"4GW as a Model of Future Conflict
Boyd 2007 Conference, 13 July 2007
Warfare Since Boyd Panel Presentation

F. G. Hoffman

I have been asked to be the token diversity candidate from outside the 4GW “church” today, and am honored just by the chance to appear at an event that preserves John Boyd’s deep intellectual contributions, and to be on stage with my fellow panelists and Col Eric Walters. My assigned task is to explain why academics and historians have problems with the 4GW construct. My remarks will draw up upon my work on an alternative concept called Hybrid Warfare which I have presented at Oxford University this past winter. My comments will also draw upon unpublished work about to be released in a book titled Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict, edited by Dr. Terry Terriff, of University of Birmingham (UK) and Aaron Karp and Dr. Regina Karp of Old Dominion University, in which several of our distinguished speakers have prominent contributions including Mr. Lind and Col Hammes.

Let me begin by summarizing the arguments up front. The 4GW construct is often criticized for three major faults.

The theory is described as “weak” and the concept is too diffused, having become over time the equivalent of everything that is asymmetric.

Second the history that is drawn upon is uneven and often “too selective,” that is it is packaged to support a major component of the theory without full examination of trends or detailed counter-findings.

Finally, the generational framework is labeled “indefensible” and unnecessary. In my own assessment, I find that it hides more than it reveals.

The events of 9/11 did more than collapse a pair of buildings, or punch a hole in the Pentagon. It punctuated the end of one era of war, and heralded the dawning of a new one. This new age was a surprise to some, but it was accurately forecasted in the prescient article penned by a collective of cutting edge thinkers in 1989. The new age presents policy makers and statesmen with its own method of conflict, a way of war that is extremely foreign to America’s armed forces. This mode of war makes conventional thinkers highly uncomfortable and traditional military solutions unworkable.

This kind of war, as Mao suggested long ago, has several constituent components and overwhelming military power by itself is insufficient. Regardless of unfounded speculation in some corners, this does not eliminate the utility of the timeless Clausewitz or some 15 centuries of recorded military history before Westphalia. Quite the contrary, this current conception should cause us to reconsider our strategic complacency, and reassess today’s security challenges.

More than a decade’s worth of unipolar delusion and unilateral triumphialism went up in smoke on 9/11. European illusions fell later after the attacks in London, Madrid and Paris undercut the idea that savage violence was something in the Continent’s collective past. American hubris about its invulnerability and the over-financed Pentagon were the principal victims of 9/11, reinforced by subsequent events in Iraq.

The 4GW school was the first to identify the roots and nature of this threat. The future portends an even more lethal strain of perturbation. Purportedly a dog’s breakfast of ethnic, demographic, religious, and socio-economic trends could soon create what the CIA called a “perfect storm” of conflict. Iraq’s insurgents and jihadist foreign fighters will benefit from their education in Iraq, and will soon return home or to alternative battlespaces with greater motivation, lethal skills and credibility. Their Darwinian evolution against America’s vaunted military has refined their methods and emboldened their plans, while the clash within Islam continues unabated.

Fourth Generation Warfare

Almost immediately dismissed as “elegant irrelevance,” it is now difficult to ignore 4GW. We may quibble with the accuracy or the necessity of the generational framework, or the selective historical foundation, but not with the need to comprehend and respond to today’s most common mode of warfare. Colonel Hammes is correct that “this kind of warfare is not new or surprising” and in his description of irregular conflict as “evolving.” But irregular warfare has a long history. Thus, it’s hard to me to put away my tattered copy of Asprey’s two volume history and pass over Pontius Pilate, Caesar, the Spanish Guerrillas or the long history of Irish insurgency. That is not to say that there is not anything new to today’s conception or that the 4GW community was not a decade ahead of others.

One can also readily agree with Colonel Hammes that “there is nothing mysterious” about this form of warfare, that its non-traditional nature and emphasis on political will, amorphous structure, and mass mobilization techniques are well grounded in the annals of conflict. 1 Clearly, the notion that “superior political will when properly employed can defeat greater economic and military power” was not mysterious to the Founding Fathers. Why else might the Continental Congress have met and issued its famous promulgation in 1776. Certainly, this concept informed Washington’s strategy. Just as clearly, protracted conflict, social and political networks, diasporas, and ideological fervor were not lost on Lawrence and his Bedouins or Michael Collins and his generation.

Whether this really is something entirely new, as Hammes and other advocates of New Wars suggest, is challengeable. 2 Serious scholars like Dr. Tony Echevarria have found the entire construct to be both “artificial and indefensible.” 3 The generational construct is hard to buy into, it relies on what Sir Lawrence Freedman concludes is “selective history and poor theory.” 4 The assertion that a form of war, “visible and distinctly different from the forms of war that preceded it” has emerged is a bit much. 5 Arguably, what has occurred is simply part of war’s evolution, a shift in degree rather than kind abetted by new technologies and more importantly new or reemerging environmental or socio-political conditions. As Clausewitz noted, war is a true chameleon, with continuous adaptation in character in every age.

