'Muse of Fire' Gives Eyewitness Accounts of War
By John J. Kruzel
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 15, 2007 – "Muse of Fire," a film that debuted here last night, uses American troops' eyewitness accounts and private journals to bring to life the tragedy, pain, horror, death and even the hope and optimism of war.

The documentary, shown at the National Archives, is a frank account of life on the front lines of Iraq and Afghanistan.
"I wanted to show servicemembers who have sacrificed so much for us, not only to humanize them, but to show how they grew personally and how they turned into writers," film director Lawrence Bridges said at the debut.
Operation Homecoming, a National Endowment for the Arts literary program, served as Bridges' inspiration. The program brought a network of instructors to 50 writing seminars at 25 domestic and five overseas military bases.
Six thousand troops and their family members wrote their stories and submitted 12,000 pages. A portion of this vast war narrative was edited and anthologized in a 377-page book, "Operation Homecoming: Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Home Front, in the Words of U.S. Troops and Their Families."
Bridges said his goal was to make a film about how war sparked the troops' creativity.
"I wanted to explore the military experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, the experience on the home front of spouses and children, and show through those experiences of deep trauma that may never be experienced by average Americans, how you use that in your creative life."
Writing about traumatic experiences, Bridges said, can be cathartic for the troops.
"When you don't talk about these things, and you're not open, it can lead to violence, it can lead to depression, it can lead to a life that isn't fulfilled," he said. "I think the power of Operation Homecoming is to give voices to those troops who need to get that out."
Renowned novelist Jeff Shaara was one of the instructors who worked with the troops and encouraged them to record their narratives.
"Invariably, the first words out of their mouths would be, 'My story is not very interesting,'" Shaara said. "Then they would tell me what their experience was and I would end up with my mouth hanging open."
For former Army Sgt. John McCary, who contributed a letter to the program and who now writes for The Wall Street Journal, the desire to write during wartime was "like a flood."
In the film, McCary shares an anecdote about a young Iraqi man with olive skin and black hair he met while stationed in Anbar province. The young man was known for his oil painting of local landscapes.
"He was an artist who sold his wares on the base," McCary said. "The piece that I have captured the ghostly, transient nature of a lot of the construction that's over there. He did it with really minimal materials, and obviously minimal time and resources and it was just gorgeous.
"Of course, it was made all the more poignant by the fact that I never saw him again," he said. Shortly after McCary befriended the young painter, he stopped appearing at the base.
"I know that he never came back and he was rumored to be dead," McCary said. "The insurgents at that time made a concerted effort to target people that dealt with American forces. He lived right outside Fallujah; that's not a good place to be somebody who sells to the Americans."
With death lurking around every corner, McCary said he felt compelled to record his experience.
"The urge to write when you're in that situation is overwhelming," McCary said. "It's an impetus that you don't usually feel, and I think it has something to do with your need to communicate your experience to other people."
While some troops censor the letters they send home, McCary gave his family a choice. "I asked my family right from the start, 'Do you want the cleaned-up version or do you want the fire hose? And they didn't even hesitate. They said, 'I want the fire hose.'"
"I think the subtext there, the unsaid thing is, why would you hold anything back if this might be the last thing you say?" McCary said.

Related Sites:
Operation Homecoming

U.S. Military Program Targets Terrorism in North Africa
By Gerry J. Gilmore
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 15, 2007 – The United States is keeping a watchful eye on developments in North Africa to ensure terrorists don't gain a foothold there, a senior U.S. military officer said in remarks provided to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee at a hearing here today.

The Defense Department is participating in the U.S. State Department's Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, Army Gen. Bantz J. Craddock stated, because of concern that Islamic terrorist organizations like al Qaeda may use ungoverned areas of North Africa to gain new recruits and train for future attacks.
Craddock is chief of U.S. European Command. Headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, the command is responsible for large swaths of Africa, as well as Europe. African nations that now fall under EUCOM's purview will be transferred to the new U.S. Africa Command that's scheduled to stand up Oct. 1.
"Like all combatant commands, EUCOM is dealing with terrorism in all its forms," Craddock stated.
In northern Africa, "al Qaeda-affiliated groups exploit ungoverned spaces to gain sanctuary, recruit, indoctrinate, train, equip, transit and mount operations," Craddock said. "The Trans-Sahara region, in particular, offers sanctuary to Islamic extremist terrorists, smugglers of drugs and contraband and insurgent groups."
There's evidence that al Qaeda has stepped up recruitment of North Africans to carry out attacks against U.S., coalition and pro-Iraqi government forces in Iraq, the general said.
The DoD-State Department initiative in North Africa "strengthens regional counterterrorism capabilities and assists participating nations in halting the illegal flow of arms, goods and people through the region," Craddock said. He noted that Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia are participating in the initiative.
The U.S. military contribution to TSCTP is called Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara, Craddock said.
"The military component (of TSCTP) utilizes special operations forces to train partners on the conduct of counter-terrorism operations," he explained. The program also helps participants get better control of their territory and prevents terrorist groups from using large, open areas as safe havens.
Globalization and modern communications systems enable terrorists to establish networks anywhere in the world, Craddock pointed out, noting, "the damage individual states or groups within those states can do is unprecedented."
However, the DoD-State Department anti-terror program in North Africa has the potential to produce significant results, and at modest cost, Craddock said.
"It can be a powerful brake on future terrorist expansion," he said.

