Gunning for Al Qaeda Prime
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart
Al Qaeda's media branch, As-Sahab, released a statement by Ayman al-Zawahiri to jihadist Internet forums June 25. In it, al Qaeda's deputy leader urges Muslims to support Palestinian militants by providing weapons and money, and by attacking U.S. and Israeli interests. Although al-Zawahiri's message is interesting, especially the fact that he urges support for an organization he has criticized heavily in the past, perhaps most telling about the release is that it contains no new video footage of al-Zawahiri himself.
In the 25-minute statement, al-Zawahiri discusses the importance of al-Quds (Jerusalem) to Muslims, and urges Muslims to unite with the "mujahideen in Palestine" (Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, etc.). Al-Zawahiri also calls on Hamas to establish a government based on Islamic law in Gaza, noting that, "Taking over power is not a goal, but a means to implement God's word on earth." The release begins with a snippet of an October 2001 video of al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, but the bulk of the release consists of a still photograph of al-Zawahiri placed over a thin banner containing a small photo of the al-Aqsa Mosque.
The fact that al-Zawahiri chose this format rather than the more engaging and visually powerful video format suggests al Qaeda's apex leaders are feeling the heat of the campaign to locate and eliminate them. Although many people believe the al Qaeda leadership operates as it pleases along the Pakistani-Afghan border, evidence suggests otherwise.
Quantifying the Campaign
Last week's Terrorism Intelligence Report discussed the campaign conducted by the United States and its allies against al Qaeda's regional and local nodes. Though these efforts have been under way in many parts of the globe, the United States and its partners have been pursuing a concurrent campaign against al Qaeda's apex leadership, al Qaeda prime. Like the campaign against the regional nodes, the effort against the prime node employs all of the five prongs of the U.S. counterterrorism arsenal: military power, intelligence, economic sanctions, law enforcement operations and diplomacy.
The overall success of this campaign against al Qaeda prime has been hard to measure because there are few barometers for taking al Qaeda's pulse. By its nature it is a secretive and nebulous organization that, in order to survive, has taken great pains to obscure its operations -- especially since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 that flushed its leaders from their comfortable and well-appointed refuge inside the Taliban's Islamic republic.
While bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have escaped U.S.-led efforts to locate them, a large number of second-tier leaders and operatives have been captured or killed. This means the group's organizational chart has been altered dramatically below the top rung, making it difficult to determine the quality of the individuals who have been tapped to fill in the gaps. Publicly, al Qaeda has appointed Azzam the American as a major spokesman. If the prime node has been forced to promote others of his caliber to operational leadership positions, the group could be in big trouble. However, with so many unknown players filling critical positions, it is difficult to determine precisely how much the attrition has affected the prime node's ability to plan and execute attacks.
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that their operational ability has been diminished. The group has not launched an attack using an al Qaeda "all-star team" since 9/11. Meanwhile, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, the attacks conducted by its regional nodes, or by regional nodes working with operational commanders sent from al Qaeda prime, have decreased in frequency and impact over the past several months. The first six months of 2007 have been quieter than the first six months of 2006 and far more peaceful that the last six months of 2005. And, not to downplay the loss of life in London, Madrid, Bali and other places, but in terms of numbers, the death tolls and financial impacts of all those attacks do not hold a candle to the 9/11 attacks -- even when many of them are combined.
Beyond the personnel losses al Qaeda has suffered, the loss of its dedicated training facilities in Afghanistan also has changed the way the prime node works. It is less autonomous and far more dependent on the largesse of Pakistani and Afghan feudal lords who control training camps along the border -- and who are key to the security of al Qaeda prime. However, it is still difficult to pinpoint the impact this has had on al Qaeda's ability to operate.
Occasional glimpses into the organization made possible by intelligence efforts, however, have provided some information as to its health. For example, the seized July 2005 letter from al-Zawahiri to then-al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in which al-Zawahiri asks for financial assistance, demonstrates that al Qaeda's prime node was hurting for cash at the time. This state of affairs, a key objective of U.S. economic sanctions, likely was exacerbated by the Saudi government's action against al Qaeda supporters inside the kingdom, action prompted by attacks by al Qaeda's Saudi node.
Another way to gauge the health of the organization, or at least the comfort level of the group's apex leadership, is by looking at its public relations efforts and the statements it releases to the public. Al Qaeda prime has produced a steady supply of messages in order to keep local nodes -- and perhaps more important, grassroots jihadists around the world -- motivated. These releases, however, reveal a change over the last several months in the way al Qaeda communicates to the world.

