The Democratic Party and the Future of the Anti-War Movement
By Bart Mongoven
The major announced Democratic presidential candidates will hold their first debate of the 2008 primary season April 26 at South Carolina State University. The debate will focus on a wide range of issues, although the format will make detailed answers difficult. One of the few things that will become clear is the wide range of positions among the candidates on foreign policy matters.

The Democratic Party is united in its effort to pin responsibility for the Iraq war on the Republicans and the Bush administration, but that is the full extent of the party's unity. Among the candidates who currently appear to have a chance to win the nomination, only North Carolina Sen. John Edwards' rhetoric and voting record are satisfactory to the leadership of the popular anti-war movement. The other major candidates, Delaware Sen. Joe Biden, New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, Illinois Sen. Barack Obama and New York Sen. Hillary Clinton, are to varying degrees hawkish when it comes to the larger war on Islamist militants. And while the majority of Democrats are more in line with Edwards' position, the nomination of anyone but Edwards threatens to place the anti-war movement in a very small box.
Even with the war in Iraq continuing and the presidential election still 18 months away, the Democratic Party's anti-war faction is facing a significant set of decisions about its future. Central to its decision-making is its perception of its relationship with other movements within the party. Though most of the other major movements -- those concerned primarily about labor, civil rights, the environment, health care and education -- have been increasing their communication and cooperation, the anti-war faction has proven the most difficult to cobble into the new Democratic coalition.
In the buildup to the 2006 election, the party and its various factions found a way to unify around opposition to the conduct of the war, and in the first months of the Democratic Congress have been able to maintain that unity through budget fights over war funding. The beginning of the primary season ushers in a new period, however, in which the anti-war movement will either find a way to attach itself to the growing progressive coalition, or find itself isolated in the political wilderness.

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Hues of the Movement

Opposition to the Iraq war unites a number of groups whose attitudes range from staunch pacifists to traditional hawks who oppose only this particular war. For Democrats, the war is the common battlefield from which to pummel the Bush administration -- as the party's success in November 2006 demonstrated. However, when the issue moves beyond the Iraq theater to overall U.S. defense strategy, the party unity dissolves.
Crucially, the current leaders of the anti-war movement -- Cindy Sheehan, Code Pink, International ANSWER, World Can't Wait and United for Peace and Justice -- have not found a way to solidify a position on the larger post-war U.S. role, one that dovetails with other major threads of the liberal political agenda. This failure is critical because everyone involved knows that in the general election the major candidates will not fear losing the support of the pacifist wing of the anti-war movement. That is, of course, because staunch anti-war voters have nowhere else to turn. They are not going to vote Republican and are unlikely in 2008 to follow Ralph Nader's lead and split off behind a third party.
Though Edwards appears to be consistently on the more pacifist side, more conservative Democrats, including those who will appear at the debate, portray the war in Iraq either as a mistake from the start or as a justifiable war that has been led badly by the Bush team. However, they do not differ significantly from the administration on the basic strategy of the larger war against militant Islamists. They support a strong military posture in the Middle East and share the mainstream Republican vision that the larger war will take more than a decade to fight. Thus, they contend, the United States will have to maintain a strong military through that decade.
Both Clinton and Obama, for example, have warned of a continued threat of major terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, and Clinton has even pointed to her years on the Senate Armed Services Committee and in the White House as preparation for future military decisions, largely to highlight Obama's relative inexperience. Obama, who has been reaching out to the party's left fringe for a number of weeks, said in his first major foreign policy address that the U.S. military needs to remain active and strong, and he called for an increase in the size of the active military by 60,000 soldiers and 30,000 Marines.

Obama's statements elicited howls from the more liberal party activists, many of whom also see the Iraq war as part of the larger war against Islamist militants -- but view it as the wrong way to go about securing the country from attack. The most vocal elements of this side of the party claim that large military budgets and constant pressure on foreign governments will make more enemies than allies, and in the long term lead to more wars, not fewer. They argue that the escalating tensions with Iran demonstrate that saber rattling does not make the country safer, but rather increases the chances of yet another war in the Muslim world. They also claim that U.S. imperialism radicalizes young Muslims and increases the number of would-be militants in the Islamic countries.

Further dividing these two sides is the more liberal wing's contention that the Bush administration deliberately misled Congress to justify the war. Although some conservative Democrats are willing to make this claim, others within their ranks would rather avoid talk of "Bush lied, troops died" because it entails a degree of gullibility on their part.

Implications for the Larger Progressive Movement

The difference of opinion between the candidates over national defense policy threatens efforts by liberal leaders to build bridges between the various factions on the left side of the political spectrum. Though the anti-war movement is unlikely to arrest progress completely on this effort, its one-issue focus could dramatically limit the movement's effectiveness.

