5. Ideas matter. Since Saddam Hussein was toppled, it has become an article of faith that political allegiances in the Middle East grow out of tribal, racial and sectarian affiliation and that political parties based on ideas like women's right, socialism, or liberalism cannot succeed in "tribal societies." And though it is true that under totalitarian rule, societies do cling to close knit and familiar structures, there is little good reason to perpetuate those structures once the tyrant is dead.
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25480/pub_detail.asp
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4. Politics of Personality. It has always been a foible of American leaders to latch onto personalities in foreign policy. While the short term benefits of an alliance with a particular leader may be great, the long term costs are greater. President Bush has asserted on many occasions that he trusts the Iraqi Prime Minister (whoever he may be). At best, however, each prime minister has been a small man standing astride state institutions that barely exist. Prime Ministers come and go; only strong institutions can last. Key Iraqi institutions remain pitifully weak, rarely bolstered by serious technical support programs. Focus on institutions. Any prime minister today will soon be little more than a memory.
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25480/pub_detail.asp
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3. Oil. Failure to grasp the importance of oil production, the vital necessity of securing exports and the inequities of oil income distribution have undercut both reconstruction and security. Iraq's previous finance minister estimated that up to 40-50 percent of Iraqi oil revenue gets siphoned off into the insurgency or militias. Corrupt officials have stymied equipment upgrades and metering equipment necessary to undercut theft at Iraqi terminals. This is not a hard fix, and one that should happen immediately.
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25480/pub_detail.asp
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http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25480/pub_detail.asp
2. Corruption. Iraqi politicians treat ministries not as responsibilities, but rather as prizes in their patronage networks. That means legions of ghost employees and unqualified workers--most notoriously in state-run hospitals. Accountability and performance metrics are non-existent. It is not enough to have a panel overseeing ministries; there must be new competency tests and oversight to ensure technocrats replace kleptocrats.
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http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25480/pub_detail.asp
By Danielle Pletka
Posted: Friday, January 19, 2007
ARTICLES
www.washingtonpost.com
Publication Date: January 19, 2007
On January 10, President Bush acknowledged that the U.S. had made mistakes in Iraq. Some of those mistakes have fueled the insurgency and others have stoked sectarian tensions. But acknowledging mistakes should not mean accepting defeat. Rather, correcting mistakes can better enable victory.
Danielle Pletka, vice president for foreign and defense policy studies
President Bush's announcement of a troop surge is welcome. These additional troops and a seasoned commander well-versed in counterinsurgency tactics provide a foundation on which to jumpstart Iraq's reconstruction. However, stabilization will not translate into success if the U.S. Embassy and reconstruction team repeat the errors of the past.
As more American troops prepare to deploy to Iraq, it is essential that U.S. policymakers understand past miscalculations, avoid reliance on flawed ideas and address festering problems.
1. Partition. As sectarian violence flares, some members of congress have proposed partitioning Iraq along ethnic and sectarian lines. The idea that sectarian affiliation is a unifying force and that all Iraqis should submit to such vivisection ignores a century of development, a strong Iraqi nationalism and a broad diversity of ideas within communities in Iraq. Redrawing maps will not solve old problems and may, indeed, create new ones.
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