In fact, as Professor Colin Gray has noted, little in what is described as fundamentally different in the 4GW literature is inconsistent with a Clausewitzian understanding of war as a contest of human wills. The emphasis on impacting the political cohesion or will of one’s opponents remains a fundamental aspect of Clausewitz’s canon. Clausewitz described the totality of the enemy’s capacity to resist as “two inseparable factors, …the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.” 6

A number of historians have challenged the generational framework, and find that it overlooks several centuries of relevant conflict and the alternative possibility of seeing contemporary conflict within the realm of evolutionary change in irregular warfare that crosses through time. Academics like Sir Lawrence Freedman of Kings College find little to gain by accepting a generational construct, and much historical evidence overlooked. I have also mentioned a litany of case histories and individuals that do not fit nicely within the generational framework as defined, and thus my own assessment is again, that the concept of conflict defined with the 4GW theory may be valid but that the four generations do not help me understand it at all, and that the generations tend to hide more than they reveal. In order to respond to these comments, I recommend that the 4GW school defend itself by focusing and documenting what is believed to be enduring and to clearly depict what has changed.

However, the 4GW advocates did correctly capture the rise of nonstate actors, the confluence or blurring of civilian and military spheres, and salience of culture and popular will. They also predicted the intensity of this new form of conflict, or our vulnerability to this style. Overall, the theory of 4GW may be viewed as ineloquent in its historical foundation but its relevance is unquestionable. While the proponents have done an excellent job of laying out the nature of this challenge, few have attempted to detail of prescriptions (with exception of the gentleman on my right). 7

While historians may disagree with 4GW proponents regarding their grasp of history, the need for increased attention to the nontraditional components of what they describe as 4GW is incontrovertible. So too is the criticism that war is evolving in a manner inconsistent with the Pentagon’s infatuation with Revolutions in Military Affairs and a Transformation agenda warps defense investments towards kinetic solutions. 8

What is not debatable is the intensity of this form of conflict, or the West’s relative vulnerability or the fact that we have been very slow to address the implications of the increasingly blurred character of modern wars. We are slow to see that the most frequent form of war is now “amongst the people” and very slow in shaping our institutional tool set. It is not just that conventional warfare or interstate conflict is on the decline, there is a fusion of war forms emerging, one that blurs regular and irregular warfare, and terrorism, as well as subversion.

For a decade or more, most of us overlooked these trends. The American military has been focused on the wrong set of strategic drivers and indicators. In effect, they had misidentified the true Revolution in Military Affairs as Dr. Freedman has noted. Had the United States achieved the transformation agenda it put forward, I think it would have been at a substantial strategic disadvantage in the real world today. No doubt, its capacity to defend against ballistic missiles and to attack the space-based assets of a mythical peer competitor would be superb. Undoubtedly, the ability to dominate the electronic spectrum would be unsurpassed, and everything within a 200-mile square box would be detected by some ever present “unblinking eye” over the battlespace. The much cited “fog of war” would magically be blown away by America’s information dominance, somehow resulting in a long Pax Americana. More probable, all of this would be utterly irrelevant to the problems at hand. Security officials at the Pentagon had badly misread what really constituted a threat to our national security interests, due to an enthusiastic embrace of an idealized and outdated versions of warfare. Advocates of 4GW, including the gentlemen on this stage, do not suffer from any embarrassment or lack of sleep in this regard.

What some of the critics of 4GW have overlooked is the critical importance of the cognitive and virtual dimension of today’s conflicts. I expect several speakers to discuss this today. Now as we all know, T. E. Lawrence and the French expert Galula underscored this same issue in their seminal works. But the speed, frequency, and graphic imagery that is possible today with modern media is simply beyond their comprehension. It may still be beyond most of us. Recent scholarship by Dr. Audrey Cronin has persuasively compared the ongoing cyber-mobilization of Muslims around the world to the French Revolution and the levée en masse. This has profound implications for human conflict in this century as Dr. Cronin has perceptively warns “Western nations will persist in ignoring the fundamental changes in popular mobilization at their peril.”

Today’s 24/7 news cycles and graphic imagery produce even faster and higher response cycles from audiences around the globe and offer powerful new “weapons” to those who can master them.

Today, many small groups have mastered “armed theater” and promoted “propaganda of the deed” to arouse support and foment discord on a global scale. There is a plethora of outlets now in the Middle East and an exponentially growing number of websites and bloggers promoting a radical vision. These outlets constantly bombarded audiences with pictures, videos, DVDs, and sermons. Ironically, in Iraq and in the Long War we are facing a fundamentalist movement that is exploiting very modern and Western technologies to reestablish an anti-Western social and political system. The 4GW school, in its initial offering, identified the potential for this phenomena and the associated religious and cultural factors that might inspire it.

Conclusion

Call it what you may, 4GW or Complex Irregular or Hybrid Warfare, it presents a mode of conflict that severely challenges America’s conventional military thinking. It targets the strategic cultural weaknesses of the American Way of Battle quite effectively. It’s chief characteristic—blurring and convergence—occurs in several modes. In the blurring of combat and conflict, combatants and noncombatants, and the physical and the metaphysical. The convergence of various types of conflict will present us with a complex puzzle until the necessary adaptation occurs intellectually and institutionally. This form of conflict challenges cherished but false American conceptions about warfighting, and will continue to thwart the West’s core interests and world order over the next generation.

Because of their perceived success, call them what you may, but 4GW challengers will not be a passing fad nor will they remain low tech killers. Our opponents eagerly learn and adapt rapidly to more efficient modes of killing. We can no longer overlook our own vulnerabilities as societies or underestimate the imaginations of our antagonists. In a world of 4 GW or Hybrid Wars, the price for complacency and inept strategy only grows steeper."

