Nina Shea Testifies Before Congress on Behalf of Iraq's Assyrians and Other Minorities

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Assyrian International News Agency
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(AINA) -- The following testimony of Nina Shea, Director Center For Religious Freedom, was delivered on December 21 Before The US Congressional Committee On International Relations, Subcommittee On Africa, Global Human Rights, And International Operations.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for allowing me to testify today on behalf of the Center for Religious Freedom.


Chairman Chris Smith has been a dedicated and passionate leader on human rights for many years, and I wish to commend him for all the important hearings held under his chairmanship in this subcommittee. They have held governments around the world accountable, including our own, and given hope and relief to millions of the world's oppressed. This hearing today is no exception.


Egregious religious persecution occurs in North Korea, Saudi Arabia, China, Vietnam, Eritrea, Iran, Sudan and several other countries officially designated by the State Department as "Countries of Particular Concern," and is being addressed by the other witnesses today. There is an additional country where religious groups of various faiths face some of the bloodiest persecution in the world today, a country that is not listed among the CPC's. It is Iraq, and it is on this country, and particularly on the persecution faced by Iraq's smallest, most vulnerable minorities, that I will direct my testimony.


We should view Iraq's smallest religious minorities -- the Christians, Yizidis, Mandeans, Baha'is, Kaka'i and Jews -- as we once did Soviet Jews. The persecution these small minorities face stands out against even the horrific violence now wracking the rest of the population. This is demonstrated by the stark statistic that an estimated half of the members of the small minorities have been driven from their homes in the past two or three years, either to other parts of the country or abroad. Their very survival as communities within Iraq is now threatened by what amounts to ethnic, or rather cultural, cleansing. The State Department's Religious Freedom Reports accurately depicts a defenseless non-Muslim population that is being pounded by all other factions. Al Qaeda terrorists, Sunni insurgents, Shiite militias, Kurdish militants, and criminal gangs all persecute and prey on these small religious minorities.


Their situation is unique: Their religion and culture identifies them with the "infidel occupiers" in the minds of the extremists, and lacking the militias, tribal structures and foreign champions of Iraq's other groups, they are singularly defenseless against the mayhem that has followed the occupation. Because they do not govern any department, they are at the tender mercies of those dominant groups who aim to take their property, businesses and villages. The United States has a great moral responsibility to address their plight, and specific policy actions are required to help them. These policies will differ from the efforts we once took on behalf of Soviet Jews. Most of these small minority people do not wish to leave Iraq. We must expeditiously take actions that will maximize their security within Iraq, and will draw back some of those who have taken temporary shelter in other surrounding countries. For the most desperate among them, we must begin to resettle them here, where many, if not most, already have relatives who are well established.


While Shiites and Sunnis, who comprise Iraq's religious majority, also face appalling levels of extremist violence, sectarian strife, and official discrimination on account of their religions, it is the plight of Iraq's small religious minorities on which I will focus today both because the situation confronting these peoples threatens their very survival, and because their situation is not being sufficiently addressed by U.S. policy and was all but ignored in the recent Iraq Study Group Report. The very fact of their defenselessness -- they are persecuted and killed, but do not themselves persecute and kill -- contributes to the inverse relationship between their suffering and the world apathy at their situation.


Iraq's small religious groups -- Christians (Chaldean, who are Eastern rite Catholics Assyrian, including the Church of the East, Syriac, who are Eastern Orthodox, Armenians, both Roman Catholic and Orthodox, and Protestants, who are Anglican, Presbyterian, Baptist, evangelical and others), Mandeans (followers of John the Baptist), Yizidis (an ancient angel religion), Bahais, Kaka'i (a syncretic group around Kirkuk) and Jews, together number an estimated one million of Iraq's population of 26 million at the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. The largest group of these is Christian, the next largest is the Yizidis with about 70,000-500,000 and the Mandeans with about 6,000-10,000, and the smallest, the Jewish community, whose numbers had dwindled to the double-digits by 2003. Under escalating persecution and violence, these groups are fleeing their homeland en masse. Though they constitute some 3 or 4 per cent of Iraq's population, according to the UNHCR, they represent about 40 per cent of the refugee population. This disproportionate exodus attests to the intolerable treatment and conditions they face inside Iraq. We have also received reports that an estimated half of the Christians who remain in Iraq are internally displaced, with those from the south moving to the north of the country for relative security.


