December 29, 2006
Iraq Prepares to Execute Hussein

By MARC SANTORA
BAGHDAD, Dec. 29 — The close of the final chapter on the brutal reign of Saddam Hussein drew ever closer last night, as Iraqi officials prepared the last legal notice necessary before his execution, a red card that will be presented to the former dictator to inform him that his end is near, Iraqi officials said.

“We will do it very soon,” said Muneer Haddad, a judge on the Iraqi High Tribunal who will represent that body at the execution. He said the execution would likely be “tonight or tomorrow.”

The pace of events left some of the American legal advisors working on the case stunned, according to one Western official. For all the guidance the Americans provided, in the end the dictator’s demise did not go the way they expected, the officials said.

“It just goes to show that the Iraqis call the shots on something like this,” the official said.

It is still possible that the execution could be delayed, Western and Iraqi officials cautioned. One senior Iraqi official said there may yet be other legal hurdles.

However, Mr. Haddad said that all that remained was the technical legal matter of court officials filling out “red card,” a formal notice of impending death created during the Saddam era and widely used by his much feared secret police.

“We have almost finished his red card,” Mr. Haddad said.

It was unclear whether the red card has been presented to Mr. Hussein or whether he knows that his death may be imminent.

Iraqi and American officials have kept outsiders, including his legal team, from contacting him, according to Najib al-Nauimi, one of Mr. Hussein’s lawyers who is in Qatar.

There has also been heated debate among Iraqi officials about how swiftly to carry out the death sentence, which was handed down on Nov. 5 and then upheld on Tuesday. The appeals court said that the hanging had to take place within 30 days.

An Iraqi official close to the negotiations on when to execute Mr. Hussein expressed deep disappointment that, after years of forensic investigation, detailed litigation, and careful deliberation, the process could be compromised in the final hours by politically driven haste.

“According to the law, no execution can be carried out during the holidays” said one official involved in the negotiations,” the official said. “After all the hard work we have done, why would we break the law and ruin what we have built.”

The Muslim holiday of Eid begins Saturday for Sunnis, which is Mr. Hussein’s sect, and Sunday for Shiites, who where oppressed under Mr. Hussein’s rule but now control the government.

Iraqi law seems to indicate that executions are forbidden on the holiday.

Mr. Haddad was dismissive of those concerns, injecting some of the sectarian split that is ripping this country apart into his response to a question on the subject.

“Tomorrow is not Eid,” he said. “The official Eid in Iraq is Sunday.”

As for Mr. Hussein’s being a Sunni, he said, “Saddam is not Sunni. And he is not Shiite. He is not Muslim.”

His comments seemed to reflect the views of the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose government is ultimately responsible for the final decisions regarding Mr. Hussein’s fate.

Speaking here today to the families people who were killed while Mr. Hussein ruled, Mr. Maliki was blunt in his desire to see Mr. Hussein dispatched quickly.

“Anyone who rejects the execution of Saddam is undermining the martyrs of Iraq and their dignity,” he said. “Nobody can overrule the execution sentence issued against Saddam”

Without specifying a time, date or place, he said, “There is no review or delay in implementing the execution verdict against Saddam.”

Esam al-Gazawi, another lawyer representing Mr. Hussein but who is currently in Jordan, said that while one of his colleagues in Baghdad was asked to collect Mr. Hussein’s personal belongings, he had no idea when the execution would actually take place.

“No one knows when it’s going to happen except God and President Bush,” he said.

Mr. Gazawi said he was told that Mr. Hussein had met with his two half-brothers, Sabawai and Wataban, who are also in custody, but no other family.

“His sons are dead and his daughters are here in Amman, so he met no one,” he said. Mr. Hussein’s two sons, Uday and Qusay, were killed by American soldiers after the 2003 invasion that toppled him from power.

After his government collapsed, Mr. Hussein went into hiding and was eventually found in a dirty little hole near his home town outside Tikrit.

Once in custody, there were three separate cases brought against Mr. Hussein for crimes against humanity.

The first case to begin hearings, and the simplest in terms of details, involved the killing of 148 Shiite men and boys in the small town of Dujail in 1982, after an attack on his motorcade there. Mr. Hussein, along with tk co-defendant, was found guilty on Nov. 5 and sentenced to die by hanging.

A trial on the far more sweeping charges that he directed the killing of 50,000 Kurds in an organized ethnic cleansing campaign is still ongoing. The final trial, involving the savage squelching of a Shiite uprising in which thousands died, has yet to go to trial.

Mr. Hussein has been being held in American custody by a team known as Task Force 134 at Camp Cropper, near the Baghdad Airport. It was unclear when or if the Iraqis had taken over formal custody, which would almost certainly be the very last step before he is walked up the gallows.

