying about achieving certain numeric targets by a specific time—when a unit rotates out, say—civilian liaisons can build relationships and provide advice not tied to set timetables (as much, in theory). And they can do it without having to keep an eye on security functions that may at times be perceived to interfere with ROL development. The military is a necessary component of the ROL mission—advising on areas in which the ROL mission intersects with counterinsurgency operations, for example—but there can only be one lead actor, civilians (meaning, specifically, State and Justice Department lawyers and related officials).

2. The Case for Military Leadership

Yet in a place like Iraq we're not merely talking about developing ROL in a poor, underdeveloped area. The challenges to normalizing a system of criminal justice (to use the most visible aspect of ROL) multiply exponentially when hostile forces actively use violence to thwart the coalescence of legitimate political authority.

To use a crude analogy, this is not ROL development in New Orleans, which faces plenty of the same issues we face here (incompetence, corruption, weak institutions, low political culture). When there's an active insurgency, it's hard to remove or even scale back the military from the ROL equation.

Indeed, it is difficult to limit the military role to providing security and interfacing with counterparts in the host nation's security forces, which would essentially take ROL out of the bailiwick of the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA). Oftentimes there aren't even enough civilians to send into the field to work ROL issues, either because it is too dangerous or because they do not adequately understand the counterinsurgency issues at play. And civilians cannot marshal the same level of resources or field organization.

Counterinsurgency goes beyond security—it's not a matter of having soldiers guard courthouses or train and equip a judge's personal security detail (PSD)—and cannot be divorced from any civilian efforts. This is why the Army has a Corps of Engineers (recall the bridge/power plant), a Surgeon General, Military Police, and many other trades and professions that can be harnessed to run a self-sustaining city (which is what a military base is, after all).

Only the military combines this mix of talent in one organization under a unified chain of command, the ability to recruit talented individuals, an effective disciplinary system, unrivaled logistical capability, and a unique doctrine development capacity. The Defense Department is not perfect—its bureaucracy is the stuff of legend—but it arguably functions better at the execution of a huge range of operations than any other organization in government.

Forget New Orleans; Iraq is not even post-war Germany or Japan, not purely a post-conflict reconstruction job. If we are going to do "nation building," as we are now and always have (see, e.g., Max Boot's The Savage Wars of Peace and Niall Ferguson's Colossus), it is the military who must lead the joint ROL effort.

3. The Third Way

Yet, again, despite all the talented people in the military—and I can attest to this exceptionalism first-hand—OSJA was not designed to play a leadership role in ROL, even if it has been thrust into it by the particular demands of this campaign. And expanding the military may work through sheer brute force—throw enough resources at a problem and eventually something will stick—but it doesn't seem to be the optimal solution.

Nor is it necessarily what the military ought to be doing, and indeed civilians have the ROL lead per the Joint Campaign Plan. The problem in Iraq is the lack of a mechanism to draw enough civilians to come here long enough to make a campaign-shifting type of difference. There are excellent civilian personnel here, and where they can lead, the military has followed. But for a host of reasons, the 500+ military legal personnel (JAGs and paralegals) charged with direct support to commanders wind up plugged into holes where civilians otherwise would be.

In Iraq, Provincial Reconstructions Teams (PRTs, which have become joint military-civilian), separate enclaves with heavy U.S. support (like the Rusafa Rule of Law Complex), and a realignment of interagency responsibilities are all part of the solution, but practical and logistical issues remain—not least in staffing. We need something more systematic.

What we need is the legal authority to deploy overseas civilians with the requisite expertise in ROL and otherwise. Britain's India Civil Service (ICS) is a good model, and two bills were proposed in the last Congress to create just that sort of "Civilian Reserve Corps" (CRC, one of the names bandied about).

A CRC would make the civilian vs. military debate academic; the responsibility for implementing ROL would fall to it. Stay tuned for more on this concept in my next dispatch.

Ilya Shapiro, the incoming Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute, is currently a Special Assistant/Advisor to the Multi-National Force-Iraq's (MNFI) Law and Order Task Force (LAOTF). He writes the "Dispatches from Purple America" column for TCS Daily.com and a blog of the same name. The opinions expressed here are his alone and do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of any institution with which he is affiliated.

