April 30, 2007
Sunni Bloc Threatens to Pull Ministers From Cabinet

By ALISSA J. RUBIN
The largest bloc of Sunni Arabs in the Iraqi Parliament threatened to withdraw its ministers from the Shiite-dominated cabinet today in frustration over the Iraq government’s failure to deal with Sunni concerns.

President Bush stepped in to forestall the move, calling one of Iraq’s two vice presidents, Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni Arab, and inviting him to Washington, Mr. Hashimi’s office said in a written statement.

The bloc, known as the Iraqi Consensus Front and made up of three Sunni Arab parties, “has lost hope in rectifying the situation despite all of its sincere and serious efforts to do so,” the statement said.

If the Sunni group followed through on its threat, it would further weaken a government already damaged by the pullout two weeks ago of six cabinet ministers aligned with the renegade Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr and further erode American efforts to promote reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites.

Also on Monday, the White House expressed concern about a report in The Washington Post that aides to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki were involved in the arrests or removal of at least 16 army and police commanders, at least nine of whom are Sunni, who had been fighting Shiite militias.

“We’re aware of the reports, we’re concerned about them, and those are the kinds of things we do discuss with the Iraqis that will be a focus of conversations,” said the White House spokesman, Tony Snow. But he added that the Maliki government has taken aggressive enforcement actions in Shiite neighborhoods in the past.

As the Sunni cabinet ministers were threatening to withdraw on Monday, bombs and mortars took the lives of at least 22 Iraqis. American and Iraqi soldiers squelched a three-pronged attack in Mosul by insurgents who struck at the main American military base, a police station and a provincial government center.

At least 104 United States troops lost their lives in hostile actions in Iraq in April, the highest of any month so far this year. Another 13 deaths among other allied forces have been reported, making it the highest monthly death toll for all allied forces in more than two years. Military reporting typically lags at least 24 hours so the final total for the month could be higher.

In his phone call with President Bush, Mr. Hashimi “talked frankly about the faltering political process,” the statement from his office said.

The concerns the Sunnis say the government has failed to address include a fair distribution of oil revenues, a de-Baathification process that has barred many Sunnis from participating in the government and the operation of Shiite militias within government security forces.

If the Sunni bloc pulled its five ministers from the cabinet, it would be a stark reflection of the difficulty Mr. Maliki’s government has had in mustering support from a broad spectrum of Iraqis. The Shiite ministers who walked out two weeks ago have yet to be replaced.

Such a move would also undo part of the work of Zalmay Khalilzad, the former United States ambassador, who spent much of his time persuading Sunnis to participate in the government.

The bloc has 44 representatives in the 275-member Parliament.

Neither Mr. Sadr’s bloc nor Mr. Hashimi’s has threatened to pull out of the Parliament, so technically the government would remain standing, but more cabinet resignations would seriously undermine efforts to move forward on legislation needed to ensure that Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds all feel they have a stake in the government.

Members of the Sunni bloc said it had not yet decided to pull out its ministers but that it was divided between those who wanted to pull out immediately and those who worried that pulling out would diminish the bloc’s influence on government policy even further.

“The first group is enraged by what is going on and is pushing for withdrawal saying that there is no use of staying in the government,” said Nasir al-Ani, a member of the Sunni bloc in the parliament.

“The second group takes a rational approach and is not in favor of withdrawing, but prefers to try to work within the government to deal with the problems,” he said.

There was a serious debate under way prompted by the continued lack of services to Sunni areas of Baghdad. For months, those areas have been deprived of adequate amounts of food rations, electrical power and hospital supplies.

In the last several days, the Iraqi Army has worsened the situation by occupying one of the few hospitals used by Sunnis on the heavily Shiite east side of Baghdad, according to politicians. Doctors at the Al-Numann hospital said that patients had been frightened by the presence of soldiers and that most had left the hospital.

“The problem is not just with the sectarian practices, but with the government’s ineffectiveness,” said Mr. al-Ani, who has been involved in the meetings, but emphasized that he was speaking for himself and not for the bloc.

“We see a lot of problems in Karkh on the western side of Baghdad, where the government is invisible. People are suffering and the government can not solve the problems,” he said.

A cabinet minister who is not from the Sunni bloc said that while Mr. Maliki has a difficult job, he had failed to make an effort to get the government to work. “He said he was going to appoint new ministers; he needs to do that. What is he waiting for?” said the minister, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the situation.

The heavily fortified Green Zone, where the American and British embassies are located, suffered its second serious mortar attack in two weeks on Monday night when it was hit by a volley of mortars. The attack set off sirens and loudspeaker broadcast messages warning residents that “cellphones are for emergency use only” and to “duck and cover.” There was no immediate information on whether there were any casualties.

In Khalis, a town near the Iranian border, a suicide bomber killed 16 people and injured 27 when he detonated his explosives next to the funeral tent, where relatives and friends were mourning the death of a civilian, according to a local police source.

Three people died from roadside bombs in Baghdad, and a suicide bomb in the Western Bayaa neighborhood killed one person, according to an Interior ministry official. A suicide car bomb in the Harithia neighborhood killed two. Nine bodies were found in Baghdad, the Interior ministry official said.

In the usually quiet Khadimiya neighborhood, which is entirely Shiite, a peaceful demonstration was interrupted by heavy gunfire in a fight between soldiers at an Iraqi checkpoint and a gunmen aiming at a passing Iraqi army convoy.

The shootout may have been tied to repercussions from a raid on Sunday by the American military on the local office of Moktada al-Sadr . Acting on intelligence, the American and Iraqi soldiers had been searching for a group of individuals they believed were meeting in the area. They were attacked by small arms fire.

The American military in a statement said that one Iraqi Army soldier and eight extremists were killed and that none of the individuals that the operation had targeted were captured.

In the Mosul attacks, insurgents popped out from manholes near the police station and fired rocket-propelled grenades while three suicide car bombs exploded near the station, said Lt. Col. Eric Welsh, commander of the single American combat battalion in Mosul.

An American patrol responding to the attack killed at least six insurgents in a firefight, the colonel said. At least one American soldier and four Iraqi policemen were injured in the battle, which some soldiers said took place along a one-kilometer stretch of road.

