The chess game goes on. The Saudi's are SUNNI while the majority in iraq are Shia.
The USA trying to forge a national unity government in Iraq includes beating back both Sunni and Shia elements isn't in the Saudi Sunni interest.

So how does it play out.
Like I have been saying for a long time, Iraq breaks up 'defacto' into 3 regions, then when people feel safe, strands of economic connectivy will slowly re unite them.

Think Balkans.
===================================
March 28, 2007

By HASSAN M. FATTAH
RIYADH, Saudi Arabia, March 28 — The king of Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah, condemned the presence of American forces in Iraq as an “illegitimate foreign occupation” in a speech today, and said the withholding of aid to Palestinians should end.

The king’s speech, at the opening of the Arab League summit here, appeared to distance his country’s position from that of the United States. Saudi Arabia has been a powerful Arab ally to the United States in the Persian Gulf region.

The speech was wide-ranging, but in referring to the Palestinians and the conflict in Iraq he touched on two of the biggest issues in the Middle East. “In our dear Iraq, the blood is spilling between our brothers in light of an illegitimate foreign occupation,” he said.

At the start of the two-day meeting of Arab states, King Abdullah called on Arab governments to increase their unity.

“In Palestine, the people are suffering and the occupation is denying it stability and nation,” the king said in the speech that also touched on Sudan and Lebanon, and other issues in Arab countries.

“It has become necessary to end the continued losses of the Palestinian people,” King Abdullah said. “So the peace process must move far from the realm of tragedy and sadness to lead to an independent state.”

The head of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, urged Israel in his remarks today to accept an Arab initiative that was raised again at the summit after having been dormant for five years.

Arab states agreed at the meeting to restart the initiative, which would offer Israel normalized ties with Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, in return for Israel’s full withdrawal from land it has occupied since 1967.

Israel rejected the plan — which also stipulates that Palestinians have the right to return to Israel — when it was presented in 2002. But recently Mr. Olmert and Tzipi Livni, the Israeli foreign minister, have sounded positive notes about the Arab plan, while saying the refugee question remains off the table.

“We must convince their politicians and leaders” to take the initiative seriously, Mr. Moussa said, referring to the Israelis. “They say change it first, we say accept it first and come to the negotiating table.”

The United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, was also in Riyadh for the summit as part of a tour of Middle East diplomacy.

He had said in Jerusalem that representatives from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, along with Israeli and Palestinian officials, could be invited to attend the next meeting of the so-called quartet working on Middle East peace: Russia, the United States, the European Union and the United Nations.

Warren Hoge contributed reporting from Riyadh, and Christine Hauser from New York.

By Michael Rubin
Posted: Tuesday, March 27, 2007

ARTICLES
National Review Online
Publication Date: March 27, 2007


Resident Scholar
Michael Rubin

The Iranian government's decision to take 15 British marines hostage is an act of war. The decision was both deliberate and central. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is not a rogue element. The regime created it to conduct the operations which the leading clerics did not trust the army to execute.

That Iranian decision makers took such a step is not the result of too little diplomacy, but rather too much. Since Germany launched its critical dialogue with Iran in 1992, European countries have showered the Islamic Republic with apologies and incentives to compromise. Rather than abandon terrorism as a tool of state or reconsider its clandestine nuclear program, the Iranian government has redoubled its efforts to defy. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's May 31, 2006 offer to engage Tehran resulted not in a suspension of uranium enrichment, but rather public gloating by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei about U.S. weakness. Nor did the British "softly-softly" approach toward Tehran or its proxies in Basra bring peace in our time. Rather, it convinced the Revolutionary Guards that the British were targets of least resistance.

While Western diplomats seek an elusive formula of concessions and incentives, the fact remains that the Iranian regime has yet to offer a single confidence-building measure. Freelance proposals by Swiss diplomats are no substitute.

