By Tim Kilbride
Special to American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, June 12, 2007 – The goal for Iraq's electrical sector is to meet roughly 50 percent of demand over the summer, a U.S. reconstruction official said.

Army Col. Michael Moon, director of electrical sector development for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Gulf Region Division, spoke with "bloggers" and online journalists on a June 9 conference call. He said he expected to have between 5,000 and 6,000 megawatts of power on the Iraqi grid by summer's end.
Steady generation of 5,000 megawatts would represent 56 percent of the electricity demand for the country and just over 50 percent of the demand for Baghdad, Moon said.
"One good, positive trend is that actually our generation numbers are increasing," he said. "It's been an upward trend for about the last 30 days, keeping in mind that demand has also been increasing during that time period."
Even upon reaching the 6,000-megawatt target in the near-term, Moon said, demand will continue to outstrip supply. But even at less than 100 percent, he noted, most Iraqis are receiving more power than they did under Saddam Hussein.
Prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003, Moon said, electricity was rationed as a political spoil. Baghdad was kept illuminated at the expense of the outlying provinces.
"After Operation Iraqi Freedom, 75 percent of Iraq automatically was receiving twice as much power as they did before," Moon observed. "Unfortunately for the residents of Baghdad who were used to that lion's share, they saw the reduction."
In light of rising demand, "the goal right now is to provide 10 to 12 hours of power daily throughout the country," Moon said. "And again, even before 2003, there (were) no 24-hour operations for electricity. ... And it's not necessarily our goal to get there, but that's just kind of the metrics."
Obstacles to progress abound, the colonel noted. The insurgency represents an omnipresent shadow on construction of a fully functioning national electrical grid, and transmission is affected as a result.
"It's so easy to disrupt the electrical system," Moon said. "It's so easy to pull down a tower and ... cause a blackout across the country."
As an example of the threat to the transmission sector, Moon pointed to a hydroelectric generating station in Anbar province.
"That was an isolated power-generation unit. ... And by linking it back to the grid, that has improved dramatically some of the electricity that's available and getting into Baghdad," he said. "Our big concern is that insurgents or terrorists are going to knock that line down again."
Never knowing when a portion of the national grid might go down makes it extraordinarily challenging to balance the power supply, Moon explained.
"If you get into the real technical parts of it, it is almost impossible to develop a national grid on a rolling blackout system," he said. "It's incredibly complex. It's technical. It requires a great deal of cooperation."
The challenge cannot be considered in the same context as the United States, where the electrical system has been refined over decades, Moon said.
"In our society, we've had 100-plus years of improving it and making it work with long-range planning always looking out ahead to meet ... the growth of our nation," he said. "That has not been the case in Iraq, where you've had infrastructure deterioration for over 20 years and they haven't had 24-hour electricity to begin with."
Similarly, he pointed out, the maturation of bureaucratic functions to oversee the industry takes a long time. While the United States has established agencies with clear regulations, Iraq is still learning to govern itself and share power at the national and provincial levels, he said.
"As much as we hate the bureaucracy in America, boy, I've really learned that it gets stuff done; it actually works. And the problem is, there is absolutely no bureaucracy here," Moon explained.
In the case of the Iraqi minister of electricity, he said, that translates to extreme political hurdles for every new project undertaken.
"His hands are virtually tied in terms of threshold limits that he can actually commit and authorize and has permission to use," Moon said. "Every project he's got to put together sort of a packet, and he's got to go brief the cabinet, he's got to brief the deputy prime minister, he's got to brief the prime minister. If that system was in place in America, the Cabinet official in charge of the Department of Energy wouldn't get squat done."
Inefficiencies at the national level often are misread for neglect and hostility at the provincial level, Moon noted.
"I can tell you, there's 18 governors ... throughout Iraq in the provinces, and they all think the minister of electricity's screwing them," Moon said. "It's the kind of guy that no matter what he does, somewhere somebody's going to hate him."
In fact, the colonel explained, the minister is a "technocrat" with a Ph.D. in electrical engineering.
"He is the kind of guy you need," Moon said. "He has grown up in the Iraqi electrical industry; he was a plant manager. He has worked many of these issues: generation, transmission. He knows what he needs to do. (However,) he doesn't have the resources; he doesn't always have the political backing."
Still, Moon noted, reconstruction of the electrical sector continues to hit milestones, bit by bit. If maintenance improves while generation capacity is increased up to 6,000 megawatts, Moon predicted, "that will definitely be a success."
Reaching that goal by the end of summer would allow coalition assets to switch focus to "serious maintenance" on the turbines and generators, Moon said, "in order to facilitate long-term growth and health of the system."
The colonel reiterated that where Iraq's power situation stands now vs. where it was in 2003 is well advanced from reasonable expectations and historical precedent.
"We forget sometimes how big a project we take on. We forget how big some of these issues are," he said. "But in context of the scope and scale and the security situation, we've got guys that are doing incredible work under arduous conditions, doing the best they can."
(Tim Kilbride is assigned to New Media, American Forces Information Service.)