The mainstream of the Democratic Party has for more than 30 years been an amorphous combination of liberal interests who share a few basic beliefs, but differ so broadly in policy priorities that they spend most of their time fighting internal battles. A number of organizations have sprouted up over the past six years with the goal of developing a common set of priorities by working closely with the Democratic Party -- and they have found some success. More successful, however, has been a quiet movement running largely in the background of liberal political circles -- one that operates outside of the Democratic Party. Though both aim to find common values among environmental, labor, civil rights, anti-war and other core liberal constituencies, this latter movement has developed a communications strategy that shows both the interrelatedness of liberal issues and frames them in ways that make even radical-sounding ideas reflect mainstream American values.

This movement, however, also has a policy strategy that is dedicated to bringing many elements of the party together to look at their priority issues in new, integrated ways. The movement is visible in an array of recognizable, but apparently independent, efforts. Among these are the Apollo Alliance, which brings labor and environmentalists together on energy policy and the environmental health movement -- blending health activism and environmental activism. Also hitting this chord is the campaign against Wal-Mart, led by labor but joined by liberal interests groups of almost every flavor. Finally, many elements of the Change to Win labor strategy reflect this new approach. Typical of this trend is the proposal, floated by Obama in 2006, in which the federal government would take on the health care obligations of the automakers if they agreed to significant raises in automobile fuel efficiency -- a policy that reflects the priorities of labor, health and environmental advocates within the party.

The anti-war faction on the left has always presented a challenge to these efforts because of its strident rhetoric and uncompromising attitude. As the election approaches and rifts appear in the party's unified anti-war posture, the party is not going to find unity. Its factions do not have a communications problem or a disagreement over priorities on the larger war, they have strong differences.

Ultimately, the anti-war faction is likely coming to grips with the idea that it will be strongly disappointed by the candidate who emerges in 2008, especially because the post-primary candidate will likely adopt a more moderate tone to appeal to swing voters. With this, the faction will find itself staring at a familiar abyss for Democratic interest groups -- one in which not only the group's priority is subordinated but its strongly held beliefs are contradicted by the party leadership. Most critically, the anti-war activists' natural allies in the environmental and traditional progressive movements will be forced to choose between the ongoing mission of unifying around a common set of themes, or joining with the anti-war faction on the outside.

Put another way, the question is whether the anti-war movement will pull the larger unification project down -- a la George McGovern -- or whether the party will leave the pacifists in the rearview mirror as it moves toward unity.

If one was to take the progress of the Iraqi police in the context of being less than a year or two old, the report card isn't as bad as the media would have your believe.

The truth is that they have faced tremendous challenges, have not been well equipped and have died in numbers that far surpass that of our own military.

The complication of it all is the 'infiltration' of the Al Sadr, Mahdi Army, whose repuation as a Iraqi poice during the day and 'death squad' at night to opposing sectarian and political groups.

The reason why they are so slow in being equipped is two fold, according to some of my back channel source. First, the plan for resconstruction and the corruption of the institutions from the Iraqi side is legendary. Secondly, I hear that the US Commanders privately don't want the Iraqi's as well equipped as the Americans, in case this thing goes south.

So once again, this is a long war, it is a complex process, and it is constantly in need of adapation by the day to achieve the objectives.

Those objectives come from Washington in one sense but are often not seen the same way in Baghdad.
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Iraqi Police Becoming 'Very Capable' at Law Enforcement, Official Says
By Tim Kilbride
Special to American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, April 26, 2007 – Iraq's growing police force is technically competent and functioning as it should within the country's legal system, a top U.S. police trainer said yesterday.