Insurgents in Mosul have been able to carry out highly organized assaults in the past, most notably in November 2004, when they overran police stations and got virtually the entire police force to join them or leave their jobs.

Reporting was contributed by Edward Wong, Ali Adeeb, Wisam A. Habeeb and Ahmad Fadam in Baghdad, and Iraqi employees of The New York Times in Diyala and Mosul.

April 30, 2007
Memo From Istanbul
In Turkey, Fear About Religious Lifestyle

By SABRINA TAVERNISE
ISTANBUL, April 29 — When hundreds of thousands of protesters filled the streets of Istanbul on Sunday, it may have looked like a protest of government policy.

It was not.

Behind the slogans and signs of marchers in Istanbul on Sunday and in Ankara two weeks ago was something much more basic: a fear of the lifestyles of their more religious compatriots.

Some concerns were snobbish: religious Turks were uneducated and poor, their pesky prayer rugs got underfoot in hospital halls.

Others were less elitist and had more personal worries: how much tolerance for our secular lifestyles will an emerging class of religious Turks have?

“These people are from poor areas; they just don’t know what the government stands for,” said Aysel Tuikman, 39, a civil servant wearing a skirt, a sweater, beige pumps and pearls. “They’re only being manipulated. We are here for their good also.”

“People here are the real Turkey,” she said, waving a flag high above her head.

It is an emotional reaction to a relatively new layering of society that began 20 years ago but has accelerated recently. A massive migration from rural areas to Turkey’s cities and a large-scale economic boom have drawn an entirely new class of religious Turks from the country’s heartland into the life of its secular cities.

The class is represented by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is challenging the secular elite, forcing a presidential candidate upon them whom they find completely distasteful.

On Friday, the military gave him a warning. It has ousted four elected governments since 1960, and seemed to be considering whether to make Mr. Erdogan’s the fifth. On Sunday, Mr. Erdogan gave a warning of his own: He will continue to push his candidate, an action that will probably lead to early national elections.

Secular Turks fear that Mr. Erdogan has a secret agenda to impose Islamic law on Turkey and that his party’s move to secure the presidency, the highest seat of secularism in Turkey, is one of the final steps needed to start that process.

Mr. Erdogan, for his part, came from Turkey’s political Islamic movements of the 1990s, but he broke with them and formed his own, which swept national elections in 2002. He has said that he would keep religion out of policy decisions, and for the most part, he has.

But for the protesters on Sunday, that was not enough.

“They say they’ve changed, but look at their wives,” said Yalcin Turkdogan, 61, an architect who had not been to a protest since 1977. Mr. Erdogan’s wife wears a head scarf.

For Sevim Erzen, a retired civil servant at a protest in Ankara earlier this month, the number of women in head scarves moving into her wealthy Istanbul neighborhood was disturbing. “They have started to look down on us,” she said. “They are trying to be part of the ruling class.”

The message of secularist protesters, said Metin Heper, a professor at Bilkent University in Ankara, was this: “We are uncomfortable with the lifestyles of these people.”

“They fear these people, but these fears are groundless,” he said. “Gradually, they will see that these people are no different from themselves.”

Prejudices among secular Turks have their roots in Turkey’s education system, Mr. Heper said. “Education here teaches that if you are a practicing Muslim, you are an ignorant person who will bring the country back to the Middle Ages,” he said.

M. Hakan Yavuz, the author of “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey,” describes being shocked at the rigidity in the political science department at Ankara University, where he got his undergraduate degree, compared with the village where he grew up, where interpretations of the teachings of a thinker of Sufism, a mystic branch of Sunni Islam, were welcomed everywhere.

“It was not a dialogue, but rather a carefully structured program of indoctrination,” Mr. Yavuz writes in the preface of his book, published by Oxford University Press in 2003, referring to his education at Ankara.

One of the problems for the secularists is that the elite never fully redefined the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the visionary who founded the Turkish state in 1923. It did not change with the times. The main secular political party, the Republican People’s Party, lacks agile leaders who can articulate a unifying vision for the diverse secular groups.

They never had to. The most recent attempt by a pro-Islamic party to run the country, in 1997, ended in the military pushing it out of power.

Gokay Gedik, a 20-year-old student at Marmara University here who had come to the protest on Sunday with his friends, all members of the same rock band, said the Republican People’s Party was all talk and no action.

“Blah, blah, blah,” added his friend, who had a pierced eyebrow and dreadlocks.

Secular Turks worry that the new class of religious migrants could potentially be a force for radicalism. Large groups of new migrants to cities propelled revolutions in Iran and in Russia.

But in Turkey, the class owns businesses and has become better off in the recent economic boom. It values stability in society.

The new mingling in secular urban areas has had a quieter effect, raising emotional questions like whether to separate the sexes in public swimming pools or change the curriculum in schools to include more religious instruction.

Questions about how tolerant the new class of society will be of secular lifestyles is of vital importance to secular Turks, but they go unaddressed by Mr. Erdogan’s party. In part, that is because the party is under fire by the secular establishment, which seizes on any opportunity to find evidence of Mr. Erdogan’s Islamic influence.

“Even if Erdogan walked on water, the secularists wouldn’t believe him,” said Morton Abramowitz, a former American ambassador to Turkey who is a senior fellow at The Century Foundation, a nonpartisan research group.

Mr. Erdogan dodges direct discussion of religion, preferring instead to cite his party’s glowing economic achievements, which his secular critics often dismiss. “Some have eyes but cannot see,” he said in a speech this month. “Some have tongues but cannot speak the truth. They have ears but can’t hear. That’s where the problem is.”

Then, in an earnest cry of incomprehension: “What makes you so uncomfortable?”

But his silence has fed the worries of secular Turks, who fear that their freedoms will be curtailed by the rank and file of Mr. Erdogan’s party, who have grown up in conservative communities largely separated by sex.

“There is a feeling of my rights being taken away,” said Guldal Okutucu, the leader of the women’s branch of the Republican People’s Party, “of pressure that tries to push me into a secondary role.”

Sebnem Arsu contributed reporting.