Endnotes

1. T. X. Hammes, “War Evolves Into the Fourth Generation,” Contemporary Security Policy, August, 2005, pp. 189-192.

2. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge UK: Polity, 1999; Herfried Munkler, The New Wars, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005.

3. Antulia J. Echevarria, “Deconstructing 4GW,” in Global Insurgency, Terry Terriff, Regina Karp and Aaron Karp, eds., Routledge, 2007, p. 237.

4. Lawrence Freedman, “A Comment on T.X. Hammes,” Global Insurgency, p. 262.

5. T.X. Hammes, p. 192.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 77.

7. The exception being William Lind, et al, Draft FMFM 1-A, Fourth Generation War, Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps, 2004.

8. See my “Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next RMA,” Orbis, Summer 2006.

-----

"Buying Out the Insurgency – Re-evaluating the Community De-Weaponization Initiative in Iraq
Posted by Malcolm Nance on July 19, 2007 5:12 PM | Permalink| Print

In September of 2003 I went into Baghdad’s Sadr City Ali Baba market (now called al-Nidawi market) for my first illicit black-market arms purchase. Early on outfitting Iraqi soldiers and bodyguards required use of all resources … including the street markets. Every one of my men had their own Kalashnikov, commandeered from Police stations, army barracks or Ba’ath party offices but the ability to sustain them with ammunition, working sidearms, high capacity ammunition magazines and light machineguns was beyond anyone’s capability except for the local black market.

Prior to the invasion, hundreds of thousands of weapons were widely distributed for use by the 400,000 man Iraqi armed forces, regime security forces and Al Quds civilian defense force. The security forces and intelligence agencies created thousands of caches of weapons for the follow-on insurgency. Most caches included several artillery shells, dozens of mortar shells, rocket launchers, automatic rifles, and tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition. Weapons of all types imaginable from the Makarov pistol to the SA-16 Man portable Air Defense Missile System (MANPADS) were cached. They are still discovered daily. In the chaos of the victory of coalition forces over the Iraqi army the population stripped the Iraqi government of well over a million, automatic rifles, light machineguns and heavy crew served weapons.

Another contributing factor in the proliferation of small arms was the release of all criminals by both Saddam Hussein and coalition forces. Over 100,000 dangerous criminals were set free and consequently home invasion and revenge murders became rampant. The AK-47 became the must have tool critical for personal defense of the home. Early in April 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued CPA Order Number Three, which allowed every family to be in possession of one rifle, shotgun or pistol including Kalashnikov automatic rifles for self-defense of the home. This was accomplished easily: Many had taken the opportunity to steal the hundreds of thousands of weapons. Others paid approximately $50 dollars for a Kalashnikov and a magazine of ammunition.

When I first investigated the Iraqi arms black market, it became instantly clear that the population would become a source of logistical support for the fledgling Iraqi insurgency. The quantity of weapons and ammunition in the public realm was staggering. One buying expedition for empty magazines resulted in offers of over 20 RPG-7 rocket launchers and dozens of explosive rounds, two SA-7 MANPADs with batteries, dozens of mortar rounds and a cache of over 20,000 rounds of 14.5mm heavy machinegun ammunition. If you were a serious cash player, with no visible ties to the coalition (most sellers thought I was a Sudanese insurgent), almost anything could be delivered in the span of two cups of tea or approx 15 minutes.

The logistical pipeline of the insurgency at that time was sustained by supplementing cached and stolen arms with purchases from the small arms black market. In fact, the sales of weapons on the black market was so prevalent that the coalition authorized the shooting of illicit arms dealers, the most notable being the deaths of two open-air arms dealers by US Army snipers in Tikrit. At that time coalition forces had lost 91 soldiers to the insurgency. Unlike the rebellion in 1920 under the British that sputtered due to a lack of guns and ammunition, a top concern of CJTF-7 was that the black market of looted arms would sustain the intensity and duration of this insurgency.

Unfortunately, the black market still thrives and the selling and reselling of weapons continues unabated. The US government supplied the Iraqi army 380,000 rifles and pistols that it did not initially register or control. The US Army inspector general reported over 4% (14,000) of the Glock-17 pistols for the police were stolen between delivery to the Iraqi police and issue to officers. As one Iraqi policeman told Reuters "I sold my Glock pistol and my bullet-proof vest for $1,500 so that I can feed my family until I find a safer job. They were mine to sell, after all I had risked my life and faced death."

The 2006 destruction of the Shiite Golden Mosque in Samarrah led to an explosion in arms purchases for home and community defense in both the Sunni and Shiite regions of the country. The Geneva-based Small Arms Survey reported that in 2007 the price of a Kalashnikov rose to between $210 and $800 depending on the location and one’s faith. Prices of Kalashnikov bullets rose to nearly $1 per round. Glock 17 or Walther P99 handguns stolen from the police and army rose to nearly $2,000. RPG-7 launchers were sold to militiamen at four times the previous street price. The SVD Sniper rifle, which could have been brought for $300 early in the insurgency now stands at $1,800.