The operational problems they have experienced are primarily the result of an unusually tumultuous security situation in Baghdad and elsewhere, said Army Brig. Gen. David Phillips, deputy commander of the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team and the senior military police officer in theater.
"I believe the Iraqi police are getting very capable in handling the law enforcement type mission and traffic mission. The problem you have is ... that there's a lot of terrorists and insurgents who want to see them fail," Phillips said, speaking to online journalists from Baghdad.
The Iraqi army, Phillips explained, is trained to contend with terrorism.
"When you compare the Iraqi army, who are over here fighting in an insurgency and against terrorists, we are training the police to perform law enforcement," he said. "The training we give them - although they get tactical training - is primarily focused on being a police officer."
Under normal conditions, Phillips said, the police would be engaged in "investigating crime and traffic patrols."
In these capacities, the general said, the police are performing dramatically better now than even two years ago, when Phillips was last deployed to Iraq. He cited examples of traffic cops waving his convoy through traffic circles, and patrol officers walking their beat in a Baghdad neighborhood while local children played nearby.
With nearly 170,000 regular police on the country's rosters, Phillips noted that in many areas of the country the Iraqi security forces operate virtually independently of U.S. and international guidance.
"Approximately 75 percent of the country gets very minimal coalition force presence," he said. Those areas are "under the control of the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army, and they're out there doing what you'd expect them to do."
It is in Baghdad and other particularly restive areas, Phillips explained, that though "it is truly Iraqis in the lead now," the coalition continues to provide support.
And in areas such as violence-prone Anbar province, Phillips said, tribal sheikhs are now encouraging their relatives and affiliates to create local units to stand up to terrorist and insurgent activity - in effect, a "community watch."
Such forces, he said, are being created under the umbrella of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior and will function as an extension of the standard police force.
An official government sanction is crucial to the success of these initiatives and will be forthcoming, Phillips said, though he noted there are worries among the sheikhs as to where and how their associates could be used.
"They want to come into the system, be sanctioned as police; they want to be trained as police," Phillips said. "Their concern is if they're trained will they be sent out of that area and then have to work in an area - they're predominantly Sunni - would they have to work in a predominantly Shiia area? That's where they object."
The Iraqi leadership, with coalition assistance, is trying to work out the command and control relationships for these organizations, Phillips said.
The general admitted the question of sectarian loyalty remains an issue throughout the force, but said its effect is less severe than commonly believed.
The police, Phillips explained, are trained at academies close to their homes and return to those homes at the completion of their courses, as opposed to Iraqi army soldiers, who train as a unit and then deploy to different locations.
For the graduating policeman, he said, "you go back to the same community you were in, ... and you're policing in the neighborhood where your family is, with the same influences you had, with people who are like you."
Sectarian bias will naturally apply in these cases, Phillips said.
"When you look, is one police force in this city predominantly Sunni and one in another city predominantly Shiia? Yes, it's going to be natural that way. But we also have mixed forces in the towns that are mixed."
Baghdad is a prime example of a mixed-force town, Phillips said, and working out the dynamics there among diverse populations will remain a challenge.
Useful progress is being made in screening out known risks from the police recruiting pool, however, Phillips said. He noted an Iraqi-operated "Automated Fingerprint Identification System" and other biometric information are being used to check potential recruits against a database of known or suspected criminals.
"I think the vetting process is not perfect, but it's catching quite a few who you would not want to be one of your community cops on the corner," Phillips said.
Addressing another common criticism of the Iraqi force, the general said overcrowding in police detention facilities does still occur, but is the product of temporary delays in legal processing rather than a flawed system.
"Yes, there's overcrowding," Phillips said, "And the reason is because of the number of investigative judges." The number of judges is not equal to the backlog of criminal cases, he said.
To compensate, Phillips noted, in addition to training more judges, Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, Multinational Force Iraq commander, is expediting work on a "Rule of Law" complex in Baghdad that will house investigative judges, investigators, trial judges, police and detention facilities all in one compound. The proximity of all the key players in the Iraqi justice system should streamline the legal process and help keep detention centers operating at normal levels, he explained.
"If there's a delay there, that's where you start seeing crowding in the jails," Phillips said. "The system in place as templated is a pretty good system; we just have to get the number of judges, the facilities and all of that, stood up."
Capacity issues aside, Phillips noted, the police are performing admirably in their assigned roles in a situation that is grossly outside their traditional mandate.
Until that security situation stabilizes, Phillips noted, U.S. forces will continue to support the police in their mission.
"If they're out there doing a simple operation and all of a sudden a terrorist starts shooting at them, of course they do not have the firepower to return - they're police officers - but they contact us and we respond," he said.
Still, despite the underlying security challenge, Phillips said, there is reason for optimism regarding the police's long-term effectiveness.
"If you took the equation of the terrorists and the insurgents out of the mix," he said, "You have a nationally trained police force that, I think, would be able to do quite well."
(Tim Kilbride is assigned to New Media, American Forces Information Service.)

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Criminal Trials Open Window for Reconciliation in Iraq

The complexities continue. The sectarian agenda's of the government have General Patraeus saying:

"Petraeus directed some criticism at the government Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which he noted "is not a government of national unity" but one "comprised of political leaders from different parties that often default to narrow agendas and a zero-sum approach to legislation."

Good news is that the Marines have done a remarkable job of engaging the tribal sheiks in Al Anbar Province who are increasingly turning against Sunni Al Queda.

"He described the development as part of a U.S. effort to "engage with Sunni tribal sheikhs and former insurgent leaders" and to "reach out to moderate members of all sects and ethnic groups to try to drive a wedge between the irreconcilables and the reconcilables." He said the aim is to "help the latter become part of the solution instead of part of the problem."

This is good news. The notion that we could ignore a thousand year old power structure in the region is absurd. When I interviewed (Ret) General (4 star) Joe Hoer, he share this with me and said, in essense, 'what do you expect, the Sunni and Shia, to all of a sudden hold hands and sing 'cum ba ya' by the campfire?!! Come on GIVE ME A BREAK!'

Afters decades of being killed mercilessly at the hands of Saddam and the 3% that ruled the 97% of Iraq, this lousy planning.

