count

May 23: 2954

June 12 3195 11:45 p
June 13 3210 10:30p
June 14 3228 7:30p
June 15 3238
June 16 3249 11:45p
June 18 3274 8 a.m.
June 18 3288 10p.m
June 20 3350 11p.m
June 22 3371 8 a.m.
June 23 3381 10 a.m.
June 24 3408 10 p.m
June 26 3435 8 a,m.

June 27 3455 4p.m.
June 28 3465 9p.m.
June 29 3486 7p.m.
June 30 3501 11p.m.
July 1, 3547 11.p.m.
July 2 3585
JUly 3 3649 11 p.m.
July 6 3718 4p.m.
July 15 3830 10 p.m.
July 16 3885 11 p.m.
July 18 3997 1 p.m. afternoon
July 19 4024 1:30 p "
July 20 4071 1 p
July 21 4097 8p
July 23 4131 8p
july 28 4210 1 a.m.
Aug 6, 4308
Aug. 12 4500 11:30 P.M.
Aug 18 4674 6:p
Aug 25: 4816 10a.m.

August 25, 2007
News Analysis
Iraqi Factions’ Self-Interest Blocks Political Progress

By DAMIEN CAVE
BAGHDAD, Aug. 24 — The National Intelligence Estimate released Thursday illustrated convincingly that, despite the troop buildup, Iraq has failed to forge the political reconciliation that could lead to long-term security and economic growth.

What it did not explain, though, is why reconciliation has been so hard to attain.

In part, of course, Iraq remains a place pocked by violence and fear, which makes compromise difficult. But more important, say Iraqi political commentators and officials, Iraq has become a cellular nation, dividing and redividing into competing constituencies that have a greater stake in continued chaos than in compromise.

In most areas, for most Iraqis, the central government today is either irrelevant or invisible. Provinces and even neighborhoods have become the stages where power struggles play out. As a result, Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds — or elements of each faction — have come to feel that they can do a better job on their own.

“No one can rely on the political participants who lack a common view of the public interest,” said Nabeel Mahmoud, an international relations professor at Baghdad University. “Such a concept is completely absent from the thinking of the political powers in Iraq’s government, so each side works to get their own quota of positions or resources.”

Because of their autonomy, the Kurds are perhaps best positioned to benefit from the government’s failures. American protection in the final years of the Hussein government helped disconnect the Kurdistan region from the rest of Iraq, bringing glass office towers and foreign workers to cities like Erbil.

Earlier this month the Kurds took another step in that distancing process, passing a regional oil law that will reach its full potential only if a national oil law is never implemented.

Shiites and Sunnis, however, are still the factions with the greatest responsibility for Iraq’s political stalemate, and the ones most able to gain from the dysfunctional status quo.

Shiites in particular, as the majority, have managed to take advantage of the weak central government in a number of ways.

Religious parties in majority-Shiite areas like Basra now openly fight for positions of power. Killings of Shiite officials by Shiite gunmen in the south have grown more common, and with huge oil wealth located in the region, interference from Baghdad remains entirely unwelcome.

In the capital, offices run by the militia and civilian organization of the populist cleric Moktada al-Sadr have opened like franchises across the city. His militia, the Mahdi Army, known as Jaish al-Mahdi, now controls businesses ranging from real estate and ice to guns and gas. One Mahdi commander from eastern Baghdad recently estimated that the militia controlled 70 percent of the city’s gas stations, a figure that is hard to verify but which falls in line with what American officials describe as a sophisticated network that combines brutality with business.

Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, for example, recently called the organization “Jaish al-Mahdi Incorporated.”

Mr. Sadr does play a role in the government. His party — encouraged by the Americans to join Iraq’s government — controls several ministries rich in resources, including the Health Ministry. Without Mr. Sadr’s support, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, a fellow Shiite, would not have become prime minister.

Like many others here, Mr. Sadr and his followers have recently turned on Mr. Maliki, repeatedly pulling out of the government to register discontent. And yet, Mr. Sadr has not called for a replacement.