Maliki's Office Is Seen Behind Purge in Forces
Some Commanders Had Pursued Militias
By Joshua Partlow
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, April 30, 2007; A01

BAGHDAD, April 29 -- A department of the Iraqi prime minister's office is playing a leading role in the arrest and removal of senior Iraqi army and national police officers, some of whom had apparently worked too aggressively to combat violent Shiite militias, according to U.S. military officials in Baghdad.

Since March 1, at least 16 army and national police commanders have been fired, detained or pressured to resign; at least nine of them are Sunnis, according to U.S. military documents shown to The Washington Post.

Although some of the officers appear to have been fired for legitimate reasons, such as poor performance or corruption, several were considered to be among the better Iraqi officers in the field. The dismissals have angered U.S. and Iraqi leaders who say the Shiite-led government is sabotaging the military to achieve sectarian goals.

"Their only crimes or offenses were they were successful" against the Mahdi Army, a powerful Shiite militia, said Brig. Gen. Dana J.H. Pittard, commanding general of the Iraq Assistance Group, which works with Iraqi security forces. "I'm tired of seeing good Iraqi officers having to look over their shoulders when they're trying to do the right thing."

The issue strikes at a central question about the fledgling government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki: whether it can put sectarian differences aside to deliver justice fairly. During earlier security crackdowns in Baghdad, Maliki was criticized for failing to target Shiite militias, in particular the Mahdi Army, which is led by hard-line Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, one of Maliki's political supporters. Before the most recent Baghdad security plan was launched in February, Maliki repeatedly declared he would target militants regardless of their sect.

Iraqi government officials denied that security force commanders have faced political pressure and said that Maliki is committed to targeting all criminals equally.

Sadiq al-Rikabi, a political adviser to Maliki, said the first two months of the Baghdad security plan show that Maliki "is not working on any agenda but the national agenda."

"The Baghdad security plan is working on a military and professional basis without any regard for any sect or ethnic group or any political factors," he said.

But some U.S. military officials say politics remains among the greatest hindrances to the development of the Iraqi security forces -- a top priority for Americans in Iraq. Col. Ehrich Rose, chief of the Military Transition Team with the 4th Iraqi Army Division, who has spent several years working with foreign armies, said the Iraqi officer corps is riddled with divergent loyalties to different sects, tribes and political groups.

"The Iraqi army, as far as capability goes, I'd stack them up against just about any Latin American army I've dealt with," he said. "However, the politicization of their officer corps is the worst I've ever seen."

At the national level, some U.S. officials are increasingly concerned about the Office of the Commander in Chief, a behind-the-scenes department that works on military issues for the prime minister.

One adviser in the office, Bassima Luay Hasun al-Jaidri, has enough influence to remove and intimidate senior commanders, and her work has "stifled" many officers who are afraid of angering her, a senior U.S. military official said. U.S. commanders are considering installing a U.S. liaison officer in the department to better understand its influence.

"Her office harasses [Iraqi commanders] if they are nationalistic and fair," said the U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity out of concern over publicly criticizing the Iraqi government. "They need to get rid of her and her little group."

A senior Iraqi army official said he plans to seek assistance from Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, in limiting the office's interference in the daily duties of the military. "We need his help to stop these noises," the official said on condition of anonymity because of the issue's sensitivity.

Officials close to Maliki denied that Jaidri or her office were influencing or removing leaders in the security forces. Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said no political pressure was being placed on any military or police officers, and that U.S. military officials were "exaggerating" Jaidri's role in the government. "She has no connection with the Ministry of Defense," he said.

Jaidri could not be reached for comment Sunday.

But according to documents and U.S. officials, political interference appears to have affected some of the most senior Iraqi officers.

Maj. Gen. Abdulla Mohammed Khamis al-Dafi is a Sunni who commands the 9th Iraqi Army Division, based in Baghdad, and is responsible for eastern Baghdad, home to such predominantly Shiite districts as Sadr City. On April 23, he told U.S. military officials he was determined to resign because of repeated "interference" from the prime minister's staff, according to portions of a report on the situation that was read to The Washington Post.

Maj. Gen. Husayn Jasim Abd al-Awadi is a Shiite who was "assessed as combating militia influences" in his work with the national police, but three Iraqi generals said he would be replaced and all "agreed that Dr. Bassima played a role in the decision to fire" him, according to a separate U.S. military document marked secret.

Another national police battalion commander, Col. Nadir Abd Al-Razaq Abud al-Jaburi, has been "known to pass accurate and actionable intelligence" about the Mahdi Army, the report said, adding that U.S. military officials describe him "as professional, non-sectarian, and focused on gaining support of the populace."

Yet he was detained April 6 under an Interior Ministry warrant for allegedly supporting Sunni insurgents, the document said.

The report also outlines the case of Lt. Col. Ahmad Yousif Ibrahim Kjalil, a Sunni battalion commander in the 6th Iraqi Army Division, based in Baghdad. He was allegedly fired by Jaidri but reinstated with another general's help. "He eventually resigned after at least five attempts on his life and one attempt on his children," the report said.

Col. Ali Fadil Amran Khatab al-Abedi, a Sunni who leads the 2nd Battalion, 5th Brigade of the 6th Iraqi Army Division, was ordered arrested by the prime minister's office on April 17, the report said. Lt. Col. Emad Kahlif Abud al-Mashadani, a Sunni commander with the 1st Iraqi National Police Division, was detained April 15, the report said.

After the massive bombing in Baghdad's Sadriya market this month, Maliki ordered the arrest and investigation of a Shiite army battalion commander responsible for security in the area. A U.S. official said the commander was subsequently released and has fled.

A spokesman for the Interior Ministry, which oversees the national police, said his agency removes only officers who have committed crimes or whose political and sectarian leanings influence their work. An estimated 14,000 Interior Ministry employees have been purged for criminal behavior or ties to insurgents or militias, according to the spokesman, Gen. Abdul Karim Khalaf Qanani.

"Any officer whose allegiance to a political party or sect we have proved will be kicked out of the ministry," he said. "Working for a Sunni or Shiite sect, this is not appropriate at the Ministry of Interior. One should work only for Iraq."