It was further confirmed to me by Capt. Jess Humphreys, whom i interviewed, who tells the story of finding a tribal sheik who controlled 1.2M Iraqi's. A gist of it all was that the Tribal Sheik offered to put 50 of the top tribal sheiks together if the Commanders would meet with them to help quell the violence. Capt Humphreys, a true American hero, tell of his detailed report which he put up the chain of command, was not followed thru on.

Tragic, even arragant, in lack of planning and utilizing existing power structures to maximize effectiveness and minimize 'system pertubation' as military strategist Thomas Barnett talks about.

So now we are emeshed in the LONG WAR, which all the generals have talked about in response to their civilian task masters who have little patience these days for anything beyond their terms in Congress!

How it plays out will be a part of US History.

==================================
Petraeus: Iraq Situation Is 'Exceedingly Challenging'
By William Branigin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, April 26, 2007; 2:22 PM

A surge of U.S. troops into Iraq has achieved "some notable successes" in recent months, but the situation remains "exceedingly challenging" as Americans battle a resilient al-Qaeda network capable of spectacular attacks and deal with a fractious Iraqi government composed of political leaders with "narrow agendas," the top U.S. commander in Iraq said today.

Presenting a mixed picture to Pentagon reporters at a news briefing, Army Gen. David H. Petraeus declined to specify how many U.S. troops might need to stay in Iraq in coming years. But he said the U.S. effort "clearly is going to require enormous commitment and commitment over time." He also warned that it "may get harder before it gets easier" and told Americans to be prepared for "more combat action and . . . more casualties" as troops move into new areas.

While al-Qaeda is "probably public enemy number one" in Iraq, Petraeus said, Iran has become increasingly active, providing help to "extremist secret cells" that have targeted U.S. forces. He said a group that carried out a brazen assault on a U.S. post in Karbala in January, killing one American soldier on the spot and four others after abducting them, had links to Iran, although there was no evidence of Iranian involvement or direction in that particular attack.

Petraeus pointed to "heartening" signs that Sunni Muslim Arabs in the western province of Anbar are increasingly "turning against al-Qaeda" and joining the Iraqi security forces to fight against the largely foreign-led group.

He described the development as part of a U.S. effort to "engage with Sunni tribal sheikhs and former insurgent leaders" and to "reach out to moderate members of all sects and ethnic groups to try to drive a wedge between the irreconcilables and the reconcilables." He said the aim is to "help the latter become part of the solution instead of part of the problem."

Petraeus, 54, a 33-year veteran of the Army, told reporters that "the operational environment in Iraq is the most complex and challenging I have ever seen." He said it was much more complicated than when he ended a previous tour there in September 2005, and "vastly more complex" than the situations he saw in Central America, Haiti and the Balkans earlier in his career.

He delivered the briefing as the U.S. Senate was debating a $124 billion emergency war-funding bill that includes provisions for the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq starting Oct. 1 this year, with a goal of ending U.S. combat operations there by April 1, 2008. The House narrowly passed the bill last night, defying President Bush's repeated threats to veto it.

Asked to assess the consequences if the United States started pulling back from Baghdad in the fall, Petraeus initially demurred, saying he has "tried to stay clear of the political mine fields of various legislative proposals."

But he then added, "My sense is that there would be an increase in sectarian violence, a resumption of sectarian violence, were the presence of our forces and Iraqi forces, at that time, to be reduced and not to be doing what it is that they are doing right now."

He said the plan to increase U.S. troop strength in Iraq to carry out a joint security operation for Baghdad and reinforce Anbar province came "in response to an increase in sectarian violence" last year. About 30,000 troops, including support personnel, are being deployed to Iraq as part of the plan, and all are expected to be on the ground by mid-June, Petraeus said.

So far, he said, "sectarian murders" in Baghdad have been reduced to about a third of their level in January. He said the killings by Shiite and Sunni sectarian groups are still unacceptably high but that the decrease represents a measure of progress in making Baghdad neighborhoods safer.

In addition to the destructive actions of al-Qaeda, extremist militias and Sunni insurgent groups, other threats to U.S. aims in Iraq come from "political parties with ethno-sectarian interests, limited governmental capacity and corruption," as well as from "exceedingly unhelpful activities by Iran and Syria," Petraeus said.

Calling Iraq "the central front of al-Qaeda's global campaign," he cited "some notable successes in the past two months" against the group, including the killing of "the security emir of eastern Anbar province" and the dismantling of a car-bomb network that killed 650 people in Baghdad.

"Nonetheless, al-Qaeda-Iraq remains a formidable foe with considerable resilience and a capability to produce horrific attacks, but a group whose ideology and methods have increasingly alienated many in Iraq," the general said.

He also cited "some significant successes" against Shiite "militia death squads," which he said cannot be allowed to "lie low during the surge, only to resurface later and resume killing and intimidation."