Weapons have an inherent cultural and personal value, not just for community defense. The rifle is a cherished cultural feature for many tribes and peoples, such as in Yemen, Somalia and even America. In some cultures, it is a symbol of power and manhood, in others it is a sign of community status. In Middle Eastern cultures it is auspicious and a sign of wealth to fire of hundreds of rounds during wedding celebrations. There will always be rifles in the Iraqi home. However, many Iraqis retain numerous hidden weapons and explosives that, like the gold or jewelry they hide in their walls, are insurance to be converted into cash. The focus should be to ensure these weapons are not sold to the insurgents or to dealers who will supply the insurgents. The intent of any program enacted by the coalition should not be to remove all weapons from the community but to remove the large excess military hardware that could be sold in difficult times to anti-Iraqi forces. Our search and seize tactics are highly unpopular and alienate many we are trying to influence Perhaps there is a better way.

Incentivize the Community to Starve the Insurgency

In October 2003 I proposed a program called the Community De-weaponization Initiative (CDI) to Ambassador L. Paul Bremer via USAID as community revitalization and security program. The CDI’s goal was as simple as it was revolutionary– take cash and leverage the economic power of the United States to buy out the insurgency’s street-based logistic capacity, starving the internal resupply structure of the insurgency. This in turn would curtail or limit the amount of attacks on the Iraqi population and coalition forces in the field. The program was dismissed because the initial $50 million dollars requested was believed to be far too excessive.

This program was recently brought back up for discussion after an incident where my Iraqi staff negotiated the release of three kidnapped Turkish engineers in Kirkuk. The kidnappers were a cell associated with the foreign terrorist group the Islamic State of Iraq but during negotiations had complained that they not been paid in months. Demanding $150,000 US dollars the cell leader, a Jordanian, stated in frustration “We want to take the money and go home.”

However the CDI is not principally oriented to the religiously motivated terrorist or insurgent. Ideologically motivated insurgents, including those of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al Islam and the Islamic Army of Iraq are the least susceptible to financial inducements. The CDI is oriented to disrupting the IED and ambush social networks by micro targeting three other categories of individuals who actively or passively support the insurgency.

These groups include financially motivated insurgents who plant and detonate IEDs or sell weapons to support their families. The next targeted group is the immediate family members who support the insurgents or militiamen out of economic and financial frustration. Finally, it targets the greater community social support network by showing that the sale of military grade weapons and explosives in exchange for cash could bring needed infusion of social welfare in some desperate communities. Cash to tribal leaders in direct exchange for weapons or IEDs, done through the CDI, could bring big material benefits including community diesel generators, ability to purchase fuel oil or assist families with cash that wish to leave the insurgency or who are displaced.

This option of allowing people to sell extra weapons, secretly point out ‘an object on the street’, or sell a mortar base-plate in the backyard allows them to maintain a veneer of respectability because they did not sell out the insurgency directly.

Providing financial compensation in exchange for removing the logistical base of the insurgents is far less odious than offering a direct bribe. A man that can make a large lump sum quantity of money turning over his IED trigger, selling out his artillery shells in the garden, dropping off two or three MANPADs at a CDI disposal facility or pointing out to an NGO investigator the mortar arms cache in the date grove is one less player that the coalition has to capture or kill. However, the CDI gives him an opportunity to do it on his terms at a time of his choosing and under anonymity of a civilian disarmament program run by NGOs and not the US Army.

The risk of CDI money flowing back to the insurgency is minimal. With the current economic situation in Iraq few former insurgents, or their wives, will turn any money back over to the Jihad or go out and buy weapons at a higher price from a skyrocketing market controlled by the coalition.

Though controversial, I believe that the real center of gravity for the financially motivated insurgents that dominates many of the Shiite militias and armed Sunni groups is the immediate family. Iraqis, like all of us, cherish their family – particularly their children and they have a ferverent desire to ensure their children study and live in a level of minimal comfort at least equal to that before the invasion. That comfort generally means food, electricity and air conditioning particularly in summer. This actual lack of minimal living standards has been complaint number one in all regions of Iraq. The loss of that level of family comfort, coupled with the loss of security after the fall of Hussein led to many to support the insurgents.

From the day this proposal was first offered, the coalition has lost nearly 3,600 additional soldiers. The material and equipment losses are equally staggering. Had this program been implemented at the time and “budgetary concerns” not been an overriding issue, the program could have been effected for a fraction of what has been spent fighting the war. Additionally, the economic benefits may be an inducement to bring the Sunni community into greater and less temporary alignment with the central government.

You Have Weapons? We have Cash!

The original CDI proposed requested $50 million dollars to purchase all manners of weapons – from rifles to grenades to IEDs. Any weapons that could be sold to the insurgency would be bought out by the program at prices that would be irresistible to the community and eventually, to the holders of insurgent weapons caches.

This program was radically different from the small scale rifle and MANPAD buy back programs Commander, Joint task Force Seven (CJTF-7) and Multi-national Force – Iraq conducted in 2003, 2004 and 2005.

Again the intent of the CDI is to buy out the entire insurgency supply base, not just police up a few hundred pieces. It is designed to puts large quantities of money in the hands of any potential insurgent supplier and to get the insurgents themselves to turn-in or steal the caches, IEDs or weapons under their control. They would then exchange them for cash. At that point they would take the cash given to them, amounts of which could be substantial, and leave the insurgency altogether.

Weapons would be purchased at prices that no insurgent force or arms dealers could control or resist. If an extra Kalashnikov was purchased at the 2003 street price of $125 (it has now increased to an average $400 as of January 2007). The CDI would pay three times the market price or more per weapon depending on the item in question. Had MANPADs been bought back for the street price terrorists are willing to pay ($15,000-20,000) instead of the $500 offered by CJTF-7 three years ago more than the 400 they purchased would have been recovered. According to the Washington Post that program left unaccounted over 4,000 missiles.

