U.S. Policy: Back to the Future

by Michael Rubin
Aspenia
June 2007
http://www.meforum.org/article/1701

On January 20, 2005, after President George W. Bush took his second oath of office, he delivered an address in which he laid out his vision for his second term. In his speech, he reiterated his intention to tie U.S. policy to be the promotion of freedom and democracy abroad. "All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you," he declared.[1] Many European commentators were aghast. Robin Cook, the former British foreign secretary, wrote in The Guardian, London's left-wing flagship, that "On the very day when the president set forward his mission to bring liberty to the world, a poll revealed that a large majority of inhabitants believe that he will actually make it more dangerous."[2] The conservative Daily Telegraph questioned whether Bush's "ringing encomium of freedom" could survive Iraq.[3] Spain's El Pais, Germany's Die Tageszeitung, and Austria's Die Presse all expressed concern. Sueddeutsche Zeitung observed, "The whole world is seeking an answer…to the question of whether George Bush will really be a changed president in his second term."[4]

They need not have worried. Rather than forward his agenda, Bush's foreign policy team reversed it. On June 20, 2005, speaking at the American University in Cairo, Secretary of State Condoleezza called for multiparty elections. "The Egyptian Government must put its faith in its own people. We are all concerned for the future pf Egypt's reforms when peaceful supporters of democracy—men and women—are not free from violence. The day must come when the rule of law replaces emergency decrees and when the independent judiciary replaces arbitrary justice."[5] But, less than a year later, the Bush administration remained silent as Egyptian police imprisoned Ayman Nour, President Hosni Mubarak's election challenger, on spurious charges. Then, as Egyptian security forces in May 2006 rounded up hundreds of demonstrators rallying in support of two judges who had alleged fraud in parliamentary elections, Rice did not express outrage. Washington remained silent as Mubarak cancelled municipal elections.[6] On October 3, 2006, Rice stood next to Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit at a press conference and, in her prepared remarks, neglected even to mention democracy.[7] Egypt is not the exception, but rather the rule. The Bush administration has abandoned reformers and dissidents across the region, from Iran and Saudi Arabia to Libya and Tunisia.

Election Shock

While the Bush administration does not acknowledge publicly its policy reversal—a lack of candor which undercuts its credibility at home and abroad—the White House and State Department reversed course on the democracy agenda following the combined shock at Muslim Brotherhood gains in the November and December 2005 Egyptian parliamentary elections and the Hamas landslide in the January 25, 2006 Palestinian poll. As Hamas celebrated its victory the following day, supporters rushed the parliament building and replaced the Palestinian flag with a green Islamist banner, symbolically subordinating institution to party. Ismail Haniya, who would soon assume the premiership, rededicated Hamas to violence. "Our fighting is only with the Zionist enemy," he said.[8]

Such events shocked Washington. Prior to their election, there was broad consensus not only among those supportive of Bush's democracy agenda, but also those opposed that the most radical Islamist fringe would not benefit from elections.[9] The logic that a foreign policy prioritizing stability contributed to the dynamics culminating in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was and remains compelling.

After the Hamas victory, many in foreign policy establishment reversed course. Rather than examine faulty implementation and a rush to elections, they advocated abandoning Bush's democracy agenda altogether. This is unfortunate. Analysts long expected Muslim Brotherhood gains in Egyptian elections, if only as a response to Mubarak's corruption and dictatorship. Many Egyptians may have preferred a liberal opposition party to the Islamist alternative, but did no serious alternative existed. This in itself was in part a result of traditional U.S. stability policy. For years, the U.S. diplomats allowed the Mubarak regime to veto any aid projects which might benefit an independent political base.

There were many policy remedies short of abandoning democracy to which a stronger leader in the White House might have directed diplomats. Many policymakers had questioned the rush to elections, and the failure to uphold standards for participation.[10] In the Palestinian, Lebanese, and Iraqi elections, U.S. and United Nations officials did not object strenuously to participation of those political parties which maintained armed militias. It was a mistake. In each case, political leaders used their militias to intimidate voters or perpetuate fraud. Rather than abandon democracy, Rice might have corrected the standards used to legitimize election participation.

Flawed election design has also empowered extreme elements of society. For Iraq, U.S. officials had the choice of two election systems: A nationwide, proportional representation system based on party lists; or a constituency based systems in which Iraqis would elect officials for specific districts. Rice and Coalition Provisional Authority administrator L. Paul Bremer chose the former in order to simplify the process. Iraqi party leaders assembled their election list, from which one member would enter parliament for every 0.4 percent of the vote which the list received. Aspiring politicians, therefore, became more accountable to party leaders than constituents. Rather than debate practical issues such as restoration of basic services, education, or security, party leaders amplified populist sectarian and ethnic agendas.