Among the successes, he said, have been the detentions of leaders of a "secret cell network" loyal to firebrand Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, as well as the arrest of "the Iraqi leader of an explosively formed projectile network from Iran." Also detained, he said, have been two men who had "effectively hijacked the Ministry of Health:" a former deputy minister and a brigadier general in charge of his security force.

Petraeus directed some criticism at the government Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which he noted "is not a government of national unity" but one "comprised of political leaders from different parties that often default to narrow agendas and a zero-sum approach to legislation."

He added, "That is one reason that progress on key laws has been slow, though there has been some progress."

He said he was aware that "the sense of gradual progress and achievement we feel on the ground in many areas in Iraq is often eclipsed by the sensational attacks that overshadow our daily accomplishments."

"The situation in Iraq is, in sum, exceedingly complex and very tough," he said. "Success will take continued commitment, perseverance and sacrifice, all to make possible an opportunity for the all-important Iraqi political actions that are the key to long-term solutions to Iraq's many problems."

With U.S. forces confronting enemies in new areas, "this effort may get harder before it gets easier," Petraeus said. "Success, in the end, will depend on Iraqi actions. . . . Military action is necessary but not sufficient. We can provide the Iraqis an opportunity, but they will have to exploit it."

Petraeus declined to estimate the number of foreign fighters in Iraq but said that "certainly dozens" of them enter the country through Syria on a monthly basis. He blamed al-Qaeda for worst bomb attacks against Iraqi civilians and estimated that "80 to 90 percent of the suicide attacks are carried out by foreigners."

As for Iran, he said, its involvement has become clearer as the result of the interrogation of leaders of an extremist network that carried out the January attack on U.S. soldiers in Karbala.

"They were provided substantial funding, training on Iranian soil, advanced explosive munitions and technologies as well as run-of- the-mill arms and ammunition," Petraeus said. In some cases, the group received advice from Iranians and "even a degree of direction," he said.

A key piece of evidence, he said, was a computer containing a 22-page memorandum "that detailed the planning, preparation, approval process and conduct of the operation that resulted in five of our soldiers being killed in Karbala." He said the records appear to have been kept so that "they could be handed in to whoever it is that is financing them." There is "no question," he said, that Iran is financing such groups through the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Pressed on the Iranian connection, however, Petraeus said that "we do not have a direct link to Iranian involvement" in the Karbala attack. He also said he does not know of any evidence tying Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or the government in Tehran to the "secret cells" in Iraq reportedly backed by the Quds Force.

This is a good article of on the complexities of Iraq. Anyone who sees the solution in simple soundbytes can justly be called a SIMPLETON in my book. The mindset from the middle east isn’t the mindset of the Average American.

The likely reality is that Iraq will ‘Balkanize’ and separate into more ethnics groups, which will be difficult in itself. Families will and are separating and divorcing along ethnic lines, and they are moving, exiling and shuffling the game board in Iraq. Huge number of the educated Iraqi’s are moving from Baghdad to neighboring Jordon, Syria, and dispersed through out the world because of the lack of security. Kirkuk is becoming the economic boom town. Baghdad may be a city of the past glories of Iraq.

Nonie Darwish, author of ‘NOW THEY CALL ME INFIDEL’ said in her address last evening, that in the Arab mind, the U.S. Thinks in terms of liberation, and the common Arab is taught to think in terms of OCCUPATION. It is a mindset. We think they would be grateful, and the are ultimately confused.

The 3 state solution of Kurdistan, Shialand, and Sunniland is probably the most realistic outcome over the next 5-10 years. Then when the regions are feeling safe, the economic connectivity will begin to re-integrate between the greater Iraq and the need to band together to defend “Iraq” against Syria, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia will emerge as nationalistic roots will become more prominent.

Remember the Shia ‘Arabs’ and Shia Persians have had long standing differences. Once the U.S. Manages to disengage watch how quickly they turn on each other.

TAKE THE OIL REVENUE out of their income stream and you will see a now powerful middle east shrivel up like a flower wilting in the desert sun. For the most of the middle east (with Dubai being the biggest exception), do not have broad-based economies and rely on the ‘one trick pony’ being OIL. Turn that table and it will force those economies to re-look at a broader based set of sectors. Iran will be a bankrupt state quicker that the others is my guess.
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Baghdad's Fissures and Mistrust Keep Political Goals Out of Reach
By Sudarsan Raghavan
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, April 26, 2007; A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/25/AR2007042503076_pf.html
BAGHDAD, April 25 -- U.S. military commanders say a key goal of the ongoing security offensive is to buy time for Iraq's leaders to reach political benchmarks that can unite its fractured coalition government and persuade insurgents to stop fighting.

But in pressuring the Iraqis to speed up, U.S. officials are encountering a variety of hurdles: The parliament is riven by personality and sect, and some politicians are abandoning Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government. There is deep mistrust of U.S. intentions, especially among Shiites who see American efforts to bring Sunnis into the political process as an attempt to weaken the Shiites' grip on power.