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-bhutto30aug30,0,4190919.story
From the Los Angeles Times
A moment of truth in Pakistan
For the sake of the civilized world, democracy must overcome extremism.
By Benazir Bhutto

August 30, 2007

LONDON — There are moments in history that prove decisive and mark a turning point for the future. The Civil War was such a moment in the United States. The fall of the Berlin Wall was such a moment for Germany and the European Union. Today is Pakistan's moment of truth. Decisions made now will determine whether extremism and terrorism can be contained to save Pakistan from internal collapse. The stability of not just Pakistan but the civilized world is at stake.

In a democratic Pakistan, extremist movements have been minimal. In all democratic elections, extremist religious parties never have garnered more than 11% of the vote. But under dictators -- most notably Gen. Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s, but unfortunately also Gen. Pervez Musharraf during this decade -- religious extremism has gained a foothold in my homeland.

Whether leaders like Zia exploited religion for their own political ends, or dictatorships inherently induce deprivation and desperation, the fact remains that extremism has emerged as a threat to my nation, to the region and to the world. These extremists are the petri dish of international terrorism. It need not be so. It must be reversed. And it can be done.

In both of my tenures as prime minister, my government imposed the rule of law on all areas of Pakistan -- our four provinces and also the federally administered tribal areas, including Waziristan. With the support of the people of those tribal areas, we managed to uproot an international drug cartel that had operated with impunity under dictatorship.

Today, however, the international drug barons have morphed into religious extremists and terrorists. The current government of Pakistan has ceded large areas of our nation to the pro-Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, claiming that these areas are ungovernable. I believe that they are governable and that a democratic government can better restore the authority of the state.

We must be realistic about the history and politics of Pakistan. In a perfect world, perhaps the military would not play a role in politics. But Pakistan is less than perfect in this regard. The security forces fundamentally have served as a political institution in Pakistan, ruling either directly, through generals, or indirectly, by manipulating and ultimately sacking democratic governments.

I know that some people have been surprised that I have been negotiating a transition to democracy and talking about the future of Pakistan with Musharraf. On dictatorship, there can be no compromise. The parliament must be supreme. That's why I have made it clear to Musharraf that my party, the Pakistan People's Party, supports the constitution, which requires that the president be a civilian who is legitimately selected by the parliament and provincial assemblies. After much negotiating, I announced on Wednesday that Musharraf had decided to resign as army chief.

But that is not the only issue. The ban on twice-elected prime ministers, like myself, holding office again was not part of Pakistan's constitution and must be abolished.

All members of parliament and public officials elected before the military coup of 1999 who have not been convicted of any offense must also be granted immunity from politically inspired charges. All parties and all party leaders must be allowed to freely contest elections. A neutral caretaker government, pursuant to our constitution, must be empowered to oversee the nation before the upcoming elections, and an independent election commission, with the participation of all political parties, must be constituted.

Election rolls must be free from political manipulation. Balloting must be transparent, counting must be free from political intervention, and the entire process must be monitored by international observers to ensure its sanctity and validity.

But free and fair elections alone are not enough to solve the problems of Pakistan. We must have free, fair and effective governing. And that requires that all responsible, moderate forces in the country be mobilized, working for the same plan, reading from the same page.

Musharraf continues to enjoy the support of the international community and the armed forces of Pakistan. But such support is no substitute for the will of the people who are now disempowered and disenchanted. Growing poverty and unemployment make it clear that in the absence of democracy, the people's needs cannot be met. I believe that unless the people of Pakistan are empowered through the ballot, extremists will continue to exploit this discontent to their advantage.

I believe that democracy and moderation go together. Like many Pakistanis, I am pained that part of our land in the tribal areas has been ceded to terrorists.

Some argue that through cease-fires and peace treaties, one can get the extremists into the mainstream and moderate them. But the experience in Pakistan proves otherwise. Every cease-fire and peace treaty has emboldened the militants and terrorists. Nowhere was this more profoundly demonstrated than during the siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad this summer.

The militants who holed up in the mosque had tried to impose their own laws over and above the laws of Pakistan. They kidnapped women and police officials. They intimidated and shut down entertainment shops. Their vigilante squads terrorized the women who drove cars in the capital city. Six long months of negotiations with them failed, and a bloody result ensued when the army tried to overcome the mutiny. More than 100 people were killed.