The Iranian decision to take hostages is in part an outgrowth of the moral equivalency of Western diplomats and intellectuals. The Iranian government will try to construct a linkage with Iranian operatives detained by U.S. forces in Baghdad and Erbil. Such a claim is risible. The Iranian government--which has yet to apologize for its seizure of U.S. hostages in 1979--did not grant the detained Qods Force operatives diplomatic credentials until after their arrest. None appeared on Iraqi diplomatic lists. But, in a world where U.S. and British diplomats apologize for slights real and imagined, and professors see their role to advocate for their countries of study rather than pursuit of dispassionate knowledge, Tehran counts on the fact that Western intellectuals will rationalize the most irresponsible and illegal behaviors.

Tehran has grown accustomed to expecting rewards for non-compliance. It is time U.S. officials, if not their European counterparts, recognize failure. Ratcheting up pressure only enables Iranian officials to adjust. True leverage requires comprehensive sanctions which can be lifted in response to changes in Tehran's behavior. The West should abandon the illusion that factionalism within the Iranian government matters. The Office of the Supreme Leader has exercised remarkable control and coordination over its security apparatus. Presidents, whether pragmatic, reformist, or hardline, may differ in style, but have all operated toward the same goals. The White House should not differentiate between officials, power structures, and proxies and should hold the Iranian government accountable for all its actions.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at AEI.

Review Essay

by Simon Henderson
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2007

The United States has a bipolar relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf emirates. On one hand, Western economies remain dependent on imported oil of which the Saudi fields are an important source. On the other hand, many policymakers are repelled by Saudi subsidization of Islamic extremism. Fifteen of the nineteen 9-11 hijackers were Saudi. Despite the importance of the relationship, literature about Saudi Arabia, the smaller Arab emirates, and their relationship with the West remains thin. What does exist falls into three categories: treatments of oil, examinations of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, and studies of Saudi personalities.

Oil Opacity

Quantifying Energy: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2006. London: British Petroleum, 2006. 45 pp. Available free online.

Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy. By Matthew R. Simmons. Hoboken: John Wiley and Son, 2005. 422 pp. $24.95.

Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East. By Valerie Marcel. London: Chatham House/Brookings Institution Press, 2006. 322 pp. $22.95.

That oil dominates discussion of the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf should not surprise. After all, Saudi Arabia has 22 percent of the world's oil reserves; Kuwait has 8.5 percent; and the United Arab Emirates has 8.1 percent.[1] For policy analysts and industry experts alike, the annual BP Statistical Review of World Energy is a standard reference. Not only does it enable analysts to determine just how oil-wealthy various countries are, but it now also includes data on energy alternatives such as wind power and ethanol.

While many policymakers accept Saudi and other Persian Gulf statistics too uncritically, taking any product of these governments or state oil companies at face value would be a mistake. British Petroleum acknowledges it reproduces figures provided by national governments, even when such statistics are implausible. Industry experts, for example, believe Kuwait exaggerates its reserves; others governments might do likewise.

By voicing doubt over the kingdom's figures, Texan investment banker and veteran oil industry analyst Matthew R. Simmons angered Saudi officials. In 2003, as a guest of Saudi Aramco, he contrasted verified production shortfalls in twelve key oil fields with "unverified Saudi rhetoric." In Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy, he suggests that the Saudi government lies about its reserves. Simmons argues that private geological and engineering information simply does not correlate to public statements. While Saudi officials and many oil industry experts maintain that Simmons is wrong, the matter will not be laid to rest until the kingdom allows an independent audit.

The question of the BP statistics and the anger over Simmons' assertions reflect the problem of state opacity that faces scholars and analysts of the Persian Gulf region. Arab governments (as well as Iran) prize secrecy. They release only that information which serves their interests. Thus, to rely too much on official data can be counterproductive. In Oil Titans, Valerie Marcel, a researcher at Chatham House in London, explores this opacity and the structure and thinking of these state-owned oil companies, not only in Saudi Arabia but also in Iran, Kuwait, Algeria, and Abu Dhabi, the chief oil producer within the United Arab Emirates.