Many Iraqi politicians view the U.S. pressure as bullying that reminds them they are under occupation. And the security offensive, bolstered by additional U.S. forces, has failed to stop the violence that is widening the sectarian divide.

"The Americans should take into consideration the Iraqi situation and its complications, not just their own internal politics," said Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish legislator.

Ten weeks into the security plan, even as U.S. lawmakers propose timelines for a U.S. troop withdrawal, there has been little or no progress in achieving three key political benchmarks set by the Bush administration: new laws governing the sharing of Iraq's oil resources and allowing many former members of the banned Baath Party to return to their jobs, and amendments to Iraq's constitution. As divisions widen, a bitter, prolonged legislative struggle is hindering prospects for political reconciliation.

"They are all up in the air," said Ahmed Chalabi, a secular Shiite who is chairman of Iraq's Supreme National Commission for De-Baathification. "They are certainly not going to be produced in any timetable that is acceptable within the context of the current political climate in the United States."

Other benchmarks such as provincial elections, a political agreement on dismantling militias and a program for reconciliation announced last July also have not moved forward, Iraqi officials said.

Iraqi politicians across the sectarian spectrum said their political process is being hijacked by American domestic politics. Pressured by congressional Democrats and growing antiwar sentiment at home, senior U.S. officials are growing impatient.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, visiting Iraq last week, declared that the "clock is ticking" for political progress. He urged Iraq's parliament not to take a scheduled two-month recess and to pass by the end of summer both an oil law and a proposal to reverse the de-Baathification law.

Even if compromises are reached on the three benchmarks, it is unlikely the final legislation will resemble anything close to the Bush administration's blueprint. Maliki's aides are already stressing that they cannot control how the divided 275-member parliament will react to the proposals.

"When the Americans give orders, people will be more against it," Othman said. "That's what the Americans don't understand."

Oil
In February, Iraq's cabinet passed a U.S.-backed draft law that would give the central government control over Iraq's oil reserves, the third largest in the world. President Bush and Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a presidential contender, cited it as a sign of political progress.

But the legislation has yet to be introduced in parliament. Politicians from the semiautonomous Kurdish region say measures in the law that would take undeveloped oil fields away from regional governments and have a new national oil company oversee them are unconstitutional.

"Iraq, frankly, does not have the money to invest in oil fields," said Ashti Hawrami, the Kurdish region's minister of natural resources. He added that the Kurds are disputing four annexes to the draft law that would dilute their ability to exploit oil in their territory. If the draft isn't "watered down," Kurdish regional authorities will not support it, he said.

The Kurds also don't trust the central government to distribute oil revenue, saying it has been behind in payments in other instances. Some have suggested that a fund be set up outside Iraq to dole out that money. "We are asking for our fair share and guarantees that we will receive it," Hawrami said.

Sunni Arabs and some secular Shiite politicians, however, stand firm that the central government must control oil production and revenue distribution. "If we want to keep the unity of Iraq, the best way is to keep the oil under the authority of the central government," said Adnan Pachachi, a secular Sunni with the Iraqi National List party of former prime minister Ayad Allawi.

While some Kurds favor allowing agreements that would share production with foreign oil companies, many Sunnis and Shiites are against them on nationalistic grounds. They prefer service contracts in which Iraq would pay for work.

"The oil law needs time to pass in order to become an additional bond in the reconciliation process, and not cleave it," said Mustafa al-Hiti, a Sunni legislator. "If the Americans want national reconciliation, they should postpone this law, and don't force the government to pass it by the right time."

De-Baathification
For the first time in months, Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni, saw hope for reconciling with his Shiite counterparts.

On March 26, then-U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Maliki announced a proposal to allow thousands of additional former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party to rejoin the government or get pensions.

But less than 24 hours later, it quickly unraveled. Religious Shiites in Maliki's ruling coalition opposed key elements of the proposal. Now, at least three additional versions have surfaced, all diluted versions of the original proposal.

"We are suffering a political chaos," Hashimi said. "I thought when Maliki signed and gave his endorsement, he had done his homework and convinced his colleagues."

In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, the U.S. occupation authority under L. Paul Bremer forced Baathists out of their government jobs and disbanded Hussein's army. Those actions are now widely seen as having fueled the Sunni Arab insurgency. Thousands of low-ranking Baathists have been allowed to return to their jobs, but not enough to satisfy Sunni leaders.

"Everyone agrees we need to reform de-Baathification," said Chalabi. "But there is a great sense the facts as perceived in Washington about de-Baathification are certainly not what they really are here."

The Khalilzad proposal, designed to bring minority Sunnis into the political process, would disband the de-Baathification commission and set a 90-day limit for Iraqi citizens to bring complaints in court against former Baathists.