Many here say that is because he knows that a strong government would be likely to crack down on what his organization has built.

“The people outside the law, the militia, the terrorists, the tribal leaders — all these people benefit,” said Qasim Dawood, a Shiite member of Parliament. “There are people living on the crisis, gaining their power through the crisis.”

New sources of power have also formed in the Sunni community. Millions of dollars in American reconstruction contracts have gone to Sunni tribal groups in Anbar who now work alongside the Americans to fight homegrown groups like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.

Similar bands of Sunni “guardians,” as the American military often calls them, have formed in Diyala Province and in Sunni areas in and around Baghdad.

Leaders from the groups have said they would like to join the government, but according to some American officers working with the groups, their most common demand has consisted of three things: money, guns and freedom of movement. It is unclear what they will do if they are not given what they consider a fair share of power.

The National Intelligence Estimate points out that if the Iraqi government does not move quickly to co-opt the tribes, American support for them could “shift greater power to the regions, undermine efforts to impose central authority and reinvigorate armed opposition to the Baghdad government.”

In short, the American strategy for Sunni Arab areas — widely described as promising — may ultimately encourage sectarianism and undermine the democracy that American troops are meant to support.

Sunni Arab leaders, nearly all of whom have pulled out of Iraq’s government, say they have no choice but to remain in opposition. Their communities view Shiite power as illegitimate, so signing on to legislation like a new oil law is anathema.

Indeed, for many Iraqis, seeing the government actually work together — at a time when so many are invested in keeping it weak — would be cause for alarm, not celebration.

As Saleh al-Mutlak, one senior Sunni leader, put it: “We have to satisfy people’s frustrations.”

Wisam A Habeeb contributed reporting.

Bhutto Outlines Version of Musharraf 'Agreement'

In a television interview, former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto revealed what she described as details of a deal with Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf that would allow her to return both to Pakistan and to Pakistani government. She outlined an agreement and remained steadfast that she is not interested in playing the part of a political puppet. “So we’re not trying to bail out a military dictator by saying we will come there on your terms. What we are seeking is a compromise that could help bring about a stable, democratic, civilian order,” Ms Bhutto said on PBS’s NewsHour With Jim Lehrer. “What we’re negotiating for are certain changes that will empower the parliament to take on the militants,” she said.

With Pakistan under more US pressure to combat the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri cautioned lawmakers in the Pak Senate that Pakistan could not afford to make the United States its enemy, though “red lines” had been drawn for other nations to recognize.

Meanwhile, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif has his own sights set on a similar return, but Musharraf has not entertained the thought of talks with Sharif. Sharif continues to run into legal obstacles that have largely been removed and/or pushed aside for Bhutto during her ongoing talks with Musharraf on a power-sharing arrangement. The reluctant Musharraf increasingly has little domestic choice, but talks with Sharif have been a non-starter, as Sharif is suspected of ties to bin Laden and other Islamist groups inside Pakistan.

U.S. Falters In Bid to Boost Iraqi Business
Few Products Sold To American Firms
By Josh White
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, August 24, 2007; A01

More than a year after the Pentagon launched an ambitious effort to reopen Iraqi factories and persuade U.S. firms to purchase their goods, defense officials acknowledge that the initiative has largely failed because American retailers have shown little interest in buying products made in Iraq.

The Pentagon thought U.S. firms would be willing to help revitalize the war-torn Iraqi economy and create jobs for young men who might otherwise join the insurgency. But the effort -- once considered a pillar of the U.S. strategy in Iraq, alongside security operations and political reform -- has suffered from a pervasive lack of security and an absence of reliable electricity and other basic services.

Iraqi officials have recently highlighted pending deals with retailers such as Wal-Mart and J.C. Penney, businesses that they said were considering purchasing Iraqi products from the few local factories that have restarted. But the two companies said last week that they are not in negotiations to buy Iraqi products, citing Iraq's uncertain future and the questionable viability of potential suppliers there.

Three officials who have worked with the Pentagon's Task Force to Support Business and Stability Operations in Iraq said in recent interviews that, although some factories have achieved limited success, the larger effort to link Iraqi industries with U.S. retailers has been a "failure."