CIA Releases Files On Past Misdeeds
Assassination Plots, Domestic Spying Cited
By Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, June 27, 2007; A01

Hundreds of pages of decades-old documents declassified and released by the CIA yesterday revealed a 1970s-era agency in the throes of unaccustomed self-examination, caught between its traditional secrecy and demands that it come clean on a history of unsavory activities.

Prompted by the then-unraveling Watergate affair, and by fears that CIA involvement in that scandal would be exposed along with other illegal operations, the agency combed its files for what it called "delicate" information with "flap potential." The result was a collection of documents the CIA called the "family jewels."

Partly disclosed yesterday, the documents chronicle activities including assassination plans, illegal wiretaps and hunts for spies at political conventions. One document spoke of a plan to poison an African leader. Another revealed that the CIA had offered a Mafia boss $150,000 to kill Cuba's Fidel Castro.

Agents set up surveillance in a hotel opposite The Washington Post to watch for possible sources of leaked intelligence information, and senior officials juggled requests from the Nixon White House to pay off the Watergate burglars.

As he prepared the agency's testimony for congressional committees investigating Watergate in May 1973, William E. Colby, then a senior CIA official, struggled with how much to reveal, according to one memo. What investigators wanted to know, one colleague warned after reviewing Colby's draft, was: "Did the CIA cooperate wittingly in [illegal] activities. . . . Or did it only respond supinely to higher authority even though it had some reason for suspecting illegal conduct?"

The colleague advised against a "minimal factual response" in favor of "candor." Colby, who became CIA director in September 1973, later turned the entire "family jewels" file over to Congress, an act some agency veterans still consider a betrayal.

Current CIA Director Michael V. Hayden said yesterday that the papers include "reminders of some things the CIA should not have done." He told agency staff members that the internal reforms and increased oversight after the Watergate disclosures gave the CIA "a far stronger place in our democratic system."

Hayden became CIA director last summer in the midst of new allegations that the intelligence community crossed legal lines by torturing terrorism suspects at secret prisons and by conducting warrantless surveillance involving Americans. His decision to release the "family jewels," responding to a 1992 Freedom of Information Act request, was meant to convince critics that the agency embraces openness when possible.

Some documents resonate with recent intelligence controversies. Several dealt with the agency's domestic spying on anti-Vietnam War groups during the Johnson and Nixon years. One described an operation, begun under President Richard M. Nixon in late 1972, to track telephone calls between people stateside and overseas, and foreign calls routed through the United States.

The documents provided few new details of CIA operations, most of which were revealed long ago, either by Congress or the media. Rather than being a comprehensive accounting of a quarter-century of agency history, they were a haphazard collection of internal memos, communications with Congress and press clippings. Many contained deletions, and a number of pages were blank.

Most revealing were the memos written in response to a May 1973 appeal by then-Director James R. Schlesinger to "report to me immediately on any activities now going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency."

The responses, sent by division heads, low-level bureaucrats and retired operatives, included lengthy explanations of illegal surveillance and pithy recollections of long-ago black operations.

A one-paragraph memo recounts planning for a "project involving the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, then premier of the Republic of Congo. According to [name deleted], poison was to have been the vehicle . . ." A Belgian commission later attributed Lumumba's 1961 death to local rivals who had imprisoned him.

In 1972, Colby offered a carefully worded disclaimer in response to a letter from Lloyd Shearer of Parade magazine, who asked about direct CIA involvement in assassinations. "I can say, under oath if need be, that the CIA has never carried out a political assassination, nor has it induced, employed or suggested one which occurred."