The Red Mosque incident demonstrated that no deals can be struck with religious fanatics.

Pakistan is at the crossroads. Our success can be a signal to 1 billion Muslims all over the world that Islam is compatible with democracy, modernity and moderation. I go back to Pakistan this autumn knowing that there will be difficult days ahead. But I put my faith in the people and my fate in the hands of God. I am not afraid. Yes, we are at a turning point, but I know that time, justice and the forces of history are on our side.

Benazir Bhutto was twice prime minister of Pakistan

Report Finds Little Progress On Iraq Goals
GAO Draft at Odds With White House
By Karen DeYoung and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, August 30, 2007; A01

Iraq has failed to meet all but three of 18 congressionally mandated benchmarks for political and military progress, according to a draft of a Government Accountability Office report. The document questions whether some aspects of a more positive assessment by the White House last month adequately reflected the range of views the GAO found within the administration.

The strikingly negative GAO draft, which will be delivered to Congress in final form on Tuesday, comes as the White House prepares to deliver its own new benchmark report in the second week of September, along with congressional testimony from Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker. They are expected to describe significant security improvements and offer at least some promise for political reconciliation in Iraq.

The draft provides a stark assessment of the tactical effects of the current U.S.-led counteroffensive to secure Baghdad. "While the Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence, U.S. agencies differ on whether such violence has been reduced," it states. While there have been fewer attacks against U.S. forces, it notes, the number of attacks against Iraqi civilians remains unchanged. It also finds that "the capabilities of Iraqi security forces have not improved."

"Overall," the report concludes, "key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds," as promised. While it makes no policy recommendations, the draft suggests that future administration assessments "would be more useful" if they backed up their judgments with more details and "provided data on broader measures of violence from all relevant U.S. agencies."

A GAO spokesman declined to comment on the report before it is released. The 69-page draft, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Post, is still undergoing review at the Defense Department, which may ask that parts of it be classified or request changes in its conclusions. The GAO, the investigative arm of Congress, normally submits its draft reports to relevant agencies for comment but makes its own final judgments. The office has published more than 100 assessments of various aspects of the U.S. effort in Iraq since May 2003.

The person who provided the draft report to The Post said it was being conveyed from a government official who feared that its pessimistic conclusions would be watered down in the final version -- as some officials have said happened with security judgments in this month's National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq. Congress requested the GAO report, along with an assessment of the Iraqi security forces by an independent commission headed by retired Marine Gen. James L. Jones, to provide a basis for comparison with the administration's scorecard. The Jones report is also scheduled for delivery next week.

Asked to comment on the GAO draft, White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe said, "General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are there on the ground every day in Iraq, and it's important to wait to hear what they have to say." He disputed any suggestion that the July White House assessment did not consider all internal views, noting that it resulted from "a lengthy and far-reaching process throughout the State and Defense departments and other agencies."

Johndroe emphasized that "while we've all seen progress in some areas, especially on the security front, it's not surprising the GAO would make this assessment, given the difficult congressionally mandated measurement they had to follow."

President Bush signed legislation in May that requires him to submit by Sept. 15 an assessment of whether the government of Iraq is "achieving progress" toward the benchmarks. The interim July report determined that satisfactory progress was being made toward eight of the 18 benchmarks, most of them on the security front. It found unsatisfactory progress toward eight others and presented a mixed picture on the remaining two.

The May legislation imposed a stricter standard on the GAO, requiring an up-or-down judgment on whether each benchmark has been met. On that basis, the GAO draft says that three of the benchmarks have been met while 13 have not. Despite its strict mandate, the GAO draft concludes that two benchmarks -- the formation of governmental regions and the allocation and expenditure of $10 billion for reconstruction -- have been "partially met." Little of the allocated money, it says, has been spent.

One of eight political benchmarks -- the protection of the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature -- has been achieved, according to the draft. On the others, including legislation on constitutional reform, new oil laws and de-Baathification, it assesses failure.

"Prospects for additional progress in enacting legislative benchmarks have been complicated by the withdrawal of 15 of 37 members of the Iraqi cabinet," it says. An internal administration assessment this month, the GAO says, concluded that "this boycott ends any claim by the Shi'ite-dominated coalition to be a government of national unity." An administration official involved in Iraq policy said that he did not know what specific interagency document the GAO was citing but noted that it is an accurate reflection of the views of many officials.