Report Discusses Complexity of Iraqi Struggles
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 15, 2007 – Some areas in Iraq are involved in a civil war, according to a report titled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" that the Defense Department released yesterday.

The quarterly report to Congress goes on to agree with the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, however, that the term "civil war" does not adequately convey the complexity of the conflict in Iraq or the fact that different parts of the country have different challenges.
Most of the information in the report is from January, before the new joint Iraqi-coalition strategy had time to gel, DoD officials said.
"Some elements of the situation in Iraq are properly descriptive of a 'civil war,'" the report says. It notes that ethnic and religious lines have hardened in Iraq, the nature of the conflict has changed and the number of refugees from the fighting has increased.
Militias continue to stoke the ethnic divide between Shiia and Sunni Arabs, the report says. Militias, al Qaeda in Iraq and associated groups have used indiscriminate bombings to murder vast numbers of innocent Iraqis in an attempt to deepen ethnic and sectarian divides. "An Iraqi-conceived and -led Baghdad security plan is the centerpiece for addressing the escalating violence," the report states.
The report details the different nature of conflicts in different parts of Iraq. It says the conflict in the northern part of the country is characterized by sectarian tensions, insurgents launching extremist attacks and competition among Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen. The violence in the north is concentrated in Kirkuk, Mosul and Tal Afar.
Sunni Arab insurgents and al Qaeda in Iraq are the main problems in Anbar province to the west, according to the report. An encouraging sign in the province is the emergence of local sheikhs who are leading recruiting efforts for Iraqi security forces in the region.
In Baghdad, Diyala and Balad, the violence is centered on sectarian divisions and competition for resources. Crime also enters the violence equation in Baghdad.
In the Shiia-dominated southern part of the country, tribal rivalries and factional divisions dominate the violence.
The picture in the country is complicated by Iranian and Syrian support for insurgent groups in Iraq, the report said.
Attacks in Baghdad, Anbar, Salah ad Din and Diyala provinces account for roughly 80 percent of the attacks in Iraq. The other 14 provinces in the country have comparatively low levels of attacks.
Coalition forces attract the majority of attacks, the report says, but Iraqi security forces and Iraqi civilians suffer most of the casualties. The United Nations issued a report saying that insurgents, death squads and terrorists killed or wounded roughly 6,000 Iraqis in December, the report states.
"The total number of attacks on and casualties suffered by coalition forces, the (Iraqi security forces) and Iraqi civilians for the October through December (2006) reporting period were the highest for any three-month period since 2003," according to the report.
Baghdad is the center of gravity for the struggle in Iraq, the report says. In January, there were about 45 attacks a day in the capital city.
Surveys say the vast majority of the Iraqi people continue to reject violence. "More than 80 percent of the population rejects violence against the government under any circumstance, and more than 90 percent rejects attacks against women and children," the report states. "However, two-thirds of Iraqis express a sense that conditions for peace and stability are worsening, and the population is roughly split on whether the government is moving in the right direction to quell the violence."

Related Sites:

By Fred W. Baker III
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 14, 2007 – Suspected al Qaeda operative Khalid Sheikh Muhammad has admitted masterminding the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks as well as the World Trade Center bombing in 1993.