In October 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson requested an interagency survey of possible foreign connections to U.S. groups opposed to the Vietnam War and worldwide student movements with communist links. Then-Director Richard M. Helms tasked the agency to do it, and the main input came from "sensitive intercepts" produced by the National Security Agency, according to another memo.

Agency officials became nervous years later because CIA reports on this issue included material on the homegrown radical group Students for a Democratic Society, known as SDS. Under its charter, the CIA is not allowed to conduct domestic intelligence-gathering.

The memos also recount more mundane concerns. After Nixon's May 1970 speech defending an incursion into Cambodia during the Vietnam War, the White House received thousands of letters, and directed that the CIA fund replies. The agency's costs totaled $33,655 for printing and postage for replies sent out to Nixon supporters. Negative letters were handed to the State Department for reply.

Vigorously defending America’s national security preserves
our free and democratic way of life. American policy
makers have and will always make decisions about war and
the threat of war to defend our homeland, stabilize regions
abroad, and defend our allies. Thus, the American
democratic system requires an electorate and leadership
well versed in military affairs.

Unfortunately, many policy makers and the public do not
understand military affairs. The study and teaching of
military operations has become increasingly rare over the
past several decades. Few elite American colleges and
universities offer any courses in military history at all.
Increasingly, those military history courses that are offered
focus on the social aspects of war rather than on military
operations. As a result, most of those who study the art of
war are either ROTC cadets or students at service
academies--in other words, those who will enter the
military.

But in a healthy democracy it is as important for those
outside the military to understand war as it is for those who
are serving. Without such understanding, neither the
electorate nor the civilian leadership can understand
military challenges, formulate and choose among military
policy options, recognize sound decision-making and
understand the scale and cost of war. The abandonment of
military studies at America's colleges and universities
since the Vietnam War poses a serious challenge to civilian
control of the military and to the well-being of the nation.

The current generation of senior U.S. policy makers did not
have access to college and university education about
military affairs. Only a few of the next generation’s leaders
will have had the education in military affairs and strategy
available at the finest colleges. It is necessary, therefore, to
find an additional way to make the study of military
operations available to Americans.

MISSION

The Institute for the Study of War is a private, nonpartisan,
not-for-profit institution whose goal is to educate current
and future decision makers and thereby enhance the
quality of policy debates now and for future generations.
The Institute’s work is addressed to government officials
and legislators, teachers and students, business
executives, professionals, journalists, and all citizens
interested in a serious understanding of war and
government policy. The Institute sponsors research and
educational programs, publishes reports, and maintains a
website, www.understandingwar.org.

The Institute for the Study of War offers courses, seminars,
battlefield staff rides, and other educational programs.
These programs provide an essential introduction to terms
and concepts necessary to understanding military
operations.

Kimberly Kagan
Executive Director

The ISW is in the process of establishment as a 501(c)(3)
non-profit organization.

Warnings from Gaza
By Newt Gingrich
Posted: Tuesday, June 26, 2007

ARTICLES
Washington Times
Publication Date: June 26, 2007


Senior Fellow
Newt Gingrich

The Hamas victory in Gaza is a warning that World War IV (as Norman Podhoretz has called it) is going to be long and hard. It is also a warning that the West is currently losing that war.

These defeats are not a function of the courage and will of the American people. In a June poll sponsored by American Solutions, 85 percent of the American people said it was important to defend America and its allies. Only 10 percent were opposed. On an even stronger question, 75 percent said it was important to defeat America's enemies. Only 16 percent disagreed.

So the hard left in America is only 16 percent. It is outnumbered almost 5-1 by those who would defeat our enemies.

The source of failure is not to be found in the American people but in the inarticulate and unimaginative leaders all across government who now preside instead of lead.

The source of failure is not to be found in the American people but in the inarticulate and unimaginative leaders all across government who now preside instead of lead.