Overall, the draft report, titled "Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq," says that the Iraqi government has met only two security benchmarks. It contradicts the Bush administration's conclusion in July that sectarian violence was decreasing as a result of the U.S. military's stepped-up operations in Baghdad this year. "The average number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the last six months; 25 in February versus 26 in July," the GAO draft states.

Iraqi security forces are also assessed more severely in the GAO study than in the administration's July report. Although the White House found satisfactory progress toward the goal of deploying three Iraqi army brigades in Baghdad, the GAO disagrees, citing "performance problems" in some units. "Some army units sent to Baghdad have mixed loyalties, and some have had ties to Shiia militias making it difficult to target Shiia extremist networks," it says.

The GAO draft also says that the number of Iraqi army units capable of operating independently declined from 10 in March to six last month. The July White House report mentioned a "slight" decline in capable Iraqi units, without providing any numbers. The GAO also says, as did the White House in July, that the Iraqi government has intervened in military activities for political reasons, "resulting in some operations being based on sectarian interests." But its discussion of Iraqi security forces is often veiled, as when it states that the determination that the security forces benchmark was not met "was based largely on classified information."

The description of the Iraqi military's shortcomings contrasts with comments from many senior U.S. commanders who say that they are pleased with its progress. "Although we still have a ways to go, Iraqi security forces are making significant, tangible improvements," Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq, said earlier this month.

But Army Lt. Gen. James Dubik, who in June became the commander of the U.S. troops training and advising Iraqi army and police units, struck a more somber note yesterday in a news conference in Baghdad. "The problems that the military commanders and the minister of defense have here in generating the Iraqi army are very significant, and they shouldn't be taken lightly," he said.

Iran seals its doors tighter against the West
By Michael Slackman
Tuesday, September 4, 2007

TEHRAN: Rents are soaring, inflation has been hovering around 17 percent and 10 million Iranians live below the poverty line. The police shut down 20 barbershops for men in Tehran last week because they offered inappropriate hairstyles and women have been banned from riding bicycles in many places, as a crackdown on social freedoms presses on.

For months now, average Iranians have endured economic hardship, political repression and international isolation as the nation's top officials remain defiant over Iran's nuclear program.

But in a country whose leaders see national security, government stability and Islamic values as inextricably entwined, problems that usually would constitute threats to the leadership are instead viewed as an opportunity to secure its rule.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's economic missteps and the animosity generated in the West by his aggressive posture on the nuclear issue have helped his government stymie what it sees as corrupting foreign influences by increasing the country's economic and political isolation, economists, diplomats, political analysts, businessmen and clerics said in interviews over the past two weeks.

Pressure from the West - including economic sanctions - over Tehran's nuclear program and its role in Iraq has also empowered those pushing the harder line, many of those interviewed said.

Saeed Leylaz, an economist and former government official, said: "The leader is concerned that any effort to make the country more manageable will lead to reform and will undermine his authority."

The effort to keep Iran's doors to the West sealed tight was on display Sunday, when Ahmadinejad announced that Tehran's scientists had developed 3,000 centrifuges and then mocked the West for trying to press Iran to stop uranium enrichment and slow its nuclear program.

On Monday, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, tried to use such Western tactics to rally public sentiment behind the government. "Iran will defeat these drunken and arrogant powers using its artful and wise ways," he said to a group of students, state run television reported.

The remarks were seen here by Western diplomats and political analysts as an attempt by the president to undermine months of careful negotiations between more pragmatic conservatives in the leadership and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which days earlier had said that Iran was being more cooperative.

The message was clear, a Western diplomat said. "They are convinced the rest of the world is trying to put pressure on Iran to keep Iran down," said the diplomat, who requested anonymity so as not to compromise his ability to work in Iran. "They believe if Iran makes a concession to the West on the nuclear issue, it will be the first step toward regime change."

The economic component of Iran's go-it-alone approach began with Ahmadinejad's election two years ago. He laid down a series of erratic economic decrees that he said were aimed at helping the poor, but often made their lives harder. Recently, the head of the central bank and the ministers of oil and industry resigned, warning that Iran was heading toward trouble. The president's decisions have frightened away investors, derailing efforts to open Iran to world markets, analysts said.