Looking at the results of a questionnaire sent to more than 100 professionals and also interviewing several top executives, she finds the industry's common characteristic to be that of stifling bureaucracy. Here, the National Iranian Oil Company leads the field; by comparison, Saudi Aramco appears open. Everything is relative. While still opaque, Saudi Aramco can be efficient even as it has to operate within the limits set by the Saudi royal family. Such research may appear dry, but it has important implications in the ability of Persian Gulf economies to cope with a sustained drop in oil prices. In 1999, when prices dipped below $10 per barrel, only the United Arab Emirates had a budget surplus.

Absent a sudden shift towards privatization, the decision-making of state-owned oil companies will remain important for world energy security.

What Underlies U.S.-Saudi Relations?

America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier. By Robert Vitalis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006. 353 pp. $29.95.

Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia. By Rachel Bronson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 353 pp. $28.

National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges. By Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2005. 428 pp. $54.95.

State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration. By James Risen. New York. Simon & Schuster, 2006. 256 pp. $26.

The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. By Lawrence Wright. New York: Knopf, 2006. 470 pp. $27.95

Oil is interwoven into the modern history of the Middle East. University of Pennsylvania political scientist Robert Vitalis tackles the early history of Aramco in Saudi Arabia prior to that kingdom's 1980 nationalization of the industry in America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier. Vitalis's research demonstrates that while a security-for-oil understanding forms the basis of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, the origins of the bilateral relationship were private financial interests.

He approaches his study with an academic's love for archives and declassified documents. He does not whitewash Saudi history with the happy, pre-9-11 narrative so popular among Saudi scholars. Instead, he talks about the racism that pervaded Aramco camps, not only dividing Saudis and Americans but also segregating Palestinians and Pakistanis, who formed an intermediate tier. In an age of heightened political sensitivities, he points out early strains caused by U.S. workers draping a Saudi flag over a company bar and personal ridicule directed toward the Saudi king.

Interest in Saudi Arabia grew after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. Perhaps the most influential addition to the literature is Rachel Bronson's Thicker than Oil. Bronson, formerly at the Council on Foreign Relations and now vice-president for programs and studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, argues against the idea that oil is the basis of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Rather, with meticulous attention to State Department archives, oral histories, and interviews, she argues that Riyadh's Cold War assistance solidified the U.S.-Saudi relationship.

While Bronson's argument is valid, it perhaps inculpates Washington too much in the creation of jihadi fighters in Afghanistan. True, Washington and Riyadh's interests coincided in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but the growth of jihadism was more the result of deliberate Saudi action coupled with U.S. negligence to hold Riyadh to account for its poorly-supervised infrastructure of Islamic charities and educational establishments. Riyadh's actions were deliberate while Washington was naïve and negligent to trust too much to Saudi intentions. Bronson's statement that "mutual recriminations are easy yet counterproductive" is facile. Moral equivalency falls flat. Her recommendation that "Saudi leaders must work to address issues surrounding the financing of extremist thought [and] in return, Washington must find ways to help the pragmatists prevail in their domestic battle," undercuts the depth of the problem the West faces because of Saudi religious incitement. The quest for Saudi moderates may also be ephemeral, especially if men such as King Abdullah are counted among them. After all, in 2004, it was Abdullah who proclaimed that there was a "95 percent" chance that "Zionist hands" were behind recent terror attacks in Yanbu on the Red Sea and Al-Khobar on the Persian Gulf coast.[2]

In National Security in Saudi Arabia, both Anthony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Nawaf Obaid, until recently a Saudi security adviser, argue that the special relationship between the West and Saudi Arabia needs revision. Rather than treat Riyadh as a client, Cordesman and Obaid argue that the United States and Europe should treat the kingdom "as they do other friendly states in the region." If the authors seek to imply that Riyadh's relationship with Washington should equal Jerusalem's, they do not say so directly. Still, even hinting at such an equivalency reflects a profound misunderstanding about the nature of U.S. foreign policy. Money and patronage are not the foundations of U.S. special relationships with countries such as Israel, the United Kingdom, and Australia but rather democracy and ideology.