Special correspondent Saad al-Izzi in Baghdad contributed to this report.

How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War

by Efraim Inbar
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2007
http://www.meforum.org/article/1686

Israel's leadership was ill-prepared for the summer 2006 war against Hezbollah. Israeli politicians and planners displayed strategic blindness. While denying the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) victory, they squandered an opportunity to destroy the bulk of Hezbollah's military presence in southern Lebanon, settle regional scores, enhance Israel's deterrence, and strengthen Jerusalem's alliance with Washington.

The Failure of Deterrence

For more than six years, between Israel's May 2000 unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon and the outbreak of war in July 2006, Israeli officials sought to contain the Hezbollah threat. Preoccupied with a renewed Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza and a protracted terrorist campaign, Israel policymakers hoped restraint would suffice. They stuck to their policy despite such Hezbollah provocations as soldier abductions, Katyusha barrages, and cross-border terrorist attacks.[1] Not only would a tough response against Hezbollah risk a second front and perhaps escalation with Syria but Israeli politicians were loath to disrupt the economic development in northern Israel that followed the Lebanon withdrawal.[2]

This does not mean that Israeli officials did not take Hezbollah seriously. After leaving southern Lebanon, Israeli officials considered the group to be a nuisance, but in recent years, their assessment changed, and they acknowledged Hezbollah to be a strategic threat.[3] In July 2003, outgoing IDF chief of staff Lt. Gen. Shaul Mofaz, who subsequently became defense minister, warned of the growing Hezbollah threat.[4] His successor, Lt. Gen. Moshe Yaalon, cautioned that much of northern Israel was vulnerable to Hezbollah's missiles.[5] Politicians and former intelligence officers also said that they had warned the government.[6]

Still, many IDF leaders believed that minimal force if not diplomacy would suffice to minimize the threat. Chief of the Northern Command Maj. Gen. Udi Adam, for example, said, "There is nothing that can be solved just by the military … There is a need for a diplomatic solution," adding, "I do not believe that anyone wants to go back into Lebanon."[7]

Restraint ended on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah terrorists attacked an Israeli patrol on the Israeli side of the border and abducted two soldiers.[8] The attack came just nineteen days after Palestinian terrorists staged a similar cross border raid from Gaza.[9] Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert and defense minister Amir Peretz ordered a forceful reaction.[10] IDF chief of staff Dan Halutz, who had not even mentioned Lebanon in his tour d'horizon at the Herzliya Conference seven months earlier, acknowledged that "the way we finish this [operation in Lebanon] will have ramifications for the entire Middle East."[11] He was right. The end of military operations on August 14, 2006, with the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701[12] had implications not only in Israel and Lebanon but also across the region.

Failure to Prepare

As soon as the guns fell silent, Israeli officials began to take stock of their new situation. There was unease. Declarations of victory rang hollow. While politicians and military officials squabbled over responsibility, the government appointed an inquiry committee headed by judge Eliyahu Winograd to sort the situation out. Still, the fact that there were serious strategic errors was clear.

Israel's highest political and military echelons committed serious strategic errors in preparation for, during execution, and in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon campaign. Together, these errors enabled Hezbollah to persevere against the larger, better-equipped Israeli military and emerge as perhaps an even greater threat.

Failure to prepare undercut Israeli operations from the start. Before the war, Israeli planners had unrealistic expectations about armed conflict with Hezbollah. They planned for small skirmishes, not for a large-scale, conventional military campaign. Some of Israel's reluctance to plan for action inside Lebanon might have been rooted in former prime minister Ariel Sharon's legacy. As defense minister, Sharon presided over the 1982 Lebanon war, and many Israelis consider him responsible for the subsequent imbroglio.[13] In 1983, the Kahan Commission found Sharon negligent for his failure to predict and stop a Lebanese militia's massacre of Palestinian refugees at Sabra and Shatilla.[14] Sharon's subsequent attempts to rehabilitate his image during his premiership (2001-06) would be undercut if he again involved Israeli forces in Lebanon.

Inattention by the General Staff toward Lebanon reflected Israeli assumptions about the unlikelihood of any land war on its borders. Udi Adam complained that the highest military forum hardly discussed the Lebanese front.[15]

Perhaps as a result, the IDF failed to estimate adequately its needs prior to the war. Effective March 2007, Shaul Mofaz, defense minister between November 2002 and March 2006, had scheduled a gradual reduction in conscript military service and also initiated a new law shortening reserve duty and reducing training. According to Maj. Gen. Benny Ganz, chief of Israel's ground forces, the government had cut allocations for training reserve units by US$800 million since 2001.[16] Budgetary constraints also led the IDF to reduce the size of tank formations, and budgetary officials pressured the Israeli military to discontinue production of its top-line Merkava tank. In addition, because of cost, the IDF declined to install the Trophy antimissile system on most tanks and did not provide the Israeli air force with bunker buster bombs.[17] Only a number of special forces received training geared to operations in southern Lebanon, but even these units lacked the latest intelligence when ordered across the border because the heads of military intelligence refrained from transferring data collected on Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon to the units in the field.[18]

Further underlying Israel's lack of preparation was the failure of its leadership to acknowledge the operation against Hezbollah to be a war rather than a retaliatory raid or more limited military action. The Israeli government, for example, never declared a state of emergency, nor did it enact its wartime administrative and legal powers. Delays in mobilization of reserve forces reflected the military leadership's failure to realize it faced a war.

Israel's leadership also failed to understand the strategic significance of the cumulative Katyusha strikes. An IDF statement of its strategic goals presented to the Israeli government at the beginning of the conflict failed to even mention home-front defense.[19] Over the course of several years, Israel's intelligence organs had neglected to collect intelligence regarding Hezbollah's short range Katyushas.[20] Military officials had considered such rockets as weapons of little consequence because of their inaccuracy and small warheads. In the initial stage of the war, Halutz said that "short range rockets are not a decisive weapon."[21] But the war showed Israel's northern population to be ill-prepared to withstand a large rocket barrage. Most of the short-range Katyushas fell in empty fields and caused little damage, but 25 percent of the nearly 4,000 missiles launched hit urban areas and paralyzed the whole of northern Israel, its main port, refineries, and many other strategic installations.[22] Over one million Israelis lived in bomb shelters and about 300,000 temporarily left their homes and sought refuge in the south. Olmert was very wrong in stating on August 3, 2006, that the war could not be measured by counting the number of missiles falling on Israel.[23] The continuous barrage of Katyushas at Israel's northern cities supported Hezbollah's claim to victory. Only in the last stages of the war did the attempt to limit the Katyusha salvoes become an operational goal.