Shiite politicians in Maliki's coalition said they would like to see those who suffered under Hussein's government compensated before former Baathists have their jobs and pensions restored.

"All of this may lead to the delaying of the law, or else producing a law not as good as Americans want it," said Haidar al-Abaidi of Maliki's Dawa party.

Many Shiites and Kurds are wary of allowing former Baathists back into national security-related jobs and worry that they could regain power. "This swift transition could create negative reaction toward the state," said Bassam Sharif, a legislator from the religious Shiite Fadhila party, which withdrew from Maliki's coalition in March. "If they had properly punished the Baathists, there would be more positive results."

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the dominant Shiite party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, described Baathists as "the first enemy of the Iraqi people." Disbanding the de-Baathification commission, he said, would be unconstitutional. "All those criminals, the Baathists, their trials should continue and it is necessary to fund the proper mechanisms to carry out their tasks," he said.

Sunni Arabs, said Hashimi, insist that the de-Baathification commission be ended within six months and that the courts provide a forum for falsely accused Baathists to demonstrate their innocence.

But Chalabi said Iraq's swamped legal system could not handle more cases to judge Baathists. "What does it mean? You make the Sunnis happy and make all the Shia unhappy. That's not reconciliation. It has to be agreed," he said.

"We have to turn a new page for Iraq. But they want to keep going," Hashimi said.

Constitutional Changes
In October 2005, Khalilzad brokered a deal with Hashimi and Sunni Arab leaders. In exchange for their participation in a referendum on Iraq's new constitution, the document would be amended to address Sunni concerns. But that has not happened, and Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds remain split over key issues: whether Iraq should be divided into autonomous regions under a federal system; the authorities of the prime minister and the president; the national identity of Iraq; and the fate of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

Fouad Masoun, a Kurdish legislator and deputy chairman of the parliament's constitution review committee, said: "There are some revisions which are necessary, but there are also demands by certain parties we reject, such as returning Iraq to a centralized government or reducing the powers of the Kurdistan region and other regions."

Sunnis, such as Hashimi, would like to weaken the powers of the prime minister, who in a democratic Iraq will almost certainly be a majority-Shiite.

"Right now, all the power is injected into one post in the government," Hashimi said. "We are, whether we like or not, now getting another dictatorship but under the umbrella of democracy. This is in no way acceptable."

Humam Hamoudi, the Shiite chairman of the constitution review committee, said it hoped to submit charter revisions to parliament by the middle of next month.

That's where the real fight will begin, Iraqi lawmakers say.

With the legislature polarized along sectarian lines, compromise is difficult. Last week, anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr pulled six of his ministers from the cabinet, but did not pull his 30 loyalists from the parliament. Bahaa al-Araji, a Sadrist legislator, said this would free the Sadr bloc to vote independently of Maliki and others.

They hold posts in the parliamentary legal and de-Baathification committees, and have influence over all three political benchmarks set by the Bush administration.

A constitutional amendment approved by parliament would face a referendum. Any three provinces can vote it down with a two-thirds majority.

The political benchmarks, Hamoudi said, are on track -- on an Iraqi timetable.

"We have a saying in Iraq. We say, 'Inshallah' " -- God willing. "We never say 'yes,' " he said. "And 'inshallah' has many interpretations."

Saudi Press Plugs America’s Jihad U
By Patrick Poole
FrontPageMagazine.com | April 26, 2007
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=28040
Just weeks after an exposé appeared here at FrontPage (“Jihad U”) uncovering the extremist agenda of the largest independent Islamic studies program in North America, the Al-Maghrib Institute, and detailing the groups extensive connections to the Saudi Wahhabi religious establishment and the Muslim Brotherhood, a laudatory article appeared in the Arab News praising the program for its “state-of-the-art advertising, graphics, and 21st century vernacular,” characterizing the wildfire growth of Al-Maghrib as a “phenomena” (“Al-Maghrib Institute: Motivating People to Learn More About Islam”).
With the Arab News as the official English-language mouthpiece for the Saudi royal family (the parent company, Saudi Research and Publishing Co., is chaired by Prince Faisal bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz), it isn’t surprising that Al-Maghrib would receive such preferential treatment, especially since four of the six instructors are graduates of the University of Medina, and the other two holding degrees from King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah and Al-Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh – all devout propagators of the Wahhabi faith favored by the Saudi regime.

But the glowing media review Al-Maghrib received is all the more understandable when considering that the article’s author, New York-based “freelance journalist” Susan Smith, is in fact a student of the Institute, a fact revealed by the group’s founder, Muhammad Alshreef, and Smith herself on Al-Maghrib’s own online forum. Smith’s article, which first appeared in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs two weeks after the initial FrontPage exposé, makes no mention of her connection to the organization.