Attempts to artificially raise the price of weapons (by wholesalers hording large quantities of weapons) can easily be foiled with targeted raids and those resellers taken off the market. Prices would be matched to the point where the insurgents and criminals could no longer afford to buy weapons as the CDI would always pay a better price. The Iraqi community would quickly see it would be better to sell to the CDI rather than an intermediary or insurgent, take the cash from extra weapons, explosives or known arms caches of insurgents and buy him or herself a better life.
.
Willingness to participate was so anticipated at the time of the proposal to the CPA that just the rumor of a start date created a round of arms hording amongst families and tribes in Basrah.

The Current Price is Unacceptable

The average cost to coalition forces daily is the lives of two soldiers and several vehicles. To me the losses of these soldiers is priceless. However, the combined costs in SGLI insurance payouts, a wounded warrior’s rehabilitation, and the repair and replacement costs of just one Humvee and crew would again be a fraction of just paying a Sadrist cash not to lay his Explosively Formed Penetrator; or paying a religious extremist to drop off his car bomb in a remote field or paying an IED triggerman $2,000 cash to pre-detonate an freshly laid IED and call it a ‘miss.’

Overtime, the trust built on money could yield new intelligence assets who would turn over entire IED/SVBIED networks for cash –particularly if they send their family abroad. However, ‘show me the money’ will always be a principal demand. That money must be given freely in direct exchange for a weapon – no questions asked.

At the time of this writing the US has spent almost $350 billion dollars fighting the Iraq insurgency man for man, bullet for bullet. Considering that the coalition spends $177 million per day on Iraq, channeling a small portion of those funds into buying out the insurgents and his logistical pipeline could be the key to breaking their ability to execute well supplied operations in the future."

May 23: 2954

June 12 3195 11:45 p
June 13 3210 10:30p
June 14 3228 7:30p
June 15 3238
June 16 3249 11:45p
June 18 3274 8 a.m.
June 18 3288 10p.m
June 20 3350 11p.m
June 22 3371 8 a.m.
June 23 3381 10 a.m.
June 24 3408 10 p.m
June 26 3435 8 a,m.

June 27 3455 4p.m.
June 28 3465 9p.m.
June 29 3486 7p.m.
June 30 3501 11p.m.
July 1, 3547 11.p.m.
July 2 3585
JUly 3 3649 11 p.m.
July 6 3718 4p.m.
July 15 3830 10 p.m.
July 16 3885 11 p.m.
July 18 3997 1 p.m. afternoon
July 19 4024 1:30 p "
July 20 4071 1 p
July 21 4097 8p

COIN in a Tribal Society
Posted by Dave Dilegge on July 21, 2007 5:35 PM | Permalink| Print

During a recent e-mail discussion concerning Iraq’s tribal society William (Mac) McCallister provided several insights as well as a briefing presentation on his methodology for tribal structure analysis and a reading list for executing counterinsurgency in a tribal society. The reading list follows his e-mail.

I have been studying and working with various tribes in Iraq for the last four years plus and am currently serving as the "tribal" advisor for II MEF in Anbar. Concerning recent commentary on US forces as a “tribe” - it is old news as far as I am concerned.
We are and have been a major if not the major "tribe" for the last four years. Paul Bremer, former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, was referred to by Iraqi Sheikhs seeking an audience to pledge their loyalty and seeking patronage as the "Sheikh of Sheikhs" when they came to the palace in search of a meeting. I personally participated in coordinating a meeting with 400 Sheikhs and CPA officials for a traditional "tribal meeting" in Hillah four years ago.
We are engaged in a counterinsurgency in a tribal society. It has taken us four years to realize that we must execute operations within the existing cultural frame of reference. To quote T.E. Lawrence - Irregular warfare is more intellectual than a bayonet charge.
I've attached a reading list for executing counterinsurgency in a tribal society. Also attached is a PowerPoint brief that describes a methodology I developed on structure analysis to assist in gaining an appreciation for the operational environment.
The methodology is now in use in Anbar province and in the process of being "socialized" among the incoming MEF staff and commanders scheduled to replace the units currently serving in Anbar.
Reading List for Counterinsurgency in a Tribal Society
Researched and Compiled by William S. McCallister

Background

The design and execution of a counterinsurgency campaign in tribal society must reflect the opponent’s cultural realities, his social norms and conventions of war and peacemaking. The fight in Anbar province is a “clash of martial cultures” and reflects two divergent concepts of victory and defeat and “rules of play”. The conventions of war and peace for both sides are based on unique historical and social experience and are expressed in each side’s stylized way of fighting and peacemaking. The central tenet in the design and execution of counterinsurgency operations is that it must take into consideration an opponent’s cultural realities so as to effectively communicate intent.

The study of the “tribal terrain” is a challenge. The reason - comprehensive research materials on Iraqi tribal organization, tribal diplomacy, and the art of tribal war and peacemaking are sparse. The majority of reading materials therefore are general and regional in nature and require “reading between the lines” to gain an appreciation for tribal organizing principles, cultural operating codes, and the tribal art of war and peace. The material is intended to assist the student of the tribal art of war and peace in developing an analytic structure for assessing personal experiences, observations and unit after action reports. The ultimate objective is to assist the warfighter in assessing the effectiveness of counterinsurgency tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and cultural criteria to determine why certain approaches succeed or fail.