Israel's failure to allocate sufficient funds towards the development of an adequate missile defense system to provide protection against the Hezbollah threat was a strategic mistake. While Israeli military industries mastered several technological responses against short-range missiles, Israel had refrained from turning them operational. Only after the war, in February 2007, did the Ministry of Defense approve the development of defensive weapon systems against short- and intermediate-range missiles. The newly-approved Rafael Armament Development Authority's Iron Dome and Magic Wand systems will eventually defend against Qassam rockets, short-range Katyushas, and medium-range Iranian-made Zelzal missiles while existing Arrow missiles can protect Israel from longer-range Syrian and Iranian missiles.

Over-reliance on airpower was another strategic folly. While the IDF had long invested in its airpower, until the 1990s, it believed land forces to be critical for victory. Yet, after the 1991 Kuwait war, many military strategists, not only in the United States, but also elsewhere, began to consider airpower to be seductive.[24] Among political leaders, airpower is especially tempting. It offers great destructive capability without high risk in home casualties. Maj. Gen. (res.) Eitan Ben-Eliyahu, former chief of the Israeli air force, admitted that the fixation with new technologies was addictive and obscured thinking.[25]

The Israeli Air Force leadership convinced Israeli politicians that they could expand their military role beyond traditional air missions and cope effectively with new security challenges. Halutz had commanded the air force between April 2000 and July 2004, and his enthusiasm for airpower was unequivocal.[26] As chief of staff, Halutz planned cuts in the IDF's ground forces and emphasized reliance on the air force.[27] The IDF sought to tackle low-intensity conflict with a combination of airpower and special forces.[28] Yuval Steinitz, former chair of the Knesset (parliament)'s Committee on Security and Foreign Affairs, questioned the wisdom of giving airpower such a high priority on both a budgetary and a doctrinaire level,[29] but he was the exception rather than the rule.

Over-sensitivity to casualties also hampered Israeli operations. Maj. Gen. Elazar Stern, head of the IDF's manpower branch, complained after the war that the IDF did not complete some missions due to casualties, [30] an assessment with which Maj. Gen. (res.) Yoram Yair, head of one of the postwar IDF inquiry committees, agreed.[31]

During the war, Halutz opposed a ground incursion into Lebanon as anything but the last resort.[32] Even when Olmert and Peretz decided to insert special forces into Lebanon to deal with the Katyusha threat, Halutz resisted a large-scale land operation.[33] His hesitation enabled Hezbollah to continue its rocket salvoes into Israel for a month.

The reluctance to commit ground troops to battle betrays a gap between Israel's leadership and its people. Both political and military leaders misjudged the resilience of Israeli society. At the beginning of 2004, Yaalon asserted that the weakest link in Israel's national defense was the lack of public stamina.[34] While vice premier in 2005, Olmert said, "We are tired of fighting; we are tired of being courageous; we are tired of winning; we are tired of defeating our enemies."[35] The current chief of the Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Benny Ganz, said that while worried about Hezbollah's missiles, he was more concerned about the ability of Israeli society to withstand the pressures of war.[36]

Such concerns were misplaced. Israeli society demonstrated high stamina, even during wars of attrition. Israelis did not surrender to the post-September 2000 Palestinian terror campaign,[37] a sentiment reflected in recent polls.[38] Israeli society would have been willing to absorb greater casualties to bring an effective end to the Hezbollah threat. Even parents who had lost a child in the Hezbollah war backed its expansion. Nor did combat unit recruitment suffer because of the war.[39]

The cost of the Israeli leaderships' miscalculation of societal strength goes beyond opportunities lost. Israel's reluctance to commit troops to battle signaled weakness. The widespread perception within the Arab world that Israeli society is sensitive to the loss of human life invites aggression. It was such a perception that motivated Palestinians to renew their terror campaign in September 2000.[40]

Unrealistic Goals

Unrealistic goals compounded poor preparation. Israeli political and military leaders erred in their belief that Israeli pressure on Hezbollah and the weak Lebanese government could generate a political process in which the Lebanese army could achieve a monopoly over the use of force in Lebanon.[41] From the earliest stages of the war, Israeli leaders insisted that they could encourage Lebanon to become a regular state and that the Israeli army could crush Hezbollah's Lebanese state-within-a-state. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert saw force as instrumental to implementing UNSCR 1559, which called for strengthening the central government in Lebanon by both removing foreign forces and disbanding militias.[42] He stated that the military operation constituted "an almost unique opportunity to change the rules in Lebanon."[43] Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni declared that the goal of the campaign was "to promote a process that will bring about a long-term and fundamental change in the political reality" and to create a regime in Lebanon that would be responsible for its entire territory.[44] She argued that the harder the IDF hit Hezbollah, the easier it would be for the Lebanese government and the world to implement UNSCR 1559.[45] Peretz's statement that Israel would not end its campaign until reality changed in Lebanon reflected the broad view of the Israeli political leadership.[46]

The military from at least the time of Yaalon's tenure as chief-of-staff accepted the same logic. Both Maj. Gen. Gadi Eizencott, chief of operations in the general staff, and Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, former director of research at the IDF intelligence branch, believed that Israel's use of force could change the political equation in Lebanon.[47]

From the first day of the campaign, Halutz advocated attacking infrastructure beyond southern Lebanon to pressure the Lebanese government to counter Hezbollah.[48] This logic of transformation through force was reminiscent of the earlier attempt to transform Lebanese society through force. In 1982, Israeli officials sought not only to expel the Palestinian Liberation Organization but also to normalize relations with Beirut and its newly-empowered government.