The leadership has been able to ease some of the pain because of the income from its crude oil sales. Ultimately, those interviewed agreed, Ahmadinejad has continued unimpeded because he has the support of Khamenei, who has the final say on all key decisions.

"The only thing that has kept Ahmadinejad in power is the support of the leadership," said Muhammad Atrianfar, publisher of two newspapers that have been closed and an ally of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. "As soon as the leader stops supporting him, he can easily be impeached and dismissed."

No one accuses the leadership of deliberately fostering economic chaos. Instead, analysts here said Ahmadinejad fails to understand the effects of his policies. "He feels the pain of the poor but doesn't have any solution," said Ali Rashadi, an economist. "He is wrecking a system that was patched together over 25 years."

Many journalists, academics and former government officials said they thought Ahmadinejad had been more active, and reckless with the economy, than Khamenei had expected. But he is comfortable with Ahmadinejad because he can count on him to preserve the system and to roll back political, economic and social changes that conservatives feared were insidious steps toward revolution, some of those interviewed said.

A Western-allied ambassador here said that the supreme leader and the security services arrested Haleh Esfandiari, an Iranian-American scholar who was imprisoned here for months before being allowed to leave the country last weekend, partly as a warning to Iranians who have expressed dismay over the direction of the country.

"They think little by little we have moved away from Islamic values," said Mohsen Kadivar, a cleric who was removed from his teaching job at Tehran University. "They see Ahmadinejad as the man to return Iran to these values."

Kadivar added, "What's important for them is being in power."

When Ahmadinejad was elected, he campaigned as a Robin Hood, promising to redistribute Iran's oil wealth from the rich to the poor. One of his first edicts was to order banks to lower interest rates to 12 percent, from as high as 17 percent. The order, like others, backfired, making loans harder to come by.

In another case, Ahmadinejad decided that the price of cement was too high, so he ordered it reduced. Rashadi, the economist, said the decree frightened away investors who had planned to build new cement factories around the country.

Rashadi also said the president's constant insults aimed at the stock market had undermined investor confidence, which he said encouraged people with money to invest in real estate, driving up property values.

"My income does not match my cost of living," said Hassan Khalili, 37, who rents a small apartment in the village of Vardan, a meandering hillside community of about 9,000 people an hour outside Tehran. "I thought it was going to get better under Ahmadinejad, but it didn't."

But with its oil revenues, the government has, in the short term, been able to buy itself out of an economic meltdown by using $60 billion for subsidies and a massive increase in imports - although that has undermined local manufacturing, economists here said.

Some of those interviewed said the oil revenues also have helped shore up the regime by enriching a new ruling class made up of members of the Revolutionary Guard and alumni of the Basij militia, who have their hands in nearly every aspect of the economy - and now in much of the government as well.

Ahmadinejad's economic policies have also cushioned many homeowners because property values have skyrocketed. Three years ago, for example, a four-bedroom apartment in a good Tehran neighborhood sold for $200,000; it could be worth more than $1 million today.

Mehdi Panahi lives in central Tehran and runs a small snack shop in the mountains just north of the city, where many people hike and relax on the weekends.

He has had to raise his prices 20 percent since March, he said, because his rent doubled in the last year. The cost of cooking oil shot up 50 percent, tomato paste rose 70 percent and prices of dairy products increased by 70 percent.

But in the current environment of fear and caution, Panahi said: "Of course I am optimistic. What is there not to be optimistic about?"

The economic upheaval has been coupled with a far-reaching, months-long security clampdown. Analysts said the authorities have arrested prominent Iranian-American intellectuals, suppressed the student movement, rolled back social freedoms, purged university faculties, closed newspapers and moved to marginalize political figures who are out of step with the government.

Those arrested included a once-prominent ally of the leadership, Hossein Mousavian. The former nuclear negotiator - and ally of Rafsanjani - was detained on espionage charges in May.

The repression is calibrated. Students and female activists have been encouraged to leave the country or face more serious pressure. The idea is to send a message without spreading the pain too widely.

As a result, the streets are calm but there is an undercurrent of unease and confusion. People routinely say that life is good, better even under this president - then rattle off a litany of complaints.

Last week, Ahmedinejad attended a conference of religious leaders in the north of Tehran. Ali Akhbar Akhbari, his wife and two young daughters live in a tent a block from the convention center. They said they were homeless and collected bottles to make money for food. Marziah, 13, and Roziah, 9, slept in their own small tent decorated with Looney Tunes characters.