Related Sites:
Department of Defense Bloggers' Roundtable
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division

By George Friedman
Russian President Vladmir Putin threw a classic Cold War curveball during his chat with U.S. President George W. Bush at the G-8 summit. Having totally opposed the creation of a U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Poland and the Czech Republic, Putin suddenly shifted his position, saying he might go along with a BMD system under certain conditions. The system, he said, would be acceptable if the United States used a Russian radar system placed in Azerbaijan and based its interceptor missiles anywhere else, such as on ships or in Turkey or Iraq -- anywhere but in Poland.
By rejecting the proposal, Washington would look hostile and uncompromising. Accepting it would mean basing the missiles near the Iranian border, possibly too close to intercept long-range missiles fired from there. Using Russian radar -- which currently is insufficient for U.S. needs -- would make the entire system dependent on Russian cooperation. And pulling the system from Poland would be a signal to Central Europe that military agreements with the United States are subject to negotiation with the Russians. That, of course, is exactly the signal Putin wants sent.
First, let's consider the BMD system itself. There are two criticisms of it, usually made by the same people. The first is that it won't work, and the second is that it is destabilizing. That the two statements are incompatible does not seem to faze most people. Therefore, it is necessary to begin by explaining the reason the BMD is such a passionate issue.
The foundation of stability during the Cold War was Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD. MAD was based on the certainty that an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), once launched, could not be blocked. With enough ICBMs, land- and submarine-launched, both the United States and Soviet Union could assure the destruction of the other side in the event of a nuclear exchange. That deterred nuclear risk-taking and stabilized the situation.
The introduction of a missile defense system threatened to change this equation. If one side created such a system, its destruction would no longer be assured, and it might choose to launch a nuclear attack against another side. Even if the effectiveness of the BMD system were uncertain, its very uncertainty created an unknown factor. Neither side could be sure the system would work -- one's own or the other's. In the hall of mirrors that constituted nuclear strategic thinking, the possibility that the other side might calculate probabilities different than you might force you to strike pre-emptively. Since the other side wouldn't know what you were thinking, it might strike pre-emptively. Thus, the existence of a BMD system that might not work was seen as increasing the chance of war.
The Soviets, however, had two very real fears when then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars. The first was that the United States might just create an effective BMD system. The Soviets had been burned too many times by underestimating U.S. technological capabilities to be as dismissive as Western critics. The second problem was that the Soviets could not match the system financially or technologically. If it failed to work, fine. But if the United States pulled it off, the Soviet Union would be wide open to attack without the ability to field its own system.
Therefore, the Soviets went ballistic because they were uncertain about the system's effectiveness. They carried out diplomatic attacks against the system and encouraged its Western critics -- and critics of the Reagan administration in general -- to do all they could to block the system. As it was, Star Wars couldn't be made to work at the time, but if you were to have listened to the Soviets on the subject in the mid-1980s, you would have thought the United States was on the verge of annihilating the Soviets with Star Wars. By then, the Soviets' nerves were pretty well shot. They were generally on the ropes, and knew it.
Since those days, the concept of a BMD system has been seen as a technical impossibility that nevertheless is dangerous and destabilizing. There might have been an element of truth to that, but it is difficult to describe a system designed to block one or two missiles fired by a rogue state as destabilizing. MAD is not in effect, for example, with an Iranian or North Korean missile launch. There is no balance to destabilize. An argument could be made that the system doesn't work. You also could argue that the cheapest and most effective solution to an Iranian missile launch is a pre-emptive strike against the Iranian missile site. But it is hard to argue that the existence of a small defensive system of uncertain effectiveness and geared to look at a third party increases the probability of an American-Russian nuclear war.