Ideological Aversion

To abandon democracy as a goal was not a huge leap. While Bush had committed himself to democratization, even in his first term, the policy never took firm hold. The White House announced initiatives with great fanfare, but implemented relative few.

Many of those implementing Bush administration policies expressed indifference if not disdain for his policies. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, for example, while mislabeled a neoconservative by many European commentators, was ambivalent to democratization. He directed his staff, for example, to replace the term democracy with representative government in every memo directed to his office. The difference is important, for the latter could include benevolent autocracies which co-opt factions, or states which pursue the Lebanese model of sectarian quotas.

Foreign policy specialists do not abandon opinions when they enter government service. Indeed, their debate is a critical part of the interagency process that shapes policy. Where the Bush administration differed from its predecessors, though, was in the weakness and disorganization of his National Security Council. Established by the National Security Act of 1947,[11] the National Security Council coordinates policy across agencies. Under Rice's stewardship, the Council neglected to resolve many open policy questions. Under both Rice and her successor Steven Hadley's stewardship, the Council failed to impose discipline to ensure that various agencies implemented those rare policy directives upon they or the President had ruled.

While most presidents populate their National Security Council with officials loyal to their agenda, White House chief-of-staff Andy Card decided early in Bush's first term to trim the National Security Council budget through reliance on secondement of career employees whose salaries other departments paid. With few exceptions, the Pentagon opted out of this scheme, because Rumsfeld frowned on the idea of paying anyone who did not directly serve his department. Accordingly, Rice staffed the Council with State Department and Central Intelligence Agency employees. Many made little secret of their disdain for the Bush administration. Prior to the 2004 elections, senior National Security Council officials resigned to work for Bush's election opponents.

Within the State Department, there was as much disdain for Bush's agenda. Just a year after Bush included Iran in the "Axis of Evil," Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage called the Islamic Republic a democracy in an interview with The Los Angeles Times.[12] One senior diplomat serving in Baghdad told his British colleagues that he thought Bush and his polices to be stupid. Bush subsequently nominated the man to be ambassador to an Arab country important both as a subject of democratization and as an ally in the war on terror.

While Rice spoke often of democracy while national security advisor, it was not difficult for her to abandon the policy upon her move to the State Department. The traditional foreign policy establishment disliked the Bush emphasis on democracy. Outreach to dissidents makes tenure in diplomatic postings difficult. Many diplomats seek to avoid rather than instigate tension between their embassy and host government. At its root, their attitudes touch upon a philosophical divide among foreign policy professionals: Should embassies represent the U.S. government to entire countries or just their governments? Those who believe the latter focus attention on relations with ruling regimes rather than upon opposition groups and civil society.

Rice's staffing reflected antipathy toward democratization. Her Policy Planning Director Stephen Krasner placed Suzanne Maloney, an Exxon Mobil official who had deferred an earlier employment offer because she preferred to work in a Kerry administration, in charge of the Iran portfolio. Maloney used her position to veto expenditure of much of the $75 million which the Congress allocated to support democracy in Iran. In an April 2007 interview against the backdrop of the Islamic Republic's seizure of 15 British hostages, her husband told an Iranian paper, "America also has to forget the hopeless policy of regime change, as well as the $75 million budget for the opponents of the Tehran government."[13] Rice also appointed Nicholas Burns her undersecretary of state for Policy, the same position promised him by the Kerry administration. After Robert B. Zoellick stepped down as deputy secretary of state on July 7, 2006, Rice sought to promote Burns, but the White House personal office vetoed his nomination.

Future U.S. Direction

So where does U.S. Middle East policy stand? Iraq continues to consume U.S. attention. When ethnic and sectarian violence did not subside, opponents of democratization blamed the reform agenda. Regardless of whether democratization is to blame for exacerbating violence in Iraq, neither the White House nor the State Department can pursue a proactive democracy agenda so long as violence and instability continue there.

Events dictate policy. Violence in the West Bank and Gaza, and the threat of renewed instability in Lebanon also constrain U.S. diplomacy. Despite pledges to form a united front, Hamas and Fatah are today in a state of civil war. In Lebanon, too, Hezbollah holds stability hostage. Hezbollah's cross-border attack on Israel on July 12, 2006, sparked a month-long war which underlined both regional instability as well as Iran's growing regional influence.