In the contemporary Middle East, though, force seldom creates a new political environment.[49] For years after signing the Oslo accords, Israeli politicians turned a blind eye to Palestinian Authority actions rather than acknowledge that Yasir Arafat's administration did not live up to its agreements. In Lebanon, Israeli leaders might have adopted more modest goals. Rather than seek to change Lebanon's reality, they might have instead sought only to eviscerate Hezbollah's ability to harm Israel.

Fear of escalation clouded Olmert's strategic judgment. On the first day of the conflict, Mossad chief Maj. Gen. Meir Dagan recommended that the Israeli air force target Syrian sites.[50] Instead, Olmert sought to placate. Israeli leaders repeatedly said that Israel had no intention of expanding its military activities to target Syria.[51] Peretz even called for a renewal of peace negotiations with Syria.[52] Even when Hezbollah was launching Syrian missiles at Israeli cities, Israeli military officials announced that retaliating against Syria was not under consideration.[53] Rather than pressure Damascus to stop its resupply of missiles to Hezbollah, such statements, in effect, blessed the Syrian government's proxy warfare.

Such rhetoric contrasted sharply with past practice when the threat of escalation coerced Israel's adversaries into accepting its conditions. The Syrian government was susceptible to such pressure. After the February 14, 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, apparently at the Syrian leadership's behest, joint condemnation by Washington, Paris, and Riyadh reverberated through Damascus.

Israeli officials enjoyed similar sympathy after Hezbollah initiated the summer 2006 conflict. At the Group of Eight (G8) heads of states meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia, on July 17, 2006, an open microphone caught U.S. president George W. Bush saying that they needed "Syria to get Hezbollah to stop doing this shit."[54]

But, the Israeli military's restraint cost it an opportunity to eliminate Syria's long-range missile capability. The risks of regional escalation were minimal. Iran was in no position to intervene directly. Tehran, rushing to complete its nuclear program, did not want to create a pretext for international action against it.

A successful campaign against Syria could have weakened Hezbollah and might even have strengthened the Lebanese government more than destroying Lebanese infrastructure did. An Israeli strike against Syrian targets would have signaled Israel's determination to deal with terrorist and proxy threats, enhancing Israeli deterrence. It would have also diminished both Iranian influence in the region and Tehran's ability to retaliate through Hezbollah in the event that its nuclear installations were attacked.

Bungling the Aftermath

How Israel ended the war augmented its failure. UNSCR 1701 marked the first time in Israeli history that Jerusalem had sought a U.N. resolution to end a war. Jerusalem's involvement in drafting the Security Council resolution reflected a new, misplaced faith in the U.N. Israeli foreign minister Livni said that prevention of Syrian arms transfers to Hezbollah,[55] the group's disarmament, and an overhaul of the U.N. forces in southern Lebanon were among Israel's requirements for a cease-fire. The Israeli foreign ministry sought to replace the ineffective United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), deployed there since 1978, with a more "robust" international force,[56] at least in the interim period before the Lebanese army could deploy southward and exert its authority over all Lebanese territory.[57] According to Livni, the Israeli government expected the U.N. contingent to have coercive military capability to enable it "to control the passages on the Lebanese-Syrian border, to aid the Lebanese army in deploying properly, and to fully implement UNSCR 1559, particularly in disarming the Hezbollah."[58]

Olmert initially sought to have the Lebanese army deploy its forces southward. In a meeting with Israeli diplomats on July 18, he said that the idea of an international force was "a good headline" but that Israel's experience "shows that there is nothing behind it."[59] Yet, after learning of the weakness of the Lebanese army, he agreed to deploy a U.N. force instead. The Israeli military concurred that an international force in south Lebanon and a U.N.-imposed arms embargo could be effective.[60]

But the U.N. mandate determines that in the event that UNIFIL personnel come across caches of weapons or gunmen, they should call upon the Lebanese army to handle the situation. The European-enhanced UNIFIL not only shows little inclination to use force to implement UNSCR 1701 but also hampers Israeli monitoring of weapons trafficking across the Lebanese-Syrian border. The French government, for example, denounced Israeli flights over Lebanon to monitor continuing violations of the arms embargo by Hezbollah. On October 19, 2006, the French commander of UNIFIL even threatened to shoot at Israeli planes if they came too close to his troops.[61] A few days later, Berlin complained that Israeli planes had taken aim at one of their ships.[62]

Unfortunately, the U.N. favors ineffectiveness over conflict. Secretary-general Kofi Annan advocated "flexibility" in the deployment of UNIFIL along the Syria-Lebanon border,[63] in effect blessing non-enforcement. Damascus has continued to funnel arms to Hezbollah, something that both prominent Lebanese officials and the U.S. government acknowledge.[64]

By November 2006, according to Israeli military officials, Hezbollah had replenished nearly half of its prewar stockpiles of short-range missiles and small arms.[65] In December 2006, Mossad chief Meir Dagan told the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Syria continued to arm Hezbollah and sought to overthrow the independent-leaning Lebanese government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.[66]

While the new UNIFIL might be no more effective than its pre-2006 incarnation, its damaging impact is greater. It now not only restricts possible Israeli action against Hezbollah but also creates a precedent for an international force in the West Bank and/or Gaza, a move long sought by the Palestinian Liberation Organization that successive Israeli governments have resisted.

Conclusions

When war erupted in summer 2006, Israel enjoyed overwhelming military superiority and favorable political conditions. However, its strategic follies and operational deficiencies resulted in a faltering, indecisive war. The Israeli military could have administered a serious blow to Hezbollah from the air during the first few days of the war or, alternatively, destroyed most of Hezbollah's military presence in southern Lebanon with a large land invasion. Unfortunately, Israel's political and military leadership had no clear concept of what victory over Hezbollah entailed.

Israel squandered an important opportunity to settle regional scores. It left unchecked Iran's apparent efforts to expand Shi‘i influence in Lebanon and left untouched Syria's potential for mischief in Lebanon. Hezbollah's resilience against the Israeli bombardment emboldened it to withstand future Israeli assaults, and Israel's failure to succeed emboldened regional radicals.