Another question which permeates the literature, but which few authors address directly, is whether the U.S.-Saudi relationship is good for both countries. In State of War, James Risen of the New York Times writes that after 9-11 "no one in Washington worked harder to earn their keep than the spin merchants of Saudi Arabia." These he identified as "[s]o many people in Washington's power circles—lawyers, and lobbyists, defense contractors, former members of Congress and former White House aides, diplomats and intelligence officers, and even some journalists [who] rely so heavily on Saudi money or Saudi access that ugly truths about Saudi links to Islamic extremists have been routinely ignored or suppressed." It is a devastating but accurate comment. When Saudi officials address public meetings in the United States, their audience too often acts as supplicants, seeking notice and favor. Risen goes on to make the curious comparison that Saudi influence "is an issue only slightly less sensitive to discuss in polite company in Washington than that of Israeli political influence." It is an ugly reminder that although U.S. society is polite, strong opinions and prejudice can lie behind a smiling veneer.

While no judgment about the future of the U.S.-Saudi relationship is possible without gauging the kingdom's internal stability, few authors are willing to address the issue directly. In Twilight in the Desert, Simmons also questioned the kingdom's social stability. By focusing on rejection of his technical arguments, the Saudis have sought to discredit his book and sidestep its political dimension. Yet his political arguments are based on economics rather than partisan vitriol.

New Yorker staff writer Lawrence Wright tangentially addresses the issue in The Looming Tower, which tells the story of 9-11 through the interlocking lives of four men: Osama bin Laden, his Egyptian deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, FBI counter-terrorism chief John O'Neill, and then-Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal. His narrative addresses the historical compromises between the Saudi royal family and the Wahhabi clerical leadership. Wright provides anecdotes to illustrate shifting power balances, for example, relating a confrontation between Turki and a preacher who had objected to women running charitable organizations, and reporting Turki's decision to monitor religious police, even though they were outside his area of responsibility.

The Royal Family

Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs. Edited by Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman. London: C. Hurst and Co, 2005. 462 pp. $50.

The Prince: The Secret Story of the World's Most Intriguing Royal, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. By William Simpson. New York: Regan, HarperCollins, 2006. 480 pp. $32.50.

What undercuts many of the Western books about Saudi Arabia is a failure to treat royal family members critically. While scholars of Iran or Israel, for example, tackle the personal foibles of major personalities, Saudi specialists remain deferential to the royals. Many journalists treat them as if they are ten-feet tall. Many studies label Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz, king and prime minister for twenty-three years, as "revered." Others characterize Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz, defense minister since 1962, simply as "powerful." Here, Vitalis is an exception, as he does relate critical anecdotes. Still, it would be useful to explore the personal weaknesses of royals who are crucial not only to the U.S.-Saudi relationship but also—because of Saudi Arabia's oil wealth—to the world economy. Energy independence might still be a pipe-dream for another two decades but, if Western policymakers and the general public better understood the frailties of the princes, they might take more seriously the need to invest in alternative energy sources to become less dependent upon the kingdom.

Archival records suggest senior policymakers recognize the venality of Saudi princes. In 2006, the British National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office) accidentally released a series of 1985 documents[3] relating to the multibillion Al-Yamamah arms deal in which Britain agreed to sell Tornado attack aircraft and other equipment. Among the papers was a briefing note for British prime minister Margaret Thatcher containing profiles of key Saudis that discusses the personal hypocrisy of many Saudi royals and notes King Fahd's unpopularity among both the public and the royal family. The British Foreign Office briefing describes Sultan, now crown prince, as "not highly intelligent, but he has charm … He has prejudices, is inflexible and imperious."

The British Foreign Office recognized that family interests defined Saudi policy. The Saudi foreign minister was a bit player; the king retained real control. A desire to co-opt radicals who otherwise might turn on the kingdom motivated Saudi rhetoric about Palestine. Checking Soviet and Iranian influence was also a priority. Despite the revisionism of Bronson and Cordesman and Obaid, London recognized oil dominated the U.S.-Saudi relationship since before World War II.