Specter, Colleagues Travel Abroad, but Bid for Dialogue Yields Little
Print Mail

By Michael Rubin
Posted: Thursday, December 28, 2006

ARTICLES
Philadelphia Inquirer
Publication Date: December 28, 2006

On Christmas Day, Sen. Arlen Specter (R., Pa.) arrived in Damascus for meetings with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and other senior regime officials. He becomes the fourth senator in recent weeks to break an informal travel embargo and visit the Syrian capital, following visits this month by Sens. Bill Nelson (D., Fla.), John Kerry (D., Mass.), and Christopher Dodd (D., Conn.).


Resident Scholar Michael Rubin

When Specter announced his intention to visit, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice telephoned to ask him not to go, but the senator refused.

"I deferred to them a year ago, and I deferred to them last August," Specter told the Associated Press. "If there were any signs the administration policy [in the Middle East] was working, I'd defer to them again."

But is blind engagement any better? Specter's trip was his 16th taxpayer-funded visit to Syria since 1984. While he may relish the image of statesman, Specter has little but failure to show for his efforts.

On each trip, Syria's state-controlled television broadcast Specter's meeting with the Syrian president. Specter may believe his words are tough, but the Syrian government twists them to imply endorsement. On Jan. 5, 2003, for example, the Syrian Arab News Agency reported that "the U.S. Senator... voiced the United States' appreciation for Syria's positions and efforts aimed at making the Middle East more secure and stable, adding that his country views Syria's positions as principled and rational."

On Dec. 26, 2006, Syrian television reported that Specter "stressed . . . Syria's pivotal role in the region." Bolstering the sense of importance and confidence of state sponsors of terrorism does not help regional diplomacy.

For all their travels, the senators who visited Damascus would be hard-pressed to name any Arab dissidents whose freedom they won. When Specter met Assad in January 2003, he did not raise the case of Ibrahim Hamidi, the Damascus correspondent for the London-based al-Hayat daily, whom the Syrian regime had ordered imprisoned just two weeks before for publishing material not cleared by state censors. Today, prominent dissidents such as Aref Dalila, Michel Kilo, Anwar al-Bunni, Mahmoud Issa, and Kamal Labwani remain imprisoned.

While Specter and Assad spoke of the importance of dialogue, blind engagement can endanger U.S. national security. In January 1990, Specter traveled to Baghdad to meet then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. For Hussein, Specter was useful. He believed the Iraqi leader's talk of peace. Over the next few months, Specter resisted proposals by Senate colleague John McCain (R., Ariz.) for sanctions on the Iraqi leader and instead called for dialogue. Hussein used the delay to rebuild his military and, on Aug. 2, 1990, ordered his tanks into Kuwait.

Specter's engagement with Iran was as poorly conceived. On Capitol Hill, he has been a leading voice for rapprochement with the Islamic republic. On Aug. 30, 2000, he accepted Iranian president Mohammad Khatami's call for a dialogue of civilizations and met with the speaker of the Iranian parliament at a New York reception. How sincere was the dialogue? While Specter and his colleagues helped legitimize Iran's image, interaction with the Islamic republic lost its taint. As European trade with Iran tripled, Khatami pumped 70 percent of the hard currency windfall into Iran's nuclear and military programs. Nor did Specter's dialogue stop the terror threat. The 9/11 Commission report shows that during this period, the Iranian government was granting free passage to and from terrorist training camps for the 9/11 hijackers.

Specter and his colleagues' latest engagement will hurt U.S. national interests as much. Syria remains a state sponsor of terrorism. Despite Specter's 16 trips, not only is Assad widely reported to be continuing to finance and offer safe haven for terrorists responsible for the deaths of Americans, but also he now reportedly facilitates their passage into Iraq. By legitimizing Assad, the freelancing senators undercut pressure from the United Nations for the Syrian ruler to accept responsibility for the Syrian role in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. By conditioning Assad to expect reward for noncompliance, such engagement not only undercuts prospects for peace, but also may actually increase the likelihood of further bloodshed.

Statesmanship should involve more than accruing passport stamps and photo-ops with foreign leaders. Senators should not be dupes for dictators. Not every regime is sincere when it extends an olive branch. Diplomacy is not only about talk, but also about judgment and strategy. If Specter's strategy were so wise, his track record of engagement might not be so dismal.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at AEI.

In April 1993, Iraq orchestrated a failed plot to assassinate former President George Bush during his April 14-16, 1993, visit to Kuwait.