Israel is a strong state, but it can ill-afford such failure. It lives in a dangerous neighborhood in which military might is the guarantee for survival. Halutz has initiated an intensive and comprehensive inquiry process and resigned. In the past, the IDF has proved its capacity to learn from its mistakes and improve. Some deficiencies can be easily corrected. Increases in the defense budget could provide the means to implement some lessons learned, for example, longer training for reserve units and procurement of better weapon systems. Less easy to correct are deficiencies in strategic thinking.

Post-modern notions have blurred the strategic clarity of Israel's political leadership and its defense and foreign affairs establishment. The economic cost of building a strong military force may be high, but it is not an optional expense. Too often, wishful thinking supplants reality.

Should Israeli officials recognize their mistakes, however, they will find much with which to restore unquestioned Israeli regional deterrence. The war demonstrated that Israel is a strong state. It has the spirit to fight. Its soldiers won each encounter with Hezbollah. The Israeli home front displayed great resilience, and Israel's economy continued to bloom. With adequate preparation, Jerusalem might attain a clear victory in the next round, which, however unfortunate, the outcome of the 2006 war makes inevitable.

Efraim Inbar is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. He thanks Ian Blomberg, Sara H. Krulewich, and Tamara Sternlieb for their research assistance.

[1] For a chronology of Hezbollah attacks and incursions, see "Hizbullah Attacks along Israel's Northern Border May 2000 - June 2006," Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1, 2006.
[2] Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), July 24, 2006.
[3] See Eyal Zisser, "Hezbollah and Israel: Strategic Threat on the Northern Border," Israel Affairs, Jan. 2006, pp. 86-106.
[4] Ariella Ringel-Hoffman, "Time Works against Us," Yedi'ot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), July 5, 2002.
[5] Ari Shavit, "Colleagues Undermine You," Ha'aretz, Aug. 8, 2003.
[6] For example, see the interview with Yuval Steinitz, Defense News, Jan. 29, 2007; comments of Aharon Zeevi-Farkash, former chief of the intelligence branch of the IDF, Channel 2 (Jerusalem), Nov. 5, 2006.
[7] The Jerusalem Post, July 21, 2006.
[8] The Jerusalem Post, July 13, 2007.
[9] The Jerusalem Post, June 26, 2007.
[10] Ilan Kfir, Haadama Raasha (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 2006), pp. 21, 23.
[11] The Jerusalem Post, July 17, 2006.
[12] For the resolution text, see "The Situation in the Middle East," UNSC Resolution 1701, United Nations, New York, Aug. 11, 2006.
[13] Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Milhememet Sholal (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1984), pp. 380-8.
[14] "104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut" (The Kahan Commission), Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Feb. 8, 1983.
[15] Ofer Shelah and Yoav Limor, Shvuyim Bilvanon (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2007), p. 128.
[16] Ha'aretz, Nov. 29, 2006.
[17] Kfir, Haadama Raasha, p. 178.
[18] Ha'aretz, Nov. 4, 2006.
[19] Zeev Schiff, "Let Us Be Realistic," Ha'aretz, Oct. 20, 2006.
[20] Ha'aretz, Feb. 16, 2007.
[21] Shelah and Limor, Shvuyim Bilvanon, p. 160.
[22] For a detailed analysis of the Katyusha attacks, see Uzi Rubin, The Rocket Attacks on Northern Israel during the Summer of 2006, Mideast Security and Policy Studies (Ramat Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, forthcoming).
[23] Kfir, Haadama Raasha, p. 189.
[24] Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 1994, pp. 109-24.
[25] Eitan Ben-Eliyahu, public lecture, Tel Aviv University, Dec. 19, 2006; Meir Finkel, "The Rites of Technology in the IDF—Return the Balance to the Land Build-Up," Maarachot, June 2006, pp. 40-5.
[26] Biton Heil Haavir, Israeli Air Force, May 2000, p. 7.
[27] Shelah and Limor, Shvuyim Bilvanon, p. 137.
[28] Shmuel Gordon, The Vulture and the Snake, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 39 (Ramat Gan: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, July 1998).
[29] Yuval Steinitz, "The Sea as Israel's Strategic Depth," Maarachot, May 2002; idem, "It Is Missiles," Maarachot, Dec. 2005, pp. 70-4.
[30] Ha'aretz, Nov. 4, 2006.
[31] Ha'aretz, Oct. 18, 2006.
[32] The Jerusalem Post, July 20, 2006; Kfir, Haadama Raasha, p. 293; Shelah and Limor, Shvuyim Bilvanon, pp. 118.
[33] Ha'aretz, Jan. 23, 2007.
[34] Ha'aretz, Jan. 13, 2004.
[35] Ehud Olmert, remarks, Israel Policy Forum Tribute Dinner, New York, June 9, 2005.
[36] "The Chief of the Northern Command: The Struggle of the Right Is More Dangerous than the Hezbollah Missiles," Globes (Tel Aviv), Jan. 11, 2005.
[37] Avi Kober, "From Blitzkrieg to Attrition: Israel's Attrition Strategy and Staying Power," Small Wars and Insurgencies, June 2005, pp. 216-40; Meir Elran, "Israel's National Resilience. The Influence of the Second Intifada on Israeli Society," memorandum 81 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Jan. 2006); Nadav Morag, "The Economic and Social Effects of Terrorism: Israel, 2000-2004," Middle East Review of International Affairs, Sept. 2006.
[38] "Maagar Mochot" poll reported by Israeli radio Reshet Bet, Dec. 28, 2006.
[39] The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 19, 2006.
[40] Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff, Hamilchama Hashviit (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2004), p. 54.
[41] Schiff, "Let Us Be Realistic."
[42] Ehud Olmert, statement to the Knesset, July 17, 2006, official transcript, p. 2; UNSC resolution 1559.
[43] Ehud Olmert, statement to the heads of the municipal authorities, July 31, 2006, official transcript, p. 4.
[44] Tzipi Livni and Javier Solana, EU envoy, news conference, July 19, 2006; Tzipi Livni, statement to the Knesset, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aug. 8, 2006; The Jerusalem Post, Oct. 24, 2006.
[45] The Jerusalem Post, July 20, 2006.
[46] The Jerusalem Post, July 17, 2006.
[47] "Interview with Yossi Kuperwasser," Hatzofe (Tel Aviv), Oct. 20, 2006, p. 7-8; Shelah and Limor, Shvuyim Bilvanon, p. 50; Ha'aretz, Sept. 15, 2006.
[48] Kfir, Haadama Raasha, p. 22; Shelah and Limor, Shvuyim Bilvanon, p. 50.
[49] For a discussion of attaining goals, see Avi Kober, "Israeli War Objectives into an Era of Negativism," Journal of Strategic Studies, June 2001, pp. 176-201.
[50] Kfir, Haadama Raasha, p. 22; Shelah and Limor, Shvuyim Bilvanon, p. 51.
[51] Channel 7 News (Ofra), July 26, 2006; The Jerusalem Post, July 28, 2006.
[52] MSN News, Aug. 15, 2006.
[53] The Jerusalem Post, July 19, 2006.
[54] The Jerusalem Post, July 18, 2006.
[55] Tzipi Livni, foreign minister, statement to the Knesset, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aug. 8, 2006.
[56] Ha'aretz, Oct. 1, 2006.
[57] The Jerusalem Post, July 19, 2006.
[58] "Interview with Yossi Kuperwasser," Hatzofe.
[59] The Jerusalem Post, July 19, 2006.
[60] Shelah and Limor, Haadama Raasha, p. 167; "Interview with Yossi Kuperwasser," Hatzofe.
[61] Yedi'ot Aharonot, Oct. 20, 2006.
[62] The Jerusalem Post, Oct. 28, 2006.
[63] Ha'aretz, Aug. 31, 2006.
[64] The Washington Times, Nov. 1, 2006.
[65] Time, Nov. 24, 2006.
[66] Ynet, Dec. 18, 2006.