The tragedy of the current debate in Washington is that while the inarticulateness and the failing performance of the Bush administration have led the American people to desire a new direction, the politics of the left insists that the new direction be less than President Bush. Yet the lessons of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, New Jersey, the JFK plot, the Algerian bombings, the Iranian nuclear program, the conflict in Lebanon and now the defeat in Gaza all point to the need for a war policy that is substantially bigger and more robust than Mr. Bush.

As the forces of modernity are being ground up by terrorism, our political process is not producing a Churchill or Roosevelt to rally the democracies but instead embracing advocates of surrender withdrawal and defeat. As women are being oppressed, we remain silent. Faced with the weakness, vacillation and inarticulateness of the leaders of Israel and America, the people see the violence as senseless, the bloodshed as repugnant and the current strategies as too flawed to continue to invest in them.

Gaza is the most recent example of where Western failure of imagination is being defeated by ruthlessness and determination.

Israel has had enormous power over Gaza for 40 years. The United Nations has been running refugee camps since 1949 with disastrous results that have led to massive population growth, vast unemployment, deep bitterness and a society which produces entrepreneurs of terrorism rather than entrepreneurs of wealth creation. Michael Oren has noted that since 1993 the Palestinian Authority "has garnered more international aid than any entity in modern history--more per capita than the European states under the Marshall Plan." With all these advantages the old "reasonable" terrorist organization has been destroyed in Gaza by the newer, more militant and more ferocious Hamas.

This is a signal victory for Iran and a defeat for Israel, the United States, and the so-called moderate Arab governments.

The first reactions to this defeat have been pathetic. The beleaguered American and Israeli governments have met to wring their hands and pledge funding for the old terrorists in the West Bank. This will surely prove to be a losing strategy. Hamas will consolidate its hold on Gaza and begin to extend its reach more decisively into the West Bank.

The West will sooner or later have to confront several hard realities if it is to defeat its enemies.

First, terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah will have to be rooted out and destroyed. We do not today have the strategy, the doctrine or the techniques for defeating these kinds of organizations. In Iraq, after more than four years of effort, our current doctrine for population control and for effective local policing and intelligence is pathetic. To defeat ferocious committed and enthusiastically violent organizations like al Qaeda and the Taliban will take new energy, new drive and new determination on our part.

Second, the indirect strategies of propping up corrupt dictatorships have to give way to direct people-to-people help, securing private-property rights and direct financial assistance so we can improve their families' lives and they can be empowered to defend their neighborhoods from evil men. Hernando de Soto will be vastly more effective in designing this than all the bureaucrats at AID and the United Nations combined.

Third, the U.N. camp system of socialism with unearned anti-humanitarian charity has to be replaced with a totally new system of earned income and earned property rights to restore dignity and hope to every Palestinian.

Fourth, the current system of schools under both Fatah and Hamas control have to be replaced in their entirety with a system dedicated to genuine education and to teaching human rights rather than jihad and hatred.

Lastly, mosques can no longer be allowed to preach hatred and violence. The de-Nazification that seemed obvious in Germany in 1945 will have to be matched by a dehatred campaign today. The haters have to be defeated, disarmed and detained if the forces of peace and freedom are to win.

These steps are only the beginning, but the gap between our current pathetic reaction to the Hamas victory and the requirements of victory give some indication of how far the West has to go before it starts winning. In Churchill's phrase, we are not even at the end of the beginning. However, we may be at the beginning of recognizing that this will be a real war.

Newt Gingrich is a senior fellow at AEI.