"No one will help them!" shouted Valioalah Ghiyasi, 60, as he walked down the street, his hands deep in the pockets of his sport coat. He pulled a pay stub from his pocket, showing his own small government salary, the equivalent of about $130 a month.

"It was a better situation before," he said. "My wife has cancer and I can't afford the medicine. I haven't been able to pay my rent in five months. My rent is $250 a month. I don't know what to do. I am begging."

The net effect of the president's policies can be seen in the village of Vadan. Property values have gone up so much that a local man, Ghalan Abbas Mahmoodi, has been able to open a real estate office.

Farmers are selling off land, and wealthy people from Tehran are building villas on scenic hills overlooking the rolling countryside.

Those who do not own land and have seen their rents soar, like Khalili, said they were facing a catastrophe.

Mahmoodi, the realtor, had a different view. "As my income increases, my purchase power increases," he said.

While the president has lost a great deal of political support within the system, he has not shown any signs of being deterred. "There is an honorable butcher in our neighborhood who is aware of all the problems of the people," Ahmadinejad said, "and I also get important economic information from him."

Front-line lessons from the Iraq surge

By MICHAEL TOTTEN

Wednesday, August 29th 2007, 4:00 AM

Be Our Guest

While American politicians bicker among themselves from eight time zones away about whether the surge led by Gen. David Petraeus is working or not, I returned to Iraq to see for myself.

This trip - from which I returned this month - was my fourth reporting stint in the country since the conflict began. And this time, what I saw was overwhelming, undeniable and, like it or not, complicated: In some places, the surge is working remarkably well. In others, it is not. And the only way we will know for sure whether the tide can be turned is to continue the policy and wait.

I know that's not what many Americans and politicians want to hear, but it's the truth.

On my first stop, I embedded with the 82nd Airborne Division in the Graya'at area of northern Baghdad. There, the soldiers live and work in the city 24 hours a day. Their sector has been so thoroughly cleared of insurgents that they haven't suffered a single casualty this year. I walked the streets without fear and met dozens of genuinely friendly and supportive Iraqi civilians, who greeted the soldiers like friends.

The hitch is that Moqtada al-Sadr's radical Shia Mahdi Army has infiltrated the Iraqi Army unit that shares the outpost. American soldiers are training them while their comrades kill American soldiers elsewhere in the country.

Meanwhile, Shia militias are expanding and consolidating their rule in other parts of the capital. American soldiers patrol the Hurriyah neighborhood, for example, but many locals credit the Mahdi Army with being the real peacekeepers in the area.

Progress in Baghdad is real, but it is not, or not yet anyway, the kind of peace that can last.

It's worse in Mushadah just north of Baghdad, where I also went with American soldiers who are training Iraqi police forces - which have been infiltrated by Al Qaeda. The area is so dangerous that the police refused to leave their station until an American woman, Capt. Maryanne Naro from upstate Fort Drum, showed up and shamed them by going out herself.

According to Naro, our convoys are hit with improvised explosive devices every day. I was ordered not to leave my vehicle for any reason unless something catastrophic happened to it.

Elsewhere in Iraq, though, progress is extraordinary and unambiguous. I spent a week in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province, which just four months ago was the most violent place in Iraq. Al Qaeda had taken over and ruled the city through a massive murder and intimidation campaign. Even the Marine Corps, arguably the least defeatist institution in America, wrote off Ramadi as irretrievably lost last August.

Then, local tribal leaders and civilians joined the Americans - and helped purge the city of every last terrorist cell. Violence has dropped to near zero. I have photographs of Iraqis hugging American soldiers and of children greeting us with ecstatic joy, as though they had been rescued from Nazis. The Marines are even considering going on patrols without body armor.

What worked in Ramadi might not work in Baghdad. The Mahdi Army's relative moderation, compared with Al Qaeda's brutality, prevents it from being rejected by the entire society. But this much cannot be denied: There are powerful winds of change in Iraq, and not enough time has passed to determine how they will transform the country.

Want to know if the surge will succeed or fail? There is only one thing to do: Wait.

Totten (michaeltotten.com) is an independent journalist who lives in Portland, Ore.