The UNHCR has determined that they are being targeted for their religion by militants determined to establish an extreme sharia ruled state. Because they speak Western languages and have cultural ties to the West, they have also been targeted for perceived or real cooperation with the US embassy and the Coalition.


In 2004 a dozen churches were attacked in coordinated bombings and other similar incidents have followed. Since July 2006 alone, seven clergymen have been kidnapped and two of them, both from Mosul, murdered. As the State Department notes, these religious groups can no longer gather in safety and many have stopped holding worship services altogether. My friend, the Chaldean Archbishop of Basra, who says his prayers in the language of Jesus, Aramaic, as is the Chaldean tradition, has been transferred apparently for security reasons to the diocese of Australia and New Zealand, and his Basra diocese now has only a couple of hundred families remaining. These churches are not just lying low, they are being eradicated.


Christian, Mandean and other women in some areas are being violently pressured to conform to supposed Islamic conduct and dress, with some killed or maimed, while men who operate liquor stores and cinemas have also been violently attacked by extremists. Flyers were posted at Mosul University this month declaring: "in cases where non-Muslims do not conform to wearing the Hijab (woman's head cover) and are not conservative with their attire in accordance with the Islamic way, the violators will have the Sharia and the Islamic law applied to them." It was in Mosul that some female students were murdered for wearing Western clothes and having a picnic with men in 2005 and where Orthodox priest Fr. Paulis Iskander was beheaded and dismembered on October 11.


Some of the death threats against non-Muslim minorities have been personal and some of these have been collected and translated, such as the samples that follow that were provided to the Center for Religious Freedom by the Chaldean Federation of America.:


"To the traitor, apostate Amir XX, after we warned you more than once to quit working with the American occupiers, but you did not learn from what happened to others, and you continued, you and your infidel wife XXX by opening a women hair cutting place and this is among the forbidden things for us, and therefore we are telling you and your wife to quit these deeds and to pay the amount of (20,000) thousand dollars in protective tax for your violation and within only one week or we will kill you and your family, member by member, and those who have warned are excused. Al-Mujahideen Battalions."


"You traitor, Amjad,
We can behead the traitor and we are ready for that.
We can chase the infidels and renegades and everybody who deals with them and with the occupiers and punish them according to Islam law, 'The unjust have no supporters' Allah is the most honest,
The Islamic Army in Iraq."


"This is the last warning? to the American nasty crusader agent (James). Our battalion will execute you by cutting your head and blowing up your house. Allah willing. Our battalions will pursue the snakehead your brother (Talia). We will arrest him wherever he is -- God willing.
Copy to the battalion Commander the Mudjahed
Abu Sayyaf and the Commander Abu Therr"


There are many other such examples -- and many cases of targeted killings backing them up. Grisly reports of kidnapped Christian children being crucified and mutilated after ransoms were not paid have emerged this fall from the ChaldoAssyrian community. Numerous cases are also reported by the Assyrian International News Agency on its website, www.aina.org.


This week, I received a letter from the Sabean Mandean Association in Australia that detailed the cases of Mandeans kidnapped and assassinated for their religion this past year. Some of the kidnap-for-ransom victims were reportedly circumcised before being released, a detail that indicates religion played a role in the crime.


Listed among the cases was the murder on December 2 of the Rev. Taleb Salman Araby, the deacon who assisted His Holiness Ganzevra Sattar Jabbar Hilo al-Zahrony, the worldwide head of the Mandean Community. He was easily recognizable because he wore the white rasta robes of the Mandean clergy. His family was prevented from holding a funeral service for him by extremists who threatened to blow up their house and the bereaved family was forced to bury him without any religious ceremony.


Furthermore, such violence against Christians and members of the smallest minorities is conducted with impunity. In northern Iraq and in the Nineveh Plains region where up to a third of the small minorities live, there have been no local police forces established unlike other areas in Iraq, and the few forces that are provided to Christian and minority areas from elsewhere have been known to harass and prey on these small minorities. There are reports that the judiciary discriminates against Christians and other small minorities. The Washington-based Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project, for example, reports that courts in the Kurdish area discriminate against Assyrians who contest land and property confiscated by Kurdish militants.