As revealed here previously at FrontPage, Al-Maghrib’s for-college-credit program is accredited by the Muslim Brotherhood-linked American Open University (AOU), and features an extensive curriculum in Muslim Brotherhood authors and theorists (Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, et. al), as well as past and present Wahhabi theologians and preachers, including sect founder, Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab.

In fact, a recent Washington Post article (“For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge”) on the radical Salafist ideology, which advocates for a return to the “true” Islam of Mohammad and his 7th Century companions, features an interview with Al-Maghrib instructor Yasir Qadhi as representative of this virulent strain of Islam, and notes that the Al-Maghrib Institute itself was launched in the College Park, Maryland Dar-us-Salaam Mosque known as one of the most extremist groups in the Washington D.C. area, and where Institute founder Muhammad Alshreef previously served as prayer leader.

And according to his DiscovertheNetwork.org profile, another Al-Maghrib instructor, Waleed Basyouni, studied under Saudi Sheik Abdelaziz bin Baz, who is described by French Islamic expert Gilles Kepel (in Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam) as “the principal Wahhabite ideologist” committed to ensuring that Saudi Arabia “remained true to Wahhabite norms, resisting the pernicious influence of Jews and Christians.”

This Wahhabi/Salafi strain of Islam is exhibited in Al-Maghrib’s double-weekend seminars, as well as their instructors’ many sermons and articles, which denounce more moderate forms of Islam as takfir (apostate), openly advocate for jihad and the re-establishment of the Caliphate (the stated goal of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb-ut-Tahrir), and indulge in anti-Jewish sentiments:

The curriculum areas taught by Qadhi, particularly the Light of Guidance and Light upon Light courses, are dedicated to pronouncing as heretical the non-Wahhabi Sunni schools of theology, particularly the Sufi movement. These are some of the most popular seminars taught by the Institute.
The teaching of aggressive militaristic jihad is also a common theme in Al-Maghrib’s courses, which rely on commentaries by 13th Century theologian Ibn Taymiyyah and Wahhab. One seminar taught by Muhammad Alshareef is his review of the jihadist exploits and military campaigns of the first four “rightly guided” caliphs, Conquest: History of the Khulafaa’. The militaristic themes for this course are evident in the one minute video trailer for the seminar.
The triumphalist vision of Islam as the inevitable sole world power and the justification of militaristic conquests under the banner of jihad are also repeated in the Al-Maghrib course, Islam Invulnerable: The Making of the Modern Muslim World. Tracing the rise of Islam as a global power from the initial Islamic invasions and occupations of the Near East, North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula, it glories in the triumphs of the Ottoman, Safavid, Qajar and Mughal Empires and provides its unique spin of the present Israeli (“Zionist”)-Arab conflict. The Crusades and European “imperialist” and “colonialist” efforts in recent centuries are denounced, while Islamic conquests undergo “narrative reinterpretation” to explain the difference between the two.
Muhammad Alshareef expressed his thoughts on Muslim-Jewish relations in an article he published entitled, “Why the Jews are Cursed”, where he expounds on the anti-Semitic canard that the international media is owned and controlled by Jews, and thus, biased against Muslims.
According to a May 2006 report by David Ouellette, in a detailed exposition of the Quran’s Surah Yusuf [complete audio mp3 file] by Yasir Qadhi, he draws from the anti-Semitic tract, Protocols of the Elders of Zion, to explain that Jews are not racially Semitic, and therefore, do not have any right to make a claim on their Holy Land. He also cites a Holocaust-denying book, claiming that “Hitler never intended to mass-destroy the Jews”.
Al-Maghrib’s website notes that all of these “student tribes” compete against each other on the basis of their collective examination scores in each city, with the annual winner receiving a trophy and a replica of the white flag of the Islamic Caliphate, the Al-Liwaa’, that bears the Islamic shahada and was recently used as the flag of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
The Arab News article notes that Al-Maghrib is now operating in sixteen different cities in North America (up from thirteen at the time of the original FrontPage report in February). According to the Al-Mahgrib website those sites are:

College Park, MD
Chicago, IL
Atlanta, GA
New York City
Columbus, OH
New Brunswick, NJ
Fairfax, VA/Washington D.C.
Houston, TX
Sacramento, CA
Memphis, TN
Bay Area, CA
Seattle, WA
Detroit, MI/Windsor, Ontario
Ottawa, Ontario
Toronto, Ontario
Montreal, Quebec
The Al-Maghrib Institute is active amongst the 150 chapters of the Muslim Student Association (MSA) located at universities all over the US and Canada. The MSA is one of the North American front groups operated by the international Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Maghrib staff are also regular fixtures on several Islamic satellite television networks, including Yasir Qadhi’s weekly Islam Q&A program on the Islam Channel.

The Arab News reports that Al-Maghrib now claims 7,000 members in North America, which, if accurate, would make it the largest Islamic Studies program on the continent, with the program extending internationally to Australia, South Africa and the United Kingdom in the near future.

Jihad U, coming soon to a city near you!