In terms of analysis of modern Saudi Arabia, none of the other books approaches Saudi Arabia in the Balance by University of Amsterdam lecturer Paul Aarts and University of Lancaster reader Gerd Nonneman. Some of their chapters are perhaps too academic for the general readership, but they have assembled a far-reaching collection of analyses on history, politics, and economics. "Circles of Power," a chapter by London University lecturer Madawi al-Rasheed is valuable for depicting Saudi royal politics not as the cleavage of now-King Abdullah versus the Sudairis—Fahd and his full brothers—but rather as five circles of power—Fahd's sons, Abdullah, Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin Abdul Aziz, Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, and the Governor of Riyadh, Prince Salman bin Abdul-Aziz al-Saud. The chapter "Political Opposition in Saudi Arabia," written by Abdulaziz O. Sager, director of the Gulf Research Center in Dubai, also provides a useful survey.

Overcoming the impediments to U.S.-Saudi relations will be no easy task. Between 1983 and 2005, the Saudi ambassador in Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, dedicated himself to this job. He is the subject of the new book, The Prince. Written by William Simpson, a former hedge fund executive who first met Bandar as a fellow trainee at Cranwell, the British air force training academy, it bills itself as an unofficial biography although, according to Simpson, Bandar provided unrestricted access to his family and friends. While not critical about larger issues, Simpson relates an anecdote about Bandar cheating while at Cranwell. The Saudi prince preferred a hot meal at a local guest house close to the rendezvous point to dodging British troops during an escape-and-evasion exercise. The incident recalls a similar example of avoiding physical exercise related by Bandar's half-brother, Khalid bin Sultan, in his autobiography.[4]

While too sympathetic, Simpson's biography helps to fill out Bandar's character beyond the tales of hyperactive diplomat, dealmaker, and special envoy, roles he cultivated. Also revealed are important historical details. Simpson writes that Saudi Arabia considered a direct military role in the 1973 Yom Kippur war, with some in Riyadh proposing to bomb Eilat with ten aircraft, including one piloted by Bandar. In the end, the Saudi government instead sent a brigade to Syria where it remained well clear of the Golan front. Does Bandar deserve a superman image? Aside from a bad back, a legacy of days of driving fast cars and piloting fast planes, Simpson describes bouts of depression. The reality will be crucial since Bandar, as secretary-general of the Saudi National Security Council, must face a resurgent Iran and uncertainty in Iraq.

So what might be included in the next batch of Saudi-oriented books? Another biography of a Saudi royal would be welcome—King Abdullah himself certainly deserves one—although the secrecy of Saudi society would likely undercut its value to anyone who wants detail. Studies of regionalism in Saudi Arabia remain taboo. The only recent exception here is Chatham House researcher Mai Yamani's Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian Identity,[5] whose research reminds that many residents of the once-independent Red Sea region of Hijaz resent the domination of the House of Saud, which conquered the region in 1924. There is also a growing gap, after the surge of post-9-11 books, of studies examining the role of Islam. Saudi Wahhabism aside, the rest of the Persian Gulf Arabs appear to have a simple and deep faith, not well understood in the West. There is little recent scholarship about Saudi Shi‘ites or the Sufi communities which dot the Arabian Peninsula. Perhaps there will be a volume or two on the soaring economic success of Dubai, mimicked in lesser degree by Doha and Bahrain. But publishers be warned, watch the oil price. Any further softening could prick the bubble parts of these economies. There will be tears all round. The safest bet is that Iranian titles will still dominate, with the Saudis close behind. The other Persian Gulf Arabs might well prefer it that way.

Simon Henderson is the Baker senior fellow and the director of the [Persian] Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

[1] Quantifying Energy: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2006 (London: BP Corp, 2006), p. 6.
[2] NBC News, July 26, 2004.
[3] The Guardian (London), Oct. 28, 2006.
[4] Khalid Bin Sultan with Patrick Seale, Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander (New York: Harpercollins, 1995), p. 68.
[5] London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.

U.S.-Turkey Relationship Vital to National Security, Gates Says
By Fred W. Baker III
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 27, 2007 – The U.S. relationship with Turkey is "under valued and under appreciated" and the country's geographical position is vitally important to security challenges facing the U.S., Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates today told the American-Turkish Council.