The Project also reports that in the Kurdish areas, Christian and other small minority towns have not benefited equally from U.S. reconstruction and development aid; their villages have been excluded by provincial-level officials from benefiting from water and electrical systems and denied their fair share of other utilities and services, such as schools and medical facilities, provided by U.S. aid. Apparently the US has no safeguards or checks in place to prevent this. As an Assyrian mayor of one of these towns, Telhaif, told me in November, such discrimination and marginalization is making minority towns and neighborhoods uninhabitable and forcing their residents out. According to detailed reports, once abandoned, Christian, Yizidi and Mandean properties have been seized by Kurdish authorities. Such treatment has given rise to charges that Kurdish authorities are carrying out ethnic cleansing against Christians and smaller minorities, including other ethnic minorities, such as the Shabaks and Turkomen.


Government leaders in Iraq have been largely indifferent to the victimization of the small minorities. The Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, was quoted earlier this year urging kidnappers to target Christian women instead of Muslims. After addressing the kidnapping of his own sister, Thayseer, the Speaker of the Iraqi National Assembly was broadcast by al-Iraqiya Satellite Television as stating: "Why kidnap this Muslim woman; instead of Thayseer, why not kidnap Margaret or Jean?" The latter are Christian names, thus implying that it would have been better for a Christian woman to have been kidnapped, raped and killed.


The United States Government urgently needs to take effective measures to help the most vulnerable of Iraq's religious groups. The US owes a special obligation to these peoples because their non-Muslim status associates them with the American occupation in the minds of Islamist extremists. Furthermore, they alone are defenseless, lacking militias, social structures and governing authority. Such measures should include actions that would help these peoples, who have maintained a presence in Iraq for thousands of years, to survive inside Iraq, as well as actions that would help the most desperate among them find sanctuary abroad. All such measures should be expeditiously implemented. They are:


Appoint a Special Aid Coordinator for Iraq as recommended by the Iraq Study Group. This post could prove to be very helpful in sustaining Christian and small minority communities, particularly those in northern Iraq that are being now marginalized.
Provide emergency relief for Internally Displaced Persons inside Iraq. Ensure that this aid reaches the needy Christians, and other small minorities now amassing in northern areas of Iraq.
Ensure that US reconstruction aid and development assistance is equitably distributed to Christian, Yizidi, Mandean and other small minority communities, including the ethnic minorities, the Shabaks and Turkomen, particularly in northern Kurdish areas where many are now fleeing from other parts of Iraq and where the US carries much influence. Legitimate, independent, local leadership of these minority communities should be consulted about the reconstruction priorities of their communities. Kurdish authorities must not be allowed to use US aid to ethnically cleanse northern Iraq.
Support the establishment of a new autonomous district that would be jointly governed by ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Shabaks (an ethnic minority with Shiite roots), Yizidis and other small minorities in the Nineveh Plains, an initiative provided for under article 125 of Iraq's Constitution.
Support the formation of police forces drawn from the local minority populations for Christian and small minority areas in the Nineveh Plains, as consistent with a decision of the Iraqi National Assembly and implemented elsewhere in Iraq.
Use more effective diplomacy with Iraqi leaders, particularly Kurdish leaders, to insist on the protection and equitable treatment of small religious minorities.
Resettle in the United States the most vulnerable members of the Christian and other smallest minorities. This group includes those orphaned, widowed, and maimed by targeted violence. There are over thousands of such refugees who seek to join relatives already in the US. Last year the US admitted a mere 198 refugees from Iraq, and is already authorized to admit up to 20,000. The US must provide funding to the UNHCR for the processing of such people and admit greater numbers.


Many other steps could be taken as well. While no group is spared suffering in Iraq, the smallest minorities are defenseless and the most vulnerable. In addition, they are viewed as collaborators of American occupiers by extremists. Today these Iraqi Christian ChaldoAssyrians, Yizidis, Mandeans, and others are comparable to yesteryear's Soviet Jews. They need our help to survive egregious and pervasive religious persecution and discrimination. The State Department's Religious Freedom Reports describes much of their suffering, but U.S. policy in their regard has been lacking.


Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes my testimony.