H.R.4655
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President))



Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress

H.R.4655
Public Law: 105-338 (10/31/98)
SPONSOR: Rep Gilman (introduced 09/29/98)

RELATED BILLS: S.2525

TITLE(S):

SHORT TITLE(S) AS INTRODUCED:
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998
SHORT TITLE(S) AS PASSED HOUSE:
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998

SHORT TITLE(S) AS ENACTED:
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998

OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
A bill to establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq.
STATUS: Floor Actions
10/31/98 Public Law 105-338 (11/12/98 CR D1205)
10/20/98 Measure presented to President (10/21/98 CR H11704)
10/20/98 Enrolled Measure signed in Senate (CR S12718)
10/19/98 Enrolled Measure signed in House (CR H11546)
10/07/98 Measure passed Senate (CR S11812)
10/07/98 Measure considered in Senate (CR S11811-11812)
10/07/98 Measure called up by unanimous consent in Senate (CR S11811)
10/05/98 Measure passed House, amended, roll call #482 (360-38) (CR H9494)
10/05/98 Measure considered in House (CR H9486-9494)
10/05/98 Measure called up under motion to suspend rules and pass in House (CR H9486)

STATUS: Detailed Legislative Status

House Actions

Sep 29, 98:
Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
Oct 2, 98:
Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held.
Oct 2, 98:
Committee Agreed to Seek Consideration Under Suspension of the Rules, (Amended) by Voice Vote.
Oct 5, 98:
Called up by House under suspension of the rules.
Considered by House as unfinished business.
Passed House (Amended) by Yea-Nay Vote: 360 - 38 (Roll No. 482).
Senate Actions

Oct 6, 98:
Received in the Senate, read twice.
Oct 7, 98:
Passed Senate without amendment by Unanimous Consent.
Oct 8, 98:
Message on Senate action sent to the House.
Executive Actions

Oct 7, 98:
Cleared for White House.
Oct 20, 98:
Presented to President.
Oct 31, 98:
Became Public Law No: 105-338.
Signed by President.
STATUS: Congressional Record Page References

10/01/98 Introductory remarks on Measure (CR E1857)
10/05/98 Full text of Measure as passed House printed (CR H9486-9487)

COMMITTEE(S):

COMMITTEE(S) OF REFERRAL:
House International Relations
AMENDMENT(S):
***NONE***

COSPONSORS(1):

Rep Cox - 09/29/98

SUMMARY:

(REVISED AS OF 10/05/98 -- Passed House, amended)

Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 - Declares that it should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government.

Authorizes the President, after notifying specified congressional committees, to provide to the Iraqi democratic opposition organizations: (1) grant assistance for radio and television broadcasting to Iraq; (2) Department of Defense (DOD) defense articles and services and military education and training (IMET); and (3) humanitarian assistance, with emphasis on addressing the needs of individuals who have fled from areas under the control of the Hussein regime. Prohibits assistance to any group or organization that is engaged in military cooperation with the Hussein regime. Authorizes appropriations.

Directs the President to designate: (1) one or more Iraqi democratic opposition organizations that meet specified criteria as eligible to receive assistance under this Act; and (2) additional such organizations which satisfy the President's criteria.

Urges the President to call upon the United Nations to establish an international criminal tribunal for the purpose of indicting, prosecuting, and imprisoning Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials who are responsible for crimes against humanity, genocide, and other criminal violations of international law.

Expresses the sense of the Congress that once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq's transition to democracy by providing humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people and democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals, including convening Iraq's foreign creditors to develop a multilateral response to the foreign debt incurred by the Hussein regime.





H.R.4655
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President))

One Hundred Fifth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

the twenty-seventh day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight

An Act

To establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Iraq Liberation Act of 1998'.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, starting an 8 year war in which Iraq employed chemical weapons against Iranian troops and ballistic missiles against Iranian cities.

(2) In February 1988, Iraq forcibly relocated Kurdish civilians from their home villages in the Anfal campaign, killing an estimated 50,000 to 180,000 Kurds.

(3) On March 16, 1988, Iraq used chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurdish civilian opponents in the town of Halabja, killing an estimated 5,000 Kurds and causing numerous birth defects that affect the town today.

(4) On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and began a 7 month occupation of Kuwait, killing and committing numerous abuses against Kuwaiti civilians, and setting Kuwait's oil wells ablaze upon retreat.

(5) Hostilities in Operation Desert Storm ended on February 28, 1991, and Iraq subsequently accepted the ceasefire conditions specified in United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991) requiring Iraq, among other things, to disclose fully and permit the dismantlement of its weapons of mass destruction programs and submit to long-term monitoring and verification of such dismantlement.

(6) In April 1993, Iraq orchestrated a failed plot to assassinate former President George Bush during his April 14-16, 1993, visit to Kuwait.

(7) In October 1994, Iraq moved 80,000 troops to areas near the border with Kuwait, posing an imminent threat of a renewed invasion of or attack against Kuwait.

(8) On August 31, 1996, Iraq suppressed many of its opponents by helping one Kurdish faction capture Irbil, the seat of the Kurdish regional government.