The reading list is organized into four major sections - Psychological Dimensions and Human Factors, Tribal Dynamics, the Arab Art of War, and Additional Readings.

Psychological Dimensions/Human Factors

Books

The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements by Eric Hoffer.

This book deals with some peculiarities common to all mass movements, be they religious movements, social revolutions or nationalist movements. Highlights certain essential characteristics which give all movements a family likeness.
Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies by Special Operations Research Office of the American University.

This book contains a detailed description of the organization and operations of underground movements with special attention to human motivation and behavior, the relation between the organizational structure of the underground, and the total insurgent movement.
The Multiple Identities of the Middle East by Bernard Lewis.

This book deals with the critical role of identity in the domestic, regional, and international tensions and conflicts of the Middle East today. It examines religion, race, and language, country, nation and state and shows how imported Western ideas such as liberalism, fascism, socialism, patriotism and nationalism influenced Middle Easterner’s ancient notions of community, self-perceptions and aspirations.
Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq by Hanan Makiya.

This book describes how Saddam Hussein’s “Ba’athist” Iraq was established, ruled and maintained by fear. The Ba’athist developed the politics of fear into an art form, one that ultimately served the purpose of legitimizing their rule by making large numbers of people complicit in the violence of the regime. The Iraqi Ba’athists were a wholly indigenous phenomenon, and the longevity of their rule can be understood only against the background of public acquiescence or acceptance of their authority. This book gives the reader an appreciation for the “ideology of violence” inherent in the numerous anti-Iraqi forces such as the 1920th Revolutionary Brigade and Iraqi insurgent groups affiliated with Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ).
Articles

A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement by Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

The New Totalitarians: Social Identities and Radical Islamist Political Grand Strategy by Dr. Douglas J. Macdonald

Martyrdom Operations and Their Apocalyptic Imagery by Professor Charles Strozier and Fabienne A. Laughlin

Tribal Dynamics

This section focuses on Iraqi tribalism, such as tribal organizing principles and the dynamics that coordinate and regulate the behavior of intra- and inter-tribal and state relations. The readings are intended to introduce and facilitate further study of the complex relationship between tribes and the central government. This section is divided into seven sub-sections; tribal organization (principles and cultural operating codes), concepts of shame and honor, tribal warfare (causes of and how the tribe organizes for war), Islamic rulings in warfare which form the basis for the conventions of tribal war, concepts of truce in Islamic sources, tribal diplomacy and patronage.

1. Tribal Organization

Books

Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East edited by Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod.

This book is a compilation of papers presented at the 1999 ICF sponsored “Tribes and Power” seminar conducted at the School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, London University. The reader will gain an appreciation for the “tribal factor” which has not only been strengthened but has become decisively manifest in Iraq. Saddam Hussein reinstated an already active tribal value system and their tribal networks in mobilizing allegiances and in an attempt to restructure modern political social institutions. Tribal networks have not only endured but have taken new and varied forms.
The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society: Oman under Sa’id bin Taymur, 1932-1970 by Uzi Rabi.

The author presents a historically detailed but theoretically nuanced study of the evolution of Oman under the leadership of Sa’id bin Taymur. The book details the creation of a Unified Tribal State, an administration that unified Oman while negotiating with powerful tribal forces within Omani society. This book provides the reader with a theoretical framework to structure U.S. military – tribal relationships in Iraq.
Power Point Presentation

Tribal Analysis Strategy, Iraq by William S. McCallister.

2. Concepts of Shame and Honor

Books

Honor: A History by James Bowman.

Research draws from a wealth of sources across many centuries to illuminate honor’s curious history in Western culture. The author stresses that Western concepts of honor are different from that found elsewhere in the world.
Acquaintance with our own culture of honor is indispensable for understanding the tribal honor/shame culture of the Islamic world.
3. Tribal Warfare

Articles

Declaration of Tribal War by the Southern Confederation of Tribes

The Iraq Insurgency: Anatomy of a Tribal Rebellion by William S. McCallister

Victory in Iraq, One Tribe at a Time by Amatzia Baram

The Role of Tribes at the Council on Foreign Relations website

Strategic Implications of Communal Warfare in Iraq by W. Andrew Terril

4. Islamic Rulings on Warfare

Articles

Islamic Rulings on Warfare by Youssef H. Aboul-Enein Sherifa Zuhur

Just War: An Islamic Perspective by Imam Sayed Moustafa Al-Qazwini

Islam and the Theology of Power by Khaled Abou El Fadl

5. Concept of Truce in Islamic Sources

Articles

“The Concept of Hudna (Truce) in Islamic Sources” by Dr. Mustafa Abu Sway (Preliminary Article)

Rituals of Reconciliation: Arab-Islamic Perspective by George E. Irani and Nathan C. Funk

6. Tribal Diplomacy

Books

The Political Language of Islam by Bernard Lewis.