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Iraq Coalition needs prominent Sunni leader but also has a warrant for his arrest


Protected by neighboring Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria, Al Dari has maintained ties to both the former Saddam Hussein regime and to Al Qaida.
Harith Al Dari
Task: Fugitive leader of Association of Muslim Scholars
Age: 65
Whereabouts: Syria
Harith Al Dari has been regarded as a leading supporter of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq and yet has been protected by Arab allies of the United States. In November, the Iraqi Interior Ministry issued a warrant for Al Dari's arrest for inciting terrorism.
Protected by neighboring Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria, Al Dari, secretary-general of the Association of Muslim Scholars, has maintained ties to both the former Saddam Hussein regime as well as Al Qaida. He dismisses the political process and his son is regarded as a major insurgency leader.

"The political process, irrespective of the way they describe it, has brought nothing good to Iraq," Al Dari said. "They have divided Iraq on a sectarian and ethnic basis. Iraq today belongs to the occupation, to those who benefit from it, who serve it and who are collaborating with it to oppress their Iraqi brothers."

For the United States, Al Dari, the most-wanted Sunni cleric in Iraq, remains a major challenge in any decision to embrace or abandon the Sunni minority and instead focus on the Shi'ite majority, as Vice President Dick Cheney has advised. Over the past week, President Bush has been meeting with senior advisers and military commanders to decide.

The Iraqi Interior Ministry has sought to detain Al Dari and asked the international community, including Interpol, for help. Interior Minister Jawad Al Bolani, regarded as loyal to the Iranian-backed Mahdi Army militia, said Al Dari has been a leading cause of division in the country.

"The government's policy that anyone who tries to spread division and strife among the Iraqi people will be chased by our security agencies," Al Bolani said. "We have to prove to everyone that the government is going forward with major steps to achieve security."

But Iraq's neighbors have been harboring Al Dari. He was in Jordan when the ministry issued the arrest warrant. Later, the Sunni cleric traveled to Syria. He has also visited Saudi Arabia, which supports the Sunni community in Iraq.

Jordan's King Abdullah, right, meets Iraqi Sunni Sheikh Harith al-Dari at the Royal Palace in Amman on Nov. 27. Reuters/Yousef Allan
The Association of Muslim Scholars has dismissed the arrest warrant against Al Dari saying the Shi'ite-led Interior Ministry is seeking to silence its critics.
"The warrant issued by the Interior Ministry against Dr. Harith Al Dari is clear evidence that this government has lost its balance and declared its bankruptcy," the group said.

Officials do not doubt Al Dari's connection to the Sunni insurgency. Regarded as Iraq's most prominent Sunni scholar, he has been linked to the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the Islamic Army in Iraq.

In April 2003, weeks after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Al Dari formed AMS as a tool against American forces. Since then, AMS has provided religious cover for the Sunni insurgency and refused to negotiate with the United States.

But Al Dari has demonstrated his influence when he helped end the U.S. military siege of Fallujah in 2004. He has also mediated the release of hostages held by Sunni groups.

Al Dari has been quietly wooed by the United States in an effort to help end the insurgency. But the cleric and his son, believed to be the leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, has rejected any commitment unless the U.S. military withdraws from Iraq, at least the Sunni areas.

Al Qaida has also been embraced by Al Dari as part of a legitimate resistance movement. He has welcomed the formation of the Mujahadeen Shura Council, an umbrella of Al Qaida groups connected to the late Abu Mussib Al Zarqawi.

Al Dari has defended the Al Qaida atrocities by simply denying its claims of responsibility. He has also justified the abduction of Shi'ites and others, citing a ruling by Sheik Yusef Qaradawi, the Egyptian exile based in Qatar and regarded as the most charismatic of Sunni clerics.

The Iraqi cleric has acknowledged excesses by Sunnis, particularly Al Zarqawi. But he adds that attacks against civilians have been conducted by Iraqi intelligence agencies or the United States.

"Some Iraqi resistance factions have made mistakes that gave a faulty impression about the resistance as a whole," Al Dari said. "This is not strange. What is strange is to expect the resistance to be perfect and free from error at all times. No resistance movement has succeeded in doing that."