(9) Since March 1996, Iraq has systematically sought to deny weapons inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) access to key facilities and documents, has on several occasions endangered the safe operation of UNSCOM helicopters transporting UNSCOM personnel in Iraq, and has persisted in a pattern of deception and concealment regarding the history of its weapons of mass destruction programs.

(10) On August 5, 1998, Iraq ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM, and subsequently threatened to end long-term monitoring activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency and UNSCOM.

(11) On August 14, 1998, President Clinton signed Public Law 105-235, which declared that `the Government of Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations' and urged the President `to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.'.

(12) On May 1, 1998, President Clinton signed Public Law 105-174, which made $5,000,000 available for assistance to the Iraqi democratic opposition for such activities as organization, training, communication and dissemination of information, developing and implementing agreements among opposition groups, compiling information to support the indictment of Iraqi officials for war crimes, and for related purposes.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ.

It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.

SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ.

(a) AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE- The President may provide to the Iraqi democratic opposition organizations designated in accordance with section 5 the following assistance:

(1) BROADCASTING ASSISTANCE- (A) Grant assistance to such organizations for radio and television broadcasting by such organizations to Iraq.

(B) There is authorized to be appropriated to the United States Information Agency $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1999 to carry out this paragraph.

(2) MILITARY ASSISTANCE- (A) The President is authorized to direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training for such organizations.

(B) The aggregate value (as defined in section 644(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of assistance provided under this paragraph may not exceed $97,000,000.

(b) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE- The Congress urges the President to use existing authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide humanitarian assistance to individuals living in areas of Iraq controlled by organizations designated in accordance with section 5, with emphasis on addressing the needs of individuals who have fled to such areas from areas under the control of the Saddam Hussein regime.

(c) RESTRICTION ON ASSISTANCE- No assistance under this section shall be provided to any group within an organization designated in accordance with section 5 which group is, at the time the assistance is to be provided, engaged in military cooperation with the Saddam Hussein regime.

(d) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT- The President shall notify the congressional committees specified in section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 at least 15 days in advance of each obligation of assistance under this section in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 634A.

(e) REIMBURSEMENT RELATING TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE-

(1) IN GENERAL- Defense articles, defense services, and military education and training provided under subsection (a)(2) shall be made available without reimbursement to the Department of Defense except to the extent that funds are appropriated pursuant to paragraph (2).

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for each of the fiscal years 1998 and 1999 such sums as may be necessary to reimburse the applicable appropriation, fund, or account for the value (as defined in section 644(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of defense articles, defense services, or military education and training provided under subsection (a)(2).

(f) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS- (1) Amounts authorized to be appropriated under this section are authorized to remain available until expended.

(2) Amounts authorized to be appropriated under this section are in addition to amounts otherwise available for the purposes described in this section.

(g) AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE- Activities under this section (including activities of the nature described in subsection (b)) may be undertaken notwithstanding any other provision of law.

SEC. 5. DESIGNATION OF IRAQI DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION ORGANIZATION.

(a) INITIAL DESIGNATION- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act , the President shall designate one or more Iraqi democratic opposition organizations that the President determines satisfy the criteria set forth in subsection (c) as eligible to receive assistance under section 4.

(b) DESIGNATION OF ADDITIONAL ORGANIZATIONS- At any time subsequent to the initial designation pursuant to subsection (a), the President may designate one or more additional Iraqi democratic opposition organizations that the President determines satisfy the criteria set forth in subsection (c) as eligible to receive assistance under section 4.

(c) CRITERIA FOR DESIGNATION- In designating an organization pursuant to this section, the President shall consider only organizations that--

(1) include a broad spectrum of Iraqi individuals, groups, or both, opposed to the Saddam Hussein regime; and

(2) are committed to democratic values, to respect for human rights, to peaceful relations with Iraq's neighbors, to maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity, and to fostering cooperation among democratic opponents of the Saddam Hussein regime.

(d) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT- At least 15 days in advance of designating an Iraqi democratic opposition organization pursuant to this section, the President shall notify the congressional committees specified in section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 of his proposed designation in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 634A.

SEC. 6. WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL FOR IRAQ.

Consistent with section 301 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-138), House Concurrent Resolution 137, 105th Congress (approved by the House of Representatives on November 13, 1997), and Senate Concurrent Resolution 78, 105th Congress (approved by the Senate on March 13, 1998), the Congress urges the President to call upon the United Nations to establish an international criminal tribunal for the purpose of indicting, prosecuting, and imprisoning Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials who are responsible for crimes against humanity, genocide, and other criminal violations of international law.

SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ UPON REPLACEMENT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME.

It is the sense of the Congress that once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq's transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals, and by convening Iraq's foreign creditors to develop a multilateral response to Iraq's foreign debt incurred by Saddam Hussein's regime.
SEC. 8. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces (except as provided in section 4(a)(2)) in carrying out this Act .
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.

http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Legislation/ILA.htm