This book traces the development of Islamic political language from the time of the Prophet to the present and highlights the difference between Western political thinking and theory and clarifies the perception, on-going discussion, and practice of politics in the Islamic world.
Articles

The Code of Hammurabi translated by L.W. King

Babylonian Law--The Code of Hammurabi by Claude Hermann Walter Johns

Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East by George E. Irani

Negotiating in the Bazaar by Moshe Sharon

Islamic Army in Iraq Pursues Strategy of Negotiation and Violence by Lydia Khalil

Distrust Breaks the Bonds of a Baghdad Neighborhood in Mixed Area, Violence Defies Peace Efforts by Sudarsan Raghavan

Important Islamic Terms, Concepts and Definitions at the Living Islam website

7. Patronage

Articles

Hereditary Republics in Arab States by Brian Whitaker

Legal and Judicial Reform in the Arab World: A Primer by Sharif Ali Zu’bi and Zeid D. Hanania

The Arab Art of War

Arab insurgency history and theory draws on its own unique dynamic and historical experiences. An appreciation for our opponent’s cultural perspective on insurgency warfare is key in tailoring our own counterinsurgency campaign. Three Arab insurgency models are of particular interest: Algeria, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Intifada. The inclusion of the “Battles of Islam” during the time of the Prophet Muhammad in this section is intended to give the reader an appreciation for the tribal warfare “ideal” and similarities to classical insurgency concepts. Also included in this section is the work of Sayyid Qutb, regarded as the architect and strategist in the development of modern Jihadi Salafi ideology. He has been cited as the figure that has most influenced the al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden.

Books

The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict by Dilip Hiro.

This book details the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq conflict; the longest conventional war in the 20th century. The Iran-Iraq conflict was rooted in the competition and rivalry between Iran and Iraq going back to the days of the Ottoman Turkish empire (1517-1918) and the Persian empire under the Safavids (1501-1722). This book gives the reader a historical appreciation of present-day Iraqi politics and Iranian intervention in Iraq. The nature of this competition and rivalry remains unaltered, only the context in which it occurs has changed.
Milestones by Sayyid Qutb.

In true Salafi style, Qutb re-analyzed the Quran to draw inspiration for present day Jihadi Salafi ideology. He studied the methods the Prophet Muhammad and his jamaat (movement) used to realize their own jahili society. Sayyid Qutb believed that God had revealed his plan to Muhammad in a specific sequence (hence 'Milestones' or 'Signposts' on the Road), which the contemporary jamaat needs to follow if it is to restore the Muslim world to its past glory.
Articles

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria by Constantin Melnik (April 23, 1964)

Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency by Roger Trinquier

Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa: A “Thorn in the Neck” of the United States? by Emily Hunt

The “Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa” article introduces the Algeria based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)”. The GSPC is a radical Algerian network, allied with al-Qaeda. Although relatively unknown in the United States, the GSPC represents one of the top terrorist threats in the northwestern corridor of Africa with connections in Europe, as well as aspiring militant groups in the United States.
Hezbollah (Power Point Presentation) by Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.)

Hezbollah by Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S)

Hezbollah Command Leadership: It’s Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions by Magnus Ranstorp

An understanding of Hezbollah’s structure provides a greater insight into the organization, function and roles of the Organization of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) and its military wing Jaysh al-Mahdi and its links to Hezbollah.
Hezbollah’s External Support Network in West Africa and Latin America by Douglas Farah

The Palestinian Intifada: An Effective Strategy? by James F. Miskel

Hamas and Hezbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories by Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

Insurgency in Iraq: A Historical Perspective by Dr. Ian F.W. Beckett

Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency by Dr. Max G. Manwaring

The Battles of Islam at the Official Classical Islam website

Inclusion of this website is intended to promote the study of warfighting and diplomacy during Islam’s formative years, as well as to encourage discussion as to the Prophet Muhammad’s exploitation of insurgency tenets in Islam’s ascendancy and defeat of larger, more powerful tribal confederations. Present day Salafist operations in Iraq and around the globe parallel Muhammad’s strategy of conquest. A closer study of Osama Bin Laden’s strategy and operations of al-Qaeda point to similarities with the Prophet Muhammad’s exploitation of classical insurgency concepts. An appreciation for the linkages over time provides insight into the strategic blueprint, ideational foundations, policy choices, and tactics, techniques and procedures of the Salafist “Islamic State of Iraq”.
Additional Readings

Tribal power is inversely related to the strength of the central government. When the central government is strong, tribal power is diminished. The core competencies of a functioning state are its military, police, civil service and judicial system. In a tribal society, when the central government is weak or non-existent and unable to fulfill its responsibilities, the tribal system will assume this function. The following articles are provided to assess the ability of local government to realize its core competencies and to monitor the strength of tribal power.

Articles

State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model by Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink

Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators by Robert I. Rotberg

War Making and State Making as Organized Crime by Charles Tilly

-----

William S. McCallister is a retired military officer. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. While on active duty, Mr. McCallister served in numerous special operations assignments specializing in civil-military, psychological and information operations. He is a published author in military affairs and tribal warfare and has guest lectured at Johns Hopkins University and presented numerous papers at academic and government sponsored conferences such as the Watson Institute, Brown University; Department of the Navy Science and Technology and DARPA; and the Central Intelligence Agency. He has also appeared as a guest on National Public Radio (NPR). Mr. McCallister is currently employed as a senior consultant for Applied Knowledge International (AKI) in Iraq. He continues to study current events in Iraq in tribal terms, including the tribal art of war and peace, tribal mediation processes, development of tribal centers of power, and tribal influence in political developments. He has applied his study of tribal culture in assessing Iraqi reconstruction efforts, as well as insurgency and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and the Global War on Terror.