Gates spoke to about 500 attendees at a D.C. luncheon during the council's annual conference. The ATC is a business association that promotes commercial, defense, technology and cultural relations between the two countries.
In the 20-minute speech, the defense secretary acknowledged that U.S.-Turkey relations have had struggles in recent years, but added, "Our military, economic, political and personal ties remain strong."
He heralded Turkey's $175 million role in the Joint Strike Fighter program. The country has agreed to buy 100 of the F-35 Lightning II supersonic stealth fighters in development.
Gates also commended the country for allowing 16 U.S. Navy ships to make port calls there in 2006.
In support of the war on terror, Turkey has commanded two rotations of NATO's International Security Assistance Force and a provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan, and has provided the U.S. access to Iraq through an air base in Turkey. Without that access, Gates said, operations in Iraq would be "exceedingly more difficult and vastly more expensive."
Still, all relationships need work to remain strong, the secretary said.
"The two nations should oppose measures and rhetoric that needlessly and destructively antagonize each other. That includes symbolic resolutions by the United States Congress as well as the type of anti-American and extremist rhetoric that sometimes finds a home in Turkey's political discourse," Gates said.
Gates conceded that the war in Iraq is a point of contention for Turkey, as well as many of America's allies. Adding to the tension is fighting on the Turkey-Iraq border against fighters for the Kurdistan Workers Party, known as PKK.
"The situation on Turkey's border with Iraq's Kurdish region is of particular concern," Gates said. "Every Turkey citizen killed by the PKK is a setback for success in Iraq and a setback in our relationship with Turkey."
Gates said he has tapped former NATO supreme allied commander in Europe Air Force Gen. Joseph W. Ralston as special envoy for countering the PKK, but acknowledged, "We know more needs to be done."
Regarding the situation in Iraq, Army Gen. David Petraeus, the new Multinational Force Iraq commander, is applying "sound counterinsurgency principles" that are aimed at giving the newly established Iraqi government breathing room, Gates said. Coalition forces are securing and holding neighborhoods, and the Iraqi government has committed the forces need to secure its capitol, he added.
He said, though, that Iraq's disposition will not be finally determined by military action, but by the political influence of its neighbors in the region.
"Whatever disagreements we might have over how we got to this point in Iraq, the consequences of a failed state in Iraq, of chaos there, will adversely affect every member of the Atlantic alliance and none more so than Turkey," he said.
"Iraq's neighbors will need to play a constructive role going forward even if they haven't done so in the past -- especially in encouraging political reconciliation and a reduction in violence within Iraq. This is certainly the case with Syria and Iran. They have not been helpful," Gates said.
He called recent talks in Baghdad "a good start," but said that the U.S. is "open to higher level exchanges."
Finally, Gates called Iraq's future an interest and a responsibility "that we will not abandon."
"Abandoning Iraq and leaving regional chaos in the wake clearly would be an offense to our interests as well as our values and a set back for the cause of freedom as well as the goal of stability," Gates said.
"In this strategic environment we have to be willing to spend the resources, absorb the costs, take the risks and meet the commitments we make to one another. It means having the creditability, ingenuity and skill to dissuade and divide our potential adversaries while reassuring and uniting our friends."
Gates closed his remarks with the Turkish proverb, "A wise man remembers his friends at all times, a fool only when he has need of them."
"The United States and Turkey have wisely remembered our friendship at all times," he said.

Biographies:
Robert M. Gates

Wrong on Timetables
By Frederick W. Kagan, William Kristol
Posted: Monday, March 26, 2007

ARTICLES
The Weekly Standard
Publication Date: April 2, 2007


Resident Scholar
Frederick W. Kagan

Let's give congressional Democrats the benefit of the doubt: Assume some of them earnestly think they're doing the right thing to insist on adding to the supplemental appropriation for the Iraq war benchmarks and timetables for withdrawal. Still, their own arguments--taken at face value--don't hold up.