The U.S. military has encouraged Sunni tribes to reject Al Dari. The military has scored successes with the agreement by Sunni tribes in Al Anbar to fight Al Qaida. Some of the tribes have filed a lawsuit against Al Dari.

"We tell Harith Al Dari that if there is a bandit, it is you," said a statement by the Al Anbar Chieftains Council. "If there is a murderer or kidnapper, it is you."

Pentagon briefings reveal Al Qaida's 20-year plan, inevitability of 'Long War'

The Pentagon’s Joint Staff is very secretive but it is coming out of the shadows to better promote the idea that the global war on terrorism will be a "Long War" of perhaps 100 years’ duration.
A Joint Staff briefing, entitled the "Long War," is given five or six times a week within the Pentagon to various public audiences and as many as 60 times around the country. The goal is to help the American people and leaders better understand the nature of the conflict, the enemy and its actions and the U.S. strategy and tactics for defeating them.

“It is not just about Iraq or Afghanistan. It involves the whole world and it involves the whole government,” said Air Force Brig. Gen. Mark Schissler, deputy director of the war on terrorism within the Joint Staff J-5 strategy office.

According to the briefing, Al Qaida remains the main threat but it is also changing. The terrorist group is succeeding in making more connections around the globe, especially in Muslim-dominated regions where Islamists seek to re-establish a caliphate. These include North Africa, Southern Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Central and Southeast Asia.

“We see them reaching out a little more regionally and globally and you see groups that previously had not favored Al Qaida in some cases joining up with them now,” Schissler said. For example, terrorists in North Africa in the past had refused to join Al Qaida but recently have started to join forces with the group headed by Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.

The briefing states that Al Qaida “has exploited a frustrated populace, increased communications, and improved tactics to inspire a global movement committed to establishing extremists domination over much of the world.”

“The extremists believe that only through total extremists domination can the Ummah once again be prominent in the world,” the briefing states, noting that Bin Laden has boasted that "the pious caliphate will start from Afghanistan."

The briefing discloses a 20-year Al Qaida plan to create an Islamist extremist homeland in the Middle East. The seven-stage plan began with the September 11 attacks as "The Awakening,” “Eye-Opening,” in 2003 when U.S. troops took Baghdad. The plan will continue with the “Arising and Standing Up” in 2007 with a new focus on Syria and Turkey, and also more direct confrontations with Israel to try to gain more credibility among Muslims.

By 2010, Al Qaida plans on the “Demise of Arab governments.” All this will culminate in an Islamic caliphate in 2013, when Al Qaida and Islamists gain powerful new allies such as China, and Europe declines into disunity.

The “Total Confrontation” period will commence from 2015 to 2020 with the creation of an Islamic Army that will begin a worldwide fight against believers and nonbelievers.

The "Definitive Victory" will be reached in 2020 when the Islamists will assume power globally

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace and Commander Multinational Force-Iraq Gen. George Casey
December 22, 2006
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DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from Iraq
SEC. GATES: How are you all this morning?

For the past few days General Pace and I have met with our military commanders here in Iraq, the leaders of the Iraqi government, and the brave men and women who are serving here. I appreciate the openness and candor that I received from everyone.

I'm sorry I wasn't able to travel to Mosul today to see firsthand the situation there. Iraqis working together with our military has led to success in that area. And as Iraqis take over more responsibility there, the U.S. presence will diminish.

The situation here in Baghdad obviously is difficult. Yesterday I told Prime Minister Maliki that we are committed to the success of the Iraqi government.

I've asked General Casey in the coming days to follow up with the prime minister and the Iraqi military leaders, to make specific recommendations on how to improve the security situation here. Clearly, success will only be achieved by a joint effort, with Iraqis taking the lead.

On my return home, I will report to the president what I've learned here. I hope that will be this weekend.

And finally, as we enter this holiday weekend, I'd simply like to express my admiration to the men and women in uniform and to their families, and to thank them for the sacrifices they're all making and for their bravery in pursuit of our nation's security.

Be happy to take some questions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us a little bit about what you learned this week? It's your first week on the job. You spent the bulk of it here in Iraq. Can you tell us what you know now that you didn't know before and part of what the crux of your message may be to the president, without telling us exactly what you're going to tell him?