But the complexities of nuclear deterrence against Third World countries with minor nuclear ambitions are not what Putin was thinking about when he made his offer to the United States. Rather, Putin was thinking about Poland, its role in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU), and its relationship to the United States. That's what really is worrying Putin, and the BMD issue is merely a lever to deal with the larger geopolitical issues. In other words, this isn't about missile defense, but about a U.S. military presence -- no matter how small -- in Poland.
Ever since the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Russians have been shifting their foreign policy to reassert their sphere of influence in the FSU. In their view, the Andropov experiment of trading geopolitical influence for economic benefits with the West has failed. The benefits failed to solve their problems when they materialized, and the geopolitical concessions have created massive insecurity for the Russian Federation. Therefore, reclaiming Moscow's sphere of influence is the primary issue, starting with Ukraine.
The Russians blamed the Americans for Ukraine, but they also have blamed Poland. Of all of the former European satellites, Poland has been the most openly anti-Russian and the most active in supporting forces in the FSU that also are resisting Russian resurgence. This was shown recently in the Baltic states, particularly Estonia, where Russians have been angered over what is portrayed as increasingly repressive moves toward the local Russian population. The relocation of a monument to the Red Army for liberating Estonia from Germany led to riots by ethnic Russians. Moscow deliberately intensified the crisis, warning the Estonians not to take actions against Russians.
The Russians have a particular problem with the Baltic countries, in that they have been admitted to NATO. The Russians believed they had an understanding with NATO and the United States, dating back to the fall of the Soviet Union, that NATO would not be extended into Central Europe -- and certainly never into the FSU. Obviously, though, many Central European countries have joined NATO. The induction of the Baltic countries, which brought NATO within 60 miles of St. Petersburg, angered the Russians but was grudgingly seen as the price of the Andropov doctrine. However, it was post-Orange Revolution talk of including Ukraine in NATO that drove the Russians to reverse policy.
The Poles, given their long history, are not a trustful or secure people. They view the Russians as merely recovering from a setback, not permanently vanquished. They also have no love or trust for the Germans. Historically trapped on the hard-to-defend northern European plain, equally afraid of both Russians and Germans, the Poles have always looked to an outside power as a protector. Even the experience of French and British guarantees in World War II has not soured them on this strategy, since it is the only one they've got. And that means the Poles now are relying on American guarantees.
But the Poles also badly need a buffer between them and the Russians. They want independent Baltic states in NATO. They want Ukraine in NATO. If there was any way to swing it, they would want Belarus in NATO. They want the Russians kept as far from them as possible. So long as they feel they have U.S. guarantees, they will do everything they can to create blocks to a return of Russia to the frontiers of the FSU.
The Russian view is that the Poles are being encouraged and emboldened by the United States. The missile defense system in Poland is not important in and of itself. It certainly doesn't affect Russia's ability to launch a nuclear strike. But as a symbol of a Polish-U.S. alliance that transcends NATO, it is absolutely vital. The Poles wanted the missiles in their country to symbolize the link, and the Americans wanted them there for the same reason. As long as that link exists, the Poles feel secure, and as long as the Poles feel secure, they will be a thorn in the side of the Russians. The Russian goal of exerting a sphere of influence in the FSU has a broader component. Russia does not expect to regain influence in most of Central Europe -- Serbia possibly excepted. It does want the Central Europeans to be sufficiently wary of the Russians as to exercise caution. Most of the rest of Central Europe tries hard not to get in Russia's way. The Russians want to solidify this posture and extend it to Poland while they redefine the status of the Baltics.