A Return to Kosovo
By George Friedman
Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush will meet July 1-2 at the Bush family compound in Kennebunkport, Maine. The two will have several meaty items on their plate, including the planned U.S. missile defense shield in Central Europe and Russia's threat to withdraw from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The main dish, however, will be Kosovo -- again.
This issue has been on the table since 1999, when the United States and its NATO allies, angered over Serbian behavior in Kosovo, ignored Russian objections and waged a 60-day air war against Yugoslavia. The Clinton administration charged that the Serbians were either conducting genocide against the Kosovar Albanians or were on the verge of it. Washington demanded the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and, when that failed to happen, it commenced the air campaign.
It is important to recall that the Kosovo war, like the war in Iraq, did not have U.N. sanction. Russia, in particular, opposed the war, thus making U.N. Security Council passage of an enabling resolution impossible. Russia and Serbia are historical allies and under the guise of "fellow Slav," Moscow has promoted itself as Serbia's protector. It is an excuse Russia has used to get involved in many conflicts, including World War I. In 1999, however, the United States did not take Russia seriously when it considered how to handle Serbia. In 1999, under Boris Yeltsin, Russia didn't need to be taken seriously.
The war, however, did not go as expected. The Serbs did not capitulate after the first few days of bombardment, and neither the United States nor NATO was prepared to mount a ground attack into Kosovo. After two months of bombings, a diplomatic initiative was launched via Moscow, whose channels into Belgrade remained active since the Serbs retained some trust in the Russians. In a complex round of diplomacy, the Serbs agreed to withdraw their forces from Kosovo as long as the occupying force included a substantial Russian contingent.
In fact, the Russians sent a contingent of troops from their base in Bosnia through Serbia to Kosovo, arriving at the airport in Pristina as the bombing ended. Rather than integrate the Russian forces into the NATO force in Kosovo, the peacekeeping presence known as KFOR, NATO marginalized them.
From the Russians' point of view, they had been double-crossed. They had gotten the Serbs to agree to a withdrawal on the proviso that the Russians would be a substantial part of KFOR. This was crucial because it was understood that they would guarantee the one part of the agreement that was a dealmaker to the Serbs. Serbia would withdraw from Kosovo, but it would not give up sovereignty. When the Americans and Europeans bypassed the Russians, Russian credibility, as low as it was, plummeted even more.
In a sense, Kosovo broke the back of Yeltsin's strategy. The Russians perceived the motherland as a poor but powerful country, one that not only had become poorer, but also was treated with contempt by the United States. Russian nationalists -- even of the mildest sort -- recoiled at what they saw as the American double-cross. Many issues sank Yeltsin, but Kosovo was critical. One of Putin's missions, then, has been to rebuild Russia's international standing.

Eight years after the war, KFOR continues to occupy Kosovo, though Europe and the United States are trying to bring the conflict to a conclusion by granting Kosovo independence. Their argument is that Kosovo, whatever its historical significance to Serbs, now has a majority of Albanians. In addition, the Albanians had been mistreated by the Serbs, so they cannot be returned to Serb control. Therefore, the only reasonable thing is for Kosovo to be granted independence.

The Serbs are intensely opposed to losing a province permanently. For the Russians, there are a number of issues. First, Putin wants to demonstrate to Europe and the United States that they cannot simply ignore understandings reached with Russia. The Russian opposition to Kosovo's independence was made clear eight years ago -- and it remains clear now. Second, the Russians want to demonstrate that alliance with them has meaning as they attempt to expand their sphere of influence. Until now, their successes have been confined to the former Soviet Union. They want a showdown over the interests of a Balkan ally simply to demonstrate their loyalty and effectiveness -- as well as the limits of American and European power. Finally, they want to expand their influence in the Balkans, an area of historical interest to the Russians.

On June 24, Putin attended an energy conference of southeast European leaders. While there, he made it clear that Russia is prepared to expand capital investment in power networks and pipelines in the Balkans. He also supported the creation of an "energy ring" in the Black Sea region that might serve to define the parameters of a common European power grid. That was the carrot. The stick was a warning that the Russians will not accept an independent Kosovo.

Europe just wants Kosovo off its plate. It is uneasy about extending the Muslim reach in the Balkans and it is concerned about the principle of changing borders based on ethnic makeup. In Europe, Spain's Basque region has had a separatist movement for years, while there are predominantly Hungarian regions in both Slovakia and Romania. The Russians, however, are most uneasy about the principle because if Kosovo is given independence, why not Chechnya?

