December Recruiting Numbers Exceed Goals
By John J. Kruzel
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, Jan. 11, 2007 – Last month's recruiting figures for all military services exceeded goals, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said during testimony today before the House Armed Services Committee.

"I'm pleased to report that all active branches of the United States military exceeded their recruiting goals for the month of December," Gates said, "with particularly strong showings by the Army and the Marine Corps."

In December, the Army recruited 861 soldiers, exceeding its goal by 23 percent, according to information released by the Defense Department. The Marine Corps recruited 1,761, exceeding its goal by 10 percent, and the Navy and Air Force met their recruitment goals of 2,071 and 2,330, respectively.

Additionally, the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve exceeded their recruiting goals in December.

Gates' comments come a day after President Bush announced his plan to increase the Army's and Marine Corps' overall strength.

"We propose to (increase) in annual increments of 7,000 troops a year for the Army and 5,000 for the Marine Corps until the Marine Corps reaches a level of 202,000, and the Army would be at 547,000," Gates said at a news conference this morning.

"We should recognize that while it may take some time for these new troops to become available for deployment," Gates said, "it is important that our men and women in uniform know that additional manpower and resources are on the way."

Gates then reflected on those who volunteer to serve in the U.S. armed forces.

"Our nation is truly blessed that so many talented and patriotic young people have stepped forward to defend our nation and that so many servicemen and women have chosen to continue to serve," he said at the news conference.

Gates' remarks today about the value of recruits echo President Bush's comments during his speech yesterday outlining the new way forward in Iraq.

"In these dangerous times, the United States is blessed to have extraordinary and selfless men and women willing to step forward and defend us," Bush said. "These young Americans understand that...the advance of freedom is the calling of our time."

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Op-Ed Columnist
The Fog Over Iraq
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By DAVID BROOKS
Published: January 11, 2007
If the Democrats don’t like the U.S. policy on Iraq over the next six months, they have themselves partly to blame. There were millions of disaffected Republicans and independents ready to coalesce around some alternative way forward, but the Democrats never came up with anything remotely serious.

David Brooks.
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The liberals who favor quick exit never grappled with the consequences of that policy, which the Baker-Hamilton commission terrifyingly described. The centrists who believe in gradual withdrawal never explained why that wouldn’t be like pulling a tooth slowly. Joe Biden, who has the most intellectually serious framework for dealing with Iraq, was busy yesterday, at the crucial decision-making moment, conducting preliminary fact-finding hearings, complete with forays into Iraqi history.

The Democrats have been fecund with criticisms of the war, but when it comes to alternative proposals, a common approach is social Darwinism on stilts: We failed them, now they’re on their own.

So we are stuck with the Bush proposal as the only serious plan on offer. The question is, what exactly did President Bush propose last night? The policy rollout has been befogged by so much spin and misdirection it’s nearly impossible to figure out what the president is proposing.

Nonetheless, here’s my reconstruction of how this policy evolved:

On Nov. 30, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki presented Bush with a new security plan for Baghdad. It called for U.S. troops to move out of Baghdad to the periphery, where they would chase down Sunni terrorists. Iraqi Shiite and Kurdish troops, meanwhile, would flood into the city to establish order, at least as they define it.

Maliki essentially wanted Americans protecting his flank but out of his hair. He didn’t want U.S. soldiers embedded with his own. He didn’t want American generals hovering over his shoulder. His government didn’t want any restraints on Shiite might.

Over the next weeks, Bush rejected the plan and opted for the opposite approach. Instead of handing counterinsurgency over to the Iraqis/Shiites, he decided to throw roughly 20,000 U.S. troops — everything he had available — into Baghdad. He and his advisers negotiated new rules of engagement to make it easier to go after Shiites as well as Sunnis. He selected two aggressive counterinsurgency commanders, David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno, to lead the effort. Odierno recently told John Burns of The Times that American forces would remain in cleared areas of Baghdad “24/7,” suggesting a heavy U.S. presence.