"I was responsible for the 9/11 operation, from A to Z," an interpreter read from Muhammad's statement to the Combatant Status Review Tribunal on March 10 in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
The tribunal was an administrative trial to determine only whether Muhammad could be designated as an enemy combatant. Muhammad used the opportunity to submit, through an interpreter, a two-part personal statement with 38 terrorism-related admissions.
He led the list by pledging his jihad allegiance to Osama bin Laden and finished with an admission to trying to destroy the American oil company in Indonesia owned by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
Muhammad claimed responsibility for the 2001 attempted shoe bombing of American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris.
He offered a chilling confession to "managing and following up on the Cell for the Production of Biological Weapons, such as anthrax and others, and following up on Dirty Bomb Operations on American soil."
He also named four other skyscrapers that were supposed to be destroyed in a "second wave" of attacks after 9/11. They were the Library Tower in Los Angeles, the Sears Tower in Chicago, the Plaza Bank in Seattle and the Empire State Building in New York City.
"I shared responsibility for the assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II while he was visiting the Philippines," Muhammad also admitted.
Muhammad's lengthy closing oral statement began with a pledge to Allah in Arabic followed by a refusal to take an oath as part of the tribunal. He explained that he was not lying, but that his religious beliefs prevented him taking the oath and thereby accepting, at least in part, American law and its constitution.
Muhammad went on to say that he was not trying to make himself out to be a hero, but an enemy of America.
He drew a comparison between bin Laden and George Washington, both fighting for independence, and said that the term terrorist is "deceiving." He said that during the Revolutionary War, Washington would have been considered a terrorist by the British.
Muhammad said he did not like to kill people, especially children.
"I don't like to kill people. I feel very sorry they been killed kids in 9/11," Muhammad said in broken English. But, he said, their deaths are part of the "language" of war.
He closed by stating that war is part of life and that it will never stop.
Unclassified transcripts of the tribunal are online at: www.defenselink.mil/news/Combatant_Tribunals.html at the bottom of the page.
Muhammad's tribunal was one of three for the 14 high-value detainees who were transferred Sept. 6 to Guantanamo Bay from CIA custody.
Proceedings were March 9 for Abu Faraj al-Libi, an alleged senior member of al Qaeda, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who is said to have helped Muhammad plan the Sept. 11 attacks.
Shibh also elected to not participate in the tribunal. His personal representative said that Shibh was "uncooperative and unresponsive."
Evidence submitted by the U.S. government against Shibh included a diary recovered in a 2004 raid detailing his involvement in the Sept. 11 attacks. He was also identified on a videotape of potential suicide operatives, the evidence cited. Shibh attempted to obtain a U.S. visa four times in 2000 for the purpose of attending flight school here, the evidence states. All applications were rejected.
Many other connections to pre-9/11 terrorist activities were cited in the evidence, including wiring money to the actual terrorist hijackers.
Libi elected to not participate in the tribunal, citing through his personal representative that his freedom "far too important to be decided by an administrative process" and that he is awaiting legal proceedings.
Evidence submitted against Libi included sources who stated that Libi was the supervisor of an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. Computer and other documentation were seized during his capture that contained manuals for explosives, detonators, chemicals, military tactics, missiles and tanks.
CSRTs are a one-time administrative process used to determine whether detainees at Guantanamo Bay can be designated as enemy combatants. No decisions have been made about the detainees' status.
Not all of the three detainees chose to participate in the CSRT proceedings. It was not released which detainees did or did not participate. The detainees have a right to personal representation and to receive an unclassified summary of evidence in advance of the hearing.
The CSRTs for the detainees were not open to media because of national security concerns.
The U.S. government established the CSRT process at Guantanamo Bay as a result of a June 2004 Supreme Court decision in the case of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a former driver for bin Laden who challenged his detention at Guantanamo Bay. Between July 2004 and March 2005, DoD held 558 CSRTs at Guantanamo Bay. At the time, 38 detainees were determined to no longer meet the definition of enemy combatant, and 520 detainees were found to be enemy combatants.

Related Sites:
Combatant Status Review Tribunals/Administrative Review Boards (High-Value Detainees Section is at Bottom of Page)

March 14, 2007
Wal-Mart IS the bottom of the pyramid!
ARTICLE: "In Mexico, Wal-Mart Is Defying Its Critics: Low Prices Boost Its Sales and Popularity In Developing Markets," by John Lyons, Wall Street Journal, 5 March 2007, p. A1.
Wal-Mart keeps screwing up in affluent markets, like Germany, Japan, large U.S. cities, but routinely cleans up in developing or emerging markets, where it's sell to the bottom of the pyramid mentality meets an aggressive desire on the part of consumers for better economic connectivity ("My modest income is now connected to so many more choices!").
Turns out poor Central Americans like Wal-Mart for all the same reasons why the rural red states in America like it too.
It connects and empowers while, yes, simultaneously reconfiguring local markets--the essence of globalization