In an interview last Friday, Paul A. Brinkley, the deputy undersecretary of defense in charge of the task force, acknowledged that promising opportunities with U.S. companies have slipped away as the war's popularity fell. So far, only one American company has agreed to purchase clothing from an Iraqi factory, in Mosul.

"I thought we would be further along at this point, but we have a lot of momentum building in terms of support and a lot of momentum building in terms of finances," Brinkley said. "America's economic might has still not been brought to bear in Iraq."

The task force, launched in summer 2006, also faces growing internal turmoil. In recent weeks, the Defense Department's Office of Inspector General began an investigation after allegations by two task force officials that Brinkley engaged in erratic behavior, public drunkenness, mismanagement, waste of funds and sexual harassment. The officials recently left the task force after returning early from a trip to Iraq and presenting Pentagon officials with a 12-page memo outlining the allegations. Investigators began interviews last week.

Brinkley declined to address the allegations, calling it a "personnel situation" that was going through official Pentagon channels. He said that the task force has been as "transparent and open as it can be" and that he has not been involved in any questionable workplace activities in his career. "I have never, ever, behaved inappropriately with any member of my organizations," he said.

The task force has had to shift its focus to retailers and other firms in the Middle East and Europe, Brinkley explained, because it has had little success persuading U.S. companies to buy Iraqi-made clothes, industrial equipment and other products. He is in the midst of distributing $50 million in U.S. taxpayer money to Iraqi factories, and task force officials said they plan to announce more factory openings and one international sales contract worth more than $9 million in the coming weeks.

Though officials who work with Brinkley say that he has made a valiant attempt to restart Iraq's former state-owned enterprises, the results have been modest, with just nine factories restarting -- and even some of those remain unable to produce goods because of spotty electrical service, insufficient training and other problems.

The task force's assumption from the outset -- one shared by top U.S. commanders in Iraq and senior leaders at the Pentagon -- was that jump-starting Iraqi factories would push young men into paying jobs and away from violence.

But, in the past year, only 4,000 jobs have been created in Iraq's former state-owned enterprises, according to the task force's data, far short of the stated goal in December of having more than 11,000 employees back at work this year. Less than 5 percent of the 200-plus Iraqi factories have been reopened. Brinkley said that he still believes that several could open this year but that progress has been slower than he expected.

"It's not as quick as we originally thought, but it is happening," said Robert Love, the task force's operations director. "We are just coming out of a very turbulent period."

Those results come against the backdrop of a grim overall economic picture. According to official Iraqi statistics, unemployment is estimated at 18 percent, with underemployment at 38 percent, but U.S. officials have estimated that the joblessness rate is much higher. The Iraqi government, according to a Pentagon report delivered to Congress in June, has made little progress in providing key public services such as water delivery and sewage removal, while the oil sector has struggled with security problems and the government's failure to establish a long-awaited hydrocarbon law.

Another problem, Brinkley said, is that Iraqi consumers have shown a strong appetite for imports, after years of having to buy Iraqi products under Saddam Hussein. Brinkley said one Iraqi leather factory stamps "Made in China" on its soccer balls to persuade Iraqis to buy them.

What Brinkley described as an early "groundswell" of support from U.S. companies has waned. Business experts said that was caused by the uncertain security situation, concerns that supplies could get cut off and the prospect that Congress could end the U.S. involvement in the war.

Mike Longo, president of Memphis-based Shelmar Inc., said he has signed a contract to buy about $10,000 worth of boys' shirts and jogging suits for his 51 stores in seven Southeastern states -- the only U.S. contract of its kind so far. Longo, a West Point graduate and an infantry officer for nine years, said he will put most of the clothes on the shelves of his unbranded stores this fall but will not emphasize their Iraqi origins.

"We were confronted with an opportunity that made economic sense for us, and we also think it's the right thing to do," Longo said, praising the quality of Iraqi clothing samples. "I think what the task force is doing is very worthwhile and deserves people's support."