SEC. GATES: Well, one of the things that clearly impressed me -- and I think I alluded to it yesterday in our meeting with y'all -- and that is, it seems to me that a much greater degree of confidence, sophistication and understanding on the part of the Iraqis of what needs to be done, as well as their real determination to play their role and to take a leadership role in dealing with some of these security problems and then economic reconstruction -- that seems to me to be significantly advanced since I was here a couple of months ago.

I've been very impressed by the soldiers -- American soldiers that I've met and talked to. This morning I had an excellent briefing on the effort that we're making against the IEDs. And before that, I had a meeting with a group of our soldiers who are partnering with Iraqis in operations and was very encouraged by their confidence in their Iraqi partners, by the trust that they describe developing between American and Iraqi soldiers, their admiration for the Iraqi soldiers that they're working with, and their belief that this partnering, where the Iraqis take the lead and where the Iraqis significantly outnumber the American soldiers, but in partnership, they're being very successful.

And they describe these Iraqi soldiers being very brave and very willing to be aggressive, so I found all of that very encouraging in terms of the overall strategy as we move forward of the Iraqis taking the lead with us in a support role. Those are some of the things that I think I picked up.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you've repeatedly stressed that the United States will maintain an enduring presence here in the Gulf. Meanwhile, we're sending more force into the Gulf. What message are you trying to send to Iran?

SEC. GATES: I think the message that we're trying -- that we are sending to everyone, not just to Iran, is that the United States is an enduring presence in this part of the world. We have been here for a long time. We will be here for a long time, and everybody needs to remember that, both our friends and those who might consider themselves our adversaries.

Q: This is not a response to Iran's threat to retaliate against any U.N. sanctions?

SEC. GATES: I don't think it's a response to anything anyone else has done.

Q: Will there be a second aircraft carrier moving into the Gulf?

SEC. GATES: I don't know the answer to that question at this point.

Q: Will there be an increase in U.S. force levels in the Gulf?

SEC. GATES: Well, I'd defer to General Pace in terms of the actual things that are going on. My impression is that there has been an increase in naval strength in the Gulf over the past several weeks.

Q: Mr. Secretary, as you were talking now, we can hear the crackle of gunfire in the distance, the sounds of explosions, warplanes roaring overhead. Do you really think a surge of additional U.S. forces in the short term could help bring some of this violence under control?

SEC. GATES: Well, we've talked with the Iraqis about the best path forward in terms of improving the security situation here in Baghdad. I think we have a broad strategic agreement between the Iraqi military and Iraqi government and our military. Clearly there are more discussions that need to take place in Washington and more specific recommendations. But I'm quite confident that what I've heard from the Iraqis, of their plans this week, that we will be able to -- that together and with them in the lead we will be able to make an improvement in the security situation here in Baghdad.

Q: Yes, Mr. Secretary, haven't we heard for months or -- well, years, that the Iraqis realize what needs to be done and plan to do it, and yet, you know, still, I think there's sort of widespread agreement that much of what everyone agrees needs to be done hasn't been done -- the militias, you know, et cetera. I guess I'm wondering why you think now there's more likelihood that the Iraqis will do those things, and what steps you're taking, whether it's benchmarks -- publicly announced or others -- to get them to take the steps that we've been trying to get them to take for years, frankly.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that's a fair question. And I guess I would start by saying that, as you all know, I'm pretty new to this and so I do bring perhaps a perspective that those who haven't been intensely involved with it -- or those who have been intensely involved with it for the past several years don't have.

And I think one thing that may be missing here is a sense of perspective. You know, this is a country that went through 35 years of rule under Saddam, eight years of war with Iran, the first Gulf War, 12 years of sanctions. It was a country that was ruled by fear. Having people act on their own initiative, having people take responsibility for their actions, these are new things in Iraq, perhaps in the whole history of the country. And the notion that it might have taken a little longer than we Americans might have expected strikes me as not surprising.

But based on what I've heard, I think that what I have learned about their plans, what I've seen in terms of my conversations with the minister of the Interior and the minister of Defense, I think these are people that take their responsibility seriously. I think they are eager to take the lead. They understand they have to take responsibility for their own country. That it has taken longer to get to this point, as I've suggested, I think, given the history of this country, is not surprising.