If the Russians can get the Americans to withdraw the missiles from Poland, placing them in Azerbaijan, on ships at sea or in downtown Moscow, the Russians will have achieved their goal. The Russians have a lingering distaste for the BMD. But the real issue is to force a U.S. retreat from Poland. That would shake Polish -- and broader European -- confidence in the U.S. commitment, sober the rest of an already cautious Central Europe and certainly cause the Balts to rethink their posture toward Russia.
If the United States refused to shift the system, this would give the Russians a lever with the Germans. Moscow could then go to the Germans (who still are smarting over a couple of brief cut-offs of natural gas from Russia) and argue that the Americans are triggering another Cold War by their inflexible commitment to basing in Poland when Russia has offered a set of workable alternatives. Whatever German Chancellor Angela Merkel's view of geopolitics, the German public does not want a replay of the Cold War -- and wants Poland to be quiet.
There is also, as in all good Cold War games, a domestic political component. The United States has enjoyed meddling in Russian politics for the past 15 years or so. This gives Putin a chance at payback. At a time when the Bush administration is both politically weak and quite distracted, painting the administration as being inflexible and aggressive, courting another ill-conceived confrontation over a weapon that doesn't work anyway, is a low-risk, high-gain proposition. The New York Times already bit on the bait with an editorial praising Russian flexibility.
The administration's geopolitical problem is obvious. It has too many irons in the fire and a couple of them -- Iraq and Afghanistan -- are white hot. The Russians are deliberately raising the stakes over the Polish system because they see the Bush administration's last two years as a golden opportunity to redefine their sphere of influence. If the United States resists Russia's suggestions, Russia can make inroads in Germany and the rest of Western Europe while causing more domestic political pressure on an administration that already is in the red zone when it comes to political weakness. If Washington compromises, the Russians can use that in Central Europe as evidence of the United States' lack of commitment and of a need for the Central Europeans to rethink their position. It particularly puts the Baltic states in a difficult position. Poland alone (or with the tiny Baltic states) certainly is not a sufficient counterweight to Russia.
Putin's move, therefore, was brilliantly timed and conceived. He took an issue that is controversial in its own right and used it as a geopolitical lever, striking hard at a relationship that is most troubling to Moscow. The Washington-Warsaw relationship represents a serious regional challenge to Russian ambitions. If the Russians can get an American retreat on the anti-missile system in Poland, they can begin the process of unraveling the U.S. position in Central Europe. Since the Western Europeans wouldn't mind in the least, there are possibilities here.
But the possibilities are not the same ones that existed during the Cold War, or even as recently as three years ago. Any region with three dozen states -- read: Europe -- is a dynamic place where governments regularly come and go. By the end of June, the three major European leaders who demonstrated the greatest affinity for Russia during their terms -- German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair -- will all be gone. Their replacements, and the replacements of similar governments throughout Europe, are largely Russo-skeptic. But they also are not instinctual European federalists.
This both destroys and creates opportunities for Moscow. The Kremlin is now facing a Europe that is actually more hostile to it than a similar pan-European alignment of the 1980s. Simultaneously, the unraveling of the European project means that, though the overall region is certainly more suspicious, Russia's ability to peel off individual states from the whole, either with sweet talk or intimidation, could actually prove easier.
And nowhere will it be easier than Serbia. The Russians have made it clear that they do not favor an independent Kosovo. Friendly with Serbia, and very unhappy with the way the Kosovo war was handled by the United States, the Russians could well choose to create a second confrontation over the future of Kosovo, testing both the Americans and Western Europeans at the same time. The Russians now have very little to lose and quite a bit to gain from confrontation.