Brinkley has flown nearly 100 business leaders and experts into Iraq -- for an estimated cost of more than $10,000 each -- to examine the factories and to consider helping in some way. Those who have taken the trip said they found some factories that were beyond repair and others that inspired them.

Larry Milam, a senior business analyst who visited Iraq in February and May, said the trips were "enlightening" and "motivating." Milam was a West Point classmate of Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq. He said he approached the task force because he wanted to help.

"I came back thinking that we definitely found some opportunities, and there was a chance to get some business going and get people employed and accomplish the goals of all of this, which was to get people an income so they don't need to accept money to plant an IED or fire a weapon at U.S. troops," Milam said, referring to an improvised explosive device. "We have tried to get products into the major outlets with whom we work, and, to be honest, we have not been successful. We have been given any number of reasons, but what it all boils down to is the uncertainty around the situation in Iraq."

That uncertainty is shared by companies that officials have said were ready to join the effort, such as Wal-Mart and J.C. Penney. "We are not in negotiations to sell these goods," Wal-Mart spokeswoman Mona Williams said last week. Darcie Brossart, a spokeswoman for J.C. Penney, echoed that sentiment. "J.C. Penney is not planning any production in Iraq. However, we did speak to a number of people regarding manufacturing and gave them ideas on how to alter trade policy to advantage Iraq," Brossart said.

John H. Sununu, president of the consulting firm JHS Associates, said that he has been interested in the idea for more than a year. He noted that he has been talking to clients about acquiring Iraqi products or using Iraqi services but has not gained much traction.

"If all the companies were doing was for the short term, they could do it altruistically," said Sununu, a former Republican governor of New Hampshire and a chief of staff for President George H.W. Bush. "For the long term, there has to be some potential for it being a good business decision, as well. They're struggling with balancing their natural inclination to do good with their business inclination to have to do well."

August 24, 2007
Report Offers Grim View of Iraqi Leaders

By MARK MAZZETTI
WASHINGTON, Aug. 23 — A stark assessment released Thursday by the nation’s intelligence agencies depicts a paralyzed Iraqi government unable to take advantage of the security gains achieved by the thousands of extra American troops dispatched to the country this year.

The assessment, known as a National Intelligence Estimate, casts strong doubts on the viability of the Bush administration strategy in Iraq. It gives a dim prognosis on the likelihood that Iraqi politicians can heal deep sectarian rifts before next spring, when American military commanders have said that a crunch on available troops will require reducing the United States’ presence in Iraq.

But the report also implicitly criticizes proposals offered by Democrats, including several presidential candidates, who have called for a withdrawal of American combat troops from Iraq by next year and for a major shift in the American approach, from manpower-intensive counterinsurgency operations to lower-profile efforts aimed at supporting Iraqi troops and carrying out quick-strike counterterrorism raids.

Such a shift, the report says, would “erode security gains achieved thus far” and could return Iraq to a downward spiral of sectarian violence.

After a summer of rancorous debate over the future of America’s mission in Iraq, the intelligence report is the most prominent and authoritative assessment to date of what the administration calls a surge strategy.

The report, which represents the consensus view of America’s 16 intelligence agencies, suggests that policy makers face a dilemma. While the current strategy in Iraq has produced “measurable but uneven improvements” in security, it says, the approach has done little to bridge sectarian divides in Iraq. The report also says that pulling American troops out of Iraq would most likely make things far worse.

The intelligence estimate comes just weeks ahead of a long-awaited progress report by senior American officials in Baghdad about security and political conditions in the country. Within hours of its release on Thursday, the assessment had already begun to reshape the terms of a political dialogue that could again come to a boil next month.

One leading Republican, Senator John Warner of Virginia, called for President Bush to take the first steps toward a limited drawdown of troops, of perhaps 5,000 soldiers by the end of the year, as a way to send the Iraqi government a message that “we mean business” in saying the American commitment in Iraq is not open-ended.

White House officials said that the assessment was evidence that the American troop increase had begun to dampen violence in Iraq, that progress was possible and that a precipitous troop withdrawal would sow chaos.