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April 30, 2007
Saudi "Kremlinology" Heats Up with King Talk

By REUTERS
Filed at 0:05 a.m. ET

RIYADH (Reuters) - In Soviet Russia, it was called ''Kremlinology.'' The intricate and ultimately futile analysis of an opaque ruling system dominated by ageing men in suits, who made a career out of giving little away.

In Saudi Arabia, for suits just read ``white robes.''

Interpreting minuscule movements in the political geography of Saudi Arabia's closed system of government is a favorite parlor game among journalists, diplomats and businessmen, as well as the ambitious hoping for appointments to state bodies.

But a ripple of excitement has shifted the sands in recent months with indications that Prince Salman bin Abdul-Aziz, the governor of Riyadh and half-brother of King Abdullah, is positioning himself as second-in-line to the throne.

Bear in mind that a rumor could take years to come to fruition in the absolute monarchy, governed by Saudi princes in their 70s and 80s with neither an elected parliament nor political parties.

King Fahd was for years predicted to be at death's door before he died in 2005.

``This Saudi-style Kremlinology is a popular pastime, and plenty of people can make educated guesses or swap rumors,'' one Western diplomat commented wryly. ``But for my money it's a waste of effort to engage in it.''

In a recent example, media speculation was rife over a March cabinet reshuffle that was to have seen the exit of Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi.

When the ``reshuffle'' came, not only did both men retain their posts, but the entire cabinet was simply reinstated -- apparently for another four years -- without any changes at all.

The incident highlighted the deeply conservative nature of Saudi political culture, where a powerful religious establishment and a vocal liberal elite are battling for the allegiance of a burgeoning youth population.

``The process of making decisions in our country has always been restricted to an exclusive circle,'' wrote Ahmed al-Omran on his popular blogsite http://www.saudijeans.blogspot.com/ this month. ``Normal people hardly have any history of political participation.''

PRINCE SULTAN DESIGNATED HEIR

King Abdullah, believed to have been born in 1924, is the fifth son of the country's founder Abdul-Aziz bin Saud to rule the desert state in the Arabian peninsula, which commands global political and economic clout through its status as the world's biggest oil exporter and home to Islam's holiest sites.

Abdullah's designated heir is Prince Sultan, born around 1926. But Abdullah took steps in October to ensure consensus among an inner circle of royals, including younger princes, on who would follow Prince Sultan by setting up a new succession committee.

With no clearly defined rules on the succession, analysts say candidates must embark on what amounts to an undeclared public and private campaign to prove they have the stature to head the family that leads the nation bearing their name.

Some figures in the public sphere already stand out, including Interior Minister Prince Nayef and younger princes such as billionaire businessman Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, and Sultan's sons Prince Bandar -- who has been conducting Saudi shuttle diplomacy in the region -- and military commander Prince Khaled.

Several senior European diplomats are unequivocal.

``There is only one serious candidate and that is Salman,'' one said. ``He is very able, speaks without notes, can use language that can sound appealing to Western liberal ears. He enjoys government. I can't believe Salman will not be king.''

YOUNG AT HEART

At 71, Prince Salman is a relatively youthful figure in Saudi Arabia's gerontocracy, and is known to be in good health. He is also a full-brother of the crown prince, which could strengthen his hand.

His family publishes the London-based pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat, Saudi English-language Arab News, financial daily al-Eqtisadiah, and a host of magazines, and prominent coverage has been given to the prince over the past year.

Riyadh governor since 1962, Salman led an official delegation to Russia last year and this month featured prominently in the media alongside the king and crown prince as the masterminds of a plan to develop the capital city.

``Salman is basically the CEO of the royal family. He manages its finances. He also has an incredibly good reputation among both conservatives and liberals,'' said Rochdi Younsi, Middle East and Africa analyst with Eurasia Group.

But speculation about this particular aspect of Saudi Kremlinology remains taboo in the media.

Sidestepping dissident debates of recent years that have questioned the continued domination of the Saudi family, a consensus has formed among business, political and intellectual elites that it is policies -- not personalities -- that count.

``The bottom line for many Saudis is what they see on the ground, regardless of who is the picture,'' said Suleiman al-Hattlan, editor of Forbes Arabia.

``People are reading and hearing about the huge budget, there is so much money in the country. It's time to show people the reality of reform on the ground.''