Then came the job of selling the plan. The administration could not go before the world and say that the president had decided to overrule the sovereign nation of Iraq. Officials could not tell wavering Republicans that the president was proposing a heavy, U.S.-led approach.

Thus, administration officials are saying that they have adopted the Maliki plan, just with a few minor tweaks. In briefings and in the president’s speech, officials claimed that this was an Iraqi-designed plan, that Iraqi troops would take on all the primary roles in clearing and holding neighborhoods, that Iraqis in mixed neighborhoods would scarcely see any additional Americans.

All of this is designed to soothe the wounded pride of the Maliki government, and to make the U.S. offensive seem less arduous at home. It’s the opposite of the truth.

Yesterday, administration officials were praising Maliki lavishly. He wants the same things we want, they claimed. He has resolved to lead a nonsectarian government. He is reworking his governing coalitions and marginalizing the extremists. “We’ve seen the nascent rise of a moderate political bloc,” one senior administration official said yesterday.

But the selling of the plan illustrates that this is not the whole story. The Iraqi government wants a unified non-sectarian solution in high-minded statements and in some distant, ideal world. But in the short term, and in the deepest reptilian folds of their brains, the Shiites are maneuvering amid the sectarian bloodbath all around.

This is not a function of the character of Maliki or this or that official. It’s a function of the core dynamic now afflicting Iraqi society.

Administration officials have come up with as good a military strategy as is now possible. They’ve made intelligent moves to use reconstruction money to deepen contacts with a decentralized array of Iraqi leaders and factions. But on the political level, they have papered over the unpleasant reality with salesmanship and spin.

Mutual Interest
The United States and China find themselves with a common cause

The deep south of Somalia and the far west of China might appear to have very little in common. Yet the coincidence of what has happened in these two places in the past few days may indicate a coming confluence of interests for Washington and Beijing. American forces have targeted extremists driven out of Mogadishu by the Ethiopian-backed interim Government. Meanwhile, the Chinese authorities launched a distinctly American-style raid on an alleged terror camp thought to be run by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement deep in the mountainous western Xinjiang region. In each case the objective was to disable individuals and units allied to al-Qaeda and responsible for the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 in the first case and, allegedly, a spate of attacks on facilities linked to Beijing.

There are, inevitably, risks and difficulties in the approaches adopted by the US and China. Washington cannot be blamed for seizing a rare chance to damage extremists in Somalia. But it is impossible to do this is a truly surgical fashion. The Union of Islamist Courts, which until last month held sway in the Somali capital, includes a number of dedicated fanatics with a direct correction to international terrorism but also a host of other characters. Any assault led from the air must rely upon intelligence on the ground to be effective, and this is a part of the world in which the distinction between rumour and evidence is not all that it might be. Furthermore, the US has to be careful not to be seen as excessively close to the Ethiopians in Somalia as their presence, were it to extend for months, not weeks, will become the source of much Somali resentment.

China also has to take care to be discriminating. It is not “unpatriotic”, let alone treasonous, for Chinese citizens to follow Islam. The majority of those who reside in Xinjiang province are Islamic and the overwhelming majority of that majority have no connection to religious zeal- otry. There are, however, hard cases whose opposition to Beijing extends well beyond nationalism or the understandable historical grievances of the Uighurs who come from this part of China. There are terrorists operating from the border with Pakistan who have been trained elsewhere in the world; indeed a number were captured in Afghanistan when the Taleban and al-Qaeda fell back in 2001. It might be easier for the Chinese to identify their enemies more precisely than it is for the US military in Somalia but this is still far from a precise enterprise.

Yet China’s recognition that it has common interests with the United States is significant. At times, Beijing has offered the impression that it had no Islamist threat within its borders at all or that it can deal with this in isolation. It would be wise for China to make common cause not only with the United States but others such as India and Pakistan in sharing intelligence, comparing anti-terrorism techniques and, on occasion, formally co-ordinating anti-terrorism measures. It makes sense for Washington and Beijing to work more closely in developing policies towards countries — such as Iran — that aspire to sponsor global terrorism. Much has been written (and overwritten) about how the US and China are destined to spend this century as rivals. In reality, their mutual progress will depend on the extent of their co-operation.