Thursday, July 5, 2007

Iraq: Turkey Ratchets Up Pressure For Action Against PKK

By Sumedha Senanayake

July 5, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- Recent figures by Turkish military sources indicate that attacks by Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) rebels have surged this year. Turkish officials charge that many of the weapons and much of the training and logistical support for the rebels originates from PKK-run bases in northern Iraq, at which up to 3,800 rebels are thought to operate.

While the Turkish government has repeatedly urged the United States and Iraq to move against the PKK, political complications, particularly with regard to Iraq's Kurds, have prevented any large operations against the rebel group.

Since 2004, Turkey has warned that it will go after the PKK in northern Iraq if its warnings are not heeded. Despite repeated warnings by the United States for Turkey not to carry out unilateral military actions in northern Iraq, recent indications suggest that Ankara is on the verge of actually doing just that. With thousands of Turkish troops amassed along Iraq's border, a major military operation seems imminent.

On June 30, the Turkish daily "Radikal" reported that Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul warned that a military plan was in place to invade northern Iraq if U.S. or Iraqi forces failed to move against the PKK bases there. While details of the plan were not known, it is believed the Turkish military might try to establish a buffer zone in northern Iraq to curb the rebels' movements.

Gul's warning came on the heels of comments by Turkish General Yasar Buyukanit, the head of Turkish armed forces, about the need to conduct cross-border operations against PKK rebels in northern Iraq. Buyukanit also indicated that he had requested the Turkish government draw up political guidelines for any sort of military incursion into the region.

The comments by Gul and Buyukanit have been the clearest signs yet that Turkey is planning a major military operation. The threatening rhetoric has been coupled with sporadic, and sometimes unconfirmed reports in the Iraqi and regional press of shelling and limited cross-border military operations by Turkish forces.

However, the threats also come as Turkey prepares for general elections on July 22. The increasingly aggressive rhetoric from Ankara may be partly the result of criticism by the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), which has been accusing the ruling Justice and Development (AK) party of lacking the political will to move against PKK rebels in Iraq.

The Turkish parliament is currently in recess for the elections, but the cabinet of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is scheduled to hold a final pre-election meeting on July 9. There is wide speculation in the Turkish press that the cabinet could give the green light for some sort of military operation in northern Iraq.

Pressuring The United States To Act

While Turkey has ratcheted up its threats to intervene in northern Iraq, it has also increased pressure on the United States to crack down on the PKK. In fact, accusations of U.S. failure to curb PKK activities have intensified into outright suspicions in the Turkish press that the United States may actually be aiding the rebel group.

The Turkish media widely reported on July 1 that four former PKK fighters who had "escaped" from a PKK-run base at Mount Qandil in northern Iraq claimed to have seen U.S. military vehicles delivering arms to the camp. The Turkish government said it did not have further information concerning the allegations and the U.S. Embassy in Ankara vehemently denied them.

While the veracity of the allegations by four masked ex-PKK fighters may be somewhat dubious, it could well have been a tactic by Ankara to express its frustration with the United States and to increase the pressure on Washington to move against the PKK.

Indeed, several Turkish leaders have even indicated that the United States is displaying a certain double standard regarding its commitment to fighting terrorism. The "Anatolia" news agency reported on July 4 that AKP lawmaker Egemen Bagis said Ankara is losing patience with the U.S. refusal to move against the PKK, even though Washington has labeled the group a terrorist organization.

"I cannot argue that we are making sufficient progress with the U.S. against PKK terrorism," Bagis said. "The Turkish nation is losing its patience. The prime minister is holding necessary talks. But we expect our ally [the U.S.] to take action against terrorism as soon as possible, and this is a correct and just expectation."

Washington's Hands Are Tied In Iraq

The United States has indeed shown an unwillingness to move against the PKK, and for good reason. One reason is that Washington is far too focused on stabilizing Iraq to shift valuable resources to mount a serious crack down against the PKK. Pressure from the U.S. Congress to show tangible gains from the surge strategy is immense and growing. At this juncture, it is extremely unlikely that resources would be allocated to northern Iraq to assuage Turkish anxieties.

In addition, with U.S. and Iraqi forces currently engaged in major campaigns against Sunni insurgents, Shi'ite militias, and Al-Qaeda-linked foreign fighters throughout Iraq, opening an additional front against the PKK in the north does not seem feasible.

In addition, any aggressive U.S.-led operation against the PKK in northern Iraq risks enraging the Iraqi Kurdish leadership, who may view it as an infringement on their semi-autonomous status. In turn, they may decide to distance the region from the Baghdad government, creating additional political tension.

At the same time, the United States is highly reluctant to pressure Iraqi Kurdish leaders into cracking down on the PKK for fear of antagonizing them. In the chaotic atmosphere of Iraqi politics, Washington can ill afford to alienate its most steadfast ally.

Alienating the Kurds could also lead to serious consequences for Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government given its tenuous position. The Iraqi Accordance Front, the largest Sunni political bloc in parliament, has decided to boycott the Iraqi government after an arrest warrant was issued against Sunni lawmaker and Iraqi Culture Minister As'ad al-Hashimi.

In addition, radical Shi'ite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr's political movement and the Islamic Virtue Party (Al-Fadilah) have pulled out of the Shi'ite coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance. Any further withdrawals or boycotts could lead to either greater political paralysis or, worse, the collapse of the government.

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty © 2007 RFE/RL, Inc. All Rights Reserved.