Democrats in Congress have made three superficially plausible claims: (1) Benchmarks and timetables will "incentivize" the Maliki government to take necessary steps it would prefer to avoid. (2) We can gradually withdraw over the next year so as to step out of sectarian conflict in Iraq while still remaining to fight al Qaeda. (3) Defeat in Iraq is inevitable, so our primary goal really has to be to get out of there. But the situation in Iraq is moving rapidly away from the assumptions underlying these propositions, and their falseness is easier to show with each passing day.

1. The Iraqi government will not act responsibly unless the imminent departure of American forces compels it to do so. Those who sincerely believe this argument were horrified by the president's decision in January to increase the American military presence in Iraq. It has now been more than ten weeks since that announcement--long enough to judge whether the Maliki government is more or less likely to behave well when U.S. support seems robust and reliable.

There can be no hope of defeating or controlling al Qaeda in Iraq without controlling the sectarian violence that it spawns and relies upon.

In fact, since January 11, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has permitted U.S. forces to sweep the major Shiite strongholds in Baghdad, including Sadr City, which he had ordered American troops away from during operations in 2006. He has allowed U.S. forces to capture and kill senior leaders of Moktada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army--terrifying Sadr into fleeing to Iran. He fired the deputy health minister--one of Sadr's close allies--and turned a deaf ear to Sadr's complaints. He oversaw a clearing-out of the Interior Ministry, a Sadrist stronghold that was corrupting the Iraqi police. He has worked with coalition leaders to deploy all of the Iraqi Army units required by the Baghdad Security Plan. In perhaps the most dramatic move of all, Maliki visited Sunni sheikhs in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province and formerly the base of al Qaeda fighters and other Sunni Arab insurgents against his government. The visit was made possible because Anbar's sheikhs have turned against al Qaeda and are now reaching out to the government they had been fighting. Maliki is reaching back. U.S. strength has given him the confidence to take all these important steps.

2. American forces would be able to fight al Qaeda at least as well, if not better, if they were not also engaged in a sectarian civil war in Iraq. The idea of separating the fight against al Qaeda from the sectarian fighting in Iraq is a delusion. Since early 2004, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has sought to plunge Iraq into sectarian civil war, so as to critically weaken the government, which is fighting it. AQI endeavors to clear Shiites out of mixed areas, terrorize local Sunnis into tolerating and supporting AQI, and thereby establish safe havens surrounded by innocent people it then dragoons into the struggle. Now, heartened by the U.S. commitment to stay, Sunni sheikhs in Anbar have turned on AQI. In response, AQI has begun to move toward Baghdad and mixed areas in Diyala, attempting to terrorize the locals and establish new bases in the resulting chaos. The enemy understands that chaos is al Qaeda's friend. The notion that we can pull our troops back into fortresses in a climate of chaos--but still move selectively against al Qaeda--is fanciful. There can be no hope of defeating or controlling al Qaeda in Iraq without controlling the sectarian violence that it spawns and relies upon.

3. Isn't it too late? Even if we now have the right strategy and the right general, can we prevail? If there were no hope left, if the Iraqis were determined to wage full-scale civil war, if the Maliki government were weak or dominated by violent extremists, if Iran really controlled the Shiites in Iraq--if these things were true, then the new strategy would have borne no fruit at all. Maliki would have resisted or remained limp as before. Sadr's forces would have attacked. Coalition casualties would be up, and so would sectarian killings. But none of these things has happened. Sectarian killings are lower. And despite dramatically increased operations in more exposed settings, so are American casualties. This does not look like hopelessness.

Hope is not victory, of course. The surge has just begun, our enemies are adapting, and fighting is likely to intensify as U.S. and Iraqi forces begin the main clear-and-hold phase. The Maliki government could falter. But it need not, if we do not. Unfortunately, four years of setbacks have conditioned Americans to believe that any progress must be ephemeral. If the Democrats get their way and Gen. Petraeus is undermined in Congress, the progress may indeed prove short-lived. But it's time to stop thinking so hard about how to lose, and to think instead about how to reinforce and exploit the success we have begun to achieve. The debate in Washington hasn't caught up to the realities in Baghdad. Until it does, a resolute president will need to prevent defeatists in Congress from losing a winnable war in Iraq.

Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at AEI. William Kristol is the editor of The Weekly Standard.