Will the way forward probably be difficult? Probably. This is a very difficult situation. But I think -- I believe, based on what I've heard and seen both from the American commanders and from the Iraqis, that things are moving in a positive direction. But it's still -- it's going to be a long haul.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is it your impression that there are deep splits within the Iraqi government, especially among Shi'a leaders, over whether to increase the number of U.S. troops here?

SEC. GATES: No, I don't have that impression. I think the issue, if any, is how they assert their own leadership in taking charge of their own fate, and what role is best for the United States to play, and how, together, we can figure the best way for them to succeed. I don't -- I didn't detect any -- there was no indication in any of the conversations I had of a deep split along those lines.

Q: General Casey, General Abizaid has put in his retirement papers. You've had a long career in the Army as well. Are you planning to retire any time soon?

GEN. CASEY: (Off mike) -- not in my plans.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you talk to them about the militias? And did you get any kind of commitment from them to crack down on the Mahdi Army and the other Shi'ite militias that have been causing so much trouble in the Baghdad area?

SEC. GATES: What I heard from all of the Iraqis that I talked to was the conviction that they have to break down -- that they have to crack down on all lawbreakers across the board and that no group was exempted from that.

Q: If I could change the subject just for a second, I was wondering if General Pace or General Casey had a message that they'd like -- either to the troops or about the troops as we go into this difficult period where they're far from their families.

GEN. PACE: Well, you bet. And thanks for the opportunity.

One of the things that I'm always impressed with whenever we visit here is just the incredible dedication and focus of our men and women here in uniform. I was impressed this time with the growing confidence of the Iraqi leaders in themselves and in each other, and I continue to be impressed with our U.S. military, from the privates first class up to the generals. They get it. They're focused. They know what they're doing is worthwhile. They want to see this mission to a successful conclusion.

They are, of course, missing their families now at the holiday time more than ever, and we thank them for that sacrifice.

And we thank their families, too, because obviously, the families miss their loved ones and they worry about whether or not they're safe over here. You know, our military families serve our country as well as anyone who's ever worn the uniform. So to the folks at home and the folks here, we wish them a very happy and peaceful holiday season.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said that you're ready to give the president your report this weekend. Without, obviously, telling us what you're going to say to him, do you believe you've gathered enough information this week to make a recommendation on whether or not more troops are needed here?

SEC. GATES: Well, I will report to him on what I learned. As I indicated, there is still some work to be done between General Casey and his counterparts in the Iraqi government. We expect to get more specific information relating to that in the days ahead. But I do expect to give a report to the president on what I've learned and my perceptions, yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you give us a little better sense of what the troops told you this morning about what works, what doesn't work, and how long it might be before they think the Iraqis will be able to take the mission on without the help of the U.S. Army?

SEC. GATES: I think that the main lesson -- the group that I spoke to this morning is a little different kind of transition team in the sense that, as I recall, it's a full company associated -- one American company associated with three Iraqi companies. Have I got that right, general? (Inaudible response.) And so there is a substantially -- it's not just 10 or 11 Americans embedded. It's a unit that brings all kinds of resources to help the Iraqis -- not just the training, but intelligence and so on.

And they seem to think that that's really the way to go. You know, I'll have to look to the senior officers for their recommendations on that, but certainly, this unit felt the way they were doing it was working. And they seem very content with it.
STAFF: (Inaudible) just one more, I'm afraid.

Q: So you've said that you emerged from your meetings with the Iraqis feeling confident that they were determined to get security under control in Baghdad and also that they were going to be cracking down on all outlaws, if you will. Were they able to make any commitments about concrete steps they're going to take to crack down on the militias, which is, as we've heard before, so important here in Baghdad?

SEC. GATES: I think that they do have some concrete plans in mind, and putting flesh on those bones is exactly what General Casey and his team and the Iraqis will be doing in the days ahead.

STAFF: Thank you.

Q: Thank you.

SEC. GATES: Thank you.

"Some say 140,000 troops is quite enough to secure Iraq," said Askari, the Shiite politician allied with Maliki. "The problem is not in the number but in the way the security plan is conducted. The concept of trying to balance between a majority and minority in Iraq, and doing plans only if the minority accepts, is the issue. Some see this as the main problem with the plan. As long as the Americans don't change this tactic, adding more troops won't matter."