Another good look-ahead on Cuba post-Castro
ARTICLE: "Cuban Economists Envision Role For Markets in Post-Castro Era," by Bob Davis, Wall Street Journal, 10 January 2006, p. A1.
Great stuff. Just seeing this thinking out in the open even before Castro croaks is a very good sign.

And the scenario described here is very realistic: small marketizing reforms at first, with no explicit acceptance of foreign direct investment (but just watch the informal flows boom from Miami) and once they get so far with that and no further, they'll want serious money and the opening-up process will rapidly balloon out of control.

Raul will rule with committees galore and new names will rise that we've never heard of before.

Then before he croaks (or when), we'll see serious reformers step up, "new era" and all that, and the popular push for direct elections will begin.

None of this happens overnight, but within five years Cuba is unrecognizable. The young will love it and dub it the "second revolution" and the old will be baffled and nostagically pine for the good old days. Old Miami Cubans will be shocked that the Cuba of their youth is not resurrectable, but they won't care given all the freedom to visit back and forth.

Sooner than any can imagine, life in Cuba will ramp up so close to that in Miami, the talk will begin of going all the way toward joining the U.S. Then, depending on the presidential election year, you'll start seeing Cuban statehood as a staple of Florida's electoral quid pro quo (just like sanctions support got you the Cuban vote in the past).

Going to be fascinating to watch.

OP-ED: "Two Alliances: U.S.-Sunni versus U.S.-Shiite," by Edward Luttwak, Wall Street Journal, 10 January 2006, p.A17.
Great piece by Luttwak exploring how sometimes (in Iraq) we need to be pro-Shiia and not be afraid of making Sunni states nervous and sometimes (in Lebanon vis-a-vis Syria) we need to be pro-Sunni and not worry about making Shiia leaders (Syria, Iran) nervous.

To me, that comes a lot closer to playing the board instead of having the board play you and--in effect--keeping the Big Bang alive (which Luttwak suggests is happening).

That's a key point we often forget: just because Iraq goes south doesn't mean the Big Bang dies. The BB is about shaking up existing orders and making others possible, and to me, that includes being realistic about what comes next, which is Shiia revivalism, to use Nasr's term.

That's a helluva useful thing to put into play. Scary to some, but--again--let's be realistic about two things: 1) Tom Jefferson ain't the next guy who'll show up when you topple the typical dictator (that's just too big a leap) and 2) that development gets us back in the business of competing directly with Osama (we both want to destabilize corrupt authoritarian regimes in the region, we just want different outcomes).

Now, where Luttwak doesn't go is where I'm dying to go: play Iran more as a scary balancer. The more we dialogue (none yet) with Iran on Iraq, the more we freak the Saudis and the easier it becomes to splinter Syria because we're basically playing prisoner's dilemma with both Damascus and Iran--as in, who's gonna bite first because we'll go harder on the other next.

Beyond that, I also advocate talking direct to Iran on the nukes issues, playing them like a USSR on missiles by linking carrots of connectivity with greater assurances that we'll not invade, thus giving rising pragmatists and moderates inside Iran something to reach for besides perceived humiliation in caving in to the Americans. Ahmadinejad's just been "thumped" on the mid-term elections, with Rafsanjani clearly resurrecting. We need to exploit that dynamic to our own, soft-kill ends.

But instead, we play the Big Bang 3-D chess game on just one level--hell, mostly just one square called Baghdad!

And that's too bad. A serious Henry Kissinger-James Baker type would be shuttling like mad, playing angle off angle. Instead we have talking-point Condi and just-say-no Cheney letting all the sacrifice for, and early momentum of, the Big Bang go largely to waste.

Again, it's a fundamental lack of strategic imagination.