Diplomats and many administration officials have suspended the push for reforms and re-embraced the short-term stability afforded by current leaders. Perhaps nothing symbolized this more in Washington than Vice President Dick Cheney's decision to receive Gamal Mubarak, the son of the Egyptian ruler and his anointed successor.[14]

The State Department will pressure for a breakthrough on outstanding issues in the Middle East. This is less a sign of an ideological reshuffle than conformity with the actions of second term administrations. It was during Ronald Reagan's second term that he and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev pursued rapprochement. Clinton had three goals as he neared the end of his presidency: To achieve a comprehensive Palestinian-Israeli settlement, to re-establish relations with Iran, and to normalize relations with Vietnam. That he succeeded only in the latter was not the result of lack of effort, but rather because reality intrudes upon the best of intentions.

The desire of Rice and some of Bush's handlers for a high profile success upon which to stake Bush's legacy is not enough to overcome the diplomatic problems which have hampered earlier solutions. Rice may want to revive the Palestinian-Israel peace process, but to do so mandates Palestinian abandonment of terror.

Nor will rapprochement with the Islamic Republic be easy. Many presidents have tried. Radical students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran three days after U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski met Mehdi Barzargan, the Islamic Republic's first prime minister to discuss resumption of full relations. While most Americans remember the Reagan-era Iran-Contra scandal for the illegalities of circumventing Congress to fund the Nicaraguan resistance, it was also an attempt to build trust and enable reconciliation with Tehran. The Iranian government embarrassed Madeleine Albright in 2000 when the Iranian Foreign Minister failed to show up for a private meeting arranged with the Secretary of State on the fringe of multilateral talks over Afghanistan.

While Rice may want to renew attempts at engagement, they have little chance of success. The Iranian leadership believes the Bush administration to be weak. Just four days after Rice expressed U.S. willingness to hold bilateral talks with Iran, Supreme Leader ‘Ali Khamenei responded, "Why don't you just admit that you are weak and your razor is blunt?"[15] Nor is there any indication that the Iranian government will respond positively toward engagement on issues important to Washington such as Iran's nuclear program and its support for terrorism. Between 2000 and 2005, European Union trade with Iran nearly tripled while, at the same time, rising oil prices bolstered the Iranian treasury. Rather than moderating, however, the Iranian government spent up to 70 percent of the hard currency windfall on its nuclear and military programs. While some officials may hope for a Kissinger-to-China moment, sometimes reality intrudes.

Nor is Bush necessarily willing to make the sacrifices which Kissinger did. In his 1975 attempt to win Iran-Iraq peace, Kissinger sacrificed the Iraqi Kurds. Undercutting his diplomacy with Beijing was a willingness to abandon Taipei. Neither Bush—nor the foreign policy establishment—is willing to abandon Israel for peace with the Palestinians, abandon Lebanon for peace with Syria, or abandon Iraq for peace with Iran. Diplomats may seize upon the Saudi initiative, but in both Washington and in Riyadh, the attempt has more to do with embracing the optic of engagement rather than in substantive diplomacy. The Saudis are more interested in repairing an image soiled by the Kingdom's past funding of al-Qaeda terrorism than in breaking new ground in the peace process. They know insistence upon the Palestinian right-of-return to Israel proper as a prerequisite will go nowhere. It would mean the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state, a price unacceptable everywhere except, perhaps, in some West European capitals.

Even if the Middle East stabilizes, the push for democracy will not return. Rice lacks strong beliefs, and prefers celebrity to purpose. Many of the staunchest proponents of Bush's democracy agenda have either resigned or abdicated their positions. But declarations that the purge of neoconservatives equates with a long-term return to realism do not hold water. There is no sign that Bush has abandoned his desire to support democrats and dissidents. The president may still believe his own rhetoric, even if his trusted aides do not. The result is a muddle, not a strategy, one which Iran and its proxies will be happy to exploit.

Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is editor of the Middle East Quarterly.