The Europeans and Americans want to wrap up the Kosovo issue as soon as possible. For Bush, who has been portrayed as rabidly anti-Islamic, having a pro-Muslim policy somewhere in the world has obvious benefit. Albania, as demonstrated by Bush's recent visit, is the one place where he can gather sympathetic Muslim crowds -- and he is not about to give it up. As for the Europeans, they want to let go of the tar baby and move on.

By visiting Albania, therefore, Bush has signaled Putin that he is committed to Kosovar independence. The point the Bush administration is missing, however, is that rather than being deterred by Bush's show of commitment, Putin sees it as an opportunity to embarrass Bush and assert Russian power. The fact that Bush has publicly committed himself on Kosovo makes it sweeter for Putin. He wants to force Bush to back down on an issue on which the American president has staked himself publicly. That serves Putin's interests much more than winning on a marginal issue.

Putin has a number of options.
Diplomatically, he can veto any resolutions presented to the Security Council. There is diplomatic talk that, absent a new resolution on Kosovo, Kosovar independence would take place under EU supervision. Russia could not veto that, of course, but Russia does have the natural gas transmission card to play. Germany and other EU members are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, and Russia has cut those supplies for short periods of time in the past. There is no reason to think Moscow would not do it again. The European Union knows this -- and is becoming fractured by it.

In fact, we believe the Russians would cut supplies if provoked. Kosovo really is that big of an issue to them. If they gave in on this, all of Putin's efforts to re-establish Russia as a great power would be undermined. Putin wants to remind Germany in particular -- but also other former Soviet satellites -- that thwarting Russia carries a price. If the European Union were to unilaterally act against Russian wishes, Putin would have to choose between appearing as if he is all talk and no action, and acting. Putin would choose the latter.

Putin also has a military option. Contrary to popular belief, the Russians retain increasingly effective military units. Five years ago, the idea that Russia's military was a joke wasn't nearly as true as many wanted to believe. It certainly is not true now. The old Red Army is dysfunctional, but the Russian military retains an excellent core, particularly in its airborne regiments. The Russians could fly a regiment of troops to Belgrade, use Serbian trucks to move to the Kosovar frontier and threaten to move into Kosovo to take their place in KFOR.

To do this, they would have to fly through Romanian or Hungarian airspace. They might be denied overflight privileges, but 1), the Russians might not ask permission and 2), would the Romanians or Hungarians try to shoot down Russian transports? They have no appetite for that kind of confrontation. Assume, then, that the troops reached the Kosovo border and crossed over. Would KFOR troops open fire on them? It is doubtful that the Europeans want a shooting war with the Russians.

Challenging Kosovo's independence militarily also would allow Russia to call NATO defense capabilities into question, which could leave the Europeans even more fractured. Do not assume that the Russians would not dare try such a move. Our view is that the Russians are itching for an opportunity to confront the West -- and win. In the case of Kosovo, should they choose to make an issue of it, they have the diplomatic, economic and military options to force the West to back down. Condoleezza Rice has said that Kosovo will never be returned to Serbian rule. Putin would love to demonstrate that it doesn't matter what the U.S. secretary of state wants.

This is going to be a key issue at the Bush-Putin summit. Although he wants this matter settled, it appears Bush will try to find a formula for putting it off, such as setting up a negotiating structure between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo that could go on for years. Putin could probably live with that, as long as Russia is given a dominant role in those negotiations and as long as the decision is seen as a public concession to Putin.

This is an asymmetric situation. Bush does not really care about Kosovo or Serbia. The Europeans would not give up a day of natural gas supplies over Albanian rights in Kosovo. Russia itself doesn't care much about Kosovo. But it does care about reasserting its international power. The Kosovo issue gives Putin the perfect launchpad to start rolling back the West and reasserting his own power.

If Putin can win on this issue, a range of comfortable assumptions by Central and Eastern Europeans about Russia's limits, as well as German and French assumptions about the future of Europe, will be reversed. Putin intends to be taken seriously in international affairs and Kosovo is the issue he will stand on. It is not clear whether the United States or Europe understands just how serious Putin is on Kosovo.