Democrats said the report showed that the White House had failed in its effort to use the troop increase to promote political progress in Iraq, and that it was time for the United States to change course.

The report says that the influx of American troops in Iraq has achieved some successes in lowering sectarian violence, but concludes that Iraqi leaders “remain unable to govern effectively” and that the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki “will become more precarious over the next 6 to 12 months” as rival factions led by Mr. Maliki’s fellow Shiites vie for power.

The assessment concludes that there is little reason to expect that Iraqi politicians will achieve significant gains before spring, when American commanders say they will have to begin to cut troop levels in Iraq, now at more than 160,000, to ease the burden on military personnel.

The report is optimistic about a number of what it calls “bottom up” security initiatives that have helped reduce violence in some parts of the country. Most prominent of these are efforts by Sunni tribal sheiks to band together against Islamic militants from Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the homegrown Sunni Arab insurgent group that American intelligence agencies have concluded is foreign-led.

But such local initiatives are also described in the report as a Catch-22. On one hand, they provide the “best prospect” for improving Iraqi security over the next year. But the assessment says that strong local initiatives could undermine Iraq’s central government, which American officials say is essential to lasting peace.

The intelligence assessment also cites a growing perception inside Iraq that an American troop withdrawal would inevitably be another factor that could destabilize the Maliki government, encouraging factions anticipating a power vacuum “to seek local security solutions that could intensify sectarian violence.”

Since being briefed on the report on Monday morning, President Bush has made comments widely interpreted as distancing him from Mr. Maliki, though White House officials insist that the Iraqi leader still has Mr. Bush’s support. Mr. Bush also called new attention to what he portrayed as the potentially catastrophic consequences of a hasty withdrawal.

Resuming his vacation at his ranch in Crawford, Tex., Mr. Bush made no public statement about the intelligence estimate. But a White House spokesman, Gordon D. Johndroe, portrayed the report as a mixed assessment of the situation in Iraq. He said that it showed both that the American troop increase in Iraq had significantly reduced the sectarian violence in Iraq and that the White House strategy was “headed in the right direction.”

Mr. Johndroe said that the current military strategy in Iraq did not become “fully operational” until the middle of the summer, and added that it was frustrating but not surprising that political progress in Iraq was lagging.

But Democrats seized on the report, issuing a flurry of press releases portraying the administration’s Iraq strategy as having failed.

“Further pursuit of the administration’s flawed escalation strategy is not in our nation’s best interests,” said Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the majority leader. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York, a Democratic presidential candidate, said the report had provided “additional evidence” that Mr. Bush’s approach “has failed,” and added, “We need to stop refereeing this civil war, and start getting out now.”

In their attacks, Democrats ignored the report’s criticism of the approach that has been a common theme of their own Iraq proposals, which have emphasized a withdrawal of American combat troops. Most Democrats have urged that American forces who stay in Iraq limit their operations to training, support and quick-strike counterterrorism missions.

Mr. Warner, a senior Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said he had not spoken personally to Mr. Bush about his recommendation for a troop drawdown. But in a news conference in the Capitol, as he returned from a visit to Iraq, Mr. Warner urged the president to announce in September that he would bring a limited number of troops home, preferably before Christmas.

The intelligence assessment predicts that Iraq’s neighbors, especially Iran and Syria, will step up efforts to exert influence over Iraq’s feuding factions. Intelligence officials on Thursday said that Sunni nations in the Middle East, most prominently Saudi Arabia, were monitoring events in Iraq, possibly with an eye toward intervening on behalf of Sunnis in the country.

But intelligence officials made clear on Thursday that it was Iraqi leaders who had the most power to influence the future of their country. For months, American officials in Baghdad have stressed that any military gains would be ephemeral if Iraqi politicians were unable to find political solutions.

Adm. Michael G. Mullen, the incoming chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told members of Congress last month that without political progress in Iraq, “no amount of troops in no amount of time will make much of a difference.”

Steven Lee Myers contributed reporting from Crawford, Tex., and Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Jeff Zeleny from Washington.