[1] "President Sworn-In to Second Term." Office of the Press Secretary. The White House. January 20, 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/250120-1.html
[2] Robin Cook. "Fireworks in Washington, despair around the world." The Guardian (London), January 21, 2005. Pg. 28.
[3] "Bush must sort out Iraq if he is to keep his promises." The Daily Telegraph (London), January 21, 2005. Pg. 29.
[4] "European press review for Friday 21 January." BBC Monitoring, Caversham, January 21, 2005.
[5] Condoleezza Rice. "Remarks at the American University in Cairo." U.S. Department of State. June 20, 2005. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm2005/48328.htm
[6] Jeffrey Azarva. "Reneging on Reform: Egypt and Tunisia." Middle East Outlook, April 2007. http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25873/pub_detail.asp
[7] Condoleezza Rice. "Remarks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit after their Meeting." U.S. Department of State. October 3, 2006. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/73525.htm
[8] "Hamas calls for international pressure on Israel." Agence France Presse, January 26, 2006.
[9] See, for example, discussion of Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Radical Political Islam (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2004), in Daniel L. Byman, "How to Fight Terrorism." The National Interest, Spring 2005.
[10] See, for example, "Debate: ‘Democracy is about more than Elections,'" Middle East Quarterly. Summer 2006. http://www.meforum.org/article/983
[11] Public Law 235-61, Statute 496, U.S. Code 402; amended in 1949 by 63 Statute 579; 50 U.S. Code 401 et seq.
[12] Robin Wright. "U.S. Now Views Iran in More Favorable Light," Los Angeles Times, February 14, 2003, pg. 5.
[13] "Ray Takeyh: A time to be conciliatory with Iran." Hamshahri (Tehran), April 5, 2007.
[14] Peter Baker. "Mubarak's Son Met with Cheney, Others." Washington Post, May 16, 2006. Pg. A4.
[15] Speech at Behesht-e Zahra, Islamic Republic News Agency, June 4, 2006.

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Update to: CAIR's Legal Tribulations

Daniel Pipes Weblog
June 4, 2007
http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/32

Federal prosecutors have named CAIR and two other Islamic organizations, the Islamic Society of North America and the North American Islamic Trust, as "unindicted co-conspirators" in a criminal conspiracy to support Hamas, a designated terrorist group.

In a filing last week, prosecutors described CAIR as a present or past member of "the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee and/or its organizations." They listed ISNA and NAIT as "entities who are and/or were members of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood." Josh Gerstein of The New York Sun reports that spokesmen for CAIR did not respond to requests for comment.

This development occurred in connection with the trial, scheduled to start on July 16 in Dallas, of five officials (Shukri Abu-Baker, Mohammad El-Mezain, Ghassan Elashi, Mufid Abdulqader, and Abdulraham Odeh) of the now-defunct Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, accused of sending funds to Hamas. This court filing listed some 300 individuals or organizations as co-conspirators.

What is an unindicted co-conspirator? Someone by and about whom hearsay is permissible in the courtroom. Here is a definition by legal journalist Stuart Taylor, discussing an entirely unrelated case:

The prosecutor is saying in essence in court … that we believe this man was part of the criminal conspiracy, along with the people who are on trial. We haven't indicted him but the relevance of that for the purposes of the trial is that [it] lets them get in more evidence about the unindicted co-conspirator's … out-of-court statements than they otherwise could. It's a way around the hearsay rule. … For example, if they want … one of their witnesses, to talk about what [a person] said to him, ordinarily that would be barred by the so-called hearsay rule. You can't … testify in a trial about what somebody else said out of court. That rule has a lot of exceptions. One of the exceptions is if the person who you're trying to quote … is named by the prosecution as an unindicted co-conspirator, then you can talk about what he said out of court.

Substitute "organization" for "man" and "person" and this description applies to the situation of CAIR, ISNA, and NAIT.

Comments: (1) CAIR being named as an unindicted co-conspirator complements the fact that many of its staff and associates are associated with terrorism, as I have documented.

(2) It is only logical that CAIR, whose origins lie in the Islamic Association for Palestine, which was founded by Hamas, be legally investigated in connection with Hamas.

(3) This may be the first time since 1994 that the press could not find a CAIR spokesman for a comment.

(4) If it turns out that there is substance to the CAIR-HLF connection, then CAIR will be caught out by the changed political and legal environment since 9/11. Put simply, Islamists can no longer get away with they could before then. (I elaborated this in a different context at "Nike and 9/11.")

(5) Whatever the future brings, this designation will hang as a permanent albatross around CAIR's collective neck.

Massive Terrorist Plot! NYT: See Page 30
By Ben Johnson
FrontPageMagazine.com | June 4, 2007

This weekend, federal authorities foiled a stunning terrorist plot by Muslim extremists to kill thousands of our readers, strike the international transport grid, and depress the nation’s economy during its slowest quarter since late 2002 – but enough about that.
That was the message of Sunday’s New York Times.