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by Daniel Pipes
New York Sun
June 12, 2007
http://www.danielpipes.org/article/4634
[With slight differences from the NY Sun version]

Barring a "catastrophic development," Middle East Newsline reports, George Bush has decided not to attack Iran. An administration source explains that Washington deems Iran's cooperation "needed for a withdrawal [of U.S. forces] from Iraq."

If correct, this implies the Jewish state stands alone against a regime that threatens to "wipe Israel off the map" and is building the nuclear weapons to do so. Israeli leaders are hinting that their patience is running out; Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz just warned that "diplomatic efforts should bear results by the end of 2007."

Can the Israel Defense Forces in fact disrupt Iran's nuclear program?

Top secret analyses from intelligence agencies normally reply to such a question. But talented outsiders, using open sources, can also try their hand. Whitney Raas and Austin Long studied this problem at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and published their impressive analysis, "Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities," in the journal International Security.

Raas and Long focus exclusively on feasibility, not political desirability or strategic ramifications: Were the Israeli national command to decide to damage the Iranian infrastructure, could its forces accomplish this mission? The authors consider five components of a successful strike:



The Natanz uranium enrichment facility.Intelligence: To impede the production of fissile material requires incapacitating only three facilities of Iran's nuclear infrastructure. In ascending order of importance, these are: the heavy water plant and plutonium production reactors under construction at Arak, a uranium conversion facility in Isfahan, and a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Destroying the Natanz facility in particular, they note, "is critical to impeding Iran's progress toward nuclearization."

Ordnance: To damage all three facilities with reasonable confidence requires – given their size, their being underground, the weapons available to the Israeli forces, and other factors – twenty-four 5,000-lb. weapons and twenty-four 2,000-lb. weapons.



An F-15IPlatforms: Noting the "odd amalgamation of technologies" available to the Iranians and the limitations of their fighter planes and ground defenses to stand up to the high-tech Israeli air force, Raas-Long calculate that the IDF needs a relatively small strike package of twenty-five F-15Is and twenty-five F-16Is.

Routes: Israeli jets can reach their targets via three paths: Turkey to the north, Jordan and Iraq in the middle, or Saudi Arabia to the south. In terms of fuel and cargo, the distances in all three cases are manageable.

Defense forces: Rather than predict the outcome of an Israeli-Iranian confrontation, the authors calculate how many out of the 50 Israeli planes would have to reach their three targets for the operation to succeed. They figure 24 planes must reach Natanz, 6 to Isfahan, and 5 to Arak, or 35 all together. Turned around, that means the Iranian defenders minimally must stop 16 of 50 planes, or one-third of the strike force. The authors consider this attrition rate "considerable" for Natanz and "almost unimaginable" for the other two targets.

In all, Raas-Long find that the relentless modernization of Israel's air force gives it "the capability to destroy even well-hardened targets in Iran with some degree of confidence." Comparing an Iranian operation to Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, which was a complete success, they find this one "would appear to be no more risky" than the earlier one.

The great question mark hanging over the operation, one which the authors do not speculate about, is whether any of the Turkish, Jordanian, American, or Saudi governments would acquiesce to Israeli penetration of their air spaces. (Iraq, recall, is under American control). Unless the Israelis win advance permission to cross these territories, their jets might have to fight their way to Iran. More than any other factor, this one imperils the entire project. (The IDF could reduce this problem by flying along borders, for example, the Turkey-Syria one, permitting both countries en route to claim Israeli planes were in the other fellow's air space.)

Raas-Long imply but do not state that the IDF could reach Kharg Island, through which over 90 percent of Iranian oil is exported, heavily damaging the Iranian economy.

That Israeli forces have "a reasonable chance of success" unilaterally to destroy key Iranian nuclear facilities could help deter Tehran from proceeding with its weapon program. The Raas-Long study, therefore, makes a diplomatic deal more likely. Its results deserve the widest possible dissemination.

Mr. Pipes (www.DanielPipes.org), director of the Middle East Forum, taught for two years at the U.S. Naval War College.

Other items in category Iran
Other items in category Israel

June 12, 2007
Are they states or nations?

2nd map for the day: US States Renamed For Countries With Similar GDPs

My main thought on viewing this map was: World's oldest multinational economic union indeed.

Posted by Sean Meade on June 12, 2007 4:05 PM Permalink | Comments (0)
One Leviathan, many SysAdmins

John Weitzer writes:

Tom - didn't know if you had seen this. Everyone else is a role player. We are the only when left, as you say, that can project force everywhere.
The item (one occurrence):

The World's Top 10 Military Spenders
Monday June 11, 8:26 am ET
By The Associated Press
A Glance at the World's Top 10 Military Spenders
The world's top 10 military spenders in 2006. The list shows the amount each country spent on weapons in 2005 dollars, and the share of world arms expenditures.