The FBI had prevented four men, including a former member of Guyana’s parliament, from blowing up John F. Kennedy International Airport – and possibly part of Queens. They hoped to ignite underground fuel pipes, setting off a chain reaction of explosions that would envelop the entire complex. The NY Post and New York Daily News made it front page news. The NY Daily News headlined its story, “They Aimed to Kill Thousands.” The Post included a chilling sidebar, “Pipeline Security A Joke.”

The (inexplicably) most prestigious newspaper in the world put its bland story on page 30. Instead, page one featured yet another story about Guantanamo Bay detainees.

Any junior editor at any county newspaper in the country would have been fired for putting the most reported story in the nation two-and-a-half dozen pages into the well. Aside from burying a major international story that took place in its metro area, the Newspaper of Record took pains to make the Muslim battle plan that could have atomized a portion of its immediate readership appear utterly irrelevant.

The NYT began by obscuring the terrorists’ target. Although it faults the U.S. military for using the term “collateral damage,” the Times wrote as though the plotters only planned to blow up inanimate objects, certainly not human beings. Its opening line read, “Four men, including a onetime airport cargo handler and a former member of the Parliament of Guyana, were charged yesterday with plotting to blow up fuel tanks, terminal buildings and the web of fuel lines running beneath Kennedy International Airport.”

Secondly, it minimized the severity of the plot. JFK “was never in imminent danger because the plot was only in a preliminary phase and the conspirators had yet to lay out detailed plans or obtain financing or explosives.” Besides, “safety shut-off valves would almost assuredly have prevented an exploding airport fuel tank from igniting all or even part of the network.” Move along. Nothing to see here!

And, as they have for the last several plots (Ft. Dix, Miami, etc.), the Old Gray Lady portrayed the would-be mass killers as pathetic and sympathetic. Plot originator Russell Defreitas, 63, was “divorced and lost touch with his two children.” Once homeless, he moved into an apartment where “the weather was rough on his health and the cold was tough on his arthritis.” He now lives on “a run-down block full of graffiti.” He liked jazz, “especially the saxophone.” Friends described him as a “polite man” and “not that bright” – not bright enough to pull off a serious attack.

Much deeper into the story the crack staff fesses up: “Defreitas envisioned ‘the destruction of the whole of Kennedy” and theorized that because of underground pipes, ‘part of Queens would explode.’” He told his co-conspirators he wanted to inflict such massive loss of life that “even the twin towers can’t touch it.” Beyond crippling the U.S. economy (during a downturn), the move would have symbolic value, as well. Americans “love John F. Kennedy,” he said. “If you hit that, this whole country will be in mourning. It’s like you kill the man twice.” Apparently murdering the president’s brother once was not enough for Muslim extremists.

Later still, the Times notes that, while they weren’t al-Qaeda operatives, the four sought help from “extremist Muslim group based in Trinidad and Tobago called Jamaat al-Muslimeen.” They had “precise and extensive” surveillance of their target, which serves 1,000 flights a day. The quartet “was very familiar with the airport and how to access secure areas.” The plotters were motivated by “fundamentalist Islamic beliefs of a violent nature.” (Coincidentally, every terrorist who has killed Americans since the late Clinton administration has also shared “fundamentalist Islamic beliefs of a violent nature.” In fact, “Mr. Kadir, who, along with being a former elected official [in Guyana], is an imam.”) An unnamed law enforcement official told reporters they stopped the plot early for a reason: “if we let it go it could have gotten [serious]; they could have gotten the J.A.M. fully involved, and we wouldn’t know where it could have gone.”

Oh, and one of the plotters is still at large. Perhaps getting “J.A.M. fully involved” now. “The fourth suspect, Abdel Nur, 57, remained a fugitive.”

Too busy to concentrate on news that doesn’t fit, the Times featured another front page story in which the terrorist is portrayed as a victim, this one set in Gitmo. The story begins:

The facts of Omar Ahmed Khadr’s case are grim. The shrapnel from the grenade he is accused of throwing ripped through the skull of Sgt. First Class Christopher J. Speer, who was 28 when he died.

To American military prosecutors, Mr. Khadr is a committed Al Qaeda operative, spy and killer who must be held accountable for killing Sergeant Speer in 2002 and for other bloody acts he committed in Afghanistan.

But there is one fact that may not fit easily into the government’s portrait of Mr. Khadr: He was 15 at the time.

Not only a mere teen, Khadr is:

the youngest detainee at Guantanamo Bay, nearly blind in one eye from injuries sustained during the July 2002 firefight in which Sergeant Speer was mortally wounded and another American soldier was severely injured. Last week, Mr. Khadr said he wanted to fire all of his American lawyers, and some of them said they understood why he might distrust Americans after five years at Guantanamo. (Emphasis added.)

His lawyer, Muneer I. Ahmad is – surprise! – an associate professor at the American University Washington College of Law. Saith Ahmad, “If Omar had had his free choice, what he would have chosen to do is ride horses, play soccer and read Harry Potter books.”

Another innocent betrayed by Bush’s War on Terror! Just like Hillary Clinton.

Only in the 17th and 18th paragraphs of the story do we learn Omar’s father, Ahmed Said Khadr, was a “senior deputy to Osama bin Laden,” and one of his brothers told the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “We are an al-Qaeda family.”

Moreover, the story grudgingly acknowledges international law does not forbid the United States from doing precisely what it is with Omar. Not only is this a non-story, it is an old non-story. FrontPage Magazine covered The Littlest Jihadist as early as 2002 and has run numerous stories about this extremist family, with its extensive ties to the 9/11 plotters. But to the Times, his alleged suffering trumps the suffering of its own readers.

In addition to this meager coverage of a legitimate threat, the NYT editorial page had not a single editorial on the threat to its readers’ hometown, although Sunday’s issue had three editorials targeting President Bush, Dick Cheney, and the “harsh” jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas.

The decisions to put a story portraying the plight of Guantanamo Bay’s beleaguered terrorist population on page one and to ignore the JFK plot in its editorial coverage were transparently political moves. While Muslim extremists wage a hot war against the United States – often centered in one of the bluest cities of the nation – the Left sees its war on President Bush as infinitely more important. Why do anything that would put the spotlight on terrorism, vindicate the present administration, or – worse yet – perhaps elect a Republican in 2008? The NYT would not take that chance, and it had no difficulty altering its news coverage to fit that political template.

Ultimately, said Mark J. Mershon, the assistant director in charge of the FBI’s New York office, the JFK plotters based their actions on “a pattern of hatred toward the United States and the West in general.” One suspects the same could be said of the New York Times.

IRAQI TRIBAL LEADER SAYS ISLAMIC STATE HAS MORE WEAPONS THAN IRAQI
ARMY. Sheikh Abd al-Sattar Abu Rishah, head of the Al-Anbar Salvation
Council, told the London-based "Al-Hayat" that the Islamic State of
Iraq may have more weapons than the Iraqi Army, the daily reported on
June 2. Abu Rishah said that based on the tribes' seven months of
fighting the Islamic State in Al-Anbar Governorate, it appears the
group "has large armament capabilities, equal to the Iraqi security
forces' [capabilities] and even exceeds them." He contended that the
Islamic State systematically looted stockpiles in Al-Iskandariyah,
Al-Taji, Al-Mahmudiyah, and Al-Fallujah after the Hussein regime
collapsed in 2003. Meanwhile, tribal leader Sattay al-Anzi from
Karbala told the daily that militias and insurgent groups have
benefited from a strong arms trade due to Iraq's porous borders.
"Al-Amarah and Al-Basrah cities have become main outlets for
smuggling weapons from Iran and Kuwait," he added. KR

IRAQI LEADER SAYS CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION 'CANNOT CONTINUE'...
Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih told Al-Arabiyah television that
all political parties in Iraq agree that the current political
landscape in Iraq must change, the news channel reported on June 1.
"We undoubtedly have observations about the performance of the
government," he said, speaking about the Kurdish position. "The
political, sectarian, and nationalist quota system produced a
government that is not on the required level in various fields."
Salih said that parliament might consider a no-confidence vote. "Iraq
has a parliamentary system, and alliances change every now and then,"
he said. Referring to former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's efforts to
gain support for a nonsectarian-based national-unity government,
Salih said: "Iyad Allawi is our friend [and] we have good relations.
He discussed this issue [of a new front] with the Kurdish leaders. We
stressed the need to have an alliance for the moderates in Iraq and
in the Iraqi parliament.... We believe in the need to bring these
forces together so that they can serve as a political base for rule
in Iraq. Talks were held on this issue with Iyad Allawi and other
leaders in the [United Iraqi] Alliance and the Iraqi Accordance Front
and we continue to discuss this issue." KR