1. United States, $528.7 billion, 46 percent
2. Britain, $59.2 billion, 5 percent
3. France, $53.1 billion, 5 percent
4. China, $49.5 billion, 4 percent
5. Japan, $43.7 billion, 4 percent
6. Germany, $37.0 billion, 3 percent
7. Russia, $34.7 billion, 3 percent
8. Italy, $29.9 billion, 3 percent
9. Saudi Arabia, $29.0 billion, 3 percent
10. India, $23.9 billion, 2 percent

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Tom says:

A view of the world: one Leviathan, many SysAdmin helpers.
I say: One more reason not to believe the hype about China as a threat.

GMT 6-12-2007 16:13:15
Assyrian International News Agency
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(AINA) -- Abreast of recent religious-political scrutiny, Kirkuk Monsignor Archbishop Louis Sako and other religious pundits have heavily criticized any exclusivity of a province or region for the "Christians" or "Indigenous Assyrian" people of Iraq. It is indisputable to not only agree with their experience driven conclusions, but to actually formulate their analyses. In order to uphold the full sovereignty and champion the stability of Iraq, it is pivotal to curb the growing sectarian or religious sentiments from fiddling with the autonomy of the state. Drawing borders around regions exclusive to a certain religion, ethnicity, or tribe spells pure and raw disaster while laying the groundwork for the ultimate fragmentation of Iraq into clusters of clashing hot sectarian zones.


In recent days, these same reports1 and testimonials from religious and news outlets that rightfully expose the dangers of ethnic and religious region carve-outs have irresponsibly shrouded an ally, the Nineveh Plains Administrative Area (NPAA) proposal, in much ambiguity. What Msgr. Sako asserts is in exact and precise accordance with what both the Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project and the Assyrian Democratic Movement have deduced in this proposal--a self-determination region contingent on geographic area without political, ethnic, or religious fidelities.


The NPAA stresses the importance of preserving and flourishing the anomalous trait of the Nineveh Plains as the peaceful crossroads of all fabrics of Iraqi life and culture. The small region of the Nineveh Plains is home to a thriving and communal population of Assyrian (also known as Chaldean and Syriac), Turkomen, Yezidis, Shabaks, Kurds, and Arabs. Within this northern triangle is a flickering symbol of the successes of the multi-pluralism of Iraq. This harmonious community must not be threatened with either ethnic or religious exclusivity, but braced with a democratic administrative unit that will be the sure indicator of and supporter for the success of universal Iraqi democracy and brotherhood.


The Church authorities in Iraq who have suffered the brunt of sectarian and religious waves of violence against the Indigenous Assyrian and Christian Iraqi minority, have heroically stated that it is "against the Christian Gospel" to create a haven purely for a distinct religion. It is agreed that the religions of a state must not be separated from the fabrics of the daily Iraqi life and placed in bordered ghettos. This is exactly why the NPAA does not incorporate neither religious nor ethnic qualifications for the geographic contingent administrative unit proposal.


The churches and their prelates in Iraq should remain part of the underlying and universal fabrics of Iraqi culture, and to preach and practice the Christian Gospel, while the political units strive for a more democratic and stable state with ethnic and religious pluralism as a basis for the new Iraq.


The NPAA not only is misrepresented in recent days by various media outlets partaking in knee-jerk analyses, but it is being criticized for qualities that are non-existent; it does not advocate for any ethnic or religious sanctuary. Within the vast pages of history, there is evidence ad infinitum to rule against any formation of an ethnic or religious inspired enclave. With that, the NPAA proposal integrates the successes and basis of democracy with the tolerance towards ethnic and religious diversity for a democratic region well within the rights of the Iraqi constitution.


An administrative unit that bolsters the unity and equality of Iraq's minority and majority protected from the engulfing sectarian strife and the expanding northern Kurdification is the key to the success of Iraq's democracy. This can only be accomplished when leaders and pundits partake in responsible journalism and careful analysis. In the end, the quest of an autonomous regions lies within the hearts and minds of the Nineveh Plains inhabitants.


1 AsiaNews June 11 , June 9 , June 9 , June 8 , June 7 , June 6

By Joseph Danavi

Joseph Danavi is a senior in Molecular Cellular Biology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is the founder of the Assyrian Chaldean Syriac Student Movement in Chicago.
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